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Konrad (2007) - Strategy In Contests-An Introduction (view source)
Revision as of 02:50, 12 April 2010
, 02:50, 12 April 2010→All-pay auctions
*<math>C_i = C \forall i\,</math>
*<math>v_1 \ge v_2 \ge 0\,</math>
*Valuations and costs are common knowledge
The contest function for player 1 (for player 2 it is <math>1-p_1\,</math>) is:
There is no equilibrium in pure strategies. This can be proved by contradiction, starting from the assumptions that <math>(x_1,x_2)\,</math> is a pure strategy NE. In mixed strategies there is an equilibrium described by the CDF of the distributions of effort as follows:
