Difference between revisions of "Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations"

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(New page: ==Reference(s)== Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/p...)
 
imported>Ed
(New page: ==Reference(s)== Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/p...)
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Revision as of 21:50, 4 April 2010

Reference(s)

Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999), "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. pdf

Abstract

The mark of a capitalistic society is that resources are owned and allocated by such nongovernmental organizations as firms, households, and markets. Resource owners increase productivity through cooperative specialization and this leads to the demand for economic organizations which facili- tate cooperation. When a lumber mill employs a cabinetmaker, cooperation be- tween specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a cabinetmaker purchases wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across markets (or between firms). Two important problems face a theory of economic organization-to explain the conditions that determine whether the gains from specialization and cooperative production can better be obtained within an organization like the firm, or across markets, and to explain the structure of the organization.