Difference between revisions of "Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases"
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imported>Moshe (New page: Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012 Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda. in order to force a median ...) |
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Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]] | Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]] | ||
| − | Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda. in order to force a median outcome near his bliss point, he can team up with minority party and require super-majority. | + | :Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda. in order to force a median outcome near his bliss point, he can team up with minority party and require super-majority. |
Assumption: Status quo policy is lower than median legislators bliss policy. | Assumption: Status quo policy is lower than median legislators bliss policy. | ||
Revision as of 14:43, 16 May 2012
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012
- Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda. in order to force a median outcome near his bliss point, he can team up with minority party and require super-majority.
Assumption: Status quo policy is lower than median legislators bliss policy.
Research Question
Do super majority requirements have effect of lowering tax rate across states?
- if super majorities adopted where majority is pro-tax, then we might measure confounding effects.
- higher tax-rate from majority party being pro-tax
- lower tax rate from super majority.
Results
Both fixed effects (state/year) and IV(variation in state constitutional amendment rules) regressions show that super-majorities requirements significantly reduce tax-rate.
