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[[Category:{{Project|Has project output=Content|Has sponsor=McNair Projects]]Center|Has title=Governance Measures|Has owner=|Has start date=|Has deadline=|Has keywords=|Has notes=|Has project status=Complete|Is dependent on=}} The ATI index can be constructed using the variables in the Takeover Defenses database marked with ATI towards the end of the line. The E index can be constructed using the variables in the RiskMetrics (ISS) Database marked with E index towards the end of the line. See the variable lists in the Availability section below.
Governance Measures (view source)
Revision as of 13:39, 21 September 2020
, 13:39, 21 September 2020no edit summary
=Measures=
Papers on the subject, even recent ones, indicate that the corporate governance data doesn't go past 2003. It is possible that some of these databases could have more recent data, although I couldn't say if that is the case because I don't have access to the databases.
=Availability=
==MSCI GMI Ratings in wrds==
===Takeover Defenses===
Covered 2005-2014, Around 3,000 US companies per year
Variables:
*BDCLASSIFIED CHAR Board Classified ATI, E index
*COMPANYNAME CHAR Company Name
*TDADVANCENOTICEREQUIRED CHAR Advance Notice Required
*TDBUSINESSCOMBINATIONPROVISION CHAR Business Combination Provision
*TDBYLAWAMENDMENTNOTES CHAR By Law Amendment Notes
*TDBYLAWVOTEPERCENT NUM By Law Vote Percent E index
*TDCALLSPECIALMEETINGPERCENT NUM Call Special Meeting Percent ATI
*TDCHARTERAMENDMENTNOTES CHAR Charter Amendment Notes
*TDCHARTERVOTEPERCENT NUM Charter Vote Percent E index
*TDCOMPANYSPECIALMEETINGCOMPAREST CHAR Company Special Meeting Compare State Law maybe ATI
*TDCOMPANYWRITTENCONSENTCOMPAREST CHAR Company Written Consent Compare State Law Maybe ATI
*TDCONSTITUENCYPROVISION CHAR Constituency Provision
*TDCUMULATIVEVOTING CHAR Cumulative Voting
*TDDIRECTORREMOVALFORCAUSEONLY CHAR Director Removal For Cause Only
*TDDIRECTORREMOVALFORCAUSEVOTEPER NUM Director Removal For Cause Vote Percent
*TDDIRECTORREMOVALWITHOUTCAUSEVOT NUM Director Removal Without Cause Vote Percent
*TDDUALCLASSSTOCK CHAR Dual Class Stock
*TDDUALCLASSSTOCKNOTES CHAR Dual Class Stock Notes
*TDEFFECTIVECLASSIFIEDBOARD CHAR Effective Classified Board
*TDFAIRPRICEPROVISION CHAR Fair Price Provision
*TDMERGERVOTENOTE CHAR Merger Vote Note
*TDMERGERVOTEPERCENT NUM Merger Vote Percent
*TDPOISONPILL CHAR Poison Pill ATI
*TDPOISONPILLNOTES CHAR Poison Pill Notes
*TDSHFILLVACANCIES CHAR Share Holder Fill Vacancies
*TDSHFILLVACANCIESNOTES CHAR Share Holder Fill Vacancies Notes
*TDWRITTENCONSENTPERCENT NUM Written Consent Percent ATI
*TICKER CHAR Ticker
===Companies===
2001-2014
Variables:
*OwnersFivePercentPctg OwnersFivePercentPctg
==Execucomp==
01/01/1992 - 12/31/2015
Variables:
*CO_PER_ROL ID number for each executive/company combination
*CONAME Company Name
*CUSIP CUSIP and Issue Number
*EXECID Executive ID number
*EXPRIC EXPRIC -- Exercise Price
*GVKEY Company ID Number
*INDDESC Industry Group Description
*MKTPRIC MKTPRIC -- Market Price of Stock on Date of Grant
*NAICS NAICS Code
*NUMSECUR NUMSECUR -- Number of Options Granted
*PCTTOTOPT PCTTOTOPT -- Pct of Total Options Grantd to Employees
*SIC SIC Code
*SPINDEX Industry Group
*TICKER Ticker Symbol
*VALUE VALUE -- Value (Company)
*YEAR YEAR -- Fiscal Year
==RiskMetrics (ISS)==
01/01/2007 - 12/22/2015
Variables:
*BLANKCHECK Blank Check Preferred
*CARVE_OUT Provision in a company's majority vote standard for director elections that the standard will revert to a plurality vote in a proxy contest (where there are more nominees than open seats - a "contest carve-out")
*CBOARD Classified Board E Index
*TER_AMEND_VOTEPCNT Vote % Required to Amend ter
*COMPANY_ID ISS (Instituitional Shareholders Services) based Company ID
*CONAME Company Name
*CONFVOTE Confidential Voting
*CUMVOTE Cumulative Voting
*CUSIP CUSIP
*DUALCLASS Dual Class Stock
*FAIRPRICE Fair Price
*FYEND FYEND
*GPARACHUTE Golden Parachutes E index
*LABYLW Limit Ability to Amend ByLaws E index
*LACHTR Limit Ability to Amend ter E index
*LAW_AMEND_VOTEPCNT Vote % Required to Amend ByLaws
*LEGACYPPS_ID LegacyID - No longer used
*LSPMT Limit Ability to Call Special Meeting ATI
*LWCNST Limit Ability to Act by Written Consent ATI
*MAJ_VOTE_REQUIRED Indicates that the company has established a requirement that directors are elected by majority vote, rather than a plurality vote
*MAJ_VOTE_REQUIREMENT Majority Vote Requirement
*MAJOR_VOTE_COMM An analyst inserted note, as relevant, about the company's majority vote (to elect directors) standard
*MEETINGDATE Meeting Date
*MTGMONTH Meeting Month
*OO_BUSCOMP Opt out of BusComb/Freezeout law
*OO_CASHOUT_PA Opt out of control share cashout law (PA)
*OO_CSA Opt out of control share acquisition law(CSA)
*OO_DUTIES Opt out of directors duties law
*OO_FAIRPRICE Opt out of Fair Price law
*OO_PP Opt out of Poison Pill
*OO_RPROFITS Opt out of Recapture of Profits law
*OO_STAKEHOLDER Opt out of Stakeholder law
*PPILL Poison Pill E index
*PRICE FYEND - Stock Price
*RESIGN_REQUIRE Indicates that a director is required to submit his/her resignation upon failing to receive support from a majority of votes cast (which, typically, the board may chose to accept or reject). In some cases, this provision alternatively indicates that the board may require the resignation of a director who fails to receive majority support
*RT_ID IRRC OLD - Company ID
*SIC SIC
*SPINDEX S&Pindex
*SPL_MEET_VOTEPCNT Vote % Required to Call Special Meeting
*STATE state
*SUPERMAJOR_PCNT Supermajority - mergers in percent E index
*TICKER Company Ticker Symbol
*TIER IRRC TIER - No longer used
*UNEQVOTE Unequal Voting Rights
*WRITTEN_CONSENT_VOTEPCNT Vote % Required for Written Consent
*YEAR Year
=Papers=
abstract={We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10% to 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of “high” vulnerability to takeovers. The complementarity effect exists for firms with lower industry-adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms.}
}
==Related Pages==
*[[Winner's Curse in Acquisitions (Academic Paper)]]
