Changes

=Summary===Dal Bo====The following is the count of papers by topic: #'''Innovation:[[Dixit Stiglitz (1977) - Monopolistic Competition And Optimum Product Diversity |Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977)]]''' , "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20and%20optimum%20product%20diversity.pdf pdf] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)%20-%20Class%20Slides.pdf (Class Slides)]#'''12[[Hotelling (1929) - Stability In Competition |Hotelling, H. (1929)]]''' Mowery, "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. [http: 12//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hotelling%20(1929)%20-%20Stability%20in%20competition.pdf pdf] #'''Strategy:[[Salop (1979) - Monopolistic Competition With Outside Goods |Salop (1979)]]''' , "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Salop%20(1979)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20with%20outside%20goods.pdf pdf]#'''12[[Shaked Sutton (1982) - Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation |Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982)]]''', "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shaked%20Sutton%20(1982)%20-%20Relaxing%20price%20competition%20through%20product%20differentiation.pdf pdf] Dal Bo====Tadelis====See notes on Steve's innovation section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Strategy%20Notes.pdf here]. #[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, Bengt and John Roberts (1999)]], "The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12(4), Pages 73-94 [http: //www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Roberts%20(1999)%20-%20The%20Boundaries%20Of%20The%20Firm%20Revisited.pdf pdf]#[[Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1994) “The Firm as an Incentive System,”]] American Economic Review, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September.#[[Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003) “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 93(3), pp. 551-572]]#[[Baker Hubbard (2004) - Contractibility And Asset Ownership |Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004)]], "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2004)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset%20Ownership.pdf pdf] Tadelis#[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986)]], "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http: 4//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]#[[Holmstrom Milgrom (1991) - Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses | de FigueiredoHolmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991)]], "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http: 4//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf] '''Institutions#[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, Robert (2005)]], "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http:''' '''23'''//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf] Spiller#[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein and Niko Matouschek (2008)]], "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review, Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-179. [http: 23//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alonso%20Dessein%20Matouschek%20(2008)%20-%20When%20Does%20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf] '''Polictical Science#[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, Patrick and Joseph Farrell (1990)]], "Decentralization, Duplication And Delay," Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 803-26. [http:''' '''21'''//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bolton%20Farrell%20(1990)%20-%20Decentralization%20Duplication%20And%20Delay.pdf pdf] Dal Bo# [[Bloom, Nicholas, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (2009) “The Organization of Firms Across Countries,”]] NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http: 10//www.stanford.edu/ ~nbloom/w15129.pdf" link])  ====de Figueiredo====#[[Villalonga, B. (2004), "Diversification discount or premium? New evidence from the business information tracking series"]], Journal of Finance, 59, pp.479-506. [http: 11//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Villalonga%20(2004)%20-%20Diversification%20discount%20or%20premium.pdf pdf] '''Auctions #[[Teece Pisano Shuen (1997) - Dynamic Capabilities And Strategic Management |Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997)]], "Dynamic capabilities and Contractsstrategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. [http:''' '''23'''//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20Pisano%20Shuen%20(1997)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20and%20strategic%20management.pdf pdf] Morgan#[[Cockburn, I. M., R. Henderson, and S. Stern (2000), "Untangling the origins of competitive advantage"]], Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1123-1145. [http: 9//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cockburn%20Henderson%20Stern%20(2000)%20-%20Untangling%20the%20origins%20of%20competitive%20advantage.pdf pdf] Tadelis#[[Eisenhardt Martin (2000) - Dynamic Capabilities What Are They |Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000)]], "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. [http: 14//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Eisenhardt%20Martin%20(2000)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20what%20are%20they.pdf pdf] #[[Schoar A. (2002), Effects of corporate Diversification on Productivity]]. Journal of Finance 57 (2): 2379-2403.#[[Montgomery, C. B. Wernerfelt (1988), "Diversification, Ricardian rents and Tobin?s q"]], Rand Journal of Economics, 19, pp.623-632. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Montgomery%20Wernerfelt%20(1988)%20-%20Diversification%20Ricardian%20rents%20and%20Tobins%20q.pdf pdf]#[[Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia (2002), "Explaining the diversification discount"]], Journal of Finance, 57, pp.1731-1762. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Campa%20Kedia%20(2002)%20-%20Explaining%20the%20diversification%20discount.pdf pdf] '''Total#[[Teece, D. (1980), "Economies of scope, and the scope of the enterprise"]], Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 1, pp.223-247. [http:''' '''91'''//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1980)%20-%20Economies%20of%20scope%20and%20the%20scope%20of%20the%20enterprise.pdf pdf] '''Total #[[Teece (1982) - Towards An Economic Theory Of The Multiproduct Firm |Teece, D. (no dups1982)]], "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. [http:''' '''89'''//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Towards%20an%20economic%20theory%20of%20the%20multiproduct%20firm.pdf pdf]

