7,613
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
[[Category:{{Project|Has project output=Content|Has sponsor=McNair Projects]]Center|Has title=Governance Measures|Has owner=|Has start date=|Has deadline=|Has keywords=|Has notes=|Has project status=Complete|Is dependent on=}} The ATI index can be constructed using the variables in the Takeover Defenses database marked with ATI towards the end of the line. The E index can be constructed using the variables in the RiskMetrics (ISS) Database marked with E index towards the end of the line. See the variable lists in the Availability section below.
Governance Measures (view source)
Revision as of 13:39, 21 September 2020
, 13:39, 21 September 2020no edit summary
=Measures=
=Availability=
==MSCI GMI Ratings in wrds==
===Takeover Defenses===
Covered 2005-2014, Around 3,000 US companies per year
Variables:
*BDCLASSIFIED CHAR Board Classified ATI, E index
*COMPANYNAME CHAR Company Name
*TDADVANCENOTICEREQUIRED CHAR Advance Notice Required
*TDBUSINESSCOMBINATIONPROVISION CHAR Business Combination Provision
*TDBYLAWAMENDMENTNOTES CHAR By Law Amendment Notes
*TDBYLAWVOTEPERCENT NUM By Law Vote Percent E index
*TDCALLSPECIALMEETINGPERCENT NUM Call Special Meeting Percent ATI
*TDCHARTERAMENDMENTNOTES CHAR Charter Amendment Notes
*TDCHARTERVOTEPERCENT NUM Charter Vote Percent E index
*TDCOMPANYSPECIALMEETINGCOMPAREST CHAR Company Special Meeting Compare State Law maybe ATI
*TDCOMPANYWRITTENCONSENTCOMPAREST CHAR Company Written Consent Compare State Law Maybe ATI
*TDCONSTITUENCYPROVISION CHAR Constituency Provision
*TDCUMULATIVEVOTING CHAR Cumulative Voting
*TDDIRECTORREMOVALFORCAUSEONLY CHAR Director Removal For Cause Only
*TDDIRECTORREMOVALFORCAUSEVOTEPER NUM Director Removal For Cause Vote Percent
*TDDIRECTORREMOVALWITHOUTCAUSEVOT NUM Director Removal Without Cause Vote Percent
*TDDUALCLASSSTOCK CHAR Dual Class Stock
*TDDUALCLASSSTOCKNOTES CHAR Dual Class Stock Notes
*TDEFFECTIVECLASSIFIEDBOARD CHAR Effective Classified Board
*TDFAIRPRICEPROVISION CHAR Fair Price Provision
*TDMERGERVOTENOTE CHAR Merger Vote Note
*TDMERGERVOTEPERCENT NUM Merger Vote Percent
*TDPOISONPILL CHAR Poison Pill ATI
*TDPOISONPILLNOTES CHAR Poison Pill Notes
*TDSHFILLVACANCIES CHAR Share Holder Fill Vacancies
*TDSHFILLVACANCIESNOTES CHAR Share Holder Fill Vacancies Notes
*TDWRITTENCONSENTPERCENT NUM Written Consent Percent ATI
*TICKER CHAR Ticker
===Companies===
2001-2014
Variables:
*OwnersFivePercentPctg OwnersFivePercentPctg
==Execucomp==
01/01/1992 - 12/31/2015
Variables:
*CO_PER_ROL ID number for each executive/company combination
*CONAME Company Name
*CUSIP CUSIP and Issue Number
*EXECID Executive ID number
*EXPRIC EXPRIC -- Exercise Price
*GVKEY Company ID Number
*INDDESC Industry Group Description
*MKTPRIC MKTPRIC -- Market Price of Stock on Date of Grant
*NAICS NAICS Code
*NUMSECUR NUMSECUR -- Number of Options Granted
*PCTTOTOPT PCTTOTOPT -- Pct of Total Options Grantd to Employees
*SIC SIC Code
*SPINDEX Industry Group
*TICKER Ticker Symbol
*VALUE VALUE -- Value (Company)
*YEAR YEAR -- Fiscal Year
==RiskMetrics (ISS)==
01/01/2007 - 12/22/2015
Variables:
*BLANKCHECK Blank Check Preferred
*CARVE_OUT Provision in a company's majority vote standard for director elections that the standard will revert to a plurality vote in a proxy contest (where there are more nominees than open seats - a "contest carve-out")
*CBOARD Classified Board E Index
*TER_AMEND_VOTEPCNT Vote % Required to Amend ter
*COMPANY_ID ISS (Instituitional Shareholders Services) based Company ID
*CONAME Company Name
*CONFVOTE Confidential Voting
*CUMVOTE Cumulative Voting
*CUSIP CUSIP
*DUALCLASS Dual Class Stock
*FAIRPRICE Fair Price
*FYEND FYEND
*GPARACHUTE Golden Parachutes E index
*LABYLW Limit Ability to Amend ByLaws E index
*LACHTR Limit Ability to Amend ter E index
*LAW_AMEND_VOTEPCNT Vote % Required to Amend ByLaws
*LEGACYPPS_ID LegacyID - No longer used
*LSPMT Limit Ability to Call Special Meeting ATI
*LWCNST Limit Ability to Act by Written Consent ATI
*MAJ_VOTE_REQUIRED Indicates that the company has established a requirement that directors are elected by majority vote, rather than a plurality vote
*MAJ_VOTE_REQUIREMENT Majority Vote Requirement
*MAJOR_VOTE_COMM An analyst inserted note, as relevant, about the company's majority vote (to elect directors) standard
*MEETINGDATE Meeting Date
*MTGMONTH Meeting Month
*OO_BUSCOMP Opt out of BusComb/Freezeout law
*OO_CASHOUT_PA Opt out of control share cashout law (PA)
*OO_CSA Opt out of control share acquisition law(CSA)
*OO_DUTIES Opt out of directors duties law
*OO_FAIRPRICE Opt out of Fair Price law
*OO_PP Opt out of Poison Pill
*OO_RPROFITS Opt out of Recapture of Profits law
*OO_STAKEHOLDER Opt out of Stakeholder law
*PPILL Poison Pill E index
*PRICE FYEND - Stock Price
*RESIGN_REQUIRE Indicates that a director is required to submit his/her resignation upon failing to receive support from a majority of votes cast (which, typically, the board may chose to accept or reject). In some cases, this provision alternatively indicates that the board may require the resignation of a director who fails to receive majority support
*RT_ID IRRC OLD - Company ID
*SIC SIC
*SPINDEX S&Pindex
*SPL_MEET_VOTEPCNT Vote % Required to Call Special Meeting
*STATE state
*SUPERMAJOR_PCNT Supermajority - mergers in percent E index
*TICKER Company Ticker Symbol
*TIER IRRC TIER - No longer used
*UNEQVOTE Unequal Voting Rights
*WRITTEN_CONSENT_VOTEPCNT Vote % Required for Written Consent
*YEAR Year
=Papers=
abstract={We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10% to 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of “high” vulnerability to takeovers. The complementarity effect exists for firms with lower industry-adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms.}
}
==Related Pages==
*[[Winner's Curse in Acquisitions (Academic Paper)]]
