Changes

=*This page is in the [[BPP]] category [[Category:BPP]]*This page is included under the section [[BPP Field Exam]] Insert the following code at the head of each page in this section: <nowiki>*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Paper Short List=Papers]]</nowiki>

==Innovation (Mowery)==#Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002), "Putting Patents in Context<b>NOTE: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science.#Cohen, W.M. and D.AThis is for 2011. Levinthal (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35For 2010, 569-596. see [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Cohen%20Levinthal%20(1990)%20-%20Absorptive%20Capacity.pdf pdf]#Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003), "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gompers%20Lerner%20Sharfstein%20(2003)%20-%20Entrepreneurial%20Spawning.pdf pdf2010 BPP Field Exam Papers]#Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Henderson%20Clark%20(1990)%20-%20Architectural%20Innovation.pdf pdf]#Lamoreaux, N. and K. Sokoloff (2005), "Decline of the Independent Inventor: A Schumpeterian Story", NBER working paper #11654. [http:<//wwwb>.edegan.com/pdfs/Lamoreaux%20Sokoloff%20(2005)%20-%20Decline%20of%20the%20Independent%20Inventor.pdf pdf]#Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001), "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Mowery%20Ziedonis%20(2001)%20-%20How%20Has%20the%20Bayh%20Dole%20Act%20Affected%20US%20University%20Patenting%20and%20Licensing.pdf pdf]#Murray F., and S. Stern (2005), "Do formal intellectual property rights hinder the free flow of scientific knowledge? An empirical test of the anti-commons hypothesis", NBER working paper #11465. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Murray%20Stern%20(2005)%20-%20Do%20formal%20intellectual%20property%20rights%20hinder%20the%20free%20flow%20of%20scientific%20knowledge.pdf pdf]#Teece, D.J. (1986), "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1986)%20-%20Profiting%20from%20technological%20innovation.pdf pdf]#Thursby J., A. Fuller, & M. Thursby (2007), "US Faculty Patenting Inside and Outside the University", NBER working paper #13256. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Thursby%20Fuller%20Thursby%20(2007)%20-%20US%20Faculty%20Patenting%20Inside%20and%20Outside%20the%20University.pdf pdf]#Ziedonis, R.H. (2004), "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ziedonis%20(2004)%20-%20Dont%20fence%20me%20in.pdf pdf]

==Strategy =Innovation (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de FigueiredoMowery)===

===Dal Bo===#Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), "Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity", American Economic Review 67, 297-308. [httpSee also://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Stiglitz%20(1977)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20and%20optimum%20product%20diversity.pdf pdf]#Hotelling, H. (1929), "Stability in competition", Economic Journal 39, 41-57. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hotelling%20(1929)%20-%20Stability%20in%20competition.pdf pdf]#Salop (1979), "Monopolistic competition with outside goods", Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Salop%20(1979)%20-%20Monopolistic%20competition%20with%20outside%20goods.pdf pdfBPP Innovation]#Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982), "Relaxing price competition through product differentiation", Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Shaked%20Sutton%20(1982)%20-%20Relaxing%20price%20competition%20through%20product%20differentiation.pdf pdf]

===Tadelis===# [[S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc]]# [[P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.]]#Baker'''[[Agrawal Henderson (2002) - Putting Patents In Context Exploring Knowledge Transfer From Mit |Agrawal A., George and Thomas Hubbard R. Henderson (2002)]]''', "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Agrawal%20Henderson%20(2002)%20-%20Putting%20Patents%20in%20Context%20Exploring%20Knowledge%20Transfer%20from%20MIT.pdf pdf]#'''[[Arrow (1959) - Economic Welfare And The Allocation Of Resources For Invention |Arrow, K.J. (20041958)]]''', "Contractibility Economic Welfare and Asset Ownershipthe Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. [http: On//www.edegan.com/pdfs/Arrow%20(1959)%20-%20Economic%20Welfare%20and%20the%20Allocation%20of%20Resources%20for%20Invention.pdf pdf]#'''[[Cohen Levinthal (1990) -Board Computers Absorptive Capacity |Cohen, W.M. and Governance in UD.SA. TruckingLevinthal (1990)]]''', "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation, " Administrative Sciences Quarterly Journal of Economics, 11935, pp.1443569-79596. