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<big>'''Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy'''</big>
PHDBA 279A - Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy is a class offered to doctoral students at UC Berkeley, and is a field requirement for PhDs in BPP at the Haas School of Business. This page details the course as it was taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and Rui de Figueiredo in the Fall of 2009. The [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A.doc course outline] provides the official requirements. The evaluation of the course is based on two problem sets and one course paper. Note that due to re-scheduling requirements the classes are not listed in order.
==1st Half==
The first half was taught by Ernesto Dal Bo ([mailto:dalbo@haas.berkeley.edu email] and [http://www2.haas.berkeley.edu/Faculty/dalbo_ernesto.aspx website]).
===Problem Set===
Problem Set 1:
*Questions: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-ProblemSet1.pdf pdf]
*Answers: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-ProblemSet1-Answers.pdf pdf] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279-PS1v2.tex tex] (© Ed Egan). Note that the posted answers may not be correct. See also: [[Help using LaTeX]].
===Paper List===
The paper list by class number is as follows ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A1.zip Zip of part 1 papers]):
1.) '''Spatial voting and legislative institutions''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture1.pdf Lecture 1 Class Slides])
*Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20(1979)%20-%20Institutional%20Arrangements%20and%20Equilibrium%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models.pdf pdf]
*Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), "Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice ", 37, 503-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20Weingast%20(1981)%20-%20Structure%20Induced%20Equilibrium%20and%20Legislative%20Choice.pdf pdf] *Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Romer%20Rosenthal%20(1978)%20-%20Political%20Resource%20Allocation,%20Controlled%20Agendas%20and%20the%20Status%20Quo.pdf pdf] *McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482472482. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McKelvey%20(1976)%20-%20Intransitivities%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models%20and%20Some%20Implications%20for%20Agenda%20Control.pdf pdf]
2.) '''Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Lecture 2 Class Slides])
*Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]
*Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Knight%20(2000)%20-%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Requirements%20for%20Tax%20Increases%20Evidence%20from%20the%20States.pdf pdf]
*Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2006)%20-%20Committees%20With%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Yield%20Commitment%20With%20Flexibility.pdf pdf]
3.) '''Externalities in voting games''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Lecture 4 Class Slides])
*Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krasa%20Polborn%20(2009)%20-%20Is%20mandatory%20voting%20better%20than%20voluntary%20voting.pdf pdf]
*Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57–665766. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Borgers%20(2004)%20-%20Costly%20voting.pdf pdf]
*Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf]
4.) '''The efficiency of democracy''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Lecture 6 Class Slides])
*Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf]
*Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf]
*Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Wittman%20(1989)%20-%20Why%20Democracies%20Produce%20Efficient%20Results.pdf pdf]
*Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]
5.) '''Competition and influence''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Lecture 7 Class Slides])
*Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf]
*Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf]
*Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1986), Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(1), 1-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bernheim%20Whinston%20(1986)%20-%20Menu%20Auctions%20Resource%20Allocation%20and%20Economic%20Influence.pdf pdf]
6.) '''Corruption deterrence''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Lecture 8 Class Slides])
*Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf]
*Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cadot%20(1987)%20-%20Corruption%20as%20a%20Gamble.pdf pdf]
7.) '''The electoral control of politicians''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Lecture 9 Class Slides])
*Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf]
*Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf]
==2nd Half==
The second half is taught by Rui de Figueiredo ([mailto:rui@haas.berkeley.edu email] and [http://www2.haas.berkeley.edu/Faculty/defigueiredo_rui.aspx website]).
===Problem Set===
Problem Set 2:
*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-ProblemSet2.pdf Questions] - Released Wed 18th Nov
*Answers - Due to be submitted at the [http://opa.berkeley.edu/AcademicCalendar/calendardisp.aspx?terms=current end of Fall semester (19th December)]
===Paper List===
The paper list by class number is as follows ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A2.zip Zip of part 2 papers]):
8.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking'''
*Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20(1979)%20-%20A%20Rational%20Choice%20Perspective%20on%20Congressional%20Norms.pdf pdf]
*Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]
9.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking (Continued)'''
*Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control, American Journal of Political Science 35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]
*Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]
10.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking (Continued)'''
*Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf]
*Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf]
11.) '''Applications to Non-Market Strategy'''
*[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation]] : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2009), The Market For Legislative Influence Over Regulatory Policy, Berkeley Haas School Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2009)%20-%20The%20Market%20For%20Legislative%20Influence%20Over%20Regulatory%20Policy.pdf pdf]
12.) '''Applications to Non-Market Strategy (Continued)'''
*Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])
*Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek)
13.) '''Whistleblowing and Delay'''
*Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides], © Bo Cowgill and Tarek Ghani)
*Dyck, A., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2008), Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? Chicago Booth School of Business Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dyck%20Morse%20Zingales%20(2008)%20-%20Who%20Blows%20the%20Whistle%20on%20Corporate%20Fraud.pdf pdf]
*Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]
14.) '''Economic Policymaking '''
*Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]
*Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]
15,16.) '''Political Competition and Conflict in Weakly Institutionalized Environments'''
*Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Rodrik%20(1994)%20-%20Distributive%20Politics%20and%20Economic%20Growth.pdf pdf]
*Powell, R. (1996), Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, Games and Economic Behavior 15, 255-289.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(1996)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20the%20Shadow%20of%20Power%20Games%20and%20Economic%20Behavior.pdf pdf]
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(2005)%20-%20Self-Enforcing%20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Law.pdf pdf]
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf]
*Powell, R. (2004), The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information, American Political Science Review 98, 231-241. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(2004)%20-%20The%20Inefficient%20Use%20of%20Power%20Costly%20Conflict%20with%20Complete%20Information.pdf pdf]