=BPP Field Exam Paper Short List==Institutions ===See also: [[ECON224]]====Tadelis====See Notes from Steve's institution section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Institutions%20Notes.pdf here].

==Innovation (Mowery)==#Agrawal A* [[Prendergast. C., and R1999. Henderson (2002), "Putting Patents The Provision of Incentives in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management ScienceFirms.#Arrow, K.J. (1958), "]] Journal of Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem.Literature, Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Arrow%2037(19591)%20:7-%20Economic%20Welfare%20and%20the%20Allocation%20of%20Resources%20for%20Invention.pdf pdf]63#Cohen* Holmstrom, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal Bengt (19901982) Moral Hazard in Teams, "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cohen%20Levinthal%20 Bell Journal of Economics 13(19902)%20:324-%20Absorptive%20Capacity.pdf pdf]340 #Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003), "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. * [[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gompers%20Lerner%20Sharfstein%20Klein Crawford Alchian (20031978)%20-%20Entrepreneurial%20Spawning.pdf pdfVertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process]]#Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration Journal of Existing Product Technologies Law and the Failure of Established Firms"Economics, Administrative Science Quarterly. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Henderson%20Clark%2021(19902)%20:297-%20Architectural%20Innovation326.pdf pdf]#Lamoreaux, N. and K. Sokoloff (2005), "Decline of the Independent Inventor: A Schumpeterian Story", NBER working paper #11654. * [[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Lamoreaux%20Sokoloff%20Grossman Hart (20051986)%20-%20Decline%20of%20the%20Independent%20Inventor.pdf pdfThe Costs And Benefits Of Ownership]]#Mowery D., & : A. Ziedonis, (2001), "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting Theory of Vertical and Licensing?"Lateral Integration, in Innovation Policy and the Journal of Political Economy, NBER. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Mowery%20Ziedonis%2094(20013)%20pp. 691-%20How%20Has%20the%20Bayh%20Dole%20Act%20Affected%20US%20University%20Patenting%20and%20Licensing719.pdf pdf]#Murray F.* [[Tadelis, Steven and S. Stern Oliver Williamson (20052011), "Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge? An empirical test of the antiTransaction-commons hypothesis"Cost Economics]], NBER working paper #11465. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Murray%20Stern%20(2005)%20-%20Do%20formal%20intellectual%20property%20rights%20hinder%20the%20free%20flow%20of%20scientific%20knowledge.pdf pdf]#Nelsonto appear in Robert Gibbons and John Roberts, REds.R. (1959), " The Simple Handbook of Organizational Economics of Basic Scientific Research", Journal of Political Economy 67, 297-306. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Nelson%20(1959)%20-%20The%20Simple%20Economics%20of%20Basic%20Scientific%20Research.pdf pdf]Princeton University Press #Teece* Levin, D.J. Jonathan (19862003) "Relational incentive contracts, "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integrationAmerican Economic Review, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%2093(19863)%20-%20Profiting%20from%20technological%20innovation:835l857.pdf pdf]#Thursby J., A. Fuller, & M. Thursby (2007), "US Faculty Patenting Inside and Outside the University", NBER working paper #13256. * [[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Thursby%20Fuller%20Thursby%20Garicano (20072000)%20-%20US%20Faculty%20Patenting%20Inside%20and%20Outside%20the%20University.pdf pdfHierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production]]#Ziedonis, R.H. (2004), "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies Journal of firms"Political Economy, Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ziedonis%20108(20045)%20:874-%20Dont%20fence%20me%20in904.pdf pdf]

