PTLR Up Group Processed BibTeX
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This page is part of the Patent Thicket Litature Review
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This page contains the processed Up Group BibTeX entries. With the exception of the first entry (Andrews) they all need reviewing and correcting.
The Processed Up Group BibTeX Records
@article{aggarwal2009modes, title={Modes of Cooperative R&D Commercialization by Start-Ups}, author={Aggarwal, Vikas A. and Hsu, David H.}, journal={Strategic Management Journal}, volume={30}, number={8}, pages={pp. 835-864}, year={2009}, abstract = {This study empirically examines the determinants of heterogeneous firm-level cooperative R&D commercialization strategies. While the volume of interfirm collaboration has increased dramatically in recent decades, the determinants of firm-level choices among alternate modes of such cooperative activity remain relatively understudied. We develop a conceptual model of factors determining collaborative mode choice at the organizational portfolio level. These factors include the firm-level appropriation environment, in which deal-level choices have portfolio-level spillover implications, as well as governance capabilities developed by the firm over time. Using a random sample of innovating biotechnology start-ups, we assemble a firm-year panel dataset that aggregates transaction-level collaboration data to the firm-year level, allowing us to characterize firms' portfolios of collaborative deals. We find broad empirical support for our model, suggesting that a firm's appropriation environment and governance capabilities strongly influence portfolio-level collaboration mode choices. In addition, we explore the implications of governance capability development, finding that experience with particular modes, as well as deviations from existing capabilities, impact firm valuation.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Empirical}, industry={Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Such an intellectual property portfolio can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s technology.}, thicket_def={Def1}, thicket_def_extract={Such an intellectual property portfolio can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s technology.}, tags={Cooperative R&D, Decision-making}, filename={Aggarwal Hsu (2009) - Modes Of Cooperative R And D Commercialization By Start Ups.pdf} }
@article{andrews2002genes, title={Genes And Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights}, author={Andrews, L.B.}, journal={Nature Reviews Genetics}, volume={3}, number={10}, pages={803--807}, year={2002}, abstract={Concerns about human gene patents go beyond moral disquiet about creating a commodity from a part of the human body and also beyond legal questions about whether genes are unpatentable products of nature. New concerns are being raised about harm to public health and to research. In response to these concerns, various policy options, such as litigation, legislation, patent pools and compulsory licensing, are being explored to ensure that gene patents do not impede the practice of medicine and scientific progress.}, discipline={Policy Report}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Professional organizations, such as the American College of Medical Genetics20 and the College of American Pathologists, oppose gene patents as threatening medical advancement and patient care21. The World Medical Association considers human genes to be part of “mankind’s common heritage” and urges medical organizations around the world to lobby against gene patenting22. This mounting concern about gene patents has lead to policy initiatives through litigation, legislation and administrative action.}, thicket_def={def23}, thicket_def_extract={Economist Carl Shapiro elaborates on the problems created by a ‘patent thicket’. Using traditional economic analysis, he has shown how, when several monopolists exist that each control a different raw material needed for development of a product, the price of the resulting product is higher than if a single firm controlled trade in all of the raw materials or made the product itself. However, the combined profits of the producers are lower in the presence of complementary monopolies. So, if there are several patent holders whose permission is needed to create a gene therapy (and any one of them could block the production of the gene therapy), inefficiencies in the market are created, potentially harming both the patent holder and the patent users.}, tags={IPR Policy, Effects on Research}, filename={Andrews (2002) - Genes And Patent Policy Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights.pdf} }
@article{aoki2008promoting, title={Promoting Access to Intellectual Property: Patent Pools, Copyright Collectives, and Clearinghouses}, author={Aoki, R. and Schiff, A.}, journal={R\&D Management}, volume={38}, number={2}, pages={189--204}, year={2008}, abstract={This paper reviews and compares patent pools, intellectual property (IP) clearinghouses, and copyright collectives as systems for promoting efficient access to licensable IP in a ‘market for technology’. These systems promote downstream use of innovations by economizing on search and transaction costs in licensing, as well as potentially mitigating the conditions that lead to the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ and other coordination problems in multilateral licensing. We compare and classify different systems in terms of their features, review some existing systems, and discuss their economic characteristics.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Some similar issues are discussed by Shapiro (2001), who considers the strategies that firms may use to reduce the effects of a patent thicket on their ability to innovate. Shapiro considers the strategies of cross licensing, patent pools, and cooperative standard setting. Our paper is complementary to Shapiro’s in that our analysis is at the level of the market for technology, rather than an individual firm.}, thicket_def={Def1}, thicket_def_extract={In the context of patents, a proliferation of IP rights may result in a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001) that can increase costs for downstream activities such as cumulative innovation and the development of new products that combine multiple existing innovations.}, tags={Pools, Collectives, Clearinghouses}, filename={Aoki Schiff (2008) - Promoting Access To Intellectual Property.pdf} }
@article{attaran2004patents, title={Patents do not Strangle Innovation, but Their Quality Must be Improved}, author={Attaran, A.}, journal={Bulletin of the World Health Organization}, volume={82}, number={10}, pages={788}, year={2004}, abstract={}, discipline={Policy Report}, research_type={discussion}, industry={Pharma}, thicket_stance={Weakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={Possibilities and facts are not the same thing, however, and there is surprisingly little empirical data to show that the patent thicket is subtracting from the rate of innovation or society's benefit from it. Maybe that is happenning without anyone noticing, but the available evidence suggests otherwise.}, thicket_def={def11}, thicket_def_extract={"As Professor Correa writes, the resulting thicket of patents could 'deprive society of the benefits[of] ... widespread use and dissemination of basic scinetific ideas. Possibilities and facts are not the same thing, however, and there is surprisingly little empirical data to show that the patent thicket is subtracting from the rate of innovation or society's benefit from it. Maybe that is happening without anyone noticing, but the available evidence suggests otherwise."}, tags={Against Thickets!}, filename={Attaran (2004) - Patents Do Not Strangle Innovation But Their Quality Must Be Improved.pdf} } @article{barnett2009isintellectual, title = {Is Intellectual Property Trivial?}, author = {Barnett, Jonathan M.}, journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review}, volume = {157}, number = {6}, pages = {pp. 1691-1742}, year = {2009}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={theory, empirical}, industry={general}, thicket_stance={neutral}, thicket_stance_extract={But normative analysis of intel- lectual property coverage must be dynamic (and complex) if it is to be realistic: that is, it must anticipate that any downward adjustment in intellectual property coverage will trigger a variety of possible market responses that may neutralize or even reverse the adjustment, result- ing in (i) no net change in access costs, (ii) a net reduction in access costs, or (iii) in the most perverse case, even a net increase in access costs coupled with a reduction in innovation gains.}, thicket_def={def12}, thicket_def_extract={This is a common theme of the expanding literature on "anticommons" effects, whereby proliferating intellectual property rights creates a "thicket" that impedes subsequent innovation. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller... Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg...}, tags={Overview of Patent-based IP}, filename={Barnett (2009) - Is Intellectual Property Trivial.pdf} }