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BakerCohen%20Hubbard20Levinthal%20(20041990)%20-%20Contractibility%20and%20Asset20Absorptive%20Ownership20Capacity.pdf pdf]#Grossman'''[[Gompers Lerner Sharfstein (2003) - Entrepreneurial Spawning |Gompers, P., Sanford J. Lerner, and Oliver D. Hart Sharfstein (2003)]]''', "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gompers%20Lerner%20Sharfstein%20(2003)%20-%20Entrepreneurial%20Spawning.pdf pdf]#'''[[Henderson Clark (1990) - Architectural Innovation |Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990)]]''', "Architectural Innovation: The Costs Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and Benefits the Failure of OwnershipEstablished Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. [http: //www.edegan.com/pdfs/Henderson%20Clark%20(1990)%20-%20Architectural%20Innovation.pdf pdf]#'''[[Mowery Ziedonis (2001) - How Has The Bayh Dole Act Affected Us University Patenting And Licensing |Mowery D., & A Theory of Vertical Integration. Ziedonis, (2001)]]''', "Numbers, Journal of Political EconomyQuality, vol& Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.94S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, pp. 691-719NBER. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/GrossmanMowery%20Hart20Ziedonis%20(19862001)%20-%20The20How%20Has%20the%20Bayh%20Dole%20Act%20Affected%20Costs20US%20and20University%20Benefits20Patenting%20of20and%20Ownership20Licensing.pdf pdf]#Holmstrom'''[[Teece (1986) - Profiting From Technological Innovation |Teece, Bengt and Paul Milgrom D.J. (19911986)]]''', "Multi-Task Principal-Agent AnalysesProfiting from technological innovation: Linear Contracts Implications for integration, Asset Ownership and Job Design"collaboration, Journal of Lawlicensing, Economics and Organizationpublic policy, Vol" Research Policy. [http://www. 7edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1986)%20-%20Profiting%20from%20technological%20innovation.pdf pdf]#'''[[Ziedonis (2004) - Dont Fence Me In |Ziedonis, ppR.H. 24-52(2004)]]''', "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20MilgromZiedonis%20(19912004)%20-%20Multi%20Task20Dont%20Principal20fence%20Agent20me%20Analyses20in.pdf pdf]

===Strategy (Dal Bo, Tadelis, and de Figueiredo)===#Eisenhardt, K., and J. Martin (2000), "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp.1105-1121. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Eisenhardt%20Martin%20(2000)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20what%20are%20they.pdf pdf]#Montgomery, C. (1994), "Corporate diversification", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, pp.163-178. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Montgomery%20(1994)%20-%20Corporate%20diversification.pdf pdf]#Teece, D. (1982), "Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", Journal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, pp.39-63. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20(1982)%20-%20Towards%20an%20economic%20theory%20of%20the%20multiproduct%20firm.pdf pdf]#Teece, D., G. Pisano and A. Shuen (1997), "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management", Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp.509-533. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Teece%20Pisano%20Shuen%20(1997)%20-%20Dynamic%20capabilities%20and%20strategic%20management.pdf pdf]

==Institutions (Spiller)==Dal Bo====#Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz (1972), "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", The American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 5. (Dec.), pp. 777-795 '''[[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alchian%20Demsetz%20Dixit Stiglitz (19721977)%20-%20Production%20Information%20Costs%20and%20Economic%20OrganizationMonopolistic Competition And Optimum Product Diversity |Dixit, A.pdf pdf]#Baker, G, R Gibbons, and K.J. Murphy Stiglitz (19991977), "Informal Authority in Organizations", Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15, March pp. 56-73. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baker%20Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1999)%20-%20Informal%20Authority%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]#Baker, George, and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003)]''', "Make Vs. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, Monopolistic competition and Informationoptimum product diversity", American Economic Review67, pp. 551297-572308. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BakerDixit%20Hubbard20Stiglitz%20(20031977)%20-%20Make%20Vs%20Buy%20in%20Trucking.pdf pdf]#Coase, Ronald (1937), "The Nature of the Firm", Economica. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coase%20(1937)%20-%20The%20Nature%20of%20the%20Firm.pdf pdf]#Demsetz, Harold (1968), "Why Regulate Utilities", Journal of Law and Economics, 11, April, pp. 55-56. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Demsetz%20(1968)%20-%20Why%20Regulate%20Utilities.pdf pdf]#Garicano, Luis (2000), "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 5. (Oct.), pp. 874-904. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Garicano%20(2000)%20-20Monopolistic%20Hierarchies20competition%20and%20the%20Organization%20of%20Knowledge20optimum%20in20product%20Production20diversity.pdf pdf]#Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver D. Hart (1986), "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4. pp. 691-719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/GrossmanDixit%20Hart20Stiglitz%20(19861977)%20-%20The%20Costs%20and%20Benefits%20of20Class%20Ownership20Slides.pdf pdf]#Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom (1991Class Slides), "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design", Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 7, Special Issue: Papers from the Conference on the New Science of Organization, January, pp. 24-52. