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=Summary=The following <b>NOTE: This is the count of papers by topic: '''Innovation:''' '''12+2''' '''12+2''' Mowery: 12+2 12+2 '''Strategy:''' '''12+1''' '''4''' Dal Bo: 4 4 Tadelis: 4 0 de Figueiredo: 4+1 0 '''Institutions:''' '''23+4''' '''(4+'''''5''''')+2''' Spiller: 23+4 (4+''5'')+2 '''Polictical Science:''' '''21''' '''11''' Dal Bo: 10 0 de Figueiredo: 11 11 '''Auctions and Contracts:''' '''19''' '''10''' Morgan: 9 4 Tadelis: 10 7 '''Total:''' '''87+7''' ('''43+'''''5''''')+4''' '''Total (no dups):''' '''85+6''' ('''42+'''''5''''')+3'''for 2011. For 2010, see [[2010 BPP Field Exam Papers]]</b>.
Column 1 lists the course or topic, column 2 indicates the number of paper agreed + the number of unapproved additions, column 3 indicates the (number of full write-ups + ''number of reviewed papers without full write-ups'') + the number of full write ups of unapproved additions. In the sections below: '''Bold face''' indicates a complete write-up. '''''Italic-bold face''''' indicates a reviewed paper with a stub or other incomplete write-up. =BPP Field Exam Paper Short List= ==Innovation (Mowery)===
#'''[[Lamoreaux Sokoloff (2005) - Decline Of The Independent Inventor |Lamoreaux, N. and K. Sokoloff (2005)]]''', "Decline of the Independent Inventor: A Schumpeterian Story", NBER working paper #11654. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lamoreaux%20Sokoloff%20(2005)%20-%20Decline%20of%20the%20Independent%20Inventor.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Murray Stern (2005) - Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder The Free Flow Of Scientific Knowledge |Murray F., and S. Stern (2005)]]''', "Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge? An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis", NBER working paper #11465. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Murray%20Stern%20(2005)%20-%20Do%20formal%20intellectual%20property%20rights%20hinder%20the%20free%20flow%20of%20scientific%20knowledge.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Nelson (1959) - The Simple Economics Of Basic Scientific Research |Nelson, R.R. (1959)]]''', "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research", Journal of Political Economy 67, 297-306. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Nelson%20(1959)%20-%20The%20Simple%20Economics%20of%20Basic%20Scientific%20Research.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Thursby Fuller Thursby (2007) - Us Faculty Patenting Inside And Outside The University |Thursby J., A. Fuller, & M. Thursby (2007)]]''', "US Faculty Patenting Inside and Outside the University", NBER working paper #13256. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Thursby%20Fuller%20Thursby%20(2007)%20-%20US%20Faculty%20Patenting%20Inside%20and%20Outside%20the%20University.pdf pdf]
Unapproved additions:#'''[[Merges (1999) - As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast |Merges, R. P. (1999)]]''', "As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform", Berkeley Technology Law Journal. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Merges%20(1999)%20-%20As%20Many%20as%20Six%20Impossible%20Patents%20before%20Breakfast.pdf pdf]#'''[[Mowery (2009) - Plus Ca Change |Mowery, D.C. (2009)]]''', "Plus ca change: Industrial R&D in the Third Industrial Revolution", forthcoming, Industrial and Corporate Change. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Mowery%20%20(2009)%20-%20Plus%20ca%20change.pdf pdf] ===Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)===
#[[Teece Pisano Shuen (1997) - Dynamic Capabilities And Strategic Management |Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997)]], "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20Pisano%20Shuen%20(1997)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20and%20strategic%20management.pdf pdf]
Unapproved Additions===Institutions ===See also: [[ECON224]]====Tadelis====See Notes from Steve's institution section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Institutions%20Notes.pdf here]. * [[Prendergast. C. 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms."]] Journal of Economic Literature, 37(1):7-63* Holmstrom, Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics 13(2):324-340 #* [[Winter Klein Crawford Alchian (20031978) - Understanding Dynamic Capabilities |WinterVertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process]], Journal of Law and Economics, S21(2):297-326. * [[Grossman Hart (20031986)- The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership]]: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, "Understanding dynamic capabilities", Strategic Management Journalof Political Economy, 24, 94(3) pp.991691-995719. * [[httpTadelis, Steven and Oliver Williamson (2011) Transaction-Cost Economics]], to appear in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, Eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press * Levin, Jonathan (2003) "Relational incentive contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3)://www835l857.edegan.com/pdfs/Winter%20* [[Garicano (2000) - Hierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production]], Journal of Political Economy, 108(20035)%20:874-%20Understanding%20dynamic%20capabilities904.pdf pdf]
