Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
| Article | |
|---|---|
| Has bibtex key | |
| Has article title | Voting on Majority Rules |
| Has author | Messner, M. and M. Polborn |
| Has year | 2004 |
| In journal | |
| In volume | |
| In number | |
| Has pages | |
| Has publisher | |
| © edegan.com, 2016 | |
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012
Intergenerational Conflict
- Voters born in continuous time and live for length 1
- Deaths equal birth, so continuous mass
- Some chance of reform opportunity
- Reforms cost, c, yeild value v element of [0, [math]\infty[/math]]
Results
- At any given time, median voter will be happy with simply majority
- However, median voter is only median for a split second, so if constitutional moment arises, he will choose super-majority
- While median voter prefer voting rule of [math]r(t_{m})=2c[/math] for a current project, he prefers [math]r(t_{m})=4c[/math] to decide on all future projects.
- rule of [math]r(t_{m})=4c[/math] corresponds to [math]t_{s}=\frac{3}{4}\gt \frac{1}{2}[/math]
- If we focus on welfare of all future generations obviously [math]t_{c}=\frac{1}{2}[/math]
- If we focus on welfare of all those currently alive [math]t_{c}=\frac{2}{3}[/math]