@article{barnett2009property, title = {Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes}, author = {Barnett, Jonathan M.}, journal = {The Yale Law Journal}, volume = {119}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {pp. 384-456}, publisher = {The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2009 The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.}, abstract = {It is commonly asserted that innovation markets suffer from excessive intellectual property protections, which in turn stifle output. But empirical inquiries can neither confirm nor deny this assertion. Under the agnostic assumption that we cannot assess directly whether intellectual property coverage is excessive, an alternative query is proposed: can the market assess if any "propertization outcome" is excessive and then undertake actions to correct it? This process-based approach takes the view that innovator populations make rent-seeking investments that continuously select among innovation regimes that trade off securing innovation gains (which tends to demand more property) against reducing transaction costs and associated innovation losses (which tends to demand less). If we can identify the conditions under which privately interested investments in lobbying, enforcement, and transactional arrangements are likely to yield socially interested propertization outcomes, then the underlying datum at issue—whether there is "too much" intellectual property—can be determined indirectly at some reasonable degree of approximation. This approach identifies a "property trap" effect where, under high coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is prone to fail: litigation risk and associated transaction cost burdens drive innovators to overconsume state-provided property rights. Conversely, under low coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is prone to succeed: adversely affected entities that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs have incentives to undertake actions that weaken property-rights coverage, including constrained enforcement, forming cooperative arrangements, or even forfeiting intellectual property to the public domain. Counterintuitively, these relationships imply that large firms that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs tend to have the strongest incentives and capacities to take actions that correct overpropertization outcomes. Preliminary evidence is drawn from the semiconductor, financial services, and information technology industries.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={theory}, industry={general, semiconductor}, thicket_stance={Weakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={Popular and scholarly commentary widely assumes that certain innovation markets -especially multicomponent markets such as biotechnology, software, and information technology- suffer from thickets of overlapping property rights that restrain and encumber research and development activities, thereby slowing, rather than promoting, innovative output. But this often-repeated statement loses considerable force given that empirical inquiries to identify patent thickets or related "anticommons" effects in these markets have so far failed to confirm or reject any inhibitory effect on innovation activity}, thicket_def={def12, def0}, thicket_def_extract={...the widely expressed view that innovation markets suffer from an intellectual property thicket (or "anticommons") where a misguided proliferation of property rights stifles innovative output beneath access restrictions, dispute-resolution actions, and other administrative burden}, tags={IP Regime Selection, Against Thicket}, filename={Barnett (2009) - Property As Process How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes.pdf} }
@article{baron2010patent, title={Patent Quality and Value in Discrete and Cumulative Innovation}, author={Baron, J. and Delcamp, H.}, journal={CERNA Working Paper}, number={2010-07}, year={2010}, abstract={This article compares the relationship between patent quality and patent value in discrete and cumulative innovation. Using factor analysis and a set of various commonly used patent quality indicators including claims, citations and family size, we build a quality factor jointly driving all indicators for 9255 patents. We then test the significance of this quality factor for predicting patent renewal after 4, 8 and 12 years in an ordered logistic regression. Whereas we establish a robust and significant link between patent quality and value in samples of discrete and complex technology patents, there is no significant link for patents that are essential to technological standards. Consistently, neither the quality factor nor any single indicator allows predicting litigation on an essential patent. We conclude that while there is a robust link between patent quality and value in discrete innovation, this link is much weaker in cumulative innovation. Nevertheless, this affects only narrow, yet highly relevant, technological fields. There is no evidence that cumulativeness affects the relationship between quality and value in whole technological classes classified as “complex” by the literature.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Empirical}, industry={ICT}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The core prediction of the patent thicket theory is thus that the link between patent quality and patent value erodes. If the link between the value of a patent and the significance of the underlying innovation is weakened, so is the capacity of the patent system to reward innovators for socially desirable innovation activity ... The primary determinant of patent value is the capacity of blocking other patents... Furthermore, among these essential patents with blocking power over a standard, patent quality is no longer a determinant of patent value.}, thicket_def={Def2}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are webs of overlapping and mutually blocking patents held by different owners. Mutually blocking patent rights result from cumulative innovation, where no technological component can be marketed individually without the technological complements potentially protected by patent rights of different companies. Patent thickets have a clear impact on patent strategies, as they provide incentives to file blocking patents.}, tags={Standards, Essential Patents}, filename={Baron Delcamp (2010) - Patent Quality And Value In Discrete And Cumulative Innovation.pdf} }
@article{barton2002antitrust, title = {Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios}, author = {Barton, John H.}, journal = {Antitrust Law Journal}, volume = {69}, number = {3}, pages = {pp. 851-882}, abstract = {}, language = {English}, year = {2002}, publisher = {American Bar Association}, copyright = {Copyright © 2002 American Bar Association}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={theory}, industry={general, ict}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Oligopolists holding cross-infringing patents may actually reduce innovation by restricting entry into the oligopoly}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={Oligopolies, Antitrust, Mutual Blocking}, filename={Barton (2002) - Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios.pdf} }
