PHDBA279A 2009

Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy

PHDBA 279A - Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy is a class offered to doctoral students at UC Berkeley, and is a field requirement for PhDs in BPP at the Haas School of Business. This page details the course as it was taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and Rui deFigueiredo in the Fall of 2009. The course outline provides the official requirements. The evaluation of the course is based on two problem sets and one course paper. Note that due to re-scheduling requirements the classes are not listed in order.

Papers for Part 1

Part 1 is taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and the paper list by class number is as follows (Zip of part 1 papers):

1.) Spatial voting and legislative institutions (Lecture 1 Class Slides)

• Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59. pdf
• Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice 37, 503-19. pdf
• Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice, 33, 27-43. pdf
• McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482. pdf

2.) Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock (Lecture 2 Class Slides)

• Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
• Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). pdf
• Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). pdf

3.) Externalities in voting games (Lecture 4 Class Slides)

• Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 pdf
• Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57–66. pdf
• Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf

4.) The efficiency of democracy (Lecture 6 Class Slides)

• Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
• Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
• Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. pdf
• Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf

5.) Competition and influence (Lecture 7 Class Slides)

• Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
• Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf
• Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1986), Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(1), 1-32. pdf

6.) Corruption deterrence

• Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
• Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44. pdf

7.) The electoral control of politicians

• Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf
• Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf

Papers for Part 2

Part 2 is taught by Rui de Figueiredo and the paper list by class number is as follows (Zip of part 2 papers):

8,9,10.) Models of Legislative Policymaking

• Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. pdf
• Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
• Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. pdf
• Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
• Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 pdf
• Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. pdf

11,12.) Applications to Non-Market Strategy

• Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2009), The Market For Legislative Influence Over Regulatory Policy, Berkeley Haas School Working Paper. pdf
• Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf
• Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. pdf
• Dyck, A., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2008), Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? Chicago Booth School of Business Working Paper. pdf

13.) Economic Policymaking

• Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
• Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. pdf
• Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf

14,15.) Political Competition and Conflict in Weakly Institutionalized Environments

• Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
• Powell, R. (1996), Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, Games and Economic Behavior 15, 255-289.pdf
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. pdf
• de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. pdf
• Powell, R. (2004), The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information, American Political Science Review 98, 231-241. pdf

Additional paper(s) (Unknown class)

• Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, available on his website

Links to Pages on Wikipedia

The following construct and theorem definitions may be useful:

• Arrow's Possibility Theorem
• Condorcet Point
• Logrolling
• Pork Barrel Spending