Difference between revisions of "Ellison Fudenberg Mobius (2004) - Competing Auctions"

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==Reference(s)==
 
==Reference(s)==
 
Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]
 
Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]

Revision as of 12:47, 29 September 2020

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Reference(s)

Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 link pdf

Abstract

This paper examines a simple model of competing auction sites to give some insights into the concentration of auction markets. In our model, there are B ex-ante identical buyers, each with unit demand, and S sellers, each with a single unit of the good to sell and a reservation value of zero. At the start of the model, buyers and sellers simultaneously choose between two possible locations. Buyers then learn their private values for the good, and a uniform-price auction is held at each location. This is a very stark model, but we believe that it provides some useful insights, and that it serves as a benchmark case for richer and more realistic models.

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