Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases
|Has bibtex key|
|Has article title||Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases|
|Has author||Knight, B.|
|© edegan.com, 2016|
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012
- Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda. in order to force a median outcome near his bliss point, he can team up with minority party and require super-majority.
Assumption: Status quo policy is lower than median legislators bliss policy.
Do super majority requirements have effect of lowering tax rate across states?
- if super majorities adopted where majority is pro-tax, then we might measure confounding effects.
- higher tax-rate from majority party being pro-tax
- lower tax rate from super majority.
Both fixed effects (state/year) and IV(variation in state constitutional amendment rules) regressions show that super-majorities requirements significantly reduce tax-rate.