==Strategy ==Yuchtman====* [[North & Weingast (1989)]]* [[Naidu (2010)]]* [[Grief (1993)]]* [[Clark (1985)]]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/La%20Porta%20et%20al%20%282008%29%20Summary.pdf La Porta et al (2008)]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Hansmann%20%281988%29%20Summary.pdf Hansmann (1988)]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Bubb%20and%20Kaufman%20%282009%29%20Summary.pdf Bubb (Dal Bo, 2009)]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Levin%20and%20Tadelis%20%282005%29%20Summary.pdf Levin and Tadelis, and de Figueiredo(2005)==]

===Dal Bo===#Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67For the Papers below, 297-308. see summaries [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)279D%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20and%20optimum28Noam%20product%20diversity.pdf pdf]#Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hotelling%20(1929)29%20-%20Stability%20in20Paper%20competition20Summaries.pdf pdfhere]. #Salop * Acemoglu and Pischke (19791998), "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Salop%20* Manning (19792003)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20with%20outside%20goods.pdf pdf]#Shaked, A. and J. Sutton * Lazear (19822000), "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shaked%20Sutton%20* Bandiera et al (19822007)%20-%20Relaxing%20price%20competition%20through%20product%20differentiation.pdf pdf]

===TadelisPolictical Science===#Baker, George and Thomas Hubbard (2004), "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, pp.1443-79. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2004)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset%20Ownership.pdf pdf]#Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy, vol.94, pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]#Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multi%20Task%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]#Gibbons, Robert (2005), "Four formal(izable) theories of the firm?", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20(2005)%20-%20Four%20formalizable%20theories%20of%20the%20firm.pdf pdf]

===de Figueiredo=Dal Bo====#Eisenhardt[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, KR.(1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, and JPublic Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])#[[Becker (1983) - A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. Martin (20001983)]], "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?"A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Strategic Management Quarterly Journalof Economics 98(3), 21371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])#[[Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers |Becker, ppG. and G.1105Stigler (1974)]], Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-112119. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/EisenhardtBecker%20Martin20Stigler%20(20001974)%20-%20Dynamic20Law%20capabilities20Enforcement%20what20Malfeasance%20are20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20they20Enforcers.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Slides #8])#Montgomery[[Coate Morris (1995) - On The Form Of Transfers To Special Interests |Coate, CS. and S. Morris (19941995)]], "Corporate diversification"On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8Political Economy 103(6), pp.1631210-17835. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/MontgomeryCoate%20Morris%20(19941995)%20-%20Corporate20On%20diversification20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])#Teece[[Dal Bo (2007) - Bribing Voters |Dal Bó, DE. (19822007)]], "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm"Bribing Voters, American Journal of Economic Behavior Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Slides #4]) #[[Dixit Grossman Helpman (1997) - Common Agency And Coordination General Theory And Application To Government Policy Making |Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997)]], Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and organizationApplication to Government Policy Making, 3Journal of Political Economy 105, pp.39752-6369. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/TeeceDixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(19821997)%20-%20Towards20Common%20an20Agency%20economic20and%20theory20Coordination%20of20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20the20Government%20multiproduct20Policy%20firm20Making.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])#Teece[[Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control |Ferejohn, DJ.(1986)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])#[[Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale |Grossman, G. Pisano and AE. Helpman (1994)]], Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale. Shuen pdf pdf] (1997[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])#[[Messner Polborn (2004)- Voting On Majority Rules |Messner, "Dynamic capabilities M. and strategic management"M. Polborn (2004)]], Strategic Management JournalVoting on Majority Rules, 18Review of Economic Studies 71(1), pp.509115-533132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/TeeceMessner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Pisano20Voting%20Shuen20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Slides #2])#[[Tullock (1967) - The Welfare Costs Of Monopolies Tariffs And Theft |Tullock, G. (1967)]], The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(19971967)%20-%20Dynamic20The%20capabilities20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20strategic%20management20Theft.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])