Additional Readings:#'''[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]]''', "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure ConsiderationsFor the Papers below," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. see summaries [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Williamson279D%20(1971)%28Noam%29%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration20Paper%20of%20Production20Summaries.pdf pdfhere]. #'''[[Williamson * Acemoglu and Pischke (19761998) - Franchise Bidding For Natural Monopolies | Williamson, Oliver E. * Manning (19762003)]]''', "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1 * Lazear (Spring2000), pp. 73-104. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20* Bandiera et al (19762007)%20-%20Franchise%20Bidding%20for%20Natural%20Monopolies.pdf pdf]
Other Spiller Readings (from the course):#[[Defigueiredo Spiller Urbiztondo (1999) - An Informational Perspective On Administrative Procedures | De Figueiredo, Rui, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo (1999)]], "An informational perspective on administrative procedures", Journal of Law Economics and Organization, March, pp. 283-305. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DeFigueiredo%20Spiller%20Urbiztondo%20(1999)%20-%20An%20informational%20perspective%20on%20administrative%20procedures.pdf pdf]#[[Spiller (1990) - Politicians Interest Groups And Regulators | Spiller, Pablo (1990)]], "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1. (Apr.), pp. 65-101. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(1990)%20-%20Politicians%20Interest%20Groups%20and%20Regulators.pdf pdf]===Polictical Science===
===Dal Bo===Slide Sets referenced are:#[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]]*'''Voting institutions, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Modelcommitment vs flexibility, Public Choice 14 and gridlock''' (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Barro%20(1973)%20PHDBA279A-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20ModelLecture2.pdf pdfSlides #2])#[[Becker (1983) - A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. (1983)]], A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98*'''Externalities in voting games''' (3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Becker%20(1983)%20PHDBA279A-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20InfluenceLecture4.pdf pdf]Slides #[[Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers |Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974)4]], Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf]#[[Coate Morris (1995) - On *'''The Form Of Transfers To Special Interests |Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995)]], On the Form efficiency of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103democracy''' (6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20PHDBA279A-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20InterestsLecture6.pdf pdf]Slides #[[Dal Bo (2007) - Bribing Voters |Dal Bó, E. (2007)]6], Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] #[[Dixit Grossman Helpman (1997) - Common Agency And Coordination General Theory And Application To Government Policy Making |Dixit, A., G. Grossman *'''Competition and E. Helpman influence''' (1997)]], Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20PHDBA279A-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20MakingLecture7.pdf pdfSlides #7])#[[Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control |Ferejohn, J. *'''Corruption deterrence''' (1986)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20PHDBA279A-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20ControlLecture8.pdf pdf]Slides #[[Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale |Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994)8]], Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf]#[[Messner Polborn (2004) - Voting On Majority Rules |Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004)]], Voting on Majority Rules, Review *'''The electoral control of Economic Studies 71politicians''' (1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20PHDBA279A-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20RulesLecture9.pdf pdf]Slides #[[Tullock (1967) - The Welfare Costs Of Monopolies Tariffs And Theft |Tullock, G. (1967)]9], The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf]
===Morgan===
→Tadelis
*This page is in the [[BPP]] category [[Category:BPP]]
*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]]
<nowiki>*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]</nowiki>
See also: [[BPP Innovation]]