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20Milgrom%20(1991)%20-%20Multitask%20Principal%20Agent%20Analyses.pdf pdf]#Klein, Benjamin Robert, G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978), "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21, No. 2. (Oct.), pp. 297-326 '''[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Klein%20Crawford%20Alchian%20(1978)%20-%20Vertical%20Integration%20Appropriable%20Rents%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Contracting%20Process.pdf pdf]#Levy, Brian and Pablo Spiller (1994), "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, October, pp. 201-246. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levy%20Spiller%20Hotelling (19941929)%20-%20The%20Institutional%20Foundations%20of%20Regulatory%20Commitment.pdf pdf]#McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28Stability In Competition |Hotelling, NoH. 1 (Feb.1929), pp. 165-179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Schwartz%20(1984)%20-%20Congressional%20Oversight%20Overlooked.pdf pdf]#McCubbins, Matt, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast (1987), "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Control", JLEO, pp. 243-277. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/McCubbins%20Noll%20Weingast%20(1987)%20-%20Administrative%20Procedures%20as%20Instruments%20of%20Control.pdf pdf]#Monteverde, Kirk and David J. Teece (1982)''', "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration Stability in the Automobile Industrycompetition", The Bell Economic Journal of Economics39, Vol. 13, No. 1. pp41-57. 206-213 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Monteverde%20TeeceHotelling%20(19821929)%20-%20Supplier%20Switching%20Costs%20and%20Vertical%20Integration20Stability%20in%20the%20Automobile%20Industry20competition.pdf pdf]#North, Douglass (1991). "Institutions", Journal of Economic Perspectives '''[[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/North%20Salop (19911979)%20-%20Institutions.pdf pdf]#Prendergast, Canice Monopolistic Competition With Outside Goods |Salop (20031979), "The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency", Journal of Political Economy. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Prendergast%20(2003)%20-%20The%20Limits%20of%20Bureaucratic%20Efficiency.pdf pdf]#Spiller, Pablo (2008), "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications", NBER Working Paper 14152, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14152 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20(2008)%20-%20An%20Institutional%20Theory%20of%20Public%20Contracts%20Regulatory%20Implications.pdf pdf]#Spiller, Pablo T. and Rafael Gely (1992)''', "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988Monopolistic competition with outside goods", The RAND Bell Journal of Economics10, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 463141-492156. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Spiller%20GelySalop%20(19921979)%20-%20Congressional20Monopolistic%20Control20competition%20or20with%20Judicial20outside%20Independence20goods.pdf pdf]#Weingast and Marshall (1988), "The Industrial Organization of Congress",Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96, pp. 132-163. '''[[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20Marshall%20Shaked Sutton (19881982)%20-%20The%20Industrial%20Organization%20of%20Congress.pdf pdf]#Whinston (2003)Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation |Shaked, "On the Transaction Costs Determinants of Vertical Integration", The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1 [http://www.edeganA.com/pdfs/Whinston%20(2003)%20-%20On%20the%20Transaction%20Costs%20Determinants%20of%20Vertical%20Integration.pdf pdf]#Williamson, Oliver (1979), "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2J. Sutton (Oct.), pp. 233-261. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(19791982)%20-%20Transaction%20Cost%20Economics.pdf pdf]#Williamson, Oliver (1991), "Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. pp. 269-296 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1991)%20-%20Comparative%20Economic%20Organization%20The%20Analysis%20of%20Discrete%20Structural%20Alternatives.pdf pdf]#Williamson, Oliver E. (1999)''', "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Costs Economics PerspectiveRelaxing price competition through product differentiation", Journal Review of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol 15Economic Studies 49, March pp. 3063-34213. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/WilliamsonShaked%20(1999)20Sutton%20-%20Public%20and%20Private%20Bureaucracies.pdf pdf]#Williamson, Oliver, (1983), "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange", The American Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. 4. pp. 519-540 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(19831982)%20-%20Credible%20Commitments20Relaxing%20Using20price%20Hostages20competition%20to20through%20Support20product%20Exchange20differentiation.pdf pdf]

==Polictical Science==Tadelis====See notes on Steve's innovation section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Strategy%20Notes.pdf here].