@article{baumol2004entrepreneurial, title = {Entrepreneurial Enterprises, Large Established Firms and Other Components of the Free-Market Growth Machine}, author = {Baumol, William J.}, journal = {Small Business Economics}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, pages = {pp. 9-21}, abstract = {The paper studies the principal influences accounting for the unprecedented growth and innovation performance of the free-market economies. It indicates that vigorous oligopolistic competition, particularly in high-tech industries, forces firms to keep innovating in order to survive. This leads them to internalize innovative activities rather than leaving them to independent inventors, and turns invention into an assembly-line process. The bulk of private R&D spending is shown to come from a tiny number of very large firms. Yet the revolutionary breakthroughs continue to come predominantly from small entrepreneurial enterprises, with large industry providing streams of incremental improvements that also add up to major contributions. Moreover, these firms voluntarily disseminate much of their innovative technology widely and rapidly, both as a major revenue source and in exchange for complementary technological property of other firms, including direct competitors. This helps to internalize the externalities of innovation and speeds elimination of obsolete technology. Some policy implications for industrialized and developing countries are also discussed.}, year = {2004}, publisher = {Springer}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 Springer}, discipline={Econ, Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={general}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={This puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manu- facturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic conse- quences this threatens for each of them is the for- mation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities}, thicket_def={def13}, thicket_def_extract={Similar perils for the public interest arise in the last of the reasons for voluntary technology sharing - the problem of "patent thickets" and the widespread patent pools that have been formed to deal with the thicket problem. A complex piece of equipment, such as a computer, characteristically is made up of components each of which is covered by a surprisingly large number of patents, and the patents pertinent for such an item are often owned by a considerable number of different firms, many of them direct competitors in the final-product market. For example, Peter N. Detkin, vice president and assistant general counsel at Intel Corporation, estimates that there were more than 90,000 patents generally related to microprocessors held by more than 10,000 parties in 2002 (Federal Trade Commission, 2002, p. 667). This puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manufacturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic consequences this threatens for each of them is the formation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities...}, tags={Pool, Startups and Incumbents}, filename={Baumol (2004) - Entrepreneurial Enterprises Large Established Firms And Other Components.pdf} }
@article{bawa2005nanotechnology, title={The nanotechnology patent ‘gold rush’}, author={Bawa, R. and Bawa, SR and Maebius, S.B.}, journal={Journal of Intellectual Property Rights}, volume={10}, number={5}, pages={426--433}, year={2005}, abstract={During the past decade, a swarm of patent applications pertaining to nanotechnology has been arriving at all the major patent offices of the world, including the US Patent and Trademark office (USPTO). As companies develop products and processes and begin to seek commercial applications for their inventions, securing valid and defensible patent protection will be vital to their long-term survival. In the decades to come, with nanotechnology further maturing and the promised breakthroughs accruing, patents will generate licensing revenue, provide leverage in deals and mergers, and reduce the likelihood of infringement. Because development of nanotech-related products is extremely research intensive, without the market exclusivity offered by a US patent, development of these products and their commercial viability in the marketplace will be significantly hampered. In this paper, effects of 'nanopatent gold rush' that is underway by 'patent prospectors' as start-ups are highlighted whereby corporations compete to lock up broad patents in these critical early days. In fact, the entire US patent system is under greater scrutiny and strain, with the USPTO continuing to struggle with evaluating nanotech-related patent applications. It is unclear whether the nanotech industry will thrive like the information technology (IT) industry or get bogged down like the radio patent deadlock.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory}, industry={Nanotech}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Such patent proliferation of broad patents could ultimately result in 'patent thickets' that will require patent litigation to sort out, especially if areas of nanotechnology become financially lucrative. Given such a patent ladnscape for nanotechnology, expensive patent litigation is inevitable, with patent owners commanding some leverage with which to avoid a self-destructive patent war. The end result of all this is too familiar to the business and patent communities: (1) higher costs to consumers if and when products are commercialized; and (2) a drag on the innovation process itself.}, thicket_def={def14}, thicket_def_extract={Predatory inventors are individuals or corporations that patent every possible application around a novel early technology. If this approach becomes commmon... it could inevitably create nanotech patent thickets.}, tags={Licensing, Patenting strategy}, filename={Bawa Bawa Maebius (2005) - The Nanotechnology Patent Gold Rush.pdf} }
@article{bawa2005will, title={Will the Nanomedicine Patent Land Grab Thwart Commercialization?}, author={Bawa, Raj}, journal={Nanomedicine: nanotechnology, biology, and medicine}, volume={1}, pages={346--350}, year={2005}, abstract={}, discipline={Biology}, research_type={discussion}, industry={Nanomedicine}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Given such a patent landscape, expensive litigation is as inevitable as it was with the biotechnology industry, where extensive patent litigation resulted once the products became commercially successful. In most of the patent battles the larger entity with the deeper pocket s will rule the day even if the brightest stars and innovators are on the other side. ... Ultimately, this situation is all too familiar to the business and patent communities, in that it leads to higher costs to consumers, if and when products are commercialized [5], as well as deter ring the innovation process itself}, thicket_def={def1, Complementary inputs with infringement, Includes innovation loss}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology". Such patent thickets, as a result of multiple blocking patents, are considered to discourage and stifle innovation. Claims in such patent thickets have been characterized as boften broad, overlapping and conflicting — a scenario ripe for massive patent litigation battles in the future...}, tags={Commercialization}, filename={Bawa (2005) - Will The Nanomedicine Patent Land Grab Thwart Commercialization.pdf} }
@article{beard2002patent, title={Patent thickets, cross-licensing, and antitrust}, author={Beard, T.R. and Kaserman, D.L.}, journal={Antitrust Bull.}, volume={47}, pages={345}, year={2002}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory}, industry={general}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The patent thicket problem can be severe in certain technologically dynamic industries. Consider, for example, the semiconductor industry. In that industry, there reportedly are already over 250,000 patents in existence that, in principle, a new innovation potentially could infringe. In addition, there are several thousand additional patent applications typically in the process of review.' 4 As a result of these extant and forthcoming patents, it is virtually impossible for a firm to know, ex ante, whether a given microprocessor innovation will infringe a patent held by another firm. The patent thicket associated with this industry, then, is quite formidable, and it creates considerable uncertainty regarding the future legal status of any intellectual property created by R&D activities.}, thicket_def={def15}, thicket_def_extract={Where a highly complex product or process is covered by numerous interrelated patents, any holder of a patent that applies to that product or process potentially may block production and/or impede further technological developments, thereby jeopardizing the returns on other parties' prior investments. In such situations (i.e., where a given product is potentially affected by numerous patents owned by a number of different parties), the resulting uncertainty regarding unforeseen patent claims can dampen firms' incentives to invest in R&D activities. This potential for numerous interrelated patents to deter R&D investment has been called the patent thicket (or minefield) problem.}, tags={Cross-licensing, Anti-trust}, filename={Beard Kaserman (2002) - Patent Thickets Cross Licensing And Antitrust.pdf} }
