Difference between revisions of "Cadot, O. (1987), Corruption as a Gamble"
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imported>Moshe (New page: Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012] ===Model=== *Firm has to request operational permit from official *Official asks bribe, b, from firm *Firm pays bribe if b<v, if not reports offi...) |
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*infinite period game | *infinite period game | ||
| − | === | + | ===Comparative Statics=== |
*If wages raised optimal bribe requested is smaller, but because its smaller, it is paid more often | *If wages raised optimal bribe requested is smaller, but because its smaller, it is paid more often | ||
*So paying higher wages in public sector could lead to more but petty corruption | *So paying higher wages in public sector could lead to more but petty corruption | ||
*When discount factor is bigger the size of the bribe is smaller, because official cares more about the future. | *When discount factor is bigger the size of the bribe is smaller, because official cares more about the future. | ||
Revision as of 15:49, 16 May 2012
Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]
Model
- Firm has to request operational permit from official
- Official asks bribe, b, from firm
- Firm pays bribe if b<v, if not reports official who is fired
- infinite period game
Comparative Statics
- If wages raised optimal bribe requested is smaller, but because its smaller, it is paid more often
- So paying higher wages in public sector could lead to more but petty corruption
- When discount factor is bigger the size of the bribe is smaller, because official cares more about the future.