===Dal Bo===#Barro[[Holmstrom Roberts (1999) - The Boundaries Of The Firm Revisited| Holmstrom, R. Bengt and John Roberts (19731999)]], "The Boundaries Of The Control Firm Revisited," Journal of Politicians: An Economic ModelPerspectives, Public Choice 14 Vol. 12(September4), 19Pages 73-42. 94 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BarroHolmstrom%20Roberts%20(19731999)%20-%20The%20Control20Boundaries%20of20Of%20Politicians20The%20An20Firm%20Economic%20Model20Revisited.pdf pdf]#Becker[[Holmstrom, G. Bengt and Paul Milgrom (19831994)“The Firm as an Incentive System, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”]] American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98vol. 84(34), 371pages 972-40091, September. #[http[Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard (2003) “Make versus Buy in Trucking://wwwAsset Ownership, Job Design, and Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%2093(19833)%20, pp. 551-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf572]]#Becker[[Baker Hubbard (2004) - Contractibility And Asset Ownership |Baker, G. George and G. Stigler Thomas Hubbard (19742004)]], Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and the Compensation of EnforcersGovernance in U.S. Trucking", Quarterly Journal of Legal Studies 3Economics, 119, 1pp.1443-1979. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BeckerBaker%20Stigler20Hubbard%20(19742004)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance20Contractibility%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of20Asset%20Enforcers20Ownership.pdf pdf]#Coate[[Grossman Hart (1986) - The Costs And Benefits Of Ownership |Grossman, SSanford J. and SOliver D. Morris Hart (19951986)]], On the Form "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Transfers to Special InterestsVertical Integration", Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210vol.94, pp. 691-35719. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/CoateGrossman%20Morris20Hart%20(19951986)%20-%20On20The%20Costs%20the20and%20Form20Benefits%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests20Ownership.pdf pdf]#Dal Bó, E. (2007), Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20[Holmstrom Milgrom (20071991)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] Multi Task Principal Agent Analyses |#Dixit, A.Holmstrom, G. Grossman Bengt and E. Helpman Paul Milgrom (19971991)]], Common Agency and Coordination"Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: General Theory Linear Contracts, Asset Ownership and Application to Government Policy MakingJob Design", Journal of Political Economy 105Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, 752pp. 24-6952. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/DixitHolmstrom%20Grossman%20Helpman20Milgrom%20(19971991)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application20Multi%20to20Task%20Government20Principal%20Policy20Agent%20Making20Analyses.pdf pdf]#Ferejohn[[Gibbons (2005) - Four Formalizable Theories Of The Firm |Gibbons, J. Robert (19862005)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50"Four formal(1-3izable)theories of the firm?", 5Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 58, pp.200-25245. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/FerejohnGibbons%20(19862005)%20-%20Incumbent20Four%20Performance20formalizable%20and20theories%20of%20Electoral20the%20Control20firm.pdf pdf]#Grossman[[Alonso Dessein Matouschek (2008) - When Does Coordination Require Centralization| Alonso, Ricardo, G. Wouter Dessein and E. Helpman Niko Matouschek (19942008)]], Protection for Sale, "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?" American Economic Review 84, 833Vol. 98(1), pp. 145-50179. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/GrossmanAlonso%20Dessein%20Helpman20Matouschek%20(19942008)%20-%20Protection20When%20for20Does%20Sale20Coordination%20Require%20Centralization.pdf pdf]#Messner[[Bolton Farrell (1990) - Decentralization Duplication And Delay |Bolton, M. Patrick and M. Polborn Joseph Farrell (20041990)]], Voting on Majority Rules"Decentralization, Review Duplication And Delay," Journal of Economic Studies 71(1)Political Economy, 98, 115pp. 803-13226. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/MessnerBolton%20Polborn20Farrell%20(20041990)%20-%20Voting20Decentralization%20on20Duplication%20Majority20And%20Rules20Delay.pdf pdf]#Tullock[[Bloom, Nicholas, G. Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen (19672009), The Welfare Costs “The Organization of MonopoliesFirms Across Countries, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. ”]] NBER Working Paper 15129 (["http://www.edeganstanford.comedu/pdfs~nbloom/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theftw15129.pdf pdf" link])