@article{bergman2007global, title={The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape: Implications for Efficient Technology Transfer and Commercial Development}, author={Bergman, K. and Graff, G.D.}, journal={Nature biotechnology}, volume={25}, number={4}, pages={419--424}, year={2007}, abstract={Characteristics of the complex and growing stem cell patent landscape indicate strategies by which public sector research institutions could improve the efficiency of intellectual property agreements and technology transfers in stem cells.}, discipline={Biotechnology}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={By blocking pathways to market and dampening investor interest in commercialization, a patent thicket has the potential to slow and skew the overall development of new technical applications.}, thicket_def={Def3}, thicket_def_extract={In a patent thicket, the existence of many overlapping patent claims can cause uncertainty about freedom to operate, impose multiple layers of transaction costs and stack royalty payments beyond levels that can be supported by the value of single innovations.}, tags={Clearinghouse}, filename={Bergman Graff (2007) - The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape.pdf} }
@article{braun2007barriers, title={Barriers to User Innovation: Moving Towards a Paradigm of 'Licence to Innovate'?}, author={Braun, V. and Herstatt, C.}, journal={International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management}, volume={7}, number={3}, pages={292--303}, year={2007}, abstract={Research into the phenomenon of user innovation has been sprouting in recent years like seeds after a rainy spring. Users have been found to be an important source of innovation in many different industries. An investigation of the barriers that users face when attempting to innovate is nevertheless lacking completely. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by discussing various factors that can prevent users from innovating. The evolution of the seed-breeding industry will be used for illustration purposes. We will argue that the barriers to user innovation seem to be progressing, potentially indicating that a paradigm change may be imminent.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={Agriculture}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The golden rice case finely illustrates the effect of such thickets on innovative researchers. Swiss scientists had developed a Vitamin A-enhanced rice that promised huge health benefits to millions of poor children in developing countries. Before they could share their development, however, the scientists had to work their way through 70 patents belonging to over 30 companies in addition to six restrictive material transfer agreements (Damodaran and Srivats, 2001).}, thicket_def={Def1}, thicket_def_extract={These developments certainly do not encourage user-innovation, as users wanting to amend existing products or to create new ones must navigate the IPR thicket. This refers to an overlapping set of IPRs, which requires those seeking to commercialise new technologies to obtain licences (Shapiro, 2001). It exists in many industries, such as in semiconductors and biotechnology (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).}, tags={Barriers, Licensing}, filename={Braun Herstatt (2007) - Barriers To User Innovation.pdf} }
@article{burk2003policy, title={Policy Levers in Patent Law}, author={Burk, D.L. and Lemley, M.A.}, journal={Va. L. Rev.}, volume={89}, pages={1575--1696}, year={2003}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Particularly in areas like the semiconductor industry, com- panies need some means for "clearing" the patent thicket, such as cross-licensing all the rights needed for their complex product}, thicket_def={Def1}, thicket_def_extract={Closely related to the problem of complementarity is the prob- lem of horizontal overlaps between patents.122 Patents are fre- quently broader than the products the inventors actually make. Multiple patents often cover the same ground, sometimes as an in- tentional result of the patent system"' and sometimes because pat- ents regularly issue that are too broad or tread on the prior art.'24 Various parties may be able to lay claim to the same technologies or to aspects of the same technology. Carl Shapiro has termed this overlap of patent claims the "patent thicket}, tags={Various theories on Patent Policies}, filename={Burk Lemley (2003) - Policy Levers In Patent Law.pdf} }
@article{callaway2008patent, title={Patent Incentives in the Semiconductor Industry}, author={Callaway, D.}, journal={Hastings Bus. LJ}, volume={4}, pages={135}, year={2008}, publisher={HeinOnline}, abstract={The semiconductor industry comprises organizations of all sizes, from single engineers contracting their work to companies as large and powerful as have ever existed. The rapid advancement of technology in the semiconductor field makes it a crucible for theories about the patent system as a whole. It is arguably desirable that as new technologies come to market, patents should be issued with appropriate scope so that other inventors retain incentive to innovate.' But it is not only the Patent Office which can offer or hinder incentives for inventors. The semiconductor industry is subjected to various incentives, both negative and positive, from Congress, the courts, and from within. Part A of this paper will survey the semiconductor industry and the incentives for patenting integrated circuits. Part B will look at disincentives, and problems that have arisen in the industry. Part C focuses particularly on patent issues relating to "interface circuits"--those circuits that directly connect a chip to the outside world}, discipline={Law}, research_type={theory}, industry={Semiconductor}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The proliferation of the 555 by other companies illustrates the cutthroat nature of the semiconductor industry in its infancy. But today, more than ever, large semiconductor companies encourage their rivals to enter cross-licensing agreements.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={Thickets only referenced in footnotes}, tags={555 Timer, History, Industry example}, filename={Callaway (2008) - Patent Incentives In The Semiconductor Industry.pdf} }
@article{carrier2003resolving, title={Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation}, author={Carrier, M.A.}, journal={Vand. L. Rev.}, volume={56}, pages={1047}, year={2003}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={A prominent example of a patent thicket is the semiconductor industry, in which hundreds, if not thousands, of patents can read onto a single product. 208 The patents typically cover "aspects of the circuitry design, materials used to achieve a certain outcome, and the broad array of methods used to manufacture the device."20 9 Consequently, companies such as IBM, Intel, and Motorola "find it all too easy to unintentionally infringe on a patent in designing a microprocessor, potentially exposing themselves to billions of dollars of liability and/or an injunction forcing them to cease production of key products."210 This concern is especially relevant for firms that have made "costly and rapidly-depreciating investments in wafer fabrication facilities, which inherently utilize a 'thicket' of innovations developed by many parties."}, thicket_def={def16}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro has defined a patent thicket as "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."20 3 Patent thickets have been associated most frequently with the semiconductor industry, but they also have been observed in the biotechnology, computer software, and Internet industries.}, tags={Pool, Bottlenecks}, filename={Carrier (2003) - Resolving The Patent Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation.pdf} }
