Difference between revisions of "BPP Field Exam Papers 2012"

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*Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2006)%20-%20Committees%20With%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Yield%20Commitment%20With%20Flexibility.pdf pdf]
 
*Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2006)%20-%20Committees%20With%20Supermajority%20Voting%20Yield%20Commitment%20With%20Flexibility.pdf pdf]
  
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#[[Barro (1973) - The Control Of Politicians An Economic Model |Barro, R. (1973)]], The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Public Choice 14 (September), 19-42. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Barro%20(1973)%20-%20The%20Control%20of%20Politicians%20An%20Economic%20Model.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])
+
===Rui's Paper List===
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#[[Becker (1983) - A Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence |Becker, G. (1983)]], A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3), 371-400. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20(1983)%20-%20A%20Theory%20of%20Competition%20Among%20Pressure%20Groups%20for%20Political%20Influence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])
 
−
#[[Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers |Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974)]], Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Becker%20Stigler%20(1974)%20-%20Law%20Enforcement%20Malfeasance%20and%20the%20Compensation%20of%20Enforcers.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Slides #8])
 
−
#[[Coate Morris (1995) - On The Form Of Transfers To Special Interests |Coate, S. and S. Morris (1995)]], On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1210-35. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Coate%20Morris%20(1995)%20-%20On%20the%20Form%20of%20Transfers%20to%20Special%20Interests.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])
 
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#[[Dal Bo (2007) - Bribing Voters |Dal Bó, E. (2007)]], Bribing Voters, American Journal of Political Science, 51(4). [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dal%20Bo%20(2007)%20-%20Bribing%20Voters.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Slides #4])
 
−
#[[Dixit Grossman Helpman (1997) - Common Agency And Coordination General Theory And Application To Government Policy Making |Dixit, A., G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1997)]], Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making, Journal of Political Economy 105, 752-69. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dixit%20Grossman%20Helpman%20(1997)%20-%20Common%20Agency%20and%20Coordination%20General%20Theory%20and%20Application%20to%20Government%20Policy%20Making.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])
 
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#[[Ferejohn (1986) - Incumbent Performance And Electoral Control |Ferejohn, J. (1986)]], Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, Public Choice 50(1-3), 5-25. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ferejohn%20(1986)%20-%20Incumbent%20Performance%20and%20Electoral%20Control.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])
 
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#[[Grossman Helpman (1994) - Protection For Sale |Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994)]], Protection for Sale, American Economic Review 84, 833-50. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Grossman%20Helpman%20(1994)%20-%20Protection%20for%20Sale.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])
 
−
#[[Messner Polborn (2004) - Voting On Majority Rules |Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004)]], Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Messner%20Polborn%20(2004)%20-%20Voting%20on%20Majority%20Rules.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Slides #2])
 
−
#[[Tullock (1967) - The Welfare Costs Of Monopolies Tariffs And Theft |Tullock, G. (1967)]], The Welfare Costs of Monopolies, Tariffs, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 224-32. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Tullock%20(1967)%20-%20The%20Welfare%20Costs%20of%20Monopolies%20Tariffs%20and%20Theft.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])
 
  
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Slide Sets referenced are:
+
The paper list by class number is as follows ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/PHDBA279A2.zip Zip of part 2 papers]):
−
*'''Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture2.pdf Slides #2])
+
 