====de Figueiredo====#Alesina[[Villalonga, A. and AB. Drazen (19912004), Why are Stabilizations Delayed"Diversification discount or premium?New evidence from the business information tracking series"]], Journal of Finance, American Economic Review 8159, 1170pp.479-1188506. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20DrazenVillalonga%20(19912004)%20-%20Why20Diversification%20are20discount%20Stabilizations20or%20Delayed20premium.pdf pdf]#Alesina[[Teece Pisano Shuen (1997) - Dynamic Capabilities And Strategic Management |Teece, D., AG. Pisano and DA. Rodrik Shuen (19941997)]], Distributive Politics "Dynamic capabilities and Economic Growthstrategic management", Quarterly Strategic Management Journal of Economics 109, 46518, pp.509-490533. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AlesinaTeece%20Pisano%20Rodrik20Shuen%20(19941997)%20-%20Distributive20Dynamic%20Politics20capabilities%20and%20Economic20strategic%20Growth20management.pdf pdf]#[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | BaronCockburn, I. M., R. Henderson, Dand S. Stern (20012000), Theories "Untangling the origins of Strategic Nonmarket Participationcompetitive advantage"]] : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Strategic Management Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 721, pp.1123-451145. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BaronCockburn%20Henderson%20Stern%20(20012000)%20-%20Theories20Untangling%20of20the%20Strategic20origins%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority20of%20Rule20competitive%20and%20Executive%20Institutions20advantage.pdf pdf] (#[[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Eisenhardt Martin (20012000)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20InstitutionsDynamic Capabilities What Are They |Eisenhardt, K.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])#Baron, D. and DJ. Diermeier Martin (20072000)]], "Dynamic capabilities: what are they?", Strategic Activism and Nonmarket StrategyManagement Journal, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1621, 599-634. [http://www.edeganpp.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%201105-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy1121.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/BaronEisenhardt%20Diermeier20Martin%20(20062000)%20-%20Strategic20Dynamic%20Activism20capabilities%20and20what%20Nonmarket20are%20Strategy20they.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])#Baron, D[[Schoar A. and J. Ferejohn (19892002), Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 Effects of corporate Diversification on Productivity]]. Journal of Finance 57 (December2), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%202379-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures2403.pdf pdf]#de Figueiredo[[Montgomery, R. J. PC. JrB. and G. Edwards Wernerfelt (20071988), Does Private Money Buy Public Policy"Diversification, Ricardian rents and Tobin? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunicationss q"]], Rand Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 54719, pp.623-576 632. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredoMontgomery%20Edwards20Wernerfelt%20(20071988)%20-%20Does20Diversification%20Private20Ricardian%20Money20rents%20Buy20and%20Public20Tobins%20Policy20q.pdf pdf]#de Figueiredo[[Campa, R. J. PM., Jrand S. Kedia (2002), Electoral Competition"Explaining the diversification discount"]], Political UncertaintyJournal of Finance, and Policy Insulation57, American Political Science Review 96, 321pp.1731-3331762. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredoCampa%20Kedia%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral20Explaining%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and20the%20Policy20diversification%20Insulation20discount.pdf pdf]#Fearon[[Teece, JD. (19941980), Rationalist Explanations for War"Economies of scope, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]#Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence scope of Individual-Specific Uncertaintythe enterprise"]], American Journal of Economic Review 81Behavior and organization, 1, 1146pp.223-1155247. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20RodrikTeece%20(19911980)%20-%20Resistance20Economies%20to20of%20Reform20scope%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in20and%20the%20Presence20scope%20of%20Individual20the%20Specific%20Uncertainty20enterprise.pdf pdf]#Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel [[Teece (19871982), Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: Towards An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment ProceduresEconomic Theory Of The Multiproduct Firm |Teece, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edeganD.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(19871982)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]#Ting, Michael (2009)], "Organizational CapacityTowards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm", forthcoming JLEOJournal of Economic Behavior and organization, 3, [http://wwwpp.columbia39-63.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/TingTeece%20(20091982)%20-%20Organizational20Towards%20Capacity.pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting20an%20(2009)20economic%20-20theory%20Organisational20of%20Capacity20the%20--20multiproduct%20Slides%20Set120firm.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek)

==Auctions and Contracts=Institutions ===See also: [[ECON224]]====Tadelis====See Notes from Steve's institution section [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Steve%20Tadelis%20Institutions%20Notes.pdf here].

