Difference between revisions of "Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo"
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
imported>Moshe |
imported>Moshe |
||
| Line 5: | Line 5: | ||
===Open Rule=== | ===Open Rule=== | ||
| − | If committee opens gates, legislators propose policies to challenge status quo. Simply majority voting selects Condorcet winner <math>x_{m}</math>. Committee only opens gate if he prefers <math>x_{m}</math> to <math>x_{0}</math> the status quo | + | If committee opens gates, legislators propose policies to challenge status quo. Simply majority voting selects Condorcet winner <math>x_{m}</math>. Committee only opens gate if he prefers <math>x_{m}</math> to <math>x_{0}</math> the status quo. |
| + | |||
| + | Suppose <math>x_{0} < x_{c} < x_{m}</math> | ||
===Closed Rule=== | ===Closed Rule=== | ||
Revision as of 15:38, 14 May 2012
Back to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012
Background
Committees allow for division of labor and gains from specialization. However, a committee also has gate keeping power. If gates kept closed, the status quo prevails. If gates opened, the policy outcome depends on if open or closed rule is use.
Open Rule
If committee opens gates, legislators propose policies to challenge status quo. Simply majority voting selects Condorcet winner [math]x_{m}[/math]. Committee only opens gate if he prefers [math]x_{m}[/math] to [math]x_{0}[/math] the status quo.
Suppose [math]x_{0} \lt x_{c} \lt x_{m}[/math]
