Gibbons Murphy (1992) - Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns

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Revision as of 23:12, 4 April 2010 by imported>Ed (New page: ==Reference(s)== Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. [...)
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Reference(s)

Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. pdf

Abstract

This paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns-concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation. We show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives: the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract. Thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers. We find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance.

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