Difference between revisions of "North & Weingast (1989)"

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==Theory Questions: ==
 
==Theory Questions: ==
=== What is the author's hypothesis? ===  
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=== What is the author's topic and hypothesis? ===  
  
 
The author believes that England was able to develop its economy and dominate the world because it had a secure property rights system. This enabled investment and growth.  
 
The author believes that England was able to develop its economy and dominate the world because it had a secure property rights system. This enabled investment and growth.  
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===  How does the author test the hypothesis? ===
 
===  How does the author test the hypothesis? ===
  
The paper doesn't include a formal model or an empirical section -- it is mostly a description of historical events.
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The authors compare the growth of England to countries in continental Europe who do not have separation of powers and where there was no veto-check on the monarchy. In these countries, growth and property rights were hindered by the lack of a check against the monarch. Spain and France are examples where the authors claims this was happening.
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The authors also point to the grown in English capital markets and particularly markets in private/public debt as evidence that the glorious revolution strengthened private property rights.  
  
 
=== How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses? ===  
 
=== How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses? ===  
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There isn't much talk of alternative hypotheses here!
  
 
=== How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? ===  
 
=== How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? ===  
  
=== What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?===
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If the Glorious Revolution was indeed about establishing property rights, one might expect that in months where Parliament's army was winning, we would see greater levels of investment by private individuals -- in anticipation of an eventual Parliamentary victory that would secure their investment from the monarch. Investors might have the opposite reaction to the Monarch's victories.
  
==Empirical Questions: ==
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=== What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?===
=== What's the author's hypothesis? ===
 
=== How it is tested? ===
 
=== What do the tests achieve? ===
 
=== How could the tests be improved? ===
 
=== What are the tests' strengths and weaknesses? ===
 
=== Can you think of any alternative empirical tests?===
 

Revision as of 18:42, 7 June 2011

Theory Questions:

What is the author's topic and hypothesis?

The author believes that England was able to develop its economy and dominate the world because it had a secure property rights system. This enabled investment and growth.

The key threat to the property rights system was the monarchy -- who was unable to credibly commit upholding property rights. In particular, wars would frequently starve the monarchy of revenue -- thus tempting the monarch to violate property rights and expropriate money from the population (mainly the nobility).

The authors show that the Glorious Revolution introduced an institutional arrangement that strengthened property rights. The key institutional feature was the Parliament, which provided a veto point against the monarch.

Parliament was able to make this commitment credible by:

  • Credibly showing its ability to remove the monarch if necessary (which was shown by the Glorious Revolution).
  • In exchange for its new power, putting the government on more secure financial footing by agreeing to higher taxes. This removed a major driver of arbitrary violations of property rights.

How does the author test the hypothesis?

The authors compare the growth of England to countries in continental Europe who do not have separation of powers and where there was no veto-check on the monarchy. In these countries, growth and property rights were hindered by the lack of a check against the monarch. Spain and France are examples where the authors claims this was happening.

The authors also point to the grown in English capital markets and particularly markets in private/public debt as evidence that the glorious revolution strengthened private property rights.

How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?

There isn't much talk of alternative hypotheses here!

How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence?

If the Glorious Revolution was indeed about establishing property rights, one might expect that in months where Parliament's army was winning, we would see greater levels of investment by private individuals -- in anticipation of an eventual Parliamentary victory that would secure their investment from the monarch. Investors might have the opposite reaction to the Monarch's victories.

What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?