Difference between revisions of "BPP Field Exam 2010 Answers"
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<b>Relevant papers</b>: | <b>Relevant papers</b>: | ||
| − | * | + | * [http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3003457.pdf?acceptTC=true Holmstrom (1982), Moral Hazard in Teams]. Not on reading list. |
| − | * | + | * [http://www.edegan.com/wiki/index.php/Holmstrom_%281999%29_-_The_Firm_As_A_Subeconomy Holmstrom (1999), Firm as Subeconomy], not on reading list. |
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===Question C1: Agenda Control and Status Quo=== | ===Question C1: Agenda Control and Status Quo=== | ||
Revision as of 18:34, 28 March 2011
- This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam
- This page is provides answers to the BPP Field Exam 2010
Question B1: Production in Teams
Relevant papers:
- Holmstrom (1982), Moral Hazard in Teams. Not on reading list.
- Holmstrom (1999), Firm as Subeconomy, not on reading list.
1.
Notes about assumptions:
- The prompt does not explicitly say that everyone must receive the same share. Nonetheless, many of the relevant papers assume that this is the case. As such, will solve the problem both ways.
- The prompt also does not explicitly require a balanced budget. However, no source of funding for the agents is mentioned besides the combined output V of the individual agents. As such, I will assume that the budget balance restriction must hold.
(a) My answer, assuming that some shares can be different.
(b) My answer, assuming that all shares must be equal.
2.
3.
Question C1: Agenda Control and Status Quo
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
