View source for Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases

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Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]
:Median legislator, member of pro-tax majority party, may want to limit his own party median power when setting agenda.  in order to force a median outcome near his bliss point, he can team up with minority party and require super-majority.

Assumption: Status quo policy is lower than median legislators bliss policy.

===Research Question===

Do super majority requirements have effect of lowering tax rate across states?
*if super majorities adopted where majority is pro-tax, then we might measure confounding effects.
**higher tax-rate from majority party being pro-tax
**lower tax rate from super majority.

===Results===
Both fixed effects (state/year) and IV(variation in state constitutional amendment rules) regressions show that super-majorities requirements significantly reduce tax-rate.