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filename={Balasubramanian Sivadasan (2011) - What Happens When Firms Patent.pdf}
tags={complementary patents, patent pools, },
filename={Brenner (2009) - Optimal Formation Rules For Patent Pools.pdf}
title={Intellectual Property Rights as Strategic Assets: The Case of European Patent Opposition in the Telecommunications Industry},
author={Calderini, M. and Scellato, G.},
journal={CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita'Bocconi, Working Paper},
abstract={The paper empirically investigates the phenomenon of patent litigation through the analysis of the all population of European patents’ opposition cases in the telecommunication industry. We recover the complete legal history of each dispute and the patent portfolios of the firms involved. We suggest that in an industry characterised by strong technological complementarities the distribution of patent rights may induce situations of mutual hold-up among innovators. The risk of retaliation through counter- suits represents a credible threat that can eventually favour the instauration of collusive behaviours. Our results confirm this hypothesis, since the occurrence of patent oppositions among large incumbents is significantly lower than industry average.},
research_type={Theory, summary statistics},
industry={Telecommunications, ICT},
tags={patent portfolios, strategic use of patents, retaliation risk},
filename={Calderini Scellato (2004) - Intellectual Property Rights As Strategic Assets.pdf}
filename={Clark Konrad (2008) - Fragmented Property Rights And Incentives For R And D.pdf}
title={Protecting their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)},
author={Cohen, W.M. and Nelson, R.R. and Walsh, J.P.},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
abstract={Based on a survey questionnaire administered to 1478 R&D labs in the U.S. manufacturing sector in 1994, we find that firms typically protect the profits due to invention with a range of mechanisms, including patents, secrecy, lead time advantages and the use of marketing complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities Of these mechanisms, however, patents tend to be the least emphasized by firms in the majority of manufacturing industries, and secrecy and lead time tend to be emphasized most heavily.A comparison of our results with the earlier survey findings of Levin et al.[1987]sugest that patents may be relied upon somewhat more heavily by larger firms now than in the early 1980s.For the protection of product innovations, secrecy now appears to be much more heavily employed across most industries than previously Our results on the motives to patent indicate that firms patent for reasons that often extend beyond directly profiting from a patented innovation through either its comercialization or licensing.In addition to the prevention of copying,the most prominent motives for patenting include the prevention of rivals from patenting related inventions (i.e.,"patent blocking"),the use of patents in negotiations and the prevention of suits. We find that firms commonly patent for different reasons in "discrete" product industries, such as chemicals, versus "complex" product industries, such as telecommunications equipment or semiconductors. In the former, firms appear to use their patents commonly to block the development of substitutes by rivals, and in the later, firms are much more likely to use patents to force rivals into negotiations.},
industry={General, Manufacturing},
thicket_stance_extract={Our data do not show the degree to which patent portfolio races distort the nature of R&D incentives or lead to socially wasteful outcomes, or whether such portfolio races or patent thickets actually block entry. Nor do they indicate whether fee stacking or the breakdown of negotiations in complex technology industries have ever undermined the commercialization of innovation. The data do suggest, however, that the potential for such outcomes may be more pervasive than previously thought.},
thicket_def_extract={For example, the building of patent fences can be carried to the extreme noted by Scherer [1980] and others to the point of creating "patent thickets" that foster broader monopolies than anticipated by patent policy which in turn impede entry and the innovation that may accompany it.},
tags={patenting strategy, patent portfolio races},
filename={Cohen Nelson Walsh (2000) - Protecting Their Intellectual Assets.pdf}
tags={Citation Networks},
filename={Csardi (2007) - Modeling Innovation By A Kinetic Description Of The Patent Citation System.pdf}
title={Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology-An Empirical Analysis of Trolls' Patent Acquisitions},
author={Fischer, T. and Henkel, J.},
journal={Available at SSRN 1523102},
abstract={Patent trolls appropriate profits from innovation solely by enforcing patents against infringers. They are often characterized as relying on low-quality patents, an assessment that, if correct, would imply that eradicating such patents would effectively terminate the troll business. In this paper, we shed light on this issue by empirically analyzing trolls’ patent acquisitions. We draw on a unique dataset of 565 patents acquired by known patent trolls between 1997 and 2007, which we compare to 1,130 patents acquired by practicing firms. Our findings regarding patent characteristics support recent theoretical propositions about the troll business model. Trolls focus on patents that have a broad scope and that lie in patent thickets. Surprisingly, and contrary to common belief, we find that troll patents are of significantly higher quality than those in the control group. This result implies that elevating minimum patent quality will not put an end to the patent troll business, and suggests that it is sustainable in the long run. Furthermore, we discuss the fact that trolls are peculiar players on markets for technology insofar as they are solely interested in the exclusion right, not in the underlying knowledge. We posit that transactions involving patent trolls may only be the tip of the iceberg of “patent-only” transactions, a conjecture with strong implications for the efficiency of markets for technologies. Managerial and policy implications are discussed.},