@article{carrier2004cabining, title = {Cabining Intellectual Property through a Property Paradigm}, author = {Carrier, Michael A.}, journal = {Duke Law Journal}, volume = {54}, number = {1}, pages = {pp. 1-145}, abstract = {One of the most revolutionary legal changes in the past generation has been the "propertization" of intellectual property (IP). The duration and scope of rights expand without limit, and courts and companies treat IP as absolute property, bereft of any restraints. But astonishingly, scholars have not yet recognized that propertization also can lead to the narrowing of IP. In contrast to much of the literature, which criticizes the propertization of IP, this Article takes it as a given. For the transformation is irreversible, sinking its tentacles further into public and corporate consciousness (as well as the IP laws) with each passing day and precluding the likelihood that IP will return to the prepropertization era. This Article therefore ventures onto a new path, one that follows property into unexpected briar patches of limits. The secret here is that property is not as absolute as it is often claimed to be. After surveying fifty doctrines in property law, Professor Carrier synthesizes limits based on development, necessity, and equity. He then utilizes these limits to construct a new paradigm for IP. The paradigm facilitates the reorganization of defenses that courts currently recognize as well as a more robust set of defenses, which include (1) a new tripartite fair use doctrine in copyright law, (2) a new defense for public health emergencies and a recovered experimental use defense and reverse doctrine of equivalents in patent law, (3) a development-based limit to trademark dilution, and (4) a functional use defense for the right of publicity. By adopting the paradigm of property, IP has reopened the door to limits. Rediscovering these limits offers significant promise for the future of innovation and democracy.}, year = {2004}, publisher = {Duke University School of Law}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 Duke University School of Law}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The danger inherent in these mechanisms is exacerbated when patents issue for products already on the market, because the owner of a newly issued patent holds a commanding position over manufacturers already in large-scale production, who cannot easily redesign their products and thus are forced to comply with the new patentee's demands}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={Intragenerational bottlenecks occur most frequently in the semiconductor industry and have also appeared in the biotechnology, computer software, and Internet industries.188 In such industries,there frequently arises a "patent thicket,"189 in which overlapping patent rights enable each patent holder with a patented input in the product to block the use of the product by all others}, tags={Nature of IP, Reverse Doctorine of Equivalents}, filename={Carrier (2004) - Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm.pdf} }
@article{chu2009effects, title = {Effects of Blocking Patents on R&D: A Quantitative DGE Analysis}, author = {Chu, Angus C.}, journal = {Journal of Economic Growth}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {pp. 55-78}, abstract = {What are the effects of blocking patents on R&D and consumption? This paper develops a quality-ladder growth model with overlapping intellectual property rights and capital accumulation to quantitatively evaluate the effects of blocking patents. The analysis focuses on two policy variables (a) patent breadth that determines the amount of profits created by an invention and (b) the profit-sharing rule that determines the distribution of profits between current and former inventors along the quality ladder. The model is calibrated to aggregate data of the US economy. Under parameter values that match key features of the US economy and show equilibrium R&D underinvestment, I find that optimizing the profit-sharing rule of blocking patents would lead to a significant increase in R&D, consumption and welfare. Also, the paper derives and quantifies a dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy on capital accumulation.}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Springer}, copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Springer}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory, Empirical}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={This reasoning suggests that for the purpose of stimulating R&D, reducing the backloading effect of blocking patents would have been a less harmful policy instrument than increasing patent breadth. Even if the current level of R&D is socially optimal, it would be beneficial for the society to reduce the level of patent breadth and the backloading effect of blocking patents simultaneously to keep R&D constant.}, thicket_def={def17}, thicket_def_extract={Today, most basic and applied researchers are effectively standing on top of a huge pyramid... Of course, a pyramid can rise to far greater heights than could any one person... But what happens if, in order to scale the pyramid and place a new block on the top, a researcher must gain the permission of each person who previously placed a block in the pyramid, perhaps paying a royalty or tax to gain such permission? Would this system of intellectual property rights slow down the construction of the pyramid or limit its heights? ... To complete the analogy, blocking patents play the role of the pyramid's building blocks.Carl Shapiro (2001)}, tags={Blocking patents, Profit sharing rules}, filename={Chu (2009) - Effects Of Blocking Patents On R and D A Quantitative DGE Analysis.pdf} }
@article{cotter2008patent, title={Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses}, author={Cotter, T.F.}, journal={J. Corp. L.}, volume={34}, pages={1151}, year={2008}, publisher={HeinOnline}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In the next two Parts, however, I will argue that, ifpatent holdup is a serious problem in reality, certain reforms to patent law may be desirable, although the precise nature of those reforms will depend in large part on the comparative error costs of different approaches to calculating reasonable royalties.}, thicket_def={def18}, thicket_def_extract={In this regard, I present a definition of patent holdup as a type of opportunistic behavior on the part of patent owners that threatens to impose (1) static deadweight losses that are not justified by likely increases in dynamic efficiency, or (2) dynamic efficiency losses due to reduction in the incentive to participate in standard setting organizations or to engage in follow-up innovation.}, tags={IPR Reform, Patent Hold-up, Antitrust}, filename={Cotter (2008) - Patent Holdup Patent Remedies And Antitrust Responses.pdf} }
@article{denicolo2007do, title = {Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?}, author = {Denicolò, Vincenzo}, journal = {Economic Policy}, volume = {22}, number = {52}, pages = {pp. 679+681-729}, abstract = {Is the current level of patent protection too high or too low? To address this issue, this paper reformulates the theoretical analysis of the optimal level of patent protection to take into account the empirical findings of the innovation production function literature. This literature finds a strong relationship between R&D spending and inventions and estimates an elasticity of the supply of inventions of 0.5 or more. Thepaper then assesses the current level of patent protection, exploiting estimates of the private and social returns to R&D taken from the empirical literature and other available sources. Although more research is needed for a more precise assessment, the evidence available suggests that patents do not overcompensate innovators.}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Wiley on behalf of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies, and the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme}, copyright = {Copyright © 2007 Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Weakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={It is tempting to conclude that policy reform, if anything, should strengthen patent protection. At this stage, however, no policy conclusion can be anything but tentative. The assessment developed in this paper, while highly suggestive, is not truly compelling: reasonable interpretations of the same evidence (or lack thereof) might differ}, thicket_def={def19}, thicket_def_extract={In certain industries, such as telecommunications and biotechnology, production of new products often requires many complementary innovative components that are owned by different firms. The proliferation and fragmentation of intellectual property rights creates a 'patent thicket' that is often viewed as an obstacle to innovation. Two main problems may emerge. First, a proliferation of patents held by different owners increases transaction costs and might even prevent manufacturers from obtaining the right to develop the new products, creating the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Second, with complementary patents there may be a problem of Cournot complements (Shapiro, 2001) that increases the deadweight loss to profit ratio. }, tags={Complementary Innovations}, filename={Denicolo (2007) - Do Patents Over Compensate Innovators.pdf} }
