Changes

* If recognized, keep <math>\hat{y}^{a}</math> for yourself and distribute the remainder to <math>m(\delta,n)<\math> other members, where <math>1-n\geq m \geq (n-1)</math>. <math>1>m/2\geq 1/2</math>. * If recognized as an amender who is part of the aforementioned group of <math>m</math>: Move to a vote. * If recognized as an amender who is NOT part of the aforementioned group of <math>m</math>: Make a proposal to keep <math>\hat{y}^{a}</math> for yourself and distribute the remainder to <math>m(\delta,n)<\math> other members -- including all those who are not in the first proposer's majority. Recognizer is never included because he is too expensive to pay off. * If you're a voter: Same rules as above. Vote for whichever pays you higher, and for the amendement if you're indifferent.  In equilibrium, the game procedes sequentially until nature randomly selects an amender who is in the coalition of the original proposer, when the proposal is approved.