Difference between revisions of "PHDBA279A 2009"

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(New page: PHDBA 279A - Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy is a class offered to doctoral students at UC Berkeley, and is a field requirement for PhDs in BPP at the Haas School of Bus...)
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<big>'''Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy'''</big>
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PHDBA 279A - Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy is a class offered to doctoral students at UC Berkeley, and is a field requirement for PhDs in BPP at the Haas School of Business. This page details the course as it was taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and Rui deFigueiredo in the Fall of 2009.
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PHDBA 279A - Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy is a class offered to doctoral students at UC Berkeley, and is a field requirement for PhDs in BPP at the Haas School of Business. This page details the course as it was taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and Rui deFigueiredo in the Fall of 2009. The [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A.doc course outline] provides the official requirements. The evaluation of the course is based on two problem sets and one course paper.
 
  
 
==Papers for Part 1==
 
==Papers for Part 1==
  
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Part 1 is taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and the paper list by class number is as follows ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A1.zip Zip of all papers]):
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Part 1 is taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and the paper list by class number is as follows:
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#Spatial voting and legislative institutions
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**Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59.
 +
**Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice 37, 503-19.
 +
**Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice, 33, 27-43.
 +
**McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482.
  
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1.) '''Spatial voting and legislative institutions''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture1.pdf Class Slides])
 
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*Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20(1979)%20-%20Institutional%20Arrangements%20and%20Equilibrium%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models.pdf pdf]
 
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*Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice 37, 503-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shepsle%20Weingast%20(1981)%20-%20Structure%20Induced%20Equilibrium%20and%20Legislative%20Choice.pdf pdf]
 
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*Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice, 33, 27-43. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Romer%20Rosenthal%20(1978)%20-%20Political%20Resource%20Allocation,%20Controlled%20Agendas%20and%20the%20Status%20Quo.pdf pdf]
 
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*McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McKelvey%20(1976)%20-%20Intransitivities%20in%20Multidimensional%20Voting%20Models%20and%20Some%20Implications%20for%20Agenda%20Control.pdf pdf]
 
  
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2.) '''Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock'''
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#Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock
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*Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf]
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**Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132.
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*Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Knight%20(2000)%20-%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Requirements%20for%20Tax%20Increases%20Evidence%20from%20the%20States.pdf pdf]
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**Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1).
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*Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2006)%20-%20Committees%20With%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Yield%20Commitment%20With%20Flexibility.pdf pdf]
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**Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4).
  
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3.) '''Externalities in voting games'''
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#Externalities in voting games
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*Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krasa%20Polborn%20(2009)%20-%20Is%20mandatory%20voting%20better%20than%20voluntary%20voting.pdf pdf]
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**Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291
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*Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57–66. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Borgers%20(2004)%20-%20Costly%20voting.pdf pdf]
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**Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57–66.
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*Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf]
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**Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4).
 
   
 
   
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4.) '''The efficiency of democracy'''
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#The efficiency of democracy
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*Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf]
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**Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32.
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*Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf]
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**Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400.
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*Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Wittman%20(1989)%20-%20Why%20Democracies%20Produce%20Efficient%20Results.pdf pdf]
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**Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424.
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*Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]
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**Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35.
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5.) '''Competition and influence'''
 
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*Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf]
 
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*Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf]
 
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*Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1986), Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(1), 1-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bernheim%20Whinston%20(1986)%20-%20Menu%20Auctions%20Resource%20Allocation%20and%20Economic%20Influence.pdf pdf]
 
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6.) '''Corruption deterrence'''
 
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*Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf]
 
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*Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cadot%20(1987)%20-%20Corruption%20as%20a%20Gamble.pdf pdf]
 
  
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7.) '''The electoral control of politicians'''
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#Competition and influence
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*Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf]
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**Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50.
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*Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf]
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**Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69.
 +
**Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1986), Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(1), 1-32.
  
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==Supporting Information==
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#Corruption deterrence
 +
**Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19.
 +
**Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44.
  
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The following construct and theorem definitions may be useful:
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#The electoral control of politicians
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*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem Arrow's Possibility Theorem]
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**Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42.
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*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method Condorcet Point]
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**Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25.
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*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logrolling Logrolling]
 
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*[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pork_barrel Pork Barrel Spending]
 

Revision as of 18:10, 26 August 2009

PHDBA 279A - Political Institutions, Business and Public Policy is a class offered to doctoral students at UC Berkeley, and is a field requirement for PhDs in BPP at the Haas School of Business. This page details the course as it was taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and Rui deFigueiredo in the Fall of 2009.

Papers for Part 1

Part 1 is taught by Ernesto Dal Bo and the paper list by class number is as follows:

  1. Spatial voting and legislative institutions
    • Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59.
    • Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice 37, 503-19.
    • Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice, 33, 27-43.
    • McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472–482.


  1. Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock
    • Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132.
    • Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1).
    • Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4).
  1. Externalities in voting games
    • Krasa, S. And M. Polborn (2009) Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?, Games and Economic Behavior 66 (1), 275-291
    • Borgers, T. (2004), Costly voting. American Economic Review 94(1), 57–66.
    • Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4).
  1. The efficiency of democracy
    • Tullock, G. (1967), The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32.
    • Becker, G. (1983), A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400.
    • Wittman, D. (1989), Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, Journal of Political Economy 97(6), 1395-424.
    • Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995), On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35.
  1. Competition and influence
    • Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50.
    • Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997), Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69.
    • Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1986), Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101(1), 1-32.
  1. Corruption deterrence
    • Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19.
    • Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble, Journal of Public Economics 33(2), 223-44.
  1. The electoral control of politicians
    • Barro, R. (1973), The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42.
    • Ferejohn, J. (1986), Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25.
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