@article{devlin2009indeterminism, title = {Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation}, author = {Devlin, Alan}, journal = {Yale Law & Policy Review}, volume = {28}, number = {1}, pages = {pp. 61-106}, language = {English}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Yale Law & Policy Review, Inc.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Yale Law & Policy Review, Inc.}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation.}, thicket_def={def20}, thicket_def_extract={More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation. One's exclusion of another from his land is isolated; a single patentee's ability to enjoin production of a semiconductor chip that implicates thousands of patents creates powerful negative externalities. Given such distinctions, many view the worlds of patent law and traditional property as sufficiently distinct to be unworthy of direct analogy.}, tags={Comparison of real and intellectual property rights}, filename={Devlin (2009) - Indeterminism And The Property Patent Equation.pdf} }
@article{federal2003promote, title={To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy}, author={Federal Trade Commission}, journal={Washington, DC}, year={2003}, abstract={}, discipline={Policy Report}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={General, Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology, ICT, Semiconductor}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={This process can deter follow-on innovation and unjustifiably raise costs to businesses and, ultimately, to consumers.}, thicket_def={def1, def21}, thicket_def_extract={This tends to create a “patent thicket” – that is, a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology... Questionable patents contribute to the patent thicket. In the context of a patent thicket, questionable patents can introduce new kinds of licensing difficulties, such as royalties stacked one on top of another, and can increase uncertainty about the patent landscape, thus complicating business planning. Questionable patents in patent thickets can frustrate competition by current manufacturers as well as potential entrants. Because a manufacturer needs a license to all of the patents that cover its product, firms can use questionable patents to extract high royalties or to threaten litigation...}, tags={FTC Report}, filename={FTC (2003) - To Promote Innovation.pdf} }
@article{federal2011evolving, title={The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition.”}, author={Federal Trade Commission}, journal={March, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf}, year={2011}, abstract={}, discipline={Policy Report}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={IT}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Furthermore, if the alleged infringer would face large switching costs due to sunk investments based on the patented technology, it may be forced to pay higher royalties than it would have negotiated prior to launch.30 These risks increase expected costs, reducing firms’ incentives to pursue innovative projects,31 while the associated expenses cause firms to reduce spending on R&D.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={Indeed, IT products are often surrounded by “patent thickets” – densely overlapping patent rights held by multiple patent owners...}, tags={FTC Report}, filename={FTC (2011) - The Evolving IP Marketplace.pdf} }
@article{gallini2011private, title={Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: The Case of Patent Pools}, author={Gallini, N.}, journal={Economia e Politica Industriale}, year={2011}, publisher={FrancoAngeli Editore}, abstract={Inventors and users of technology often enter into cooperative agreements for sharing their intellectual property in order to implement a standard or to avoid costly litigation. Over the past two decades, U.S. antitrust authorities have viewed pooling arrangements that integrate complementary, valid and essential patents as having procompetitive benefits in reducing prices, transactions costs, and the incidence of legal suits. Since patent pools are cooperative agreements, they also have the potential of suppressing competition if, for example, they harbor weak or invalid patents, dampen incentives to conduct research on innovations that compete with the pooled patents, foreclose competition from downstream product or upstream input markets, or raise prices on goods that compete with the pooled patents. In synthesizing the ideas advanced in the economic literature, this paper explores whether these antitrust concerns apply to pools with complementary patents and, if they do, the implications for competition policy to constrain them. Special attention is given to the application of the U.S. Department of Justice‐Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its companion Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007) to recent patent pool cases.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={These developments over the past few decades have led some economists and legal experts to conclude – contrary to conventional belief – that the strengthening of patent rights has frustrated, rather than supported, incentives to innovate}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={A patent thicket arises when there are overlapping patent rights that must be identified and licensed in order for an innovator to bring a new product or technology to market...}, tags={Pools}, filename={Gallini (2011) - Private Agreements For Coordinating Patent Rights.pdf} }
@article{ganslandt2009intellectual, title={Intellectual property rights and competition policy}, author={Ganslandt, M.}, year={2009}, publisher={Emerald Group Publishing Limited}, abstract={Intellectual property rights and competition policy are intimately related. In this paper I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in practice. Recognizing that intellectual property rights and competition law can interact in many different ways, the presentation focuses on several key issues. The economic literature on the interaction between competition law and intellectual property rights shows that these regulatory systems are consistent in terms of basic principles. Significant tensions exist, however, and it is difficult to balance IPR and competition law in practice. The significant differences in approach between the United States and the European Union simply reflect the underlying reality that efforts to achieve a sensible balance do not result in policy harmonization.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={IT, Biotech}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets may, therefore, impede the ability of firms to conduct research effectively (Eisenberg 1989)... Shapiro (2001) argues that problems with patent thickets become especially thorny in conjunction with the risk of hold-up, which is the danger that new products will inadvertently infringe on patents issued after these products were designed. In terms of empirical evidence, the problem may be insignificant in practice, at least at the general level. Walsh et al. (2003) find that drug discovery has not been substantially impeded by the multiplicity of patented prior inventions and they find little evidence that university research has been impeded by concerns about patents on research tools.}, thicket_def={Def1, Def22}, thicket_def_extract={In addition, the significant increase in the multiplicity of patents, referred to as “patent thickets” and “patent floods”, are considered by many to impede the ability of firms to conduct R&D activity effectively (Eisenberg 1989; Shapiro 2001)... A second issue relevant for sequential innovations is so-called “patent thickets”. In some industries, particularly biotechnology and information technologies, it is common that a new entrant, in order to engage in research or production, must obtain a large number of licenses from existing and previous innovators and producers. This problem raises the cost of product commercialization and may create substantial entry barriers for new firms.}, tags={IPR Reform, Antitrust}, filename={Ganslandt (2009) - Intellectual Property Rights And Competition Policy.pdf} }
