Merges Nelson (1990) - On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope
- This page is referenced in the Patent Thicket Literature Review
- This page is listed on the PTLR Core Papers page
Reference
- Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R (1990), "On the complex economics of patent scope", Columbia Law Review, pp.839--916
@article{merges1990complex,
title={On the complex economics of patent scope},
author={Merges, Robert P and Nelson, Richard R},
journal={Columbia Law Review},
pages={839--916},
year={1990},
abstract={The economic significance of a patent depends on its scope: the broader the scope, the larger the number of competing products and processes that will infringe the patent. Many theoretical papers have tried to assess the effects of fine tuning various aspects of the patent system to make it more efficient.' But only a few have focussed on patent scope, even though scope decisions are subject to far more discretion than most of the aspects more intensively studied. Furthermore, most theoretical writing on patents is directed toward issues that as a practical matter are considered largely settled. For example, several economists have explored the question of optimal patent duration. Their work did have a direct impact on the decision to extend patent terms on pharmaceuticals to compensate for regulatory lag. But despite the scholarly attention to patent duration, the term of most patents remains fixed at seventeen years. Likewise, there has been considerable debate over the years on the merits of compulsory licensing of patents under some circumstances, yet the intellectual property community has repeatedly rejected the idea. Thus, while the literature continues to generate interesting questions about bedrock assumptions and practices, it has little bearing on the everyday operations of the patent system. This Article is an attempt to redress this deficiency by analyzing the economic effects of patent scope.},
discipline={Law},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={All, Electrical Lighting, Automobiles and Airplanes, Radio, Semiconductors and Computers, Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Merges Nelson (1990) - On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope.pdf}
}
File(s)
Abstract
The economic significance of a patent depends on its scope: the broader the scope, the larger the number of competing products and processes that will infringe the patent. Many theoretical papers have tried to assess the effects of fine tuning various aspects of the patent system to make it more efficient.' But only a few have focussed on patent scope, even though scope decisions are subject to far more discretion than most of the aspects more intensively studied. Furthermore, most theoretical writing on patents is directed toward issues that as a practical matter are considered largely settled. For example, several economists have explored the question of optimal patent duration. Their work did have a direct impact on the decision to extend patent terms on pharmaceuticals to compensate for regulatory lag. But despite the scholarly attention to patent duration, the term of most patents remains fixed at seventeen years. Likewise, there has been considerable debate over the years on the merits of compulsory licensing of patents under some circumstances, yet the intellectual property community has repeatedly rejected the idea. Thus, while the literature continues to generate interesting questions about bedrock assumptions and practices, it has little bearing on the everyday operations of the patent system. This Article is an attempt to redress this deficiency by analyzing the economic effects of patent scope.