# [[S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc]]
# [[P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.]]
#'''[[Agrawal Henderson (2002) - Putting Patents In Context Exploring Knowledge Transfer From Mit |Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002)]]''', "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Agrawal%20Henderson%20(2002)%20-%20Putting%20Patents%20in%20Context%20Exploring%20Knowledge%20Transfer%20from%20MIT.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Arrow (1959) - Economic Welfare And The Allocation Of Resources For Invention |Arrow, K.J. (1958)]]''', "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Arrow%20(1959)%20-%20Economic%20Welfare%20and%20the%20Allocation%20of%20Resources%20for%20Invention.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Gompers Lerner Sharfstein (2003) - Entrepreneurial Spawning |Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003)]]''', "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gompers%20Lerner%20Sharfstein%20(2003)%20-%20Entrepreneurial%20Spawning.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Henderson Clark (1990) - Architectural Innovation |Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990)]]''', "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Henderson%20Clark%20(1990)%20-%20Architectural%20Innovation.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Mowery Ziedonis (2001) - How Has The Bayh Dole Act Affected Us University Patenting And Licensing |Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001)]]''', "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Mowery%20Ziedonis%20(2001)%20-%20How%20Has%20the%20Bayh%20Dole%20Act%20Affected%20US%20University%20Patenting%20and%20Licensing.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Teece (1986) - Profiting From Technological Innovation |Teece, D.J. (1986)]]''', "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1986)%20-%20Profiting%20from%20technological%20innovation.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Ziedonis (2004) - Dont Fence Me In |Ziedonis, R.H. (2004)]]''', "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ziedonis%20(2004)%20-%20Dont%20fence%20me%20in.pdf pdf]
====Dal Bo====
#'''[[Dixit Stiglitz (1977) - Monopolistic Competition And Optimum Product Diversity |Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977)]]''', "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20and%20optimum%20product%20diversity.pdf pdf] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)%20-%20Class%20Slides.pdf (Class Slides)]
#'''[[Hotelling (1929) - Stability In Competition |Hotelling, H. (1929)]]''', "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hotelling%20(1929)%20-%20Stability%20in%20competition.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Shaked Sutton (1982) - Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation |Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982)]]''', "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shaked%20Sutton%20(1982)%20-%20Relaxing%20price%20competition%20through%20product%20differentiation.pdf pdf]
====Tadelis====See notes on Steve's innovation section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Strategy%20Notes.pdf here]. #[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]#[[Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994) “The Firm as an Incentive System,”]] American Economic Review, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.#[[Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003) “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93(3), pp. 551-572]]
#[[Baker Hubbard (2004) - Contractibility And Asset Ownership |Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004)]], "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2004)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset%20Ownership.pdf pdf]
#[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]
Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]
#[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005)]], "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf]
#[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]
#[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf]
# [[Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (2009) “The Organization of Firms Across Countries,”]] NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http://www.stanford.edu/ ~nbloom/w15129.pdf" link])
====de Figueiredo====#[[Villalonga, B. (2004), "Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business information tracking series"]], Journal of Finance, 59, pp.479-506. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Villalonga%20(2004)%20-%20Diversification%20discount%20or%20premium.pdf pdf]#[[Teece Pisano Shuen (1997) - Dynamic Capabilities And Strategic Management |Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997)]], "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20Pisano%20Shuen%20(1997)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20and%20strategic%20management.pdf pdf]#[[Cockburn, I. M., R. Henderson, and S. Stern (2000), "Untangling the origins of competitive advantage"]], Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1123-1145. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cockburn%20Henderson%20Stern%20(2000)%20-%20Untangling%20the%20origins%20of%20competitive%20advantage.pdf pdf]#[[Eisenhardt Martin (2000) - Dynamic Capabilities What Are They |Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000)]], "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Eisenhardt%20Martin%20(2000)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20what%20are%20they.pdf pdf]#[[Montgomery Schoar A. (2002), Effects of corporate Diversification on Productivity]]. Journal of Finance 57 (19942) : 2379- Corporate Diversification |2403.