Edit Article: Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules

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Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]] ===Intergenerational Conflict=== *Voters born in continuous time and live for length 1 *Deaths equal birth, so continuous mass *Some chance of reform opportunity *Reforms cost, c, yeild value v element of [0, <math>\infty</math>] ====Results==== *At any given time, median voter will be happy with simply majority *However, median voter is only median for a split second, so if constitutional moment arises, he will choose super-majority *While median voter prefer voting rule of <math>r(t_{m})=2c</math> for a current project, he prefers <math>r(t_{m})=4c</math> to decide on all future projects. *rule of <math>r(t_{m})=4c</math> corresponds to <math>t_{s}=\frac{3}{4}>\frac{1}{2}</math> *If we focus on welfare of all future generations obviously <math>t_{c}=\frac{1}{2}</math> *If we focus on welfare of all those currently alive <math>t_{c}=\frac{2}{3}</math>

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