@article{hall2007patents, title={Patents and Patent Policy}, author={Hall, B.H.}, journal={Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, volume={23}, number={4}, pages={568--587}, year={2007}, abstract={A patent is the legal right of an inventor to exclude others from making or using a particular invention. This right is sometimes termed an “intellectual property right” and is viewed as an incentive for innovation. This article surveys the evidence on patent effectiveness in encouraging innovation and reviews the current controversies in patent policy.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory, Discussion}, industry={ICT, Biology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The first of the problems Barr describes is clearly a case of mutually assured destruction that leaves the firms in question no better (and no worse) off than if they were not accumulating massive numbers of patents for defensive purposes, and yet at the same time is a very costly strategy. Increasing the administrative costs of patents to firms or reforms within the industry itself to discourage this behavior would seem to be the obvious solution, since it would be in the interest of all firms involved to reduce spending on this activity.}, thicket_def={Def4}, thicket_def_extract={During the U.S. Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice hearings on the patent system and antitrust policy in 2002, a number of industry representatives expressed concerns about the difficulty of negotiating the patent thicket in their area and the risk of being “held-up” ex post by a patent on a technology that was only a small component of their product.}, tags={General Patent Discussion}, filename={Hall (2007) - Patents And Patent Policy.pdf} }
@article{kieff2011removing, title = {Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition}, author = {Kieff, F. Scott}, journal = {Supreme Court Economic Review}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {pp. 25-50}, year = {2011}, abstract = {Commentators have poured forth a loud and sustained outcry over the past few years that sees property rule treatment of intellectual property (IP) as a cause of excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, which unduly tax and retard innovation, competition, and economic growth. The popular response has been to seek a legislative shift towards some limited use of weaker, liability rule treatment, usually portrayed as “just enough” to facilitate transactions in those special cases where the bargaining problems are at their worst and where escape hatches are most needed. This essay is designed to make two contributions. First, it shows how a set of changes in case law over just the past few years have hugely re-shaped the patent system from having several major, and helpful, liability-rule pressure-release valves, into a system that is fast becoming almost devoid of significant property rule characteristics, at least for those small entities that would most need property rule protection. The essay then explores some harmful effects of this shift, focusing on the ways liability rule treatment can seriously impede the beneficial deal-making mechanisms that facilitate innovation and competition. The basic intuition behind this bad effect of liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the ability for a market-challenging patentee to attract and hold the constructive attention of a potential contracting party (especially one that is a larger more established party) while preserving the option to terminate the negotiations in favor of striking a deal with a different party. At the same time, liability rules can have an additional bad effect of helping existing competitors to coordinate with each other over ways to keep out new entrants. The essay is designed to contribute to the literature on IP in particular, as well as the broader literatures on property and coordination, by first showing how a seemingly disconnected set of changes to the legal rules impacting a particular legal regime like the patent system can have unintended and sweeping harmful consequences, and then by exploring why within the more middle range of the spectrum between the two poles of property rules and liability rules, a general shift towards the property side may be preferred by those seeking an increase in access and competition.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In the vast majority of the intellectual property (IP) literature, property rule treatment of IP is said to cause excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold- outs, and trolls, unduly taxing and retarding innovation, competition, and economic growth.}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={Recent Trends in Case Law about Patents and Liability}, filename={Kieff (2011) - Removing Property From Intellectual Property And Intended.pdf} }
@article{kwon2012patent, title={Patent Thicket, Secrecy, and Licensing}, author={Kwon, I.}, journal={The Korean Economic Review}, volume={28}, number={1}, pages={27--49}, year={2012}, abstract={This paper considers a patent portfolio race where firms compete for complementary patents, called a patent thicket. When firms have an option to keep their innovation secret, this paper shows that there exists an equilibrium where firms’ patent propensity is strictly between zero and one. In such an equilibrium, stronger patent protection reduces the firms’ investment in innovation. Moreover, this result does not change even when a licensing contract is feasible.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={ICT}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Thus, on the one hand, firms would try to build up their patent portfolio, or patent thicket, to defend their product. On the other hand, such potential patent lawsuits would eventually reduce the R&D investment, called the hold-up problem.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={A growing number of studies have emphasized the negative effect of the hold-up problem when firms compete for a portfolio of complementary patents, called apatent thicket (e.g., Bessen 2004, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Shapiro 2001).}, tags={Economic model trying to solve the holdup problem by licensing}, filename={Kwon (2012) - Patent Thicket Secrecy And Licensing.pdf} }
@article{lanjouw2004protecting, title = {Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?}, author = {Jean O. Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {47}, number = {1}, pages = {pp. 45-74}, abstract = {Abstract This paper studies the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978–99 by linking information from the U.S. patent office, the federal courts, and industry sources. We find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or other characteristics that facilitate “cooperative” resolution of disputes, are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits. However, postsuit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics. These findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits. Our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help in developing private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costs.}, year = {2004}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 The University of Chicago}, discipline={Law, Econ}, research_type={Empirical}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Carl Shapiro emphasizes that firms rely heavily on cross-licensing arrangements and patent pools as a way of mitigating these problems of the anticommons (fragmented property rights).47 But small firms are effectively blocked from using these arrangements unless cash payments are accepted for participation, and typically they are not.}, thicket_def={References Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={Litigation issues for small firms}, filename={Lanjouw Schankerman (2004) - Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Are Small Firms Handicapped.pdf} }