==Institutions (Spiller)==#Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 [httpSlide Sets referenced are://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20(1972)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20Organization.pdf pdf]#Baker, G*'''Voting institutions, R Gibbonscommitment vs flexibility, and K.J. Murphy gridlock''' (1999), "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20PHDBA279A-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20OrganizationsLecture2.pdf pdf]Slides #Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003), "Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information", American Economic Review, pp. 551-572. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Hubbard%20(2003)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf2]#Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]#Demsetz, Harold (1968), "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]#Garicano, Luis (2000), "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge *'''Externalities in Production", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. voting games''' (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Garicano%20(2000)%20PHDBA279A-%20Hierarchies%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge%20in%20ProductionLecture4.pdf pdf]Slides #Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Hart%20(1986)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of%20Ownership.pdf pdf]#Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991), "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]#Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal *'''The efficiency of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. democracy''' (Oct.), pp. 297-326 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20PHDBA279A-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20ProcessLecture6.pdf pdf]Slides #Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20(1994)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]#McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Feb.), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf6]#McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control", JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]#Monteverde, Kirk *'''Competition and David J. Teece influence''' (1982), "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry", The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Monteverde%20Teece%20(1982)%20PHDBA279A-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Automobile%20IndustryLecture7.pdf pdf]Slides #North, Douglass (1991). "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20(1991)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf7]#Prendergast, Canice (2003), "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]#Spiller, Pablo *'''Corruption deterrence''' (2008), "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications", NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Spiller%20(2008)%20PHDBA279A-%20An%20Institutional%20Theory%20of%20Public%20Contracts%20Regulatory%20ImplicationsLecture8.pdf pdf]Slides #Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992), "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463-492. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20Gely%20(1992)%20-%20Congressional%20Control%20or%20Judicial%20Independence.pdf pdf]#Weingast and Marshall (1988), "The Industrial Organization of Congress",Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20(1988)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf8]#Whinston (2003), "On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]#Williamson, Oliver (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: *'''The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal electoral control of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2. politicians''' (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Williamson%20(1979)%20PHDBA279A-%20Transaction%20Cost%20EconomicsLecture9.pdf pdf]Slides #Williamson, Oliver (1991), "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf9]#Williamson, Oliver E. (1999), "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics Perspective", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15, March pp. 306-342. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1999)%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]#Williamson, Oliver, (1983), "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1983)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments%20Using%20Hostages%20to%20Support%20Exchange.pdf pdf]

