Difference between revisions of "Grief (1993)"
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===How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?=== | ===How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?=== | ||
| − | Based on the lack of historical evidence, the author says that a court-enforced legal system was not used to overcome the commitment/agency problem. The author also notes that asymmetric information problems would hinder the court's ability to enforce contracts. For example: An 11th Century court has no way of verifying whether a storm destroyed goods or if the goods were stolen. On the rare occasions in which the courts were indeed used, they were evidently expensive and time consuming. The author speculates that this would be prohibit their use. Jewish law also (according to the author) restricts the ability to sue agents. | + | * Based on the lack of historical evidence, the author says that a court-enforced legal system was not used to overcome the commitment/agency problem. The author also notes that asymmetric information problems would hinder the court's ability to enforce contracts. For example: An 11th Century court has no way of verifying whether a storm destroyed goods or if the goods were stolen. On the rare occasions in which the courts were indeed used, they were evidently expensive and time consuming. The author speculates that this would be prohibit their use. Jewish law also (according to the author) restricts the ability to sue agents. |
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| + | * The author also notes that a model based on "types" in which "bad types" carry their cheating around is not supported by historical evidence (pg 532, left). | ||
===How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? === | ===How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence? === | ||
Revision as of 03:38, 7 June 2011
Contents
- 1 Theory Questions:
- 1.1 What is the research question?
- 1.2 What is the author's hypothesis?
- 1.3 How does the author test the hypothesis?
- 1.4 How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?
- 1.5 How might these tests be run if one had quantitative evidence?
- 1.6 What problems might arise in this quantitative analysis?
- 2 Empirical Questions:
Theory Questions:
What is the research question?
Before the modern era, traders faced a problem. Exporting goods abroad required labor for delivery. If the trader *himself* supplied this labor, he would limit his trading (and other) opportunities by spend long period of time traveling. However if the trader hired someone, that agent could steal, sabotage or ransom his goods.
The research question of this paper is: How did traders overcome this? The author describes how 11th Century Maghribi traders overcame this problem. He uses historical evidence and a game theory model to explain its rationale.
What is the author's hypothesis?
How does the author test the hypothesis?
How does the author rule out alternative hypotheses?
- Based on the lack of historical evidence, the author says that a court-enforced legal system was not used to overcome the commitment/agency problem. The author also notes that asymmetric information problems would hinder the court's ability to enforce contracts. For example: An 11th Century court has no way of verifying whether a storm destroyed goods or if the goods were stolen. On the rare occasions in which the courts were indeed used, they were evidently expensive and time consuming. The author speculates that this would be prohibit their use. Jewish law also (according to the author) restricts the ability to sue agents.
- The author also notes that a model based on "types" in which "bad types" carry their cheating around is not supported by historical evidence (pg 532, left).
