Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers

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Article
Has bibtex key
Has article title Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers
Has author Becker Stigler
Has year 1974
In journal
In volume
In number
Has pages
Has publisher
© edegan.com, 2016

Reference(s)

Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf

Abstract

No abstract available at this time

Topic and Basic ideas

A government is designing a wage scheme to deter corruption in a two period game. The government can choose a period 1 and period 2 wage. The benefit of bribing is [math]b[/math] and the probability of being caught is [math]p[/math].

Authors solve for optimal wages to deter bribing. Note that this can be costly, but recouped by using entrance fees.