===Morgan===#Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994), "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. * [[http://linksPrendergast.jstorC.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E21999.0"The Provision of Incentives in Firms.CO%3B2-G link"]] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20Journal of Economic Literature, 37(19941)%20:7-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf]63#[[Baye Morgan Scholten 2006 - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan* Holmstrom, and Patrick Scholten Bengt (20061982) Moral Hazard in Teams, "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion,"]] Handbook Bell Journal of Economics and Information Systems 13(T. Hendershott, ed.2), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. :324-340 * [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20Klein Crawford Alchian (20061978)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdfVertical Integration Appropriable Rents And The Competitive Contracting Process]]#Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003) "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 34, No. 21(2. (Summer), pp. 309:297-328326. * [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28200322%2934%3A2%3C309%3AC%26ECAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Caillaud%20Jullien%20Grossman Hart (20031986)%20-%20Chicken%20and%20Egg.pdf pdfThe Costs And Benefits Of Ownership]]#Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority : A Theory of Vertical and Communication in Organizations"Lateral Integration, The Review Journal of Economic StudiesPolitical Economy, Vol. 69, No. 4. 94(Oct.3), pp. 811691-838719. * [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]#Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, DrewTadelis, Steven and Möbius, Markus Oliver Williamson (20042011), "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30Transaction-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 linkCost Economics] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]#Grossman, Gene to appear in Robert Gibbons and Elhanan Helpman (2001)John Roberts, "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5Eds. The Handbook of Organizational Economics, MIT Princeton University Press#Hart* Levin, Oliver and John Moore Jonathan (19882003) "Relational incentive contracts, "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation" American Economic Review, Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. 93(Jul.3), pp. 755-785:835l857. * [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20Garicano (19882000)%20-%20Incomplete%20Contracts%20and%20Renegotiation.pdf pdfHierarchies And The Organization Of Knowledge In Production]]#Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008), "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4Political Economy, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20108(20085)%20:874-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitment904.pdf pdf]

===Tadelis=Yuchtman====#Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. * [[North & Weingast (1989)]]* [[Naidu (20002010) "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting]]* [[Grief (1993)]]* [[Clark (1985)]]* [http: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. [http:////www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/BanerjeeLa%20Porta%20Duflo20et%20(2000)20al%20-%20Reputation282008%20Effects29%20and%20the20Summary.pdf La Porta et al (2008)]* [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Hansmann%20%20Limits281988%20of29%20Contracting20Summary.pdf pdfHansmann (1988)]#Cabral, Luis and Ali Hortacsu (2008) "Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay" forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics [http:* [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/CabralBubb%20Hortacsu20and%20(2008)20Kaufman%20-%20Dynamics%20of282009%20Seller29%20Reputation20Summary.pdf pdfBubb (2009)]#Diamond, D. (1989), "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 * [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/DiamondLevin%20and%20(1989)20Tadelis%20-%20Reputation%20Acquisition%20in282005%20Debt29%20Markets20Summary.pdf pdfLevin and Tadelis (2005)]#ForbesFor the Papers below, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009) "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. [httpsee summaries [http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Forbes279D%20%28Noam%20Lederman%20(2009)29%20-%20Adaptation%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Airline20Paper%20Industry20Summaries.pdf pdfhere]. #Gibbons, R. * Acemoglu and K.J. Murphy Pischke (19921998), "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100* Manning (2003)* Lazear (32000): 468 505. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20Murphy%20* Bandiera et al (19922007)%20-%20Optimal%20Incentive%20Contracts%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Career%20Concerns.pdf pdf] ===Polictical Science=== ====Dal Bo====#Goldberg[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, Victor PR. (19771973) "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information]]," Bell Journal The Control of Economics, 8Politicians:250An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-261 42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/GoldbergBarro%20(19771973)%20-%20Competitive20The%20Bidding20Control%20and%20the20of%20Production20Politicians%20of20An%20Precontract20Economic%20Information20Model.pdf pdf]#Holmstrom B., (1999) "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 [http[http://www.edegan.com/pdfsrepository/Holmstrom%20PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])#[[Becker (19991983)%20-%20Managerial%20Incentive%20Problems.pdf pdf]#JinA Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. and P. Leslie (20091983) "Reputational Incentives ]], A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Restaurant Hygiene"Political Influence, American Economic Quarterly Journal: Microeconomics, 1of Economics 98(13): 237, 371-67 (Supplemental Reading) 400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Jin%20LeslieBecker%20(20091983)%20-%20Reputational20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Incentives20Groups%20for%20Restaurant20Political%20Hygiene20Influence.