#[[Montgomery, C. B. Wernerfelt (19941988), "Diversification, Ricardian rents and Tobin?s q"]], Rand Journal of Economics, 19, pp.623-632. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Montgomery%20Wernerfelt%20(1988)%20-%20Diversification%20Ricardian%20rents%20and%20Tobins%20q.pdf pdf]#[[Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia (2002), "Corporate Explaining the diversificationdiscount"]], Journal of Finance, 57, pp.1731-1762. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Campa%20Kedia%20(2002)%20-%20Explaining%20the%20diversification%20discount.pdf pdf]#[[Teece, D. (1980), "Economies of scope, and the scope of the enterprise"]], Journal of Economic PerspectivesBehavior and organization, 81, pp.163223-178247. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/MontgomeryTeece%20(19941980)%20-%20Corporate20Economies%20of%20scope%20and%20the%20diversification20scope%20of%20the%20enterprise.pdf pdf]
#[[Teece (1982) - Towards An Economic Theory Of The Multiproduct Firm |Teece, D. (1982)]], "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Towards%20an%20economic%20theory%20of%20the%20multiproduct%20firm.pdf pdf]
==Institutions (Spiller)==Yuchtman====#* [[Alchian Demsetz (1972) - Production Information Costs And Economic Organization |Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972)]], "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]#[[Baker Gibbons Murphy (1999) - Informal Authority In Organizations |Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy (1999)]], "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics North & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20Weingast (1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]#[[Baker Hubbard (2003) - Make Vs Buy In Trucking |Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (20031989)]], "Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information", American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2003)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf]#* [[Coase (1937) - The Nature Of The Firm |Coase, Ronald Naidu (19372010)]], "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]#* [[Demsetz (1968) - Why Regulate Utilities |Demsetz, Harold Grief (19681993)]], "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]#* [[Garicano Clark (2000) - Hierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production |Garicano, Luis (20001985)]], "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20Production.pdf pdf]#[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. * [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/GrossmanLa%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]#[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multitask Principal Agent Analyses |Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom20Porta%20Milgrom20et%20(1991)20al%20-%20Multitask%20Principal282008%20Agent29%20Analyses20Summary.pdf pdf]#'''''[[Klein Crawford Alchian La Porta et al (1978) - Vertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process |Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (19782008)]]''''', "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]#'''''[[Levy Spiller (1994) - The Institutional Foundations Of Regulatory Commitment |Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994)]]''''', "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. * [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)Hansmann%20-%20The%20Institutional281988%20Foundations29%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment20Summary.pdf pdf]#'''''[[Mccubbins Schwartz Hansmann (1984) - Congressional Oversight Overlooked |McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (19841988)]]''''', "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]#[[Mccubbins Noll Weingast (1987) - Administrative Procedures As Instruments Of Control |McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987)]], "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control", JLEO, pp. 243-277. * [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]#[[Monteverde Teece (1982) - Supplier Switching Costs And Vertical Integration In The Automobile Industry |Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982)]], "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20CostsBubb%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry.pdf pdf]#[[North (1991) - Institutions |North, Douglass (1991)]]. "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)20Kaufman%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]#[[Prendergast (2003) - The Limits Of Bureaucratic Efficiency |Prendergast, Canice (2003)]], "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast282009%20(2003)29%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency20Summary.pdf pdf]#'''''[[Spiller Bubb (2008) - An Institutional Theory Of Public Contracts Regulatory Implications |Spiller, Pablo (20082009)]]''''', "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications", NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(2008)%20-%20An%20Institutional%20Theory%20of%20Public%20Contracts%20Regulatory%20Implications.pdf pdf]#'''''[[Spiller Gely (1992) - Congressional Control Or Judicial Independence |Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992)]]''''', "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. * [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/SpillerLevin%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]#[[Weingast