Groseclose and Snyder (1993) - Buying Supermajorities

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Has bibtex key
Has article title Buying Supermajorities
Has author Groseclose and Snyder
Has year 1993
In journal
In volume
In number
Has pages
Has publisher
©, 2016

Model Setup

2011 2nd Year exam paper question.

  • Players: Legislators, vote buyers A and B.
  • Choice space: [math](x,s)\in R[/math].
  • Preferences: Legislators: [math]u_{i}=u_{i}(x)-u_{i}(s)[/math]
  • Game form: A first, b second. Bribe upon commitment to vote.
  • Information: Complete/perfect.
  • EQM: SPNE, Pure strategies, tie rule: Vote for last offer.
  • Because lobbyists are worried about competitors invading coalitions, it is sometimes cheaper to bribe a large majority, possibly including the entire legislature.

Rui's points:

  • Sequence matters,
  • More than minimum winning coalition
  • First mover advantage and 2nd mover advantage.
  • "The proofs are horrendous, you don't need to know those."