−
*'''Externalities in voting games''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture4.pdf Slides #4])
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3-4.) '''Models of Legislative Policymaking'''  
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*'''The efficiency of democracy''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture6.pdf Slides #6])
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*[[Weingast, B. (1979), A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms]], American Journal of Political Science 23, 245-262. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Weingast%20(1979)%20-%20A%20Rational%20Choice%20Perspective%20on%20Congressional%20Norms.pdf pdf]
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*'''Competition and influence''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture7.pdf Slides #7])
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*[[Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures |Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn (1989)]], Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (December), 1181. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Ferejohn%20(1989)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20Legislatures.pdf pdf]
−
*'''Corruption deterrence''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture8.pdf Slides #8])
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*[[Baron, D. (1991), Bargaining Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control]], American Journal of Political Science  35, 57-90. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(1991)%20-%20Bargaining%20Majoritarian%20Incentives%20Pork%20Barrel%20Programs%20and%20Procedural%20Control.pdf pdf]
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*'''The electoral control of politicians''' ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/PHDBA279A-Lecture9.pdf Slides #9])
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*[[Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees |Gilligan, T. and K. Krehbiel (1987)]], Collective Decision-making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3, 287 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Gilligan%20Krehbiel%20(1987)%20-%20Collective%20Decision%20making%20and%20Standing%20Committees.pdf pdf]
 +
*Krishna, V.  and J. Morgan (2001), Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments, ,American Political Science Review 95, 435-452 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Krishna%20Morgan%20(2001)%20-%20Asymmetric%20Information%20and%20Legislative%20Rules.pdf pdf]
 +
*Battaglini, M. (2002), Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk, Econometrica 70, 1379-1401. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Battaglini%20(2002)%20-%20Multiple%20Referrals%20and%20Multidimensional%20Cheap%20Talk.pdf pdf]
 +
 
 +
7.) '''Applications to Non-Market Strategy'''
 +
*[[Baron 2001 - Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation | Baron, D. (2001), Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation]] : Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10, 7-45. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20(2001)%20-%20Theories%20of%20Strategic%20Nonmarket%20Participation%20Majority%20Rule%20and%20Executive%20Institutions.pdf 1999 Working Paper pdf])
 +
*[[de Figueiredo Edwards (2007) - Does Private Money Buy Public Policy |de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2007)]], Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 547-576 [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2007)%20-%20Does%20Private%20Money%20Buy%20Public%20Policy.pdf pdf]
 +
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P. Jr. and G. Edwards (2009), The Market For Legislative Influence Over Regulatory Policy, Berkeley Haas School Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Edwards%20(2009)%20-%20The%20Market%20For%20Legislative%20Influence%20Over%20Regulatory%20Policy.pdf pdf]
 +
*[[Baron Diermeier (2006) - Strategic Activism And Nonmarket Strategy |Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2007)]], Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16, 599-634. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2007)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Baron%20Diermeier%20(2006)%20-%20Strategic%20Activism%20and%20Nonmarket%20Strategy.pdf 2006 Draft Paper pdf])
 +
 
 +
13.) '''Whistleblowing and Delay'''
 +
*[[Austensmith Feddersen (2008) - Public Disclosure Private Revelation Or Silence |Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen (2008)]], Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy, Kellogg School of Management Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/AustenSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Public%20Disclosure%20Private%20Revelation%20or%20Silence.pdf pdf] ([http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Handout.pdf Class Handout] and [http://www.edegan.com/repository/AustinSmith%20Feddersen%20(2008)%20-%20Whistleblowing%20--%20Slides.ppt Class Slides])
 +
*Dyck, A., A. Morse, and L. Zingales (2008), Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? Chicago Booth School of  Business Working Paper. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dyck%20Morse%20Zingales%20(2008)%20-%20Who%20Blows%20the%20Whistle%20on%20Corporate%20Fraud.pdf pdf]
 +
*[[Alesina Drazen (1991) - Why Are Stabilizations Delayed |Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991)]], Why are Stabilizations Delayed?, American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Drazen%20(1991)%20-%20Why%20are%20Stabilizations%20Delayed.pdf pdf]
 +
 
 +
14.) '''Economic Policymaking '''
 +
*[[Fernandez Rodrik (1991) - Resistance To Reform Status Quo Bias In The Presence Of Individual Specific Uncertainty |Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991)]], Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fernandez%20Rodrik%20(1991)%20-%20Resistance%20to%20Reform%20Status%20Quo%20Bias%20in%20the%20Presence%20of%20Individual%20Specific%20Uncertainty.pdf pdf]
 +
*[[Fearon (1994) - Rationalist Explanations For War |Fearon, J.  (1994)]], Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, 379-414. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Fearon%20(1994)%20-%20Rationalist%20Explanations%20for%20War.pdf pdf]
 +
 