Marshall (1988) - The Industrial Organization Of Congress |Weingast and Marshall (1988)]], "The Industrial Organization of Congress",Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast20and%20Marshall20Tadelis%20(1988)%20-%20The282005%20Industrial29%20Organization%20of%20Congress20Summary.pdf pdf]#[[Whinston (2003) - On The Transaction Costs Determinants Of Vertical Integration |Whinston (2003)]], "On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]#'''[[Williamson (1979) - Transaction Cost Economics |Williamson, Oliver (1979)]]''', "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law Levin and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. Tadelis (Oct.2005), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1979)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]#'''[[Williamson (1991) - Comparative Economic Organization The Analysis Of Discrete Structural Alternatives |Williamson, Oliver (1991)]]''', "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]#'''[[Williamson (1999) - Public And Private Bureaucracies |Williamson, Oliver E. (1999)]]''', "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]#'''[[Williamson (1983) - Credible Commitments Using Hostages To Support Exchange |Williamson, Oliver, (1983)]]''', "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]
==Polictical Science==Dal Bo====#[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])#[[Becker (1983) - A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. (1983)]], A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])#[[Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers |Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974)]], Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Slides #8])#[[Coate Morris (1995) - On The Form Of Transfers To Special Interests |Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995)]], On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])#[[Dal Bo (2007) - Bribing Voters |Dal Bó, E. (2007)]], Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Slides #4]) #[[Dixit Grossman Helpman (1997) - Common Agency And Coordination General Theory And Application To Government Policy Making |Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997)]], Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])#[[Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control |Ferejohn, J. (1986)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])#[[Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale |Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994)]], Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])#[[Messner Polborn (2004) - Voting On Majority Rules |Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004)]], Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Slides #2])#[[Tullock (1967) - The Welfare Costs Of Monopolies Tariffs And Theft |Tullock, G. (1967)]], The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])
====de Figueiredo====
See also: [[BPP Political Science]]
#'''[[Alesina Drazen (1991) - Why Are Stabilizations Delayed |Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991)]]''', Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Austensmith Feddersen (2008) - Public Disclosure Private Revelation Or Silence |Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008)]]''', Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides], © Bo Cowgill and Tarek Ghani)
#'''[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001)]]''', Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])
#'''[[Baron Diermeier (2006) - Strategic Activism And Nonmarket Strategy |Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007)]]''', Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])
#'''[[Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity |Ting, Michael (2009)]]''', "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek)
===Auctions and Contracts===See [[PHDBA279B]]. ====Morgan====
#[[Aghion Dewatripont Rey (1994) - Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information |Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994)]], "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Baye Morgan Scholten (2006) - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006)]]''', "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdf]
#[[Krishna Morgan (2008) - Contracting For Information Under Imperfect Commitment |Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008)]], "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitment.pdf pdf]
The following class notes (from a previous year) may be useful:*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes1-Introduction.pdf Introduction]*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes2-Auctions.pdf Auctions]*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes3-AdverseSelection.pdf Adverse Selection]*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes4-Contests.pdf Contests]*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes5-CostlessSignaling.pdf Costless Signalling] ====Tadelis====
#[[Banerjee Duflo (2000) - Reputation Effects And The Limits Of Contracting |Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000)]], "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Banerjee%20Duflo%20(2000)%20-%20Reputation%20Effects%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Contracting.pdf pdf]
#'''[[Diamond (1989) - Reputation Acquisition In Debt Markets |Diamond, D. (1989)]]''', "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Diamond%20(1989)%20-%20Reputation%20Acquisition%20in%20Debt%20Markets.pdf pdf]
