View source for Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules

{{Article
|Has page=Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules
|Has bibtex key=
|Has article title=Voting on Majority Rules
|Has author=Messner, M. and M. Polborn
|Has year=2004
|In journal=
|In volume=
|In number=
|Has pages=
|Has publisher=
}}
Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]

===Intergenerational Conflict===
*Voters born in continuous time and live for length 1
*Deaths equal birth, so continuous mass
*Some chance of reform opportunity 
*Reforms cost, c, yeild value v element of [0, <math>\infty</math>]

====Results====
*At any given time, median voter will be happy with simply majority
*However, median voter is only median for a split second, so if constitutional moment arises, he will choose super-majority
*While median voter prefer voting rule of <math>r(t_{m})=2c</math> for a current project, he prefers <math>r(t_{m})=4c</math> to decide on all future projects.
*rule of <math>r(t_{m})=4c</math> corresponds to <math>t_{s}=\frac{3}{4}>\frac{1}{2}</math>
*If we focus on welfare of all future generations obviously <math>t_{c}=\frac{1}{2}</math>
*If we focus on welfare of all those currently alive <math>t_{c}=\frac{2}{3}</math>