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Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures (view source)
Revision as of 18:13, 16 September 2011
, 18:13, 16 September 2011→With equilibrium restriction (Stationary Equilibrium): Exactly the same as Closed Rule +Finite Horizon
However, this is unsatisfactory as it requires a complete history at all points (which is unrealistic if <math>\delta\,</math> is a reelection probability and new members can't know the history), and if a member were indifferent between enforcing and not, it is only weakly credible.
====With equilibrium restriction (Stationary Equilibrium): Exactly the same as Closed Rule +Finite Horizon ====
To restrict the equilibrium space the paper considers '''Stationary Equilibrium'''.
<b>This is the same as closed-rule, finite session.</b>
Note that we have minimum winning coalitions, a value of the game <math>v_{i}=1/n</math> proposal power equal to <math>x_{i}^{i}\geq 1/2 \geq \delta/n. We have fairness because the value of the game is equal across all players.
Comparitive statics around proposal power: <math>x_{i}^{i}=1-\frac{\delta(n-1)}{2n}</math>. Note that patience reduces proposal power: <math>\frac{\partial x_{i}^{i}}{\partial\delta}=-\frac{n-1}{2n}<0</math>. Larger legislatures reduce proposal power:<math>\frac{\partial x_{i}^{i}}{\partial n}=-\frac{\delta}{2}+\frac{\delta(n-1)}{2n^{2}}=\frac{-\delta(n^{2}-n-1}{2n^{2}}<0</math>
</math>
===In the Paper===
The role of the majority rule (rather than say unaminity) is covered in the paper, as is the case of the stationary equilibrium for an open-rule.