==Polictical Science==de Figueiredo====

===Dal Bo===See also: [[BPP Political Science]]#Barro'''[[Alesina Drazen (1991) - Why Are Stabilizations Delayed |Alesina, RA. and A. Drazen (19731991)]]''', The Control of Politicians: An Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic ModelReview 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]#'''[[Austensmith Feddersen (2008) - Public Choice 14 Disclosure Private Revelation Or Silence |Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (September2008)]]''', 19-42Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BarroAustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(19732008)%20-%20The20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Control20Feddersen%20of20(2008)%20Politicians20-%20An20Whistleblowing%20Economic20--%20Model20Handout.pdf pdfClass Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides])#Becker'''[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, GD. (19832001)]]''', A Theory Theories of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political InfluenceStrategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(32001), 371%20-400%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions. pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BeckerBaron%20(19832001)%20-%20A20Theories%20Theory20of%20of20Strategic%20Competition20Nonmarket%20Among20Participation%20Pressure20Majority%20Groups20Rule%20for20and%20Political20Executive%20Influence20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])#Becker'''[[Baron Diermeier (2006) - Strategic Activism And Nonmarket Strategy |Baron, GD. and GD. Stigler Diermeier (19742007)]]''', Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, Strategic Activism and the Compensation of EnforcersNonmarket Strategy, Journal of Legal Studies 3Economics and Management Strategy 16, 1599-19634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BeckerBaron%20Stigler20Diermeier%20(19742007)%20-%20Law20Strategic%20Enforcement20Activism%20Malfeasance20and%20and20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20the20Strategic%20Compensation20Activism%20of20and%20Nonmarket%20Enforcers20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])#Coate'''[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures |Baron, SD. and SJ. Morris Ferejohn (19951989)]]''', On the Form of Transfers to Special InterestsBargaining in Legislatures, Journal of American Political Economy 103Science Review 83 (6December), 1210-351181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/CoateBaron%20Morris20Ferejohn%20(19951989)%20-%20On%20the20Bargaining%20Form20in%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests20Legislatures.pdf pdf]#Dal Bó'''[[de Figueiredo Edwards (2007) - Does Private Money Buy Public Policy |de Figueiredo, ER. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007)]]''', Bribing VotersDoes Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, American Journal of Political ScienceEconomics and Management Strategy 16, 51(4). 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DaldeFigueiredo%20Bo20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Voters20Policy.pdf pdf] #Dixit'''[[de Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation |de Figueiredo, AR. J. P., G. Grossman and EJr. Helpman (19972002)]]''', Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy MakingInsulation, Journal of American Political Economy 105Science Review 96, 752321-69333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20HelpmandeFigueiredo%20(19972002)%20-%20Common20Electoral%20Agency20Competition%20and20Political%20Coordination%20General%20Theory20Uncertainty%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making20Insulation.pdf pdf]#Ferejohn'''[[Fearon (1994) - Rationalist Explanations For War |Fearon, J. (19861994)]]''', Incumbent Performance and Electoral ControlRationalist Explanations for War, Public Choice 50(1-3)International Organization 49, 5379-25414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/FerejohnFearon%20(19861994)%20-%20Incumbent20Rationalist%20Performance20Explanations%20and%20Electoral20for%20Control20War.pdf pdf]#Grossman'''[[Fernandez Rodrik (1991) - Resistance To Reform Status Quo Bias In The Presence Of Individual Specific Uncertainty |Fernandez, GR. and ED. Helpman Rodrik (19941991)]]''', Protection for SaleResistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 8481, 8331146-501155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/GrossmanFernandez%20Helpman20Rodrik%20(19941991)%20-%20Protection20Resistance%20for20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Sale20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]#Messner'''[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees |Gilligan, MT. and MK. Polborn Krehbiel (20041987)]]''', Voting on Majority RulesCollective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Review Journal of Economic Studies 71(1)Law, Economics and Organization 3, 115-132. 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/MessnerGilligan%20Polborn20Krehbiel%20(20041987)%20-%20Voting20Collective%20Decision%20on20making%20Majority20and%20Standing%20Rules20Committees.pdf pdf]#Tullock'''[[Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity |Ting, G. Michael (19672009)]]''', The Welfare Costs of Monopolies"Organizational Capacity", Tariffsforthcoming JLEO, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32[http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity. pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/TullockTing%20(19672009)%20-%20The20Organizational%20Welfare20Capacity.pdf pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20Costs20(2009)%20of20-%20Monopolies20Organisational%20Tariffs20Capacity%20and20--%20Slides%20Theft20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdfSet2], © Adrienne Hosek)

===de FigueiredoAuctions and Contracts===#Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. See [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]#Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008), Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdfPHDBA279B] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides], © Bo Cowgill and Tarek Ghani)#[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation]] : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])#Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007), Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])#Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]#de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]#de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf]#Fearon, J. (1994), Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]#Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]#Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]#Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek)====Morgan====

#[[Aghion Dewatripont Rey (1994) - Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information |Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994)]], "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf]#'''[[Baye Morgan Scholten (2006) - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006)]]''', "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdf]#'''[[Caillaud Jullien (2003) - Chicken And Egg |Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003)]]''', "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28200322%2934%3A2%3C309%3AC%26ECAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Caillaud%20Jullien%20(2003)%20-%20Chicken%20and%20Egg.pdf pdf]#[[Dessein (2002) - Authority And Communication In Organizations |Dessein, Wouter (2002)]], "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]#[[Ellison Fudenberg Mobius (2004) - Competing Auctions |Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004)]], "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]#'''[[Grossman Helpman (2001) - Special Interest Politics Chapters 4 And 5 |Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001)]]''', "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(2001)%20-%20Special%20Interest%20Politics%20Chapters%204%20And%205.pdf pdf]#[[Hart Moore (1988) - Incomplete Contracts And Renegotiation |Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988)]], "Incomplete Contractsand Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1988)%20-%20Incomplete%20Contracts%20and%20Renegotiation.pdf pdf]#'''[[Konrad (2007) - Strategy In Contests-An Introduction |Konrad, Kai A. (2007)]]''', "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960458 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Konrad%20(2007)%20-%20Strategy%20in%20Contests-An%20Introduction.pdf pdf]#[[Krishna Morgan (2008) - Contracting For Information Under Imperfect Commitment |Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008)]], "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitment.pdf pdf]

