Difference between revisions of "PHDBA279A Field Exam Papers"
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| − | *This page is included under the section [BPP Field Exam] | + | *This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]] |
The following papers were selected for study for PHDBA279A 'Political Science' (listed in the order that they appeared in class): | The following papers were selected for study for PHDBA279A 'Political Science' (listed in the order that they appeared in class): | ||
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| − | *Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krasa%20Polborn%20(2009)%20-%20Is%20mandatory%20voting%20better%20than%20voluntary%20voting.pdf pdf] | + | ===Part 1 - Dal Bo=== |
| + | Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez ('''A'''ccepted or '''R'''ejected by Dal Bo): | ||
| + | *'''(A)''' Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(R)''' Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krasa%20Polborn%20(2009)%20-%20Is%20mandatory%20voting%20better%20than%20voluntary%20voting.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(R)''' Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57?66. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Borgers%20(2004)%20-%20Costly%20voting.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(A)''' Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(A)(3)''' Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(A)(3)''' Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(A)(3)''' Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(A)(2)''' Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(A)(2)''' Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(A)''' Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(A)(1)''' Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] | ||
| − | * | + | Papers added by Dal Bo: |
| + | *'''(1)''' Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf] | ||
| − | + | Note - Emphasis placed on '''(1)''' Control of Politicians, '''(2)''' Competition and influence, and '''(3)''' Efficiency of Democracy, in that order. | |
| − | * | + | ===Part 2 - de Figueiredo=== |
| − | + | Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez (marked as '''H'''igh or '''L'''ow priority by de Figueiredo): | |
| − | * | + | *'''(H)''' Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf] |
| − | + | *'''(H)''' Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf] | |
| − | * | + | *'''(L)''' [[Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments]], ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf] |
| − | + | *'''(H)''' [[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation]] : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf]) | |
| − | * | + | *'''(H)''' de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf] |
| − | + | *'''(H)''' Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf]) | |
| − | * | + | *'''(H)''' Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf] |
| − | + | *'''(H)''' Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf] | |
| − | * | + | *Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf] |
| − | + | *'''(H)''' Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Rodrik%20(1994)%20-%20Distributive%20Politics%20and%20Economic%20Growth.pdf pdf] | |
| − | * | + | *'''(L)''' de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(2005)%20-%20Self-Enforcing%20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Law.pdf pdf] |
| − | * | + | The following papers were added by de Figueiredo: |
| + | *'''(H)''' Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek) | ||
| + | *'''(H)''' de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf] | ||
| + | *'''(L)''' Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides], © Bo Cowgill and Tarek Ghani) | ||
| − | + | The following additional papers from our syllabus were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al.: | |
| − | + | *Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Romer%20Rosenthal%20(1978)%20-%20Political%20Resource%20Allocation,%20Controlled%20Agendas%20and%20the%20Status%20Quo.pdf pdf] | |
| − | * | + | *Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf] |
| − | + | *[[Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk]], Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf] | |
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| − | *Baron, D. | ||
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| − | + | The following papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al. but were not in our syllabus: | |
| + | *Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) - Institutional *Structure and the Logic | ||
| + | *[[Snyder (1991) - On Buying Legislatures]] | ||
| + | *[[Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities]] | ||
| + | *Grossman and Helpman (1994) Protection for Sale | ||
| + | *Snyder (1990) - Campaign Contributions as Investments | ||
| + | *Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) - Why is there so little money in US Politics | ||
| − | + | Note that of the above, Grossman and Helpman (1994) was included in Baron (2001), and Ansolabehere et al. (2003) should be included as it was referenced heavily. | |
Latest revision as of 20:01, 30 September 2011
- This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam
The following papers were selected for study for PHDBA279A 'Political Science' (listed in the order that they appeared in class):
Part 1 - Dal Bo
Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez (Accepted or Rejected by Dal Bo):
- (A) Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
- (R) Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 pdf
- (R) Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57?66. pdf
- (A) Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). pdf
- (A)(3) Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. pdf
- (A)(3) Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. pdf
- (A)(3) Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. pdf
- (A)(2) Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. pdf
- (A)(2) Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. pdf
- (A) Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf
- (A)(1) Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. pdf
Papers added by Dal Bo:
- (1) Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. pdf
Note - Emphasis placed on (1) Control of Politicians, (2) Competition and influence, and (3) Efficiency of Democracy, in that order.
Part 2 - de Figueiredo
Papers selected by Egan and Hernandez (marked as High or Low priority by de Figueiredo):
- (H) Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. pdf
- (H) Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 pdf
- (L) Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 pdf
- (H) Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. pdf (1999 Working Paper pdf)
- (H) de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 pdf
- (H) Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. pdf (2006 Draft Paper pdf)
- (H) Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. pdf
- (H) Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. pdf
- Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. pdf
- (H) Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. pdf
- (L) de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. pdf
The following papers were added by de Figueiredo:
- (H) Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, available on his website [1] (Class Slides: Set1 Set2, © Adrienne Hosek)
- (H) de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. pdf
- (L) Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. pdf (Class Handout and Class Slides, © Bo Cowgill and Tarek Ghani)
The following additional papers from our syllabus were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al.:
- Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. pdf
- Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. pdf
- Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. pdf
The following papers were selected by Shelef, Thompson, et al. but were not in our syllabus:
- Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) - Institutional *Structure and the Logic
- Snyder (1991) - On Buying Legislatures
- Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities
- Grossman and Helpman (1994) Protection for Sale
- Snyder (1990) - Campaign Contributions as Investments
- Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) - Why is there so little money in US Politics
Note that of the above, Grossman and Helpman (1994) was included in Baron (2001), and Ansolabehere et al. (2003) should be included as it was referenced heavily.