research_type={Empirical, Model},
thicket_stance_extract={The second patent characteristic patent trolls should favor is a high cost of substituting the underlying invention in products. This substitution cost increases with the difficulty of inventing around the patent, which in turn is high if the patent density and complexity of the relevant technology field is high. This means that many patents exist that have a high degree of overlap between them and with the patent under consideration, so that finding a gap for a non-patented substitutive technology is difficult.},
thicket_def={Refs Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={This means that many patents exist that have a high degree of overlap between them and with the patent under consideration, so that finding a gap for a non-patented substitutive technology is difficult. In other words, the focal patent is part of a patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001).},
tags={patent trolls, patent quality, licensing, business model},
filename={Fischer Henkel (2011) - Patent Trolls On Markets For Technology.pdf}
title={Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?},
author={Gallini, N. and Scotchmer, S.},
@article{huys2009legal, title={Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing}, author={Huys, I. and Berthels, N. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, G.}, journal={Nature biotechnology}, volume={27}, number={10}, pages={903--909}, year={2009}, publisher={Nature Publishing Group}, abstract={A patent landscape analysis of 22 common genetic diagnostic tests shows substantially fewer claims on genes per se than initially suggested but raises questions of legal uncertainty as to the claims’ scope.}, discipline={Biology, Law}, research_type={Empirical study, Industry Statistics}, industry={Biology, Genetics}, thicket_stance={Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={With respect to genes, 25% of the identified patents, filed by different applicants, claim a human gene, suggesting the possibility of the existence of a patent thicket. In contrast to this relatively high number of gene claims, only 3% of these gene claims can be classified as occupying a blocking position. Therefore, a hindering patent thicket cannot be demonstrated.}, thicket_def={def33}, thicket_def_extract={First, is a patent thicket, defined as many blocking patents from many different owners, emerging in the genetic diagnostic sector?}, tags={genetic diagnostic testing, patent proliferation, research sector}, filename={Huys (2009) - Legal Uncertainty In The Area Of Genetic Diagnostic Testing.pdf} }  @article{joshi2011strategic,
title={When do strategic alliances inhibit innovation by firms? Evidence from patent pools in the global optical disc industry},
author={Joshi, A.M. and Nerkar, A.},
@article{sharrott2006intellectual, title={Intellectual Property Developments in Biochip Nanotechology}, author={Sharrott, D. and Sayeed, H.A.}, journal={Nanotech. L. \& Bus.}, volume={3}, pages={20}, year={2006}, abstract={Microfluidics is the science of devices and processes dealing with fluid volumes on the nanoliter or picoliter scale. The most popular and commercially visible applications of this technology consist of DNA microarrays, or “biochips.” DNA microarrays are most useful for their fast, efficient processing of multiple DNA sequences of genes. In this article, Douglas Sharrott and Hassen Sayeed explain the various intellectual property (“IP”) issues relating to DNA microarrays and microfluidics applications. They also examine alternative methods of protecting valuable IP, such as trade secret and “mask work” protection under the copyright laws. Finally, Sharrott and Sayeed discuss a representative case that teaches valuable lessons to those in the microfluidics industry to help guide IP strategies.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Commentary, Discussion}, industry={Nanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Until recently, the most significant IP concern about biochips involved the patentability of expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”)—gene fragments for which no known functional utility exists. When the National Institutes of Health applied for the first EST patents in 1991, the possibility arose that such patents could overlap with and possibly invalidate later patents directed toward fully-sequenced, expressed genes.8 Commentators describe this proliferation of overlapping patents as a potential “patent thicket”—a tangle of intellectual property rights through which companies must cut to bring new technologies to market.9 In the thicket, scientists and corporations might be forced to renegotiate constantly for the right to exercise any individual gene patent, or to use commercial products obtained from that gene.}, thicket_def={Refs Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Commentators describe this proliferation of overlapping patents as a potential “patent thicket”—a tangle of intellectual property rights through which companies must cut to bring new technologies to market.9 In the thicket, scientists and corporations might be forced to renegotiate constantly for the right to exercise any individual gene patent, or to use commercial products obtained from that gene.}, tags={biochips, trade secrets}, filename={Sharrott Sayeed (2006) - Intellectual Property Developments In Biochip Nanotechology.pdf} }  @article{turner2011patent,
title={Patent Thickets, Trolls and Unproductive Entrepreneurship},
author={Turner, J.},
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