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Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees (view source)
Revision as of 19:23, 30 September 2011
, 19:23, 30 September 2011→Open rule, specialization
Exact inference by the floor is not possible - it is not in the committee's interest to allow this. But inference in a partition of the range of the distribution is possible, much like a cheap talk model. (Specifically, see Crawford and Sobel (1982), covered in [[Grossman Helpman (2001) - Special Interest Politics Chapters 4 And 5 |Grossman and Helpman (2001)]]).
<b>Proposition 2</b>: Let <math>a_i\,</math> denote the partition boundaries, with <math>a_0 = 0\,</math> and <math>a_N = 1\,</math>.
A legislative equilibrium is then:
Note that it would be efficient for the committee to specialize if <math>k \ge 2K^U\,</math> as well, as this would lead to gains to the floor, but the committee doesn't do so and is therefore 'underspecialized'.
<b>"Key points" from Rui</b>:
* <math>x_{1},x_{2}</math> have to be equidistant to <math>c</math> at cut point <math>a_{i}</math>.
* Floor beliefs must lie at the midpoint of the interval in <math>v</math>.
* Note that the equilibrium is partially separating.
<b>Proof</b>:
* Start by fixing the committee's strategy. Suppose <math>b\in[x_{c}-a_{i+1},x_{c}-a_{i}]</math>. This implies that <math>\omega\in (a_{i},a_{i+1})</math>. The floor's problem is now <math>\max_{p}-\int_{a_{i}}^{a_{i+1}}(p+\omega)^{2}f(\omega)d(\omega) \implies p=\frac{-(a_{i+1}+a_{i})}{2}</math>. SOC: <math>-2<0 \implies p^{\ast}(b)=\frac{-(a_{i+1}+a_{i})}{2}</math>.
*
*
===Closed rule, no specialization===