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])#Kreps[[Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers |Becker, DG. and G. Stigler (19901974), "Corporate Culture ]], Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Economic Theorythe Compensation of Enforcers," in J. Alt and K. ShepsleJournal of Legal Studies 3, Eds1-19. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through [http[http://bookswww.googleedegan.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JBrDXvyepdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-1UC&oi=fnd&pg=PA221&dq=Kreps,+D.++%22Corporate+Culture+and+Economic+Theory&ots=d4JUQusjjf&sig=7RVgXjAlocVC8FDJd2Ke1MsbjxY Google Books20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf])#Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008) "Contracting for Government Services([http: Theory and Evidence from U//www.Sedegan. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economicscom/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8. pdf Slides #8])#[[http://wwwCoate Morris (1995) - On The Form Of Transfers To Special Interests |Coate, S.edeganand S.com/pdfsMorris (1995)]], On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/LevinCoate%20Tadelis20Morris%20(20081995)%20-%20Contracting20On%20for20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Government20Special%20Services20Interests.pdf pdf]([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])#McDevitt, Ryan [[Dal Bo (20102007) "A Business by Any Other Name: Firm Name Choice as a Signal of Firm Quality- Bribing Voters |Dal Bó, E.," mimeo, northwestern university (pdf not available at this time2007) #McDevitt]], Ryan (2010) "Names and Reputations: An Empirical AnalysisBribing Voters," mimeoAmerican Journal of Political Science, northwestern university 51(pdf not available at this time) #Tadelis, S. (2001) "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 [http://www.edegan.com4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Slides #4]) #[[Dixit Grossman Helpman (1997) - Common Agency And Coordination General Theory And Application To Government Policy Making |Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997)]], Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])#[[Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control |Ferejohn, J. (1986)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])#[[Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale |Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994)]], Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])#[[Messner Polborn (2004) - Voting On Majority Rules |Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004)]], Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Slides #2])#[[Tullock (1967) - The Welfare Costs Of Monopolies Tariffs And Theft |Tullock, G. (1967)]], The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6]) Slide Sets referenced are:*'''Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Slides #2])*'''Externalities in voting games''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Slides #4])*'''The efficiency of democracy''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])*'''Competition and influence''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])*'''Corruption deterrence''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Slides #8])*'''The electoral control of politicians''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9]) ====de Figueiredo==== See also: [[BPP Political Science]]#'''[[Alesina Drazen (1991) - Why Are Stabilizations Delayed |Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991)]]''', Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]#'''[[Austensmith Feddersen (2008) - Public Disclosure Private Revelation Or Silence |Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008)]]''', Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides])#'''[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001)]]''', Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])#'''[[Baron Diermeier (2006) - Strategic Activism And Nonmarket Strategy |Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007)]]''', Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])#'''[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures |Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989)]]''', Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]#'''[[de Figueiredo Edwards (2007) - Does Private Money Buy Public Policy |de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007)]]''', Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]#'''[[de Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation |de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002)]]''', Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf]#'''[[Fearon (1994) - Rationalist Explanations For War |Fearon, J. (1994)]]''', Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]#'''[[Fernandez Rodrik (1991) - Resistance To Reform Status Quo Bias In The Presence Of Individual Specific Uncertainty |Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991)]]''', Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]#'''[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees |Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]]''', Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]#'''[[Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity |Ting, Michael (2009)]]''', "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek) ===Auctions and Contracts===See [[PHDBA279B]]. ====Morgan==== #[[Aghion Dewatripont Rey (1994) - Renegotiation Design With Unverifiable Information |Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994)]], "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information", Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 2. (Mar.), pp. 257-282. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199403%2962%3A2%3C257%3ARDWUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Aghion%20Dewatripont%20Rey%20(1994)%20-%20Renegotiation%20Design%20with%20Unverifiable%20Information.pdf pdf]#'''[[Baye Morgan Scholten (2006) - Information Search and Price Dispersion | Baye, Michael R., John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten (2006)]]''', "Information, Search, and Price Dispersion," Handbook of Economics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Elsevier Press, Amsterdam. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baye%20Morgan%20Scholten%20(2006)%20-%20Information%20Search%20and%20Price%20Dispersion.pdf pdf]#'''[[Caillaud Jullien (2003) - Chicken And Egg |Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003)]]''', "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Summer), pp. 309-328. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28200322%2934%3A2%3C309%3AC%26ECAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Caillaud%20Jullien%20(2003)%20-%20Chicken%20and%20Egg.pdf pdf]#[[Dessein (2002) - Authority And Communication In Organizations |Dessein, Wouter (2002)]], "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]#[[Ellison Fudenberg Mobius (2004) - Competing Auctions |Ellison, Glenn, Fudenberg, Drew, and Möbius, Markus (2004)]], "Competing Auctions", Journal of the European Economic Association, Mar, Vol. 2 Issue 1, p30-66 [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/154247604323015472 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ellison%20Fudenberg%20Mobius%20(2004)%20-%20Competing%20Auctions.pdf pdf]#'''[[Grossman Helpman (2001) - Special Interest Politics Chapters 4 And 5 |Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (2001)]]''', "Special Interest Politics", Chapters 4 and 5, MIT Press [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(2001)%20-%20Special%20Interest%20Politics%20Chapters%204%20And%205.pdf pdf]#[[Hart Moore (1988) - Incomplete Contracts And Renegotiation |Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1988)]], "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation", Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Jul.), pp. 755-785. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198807%2956%3A4%3C755%3AICAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Hart%20Moore%20(1988)%20-%20Incomplete%20Contracts%20and%20Renegotiation.pdf pdf]#'''[[Konrad (2007) - Strategy In Contests-An Introduction |Konrad, Kai A. (2007)]]''', "Strategy in Contests-An Introduction", WZB-Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960458 link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Konrad%20(2007)%20-%20Strategy%20in%20Contests-An%20Introduction.pdf pdf]#[[Krishna Morgan (2008) - Contracting For Information Under Imperfect Commitment |Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2008)]], "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment", RAND Journal of Economics, Winter, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 905-925. [http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Contracts.pdf link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20information%20under%20imperfect%20commitment.pdf pdf] The following class notes (from a previous year) may be useful:*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes1-Introduction.pdf Introduction]*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes2-Auctions.pdf Auctions]*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes3-AdverseSelection.pdf Adverse Selection]*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes4-Contests.pdf Contests]*[http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279B-Notes5-CostlessSignaling.pdf Costless Signalling] ====Tadelis====#[[Banerjee Duflo (2000) - Reputation Effects And The Limits Of Contracting |Banerjee, A. and Duflo E. (2000)]], "Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:989-1018. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Banerjee%20Duflo%20(2000)%20-%20Reputation%20Effects%20and%20the%20Limits%20of%20Contracting.pdf pdf]#'''[[Diamond (1989) - Reputation Acquisition In Debt Markets |Diamond, D. (1989)]]''', "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 828 862 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Diamond%20(1989)%20-%20Reputation%20Acquisition%20in%20Debt%20Markets.pdf pdf]#[[Forbes Lederman (2009) - Adaptation And Vertical Integration In The Airline Industry |Forbes, Silke J. and Mara Lederman, (2009)]], "Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry," American Economic Review, forthcoming. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Forbes%20Lederman%20(2009)%20-%20Adaptation%20and%20Vertical%20Integration%20in%20the%20Airline%20Industry.pdf pdf]#'''[[Gibbons Murphy (1992) - Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns |Gibbons, R. and K.J. Murphy (1992)]]''', "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, 100(3): 468 505. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gibbons%20Murphy%20(1992)%20-%20Optimal%20Incentive%20Contracts%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Career%20Concerns.pdf pdf]#'''[[Goldberg (1977) - Competitive Bidding And The Production Of Precontract Information |Goldberg, Victor P. (1977)]]''', "Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information," Bell Journal of Economics, 8:250-261 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Goldberg%20(1977)%20-%20Competitive%20Bidding%20and%20the%20Production%20of%20Precontract%20Information.pdf pdf]#'''[[Holmstrom (1999) - Managerial Incentive Problems |Holmstrom B., (1999)]]''', "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, 66(1): 169-182 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Holmstrom%20(1999)%20-%20Managerial%20Incentive%20Problems.pdf pdf]#'''[[Kreps (1990) - Corporate Culture And Economic Theory |Kreps, D. (1990)]]''', "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press (Book excerpts available through [http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JBrDXvye-1UC&oi=fnd&pg=PA221&dq=Kreps,+D.++%22Corporate+Culture+and+Economic+Theory&ots=d4JUQusjjf&sig=7RVgXjAlocVC8FDJd2Ke1MsbjxY Google Books])#[[Levin Tadelis (2008) - Contracting For Government Services |Levin, Jonathan and Steven Tadelis (2008)]], "Contracting for Government Services: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Cities," forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Levin%20Tadelis%20(2008)%20-%20Contracting%20for%20Government%20Services.pdf pdf]#'''[[Tadelis (2001) - The Market For Reputations As An Incentive Mechanism |Tadelis, S. (2001)]]''', "The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy 110(4):854-882 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tadelis%20(2001)%20-%20The%20Market%20for%20Reputations%20as%20an%20Incentive%20Mechanism.pdf pdf]#'''[[Williamson (1971) - The Vertical Integration Of Production |Williamson, Oliver E. (1971)]]''', "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, 61:112-23. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Williamson%20(1971)%20-%20The%20Vertical%20Integration%20of%20Production.pdf pdf]