 +
15,16.) '''Political Competition and Conflict in Weakly Institutionalized Environments'''
 +
*Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Alesina%20Rodrik%20(1994)%20-%20Distributive%20Politics%20and%20Economic%20Growth.pdf pdf]
 +
*Powell, R. (1996), Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, Games and Economic Behavior 15, 255-289.[http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(1996)%20-%20Bargaining%20in%20the%20Shadow%20of%20Power%20Games%20and%20Economic%20Behavior.pdf pdf]
 +
*de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization  21, 103-135. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20Weingast%20(2005)%20-%20Self-Enforcing%20Federalism,%20Journal%20of%20Law.pdf pdf]
 +
*[[de Figueiredo (2002) - Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty And Policy Insulation |de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002)]], Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/deFigueiredo%20(2002)%20-%20Electoral%20Competition%20Political%20Uncertainty%20and%20Policy%20Insulation.pdf pdf]
 +
*Powell, R. (2004), The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information, American Political Science Review 98, 231-241. [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Powell%20(2004)%20-%20The%20Inefficient%20Use%20of%20Power%20Costly%20Conflict%20with%20Complete%20Information.pdf pdf]
 +
 
 +
 
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See also: [[BPP Political Science]]
  
 
===Innovation (Mowery)===
 
===Innovation (Mowery)===

Revision as of 13:54, 14 May 2012

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  • This page is included under the section BPP Field Exam
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*This page is referenced in [[BPP Field Exam Papers]]

NOTE: This is for 2012. For 2011, see BPP Field Exam Papers For 2010, see 2010 BPP Field Exam Papers.

Polictical Science

Dal Bo

Class 1: Spacial Voting and Legislative institutions

1.) Spatial voting and legislative institutions (Lecture 1 Class Slides)

  • Shepsle, K. (1979), Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, American Journal of Political Science 23, 27-59. pdf
  • Shepsle, K. and B. Weingast (1981), "Structure Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, Public Choice", 37, 503-19. pdf
  • Romer, T. and H. Rosenthal (1978), "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo, Public Choice", 33, 27-43. pdf
  • McKelvey, R. (1976), Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control, Journal of Economic Theory 12, 472?482. pdf

2.) Voting institutions, commitment vs flexibility, and gridlock (Lecture 2 Class Slides)

  • Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules, Review of Economic Studies 71(1), 115-132. pdf
  • Knight, B. (2000), Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States, Journal of Public Economics 76(1). pdf. Presentation in 2011 version of class: pdf.
  • Dal Bó, E. (2006), Committees With Supermajority Voting Yield Commitment With Flexibility, Journal of Public Economics 90(4). pdf

Rui's Paper List

The paper list by class number is as follows (Zip of part 2 papers):

3-4.) Models of Legislative Policymaking

7.) Applications to Non-Market Strategy

13.) Whistleblowing and Delay

14.) Economic Policymaking

15,16.) Political Competition and Conflict in Weakly Institutionalized Environments

  • Alesina, A. and D. Rodrik (1994), Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 465-490. pdf
  • Powell, R. (1996), Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, Games and Economic Behavior 15, 255-289.pdf
  • de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. and B. Weingast (2005), Self-Enforcing Federalism, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 21, 103-135. pdf
  • de Figueiredo, R. J. P., Jr. (2002), Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, American Political Science Review 96, 321-333. pdf
  • Powell, R. (2004), The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information, American Political Science Review 98, 231-241. pdf


See also: BPP Political Science

Innovation (Mowery)

See also: BPP Innovation

  1. S. Klepper - Silicon Valley—A chip off the old Detroit bloc
  2. P. Anderson and M. Tushman: Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Design: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change.
  3. Agrawal A., and R. Henderson (2002), "Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT", Management Science. pdf
  4. Arrow, K.J. (1958), "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation" in idem., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. pdf
  5. Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation," Administrative Sciences Quarterly 35, 569-596. pdf
  6. Gompers, P., J. Lerner, and D. Sharfstein (2003), "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986-1999," NBER working paper #9816. pdf
  7. Henderson R.M. & K.B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms", Administrative Science Quarterly. pdf
  8. Mowery D., & A. Ziedonis, (2001), "Numbers, Quality, & Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?", in Innovation Policy and the Economy, NBER. pdf
  9. Teece, D.J. (1986), "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing, and public policy," Research Policy. pdf
  10. Ziedonis, R.H. (2004), "Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms", Management Science. pdf
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