===Morgan===#Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey The following class notes (1994from a previous year), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [httpmay be useful://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] *[http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20PHDBA279B-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf]#[[Baye Morgan Scholten 2006 Notes1- Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006), "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion,"]] Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20DispersionIntroduction.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdfIntroduction]#Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003) "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28200322%2934%3A2%3C309%3AC%26ECAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F link] *[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Caillaud%20Jullien%20(2003)%20-%20Chicken%20and%20Egg.pdf pdf]#Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.orgrepository/sici?sici=0034PHDBA279B-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2Notes2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20OrganizationsAuctions.pdf pdfAuctions]#Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] *[http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20PHDBA279B-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]#Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001), "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press#Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988), "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012Notes3-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0AdverseSelection.CO%3B2-I link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1988)%20-%20Incomplete%20Contracts%20and%20Renegotiation.pdf pdfAdverse Selection]#Konrad, Kai A. (2007), "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960458 link] *[http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Konrad%20(2007)%20PHDBA279B-%20Strategy%20in%20ContestsNotes4-An%20IntroductionContests.pdf pdfContests]#Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] *[http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2008)%20PHDBA279B-Notes5-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitmentCostlessSignaling.pdf pdfCostless Signalling]

====Tadelis====#[[Banerjee Duflo (2000) - Reputation Effects And The Limits Of Contracting |Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000) ]], "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Banerjee%20Duflo%20(2000)%20-%20Reputation%20Effects%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Contracting.pdf pdf]#Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008) "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics '''[[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cabral%20Hortacsu%20Diamond (20081989)%20-%20Dynamics%20of%20Seller%20Reputation.pdf pdf]#Reputation Acquisition In Debt Markets |Diamond, D. (1989)]]''', "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Diamond%20(1989)%20-%20Reputation%20Acquisition%20in%20Debt%20Markets.pdf pdf]#[[Forbes Lederman (2009) - Adaptation And Vertical Integration In The Airline Industry |Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009) ]], "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Forbes%20Lederman%20(2009)%20-%20Adaptation%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Airline%20Industry.pdf pdf]#'''[[Gibbons Murphy (1992) - Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns |Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992)]]''', "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1992)%20-%20Optimal%20Incentive%20Contracts%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Career%20Concerns.pdf pdf]#'''[[Goldberg (1977) - Competitive Bidding And The Production Of Precontract Information |Goldberg, Victor P. (1977) ]]''', "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Goldberg%20(1977)%20-%20Competitive%20Bidding%20and%20the%20Production%20of%20Precontract%20Information.pdf pdf]#'''[[Holmstrom (1999) - Managerial Incentive Problems |Holmstrom B., (1999) ]]''', "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20Managerial%20Incentive%20Problems.pdf pdf]#Jin, G. and P. Leslie (2009) "Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1): 237-67 (Supplemental Reading) '''[[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Jin%20Leslie%20Kreps (20091990)%20-%20Reputational%20Incentives%20for%20Restaurant%20Hygiene.pdf pdf]#Corporate Culture And Economic Theory |Kreps, D. (1990)]]''', "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JBrDXvye-1UC&oi=fnd&pg=PA221&dq=Kreps,+D.++%22Corporate+Culture+and+Economic+Theory&ots=d4JUQusjjf&sig=7RVgXjAlocVC8FDJd2Ke1MsbjxY Google Books])#[[Levin Tadelis (2008) - Contracting For Government Services |Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008) ]], "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levin%20Tadelis%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20Government%20Services.pdf pdf]#McDevitt, Ryan '''[[Tadelis (20102001) "A Business by Any Other Name: Firm Name Choice as a Signal of Firm Quality.," mimeo, northwestern university (pdf not available at this time) #McDevitt, Ryan (2010) "Names and - The Market For Reputations: As An Empirical Analysis," mimeo, northwestern university (pdf not available at this time) #Incentive Mechanism |Tadelis, S. (2001) ]]''', "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20The%20Market%20for%20Reputations%20as%20an%20Incentive%20Mechanism.pdf pdf]#'''[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]]''', "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]