@article{lemley2006patent, title={Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking}, author={Lemley, M. and Shapiro, C.}, year={2006}, abstract={We study several interconnected problems that arise under the current U.S. patent system when a patent covers one component or feature of a complex product. This situation is common in the information technology sector of the economy. Our analysis applies to cases involving reasonable royalties, but not lost profits. First, we show using bargaining theory that the threat to obtain a permanent injunction greatly enhances the patent holder’s negotiating power, leading to royalty rates that exceed a natural benchmark range based on the value of the patented technology and the strength of the patent. Such royalty overcharges are especially great for weak patents covering a minor feature of a product with a sizeable price/cost margin, including products sold by firms that themselves have made substantial R&D investments. These royalty overcharges do not disappear even if the allegedly infringing firm is fully aware of the patent when it initially designs its product. However, the hold-up problems caused by the threat of injunctions are reduced if courts regularly grant stays to permanent injunctions to give defendants time to redesign their products to avoid infringement when this is possible. Second, we show how hold-up problems are magnified in the presence of royalty stacking, i.e., when multiple patents read on a single product. Third, using third-generation cellular telephones and Wi-Fi as leading examples, we illustrate that royalty stacking can become a very serious problem, especially in the standard-setting context where hundreds or even thousands of patents can read on a single product standard. Fourth, we discuss the use of “reasonable royalties” to award damages in patent infringement cases. We report empirical results regarding the measurement of “reasonable royalties” by the courts and identify various practical problems that tend to lead courts to over-estimate “reasonable royalties” in the presence of royalty stacking. Finally, we make suggestions for patent reform based on our theoretical and empirical findings.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={ICT}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The fact that a great many patents can read on a single product, and that this is common in certain critical industries, creates numerous practical problems for the operation of the patent system.}, thicket_def={def1, cites Heller and Eisenberg(1998)}, thicket_def_extract={Royalty stacking, patent thickets, and the related “anti-commons” problem have been a source of concern in the semiconductor and biotechnology industries for some time}, tags={Royalty-stacking, hold-up}, filename={Lemley Shapiro (2006) - Patent Holdup And Royalty Stacking.pdf} }
@article{lemley2005probabilistic, title={Probabilistic Patents}, author={Lemley, M.A. and Shapiro, C.}, journal={The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, volume={19}, number={2}, pages={75--98}, year={2005}, abstract={}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General, Pharmaceutical}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Similarly, patent thickets can have deleterious effects on both competition and innovation.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={In a number of key industries, particularly semiconductors (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and computer software (Bessen and Hunt, 2004), companies file numerous patent applications on related components that are integrated into a single functional product.The result is a "patent thicket," in which hundreds of patents can apply to a single product (Shapiro, 2001; FTC, 2003).}, tags={cross-licensing, uncertainty}, filename={Lemley Shapiro (2005) - Probabilistic Patents.pdf} }
@article{lemley2005patenting, title={Patenting Nanotechnology}, author={Lemley, M.A.}, journal={Stanford Law Review}, pages={601--630}, year={2005}, abstract={Universities and companies are rushing to the patent office in record numbers to patent nanotechnology inventions. This rush to the patent office is so signficant that many law firms have established nanotechnology practice groups and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has now created a new technology class designed to track nanotechnology products. Three big differences between the emerging science of nanotechnology and other inventions make the role of patents more significant in this arena than elsewhere. First, this is almost the first new field in a century in which the basic ideas are being patented at the outset. In many of the most important fields of invention over the past century - computer hardware, software, the Internet, even biotechnology- the basic building blocks of the field were either unpatented or teh patents were amde available to all users by government regulation. In others, patents were delayed by interferences for so long that the industry developed free from their influence. In nanotechnology, by contrast, companies and universities alike are patenting early and often. A second factor distinguishing nanotechnology is its unique cross-industry structure. Unlike other new industries, in which the patentees are largerly actual or at least potential participants in the market, a significant number of nanotechnology patentees will own rights not just in the industry in which they participate, but in other industries as well.This overlap may signficantly affect thier incentives to license the patents. Finally, a large number of the basic nanotechnology patents have been issued to universities, which have become far more active in patenting in the last twenty-five years. While universities have no direct incentive to restrict competition, their interests may or may not align with the optimal implementation of building-block nanotechnology inventions. The result is a nascent market in which a patent thicket is in theory a serious risk. Whether it will prove a problem in practice depends in large part on how efficient the licensing market turns out to be.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Nanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The dispersion of overlapping patents across too many firms can also create an anticommons or thicket problem, making effective use of the technology difficult, if not impossible}, thicket_def={def1, refers potential of building-block patents to stifle downstream innovation and difficulty of acquiring licenses from patent holders}, thicket_def_extract={Some fear that ownership of nanotechnology patents is too fragmented, risking the development of a patent "thicket."}, tags={Thoughts on the potential effect of patent thickets on the nanotech industry}, filename={Lemley (2005) - Patenting Nanotechnology.pdf} }
@techreport{llanes2009anticommons, title={Anticommons and Optimal Patent Policy in a Model of Sequential Innovation}, author={Llanes, G. and Trento, S.}, year={2009}, abstract={When innovation is sequential, the development of new products depends on the access to previous discoveries. As a consequence the patent system affects both the revenues and the cost of the innovator. We construct a model of sequential innovation in which an innovator uses n patented inputs in R&D to invent a new product. We ask three questions: (i) what is the net effect of patents on innovation as technologies become more complex (n increases)? (ii) are patent pools welfare enhancing? (iii) what is the optimal response of patent policy as technological complexity increases? We find that the answers to these questions depend on the degree of complementarity and substitutability between the inputs used in research.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={Biomedical, Biotechnology, ICT}, thicket_stance={Neutral}, thicket_stance_extract={When the inputs are complements, the profitability of the innovation is decreasing in the technological complexity. In the limit (when n -> infinity), when the degree of substitutability is below a threshold level, which is higher than 1, the innovation is never profitable. This paper therefore gives a formal treatment of the tragedy of the anticommons. On the other hand, when the inputs are substitutes, the profitability of the innovation is increasing in technological complexity. Even in this case, when n -> infinity, the cost of gathering all the inputs for the innovation is always too high from a social point of view and thus the probability of innovation is suboptimal.}, thicket_def={def5}, thicket_def_extract={As the number of inputs needed in research increases, the innovator faces a patent thicket and is threatened by the possibility of hold-up, namely the risk that a useful innovation is not developed because of lack of agreement with the patent holders. This problem has been dubbed the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller 1998, Heller and Eisenberg 1998).}, tags={patent pool, licensing}, filename={Llanes Trento (2009) - Anticommons And Optimal Patent Policy In A Model Of Sequential Innovation.pdf} }
@article{liu2008internal, title={Internal Sequential Innovations: How does Interrelatedness Affect Patent Renewal?}, author={Liu, K. and Arthurs, J. and Cullen, J. and Alexander, R.}, journal={Research Policy}, volume={37}, number={5}, pages={946--953}, year={2008}, abstract={The value of patented innovations has attracted substantial research attention, especially in the context of patent renewal. However, research often assumes that a firm’s patented innovations are independent from each other.We draw upon evolutionary economics and suggest that some of a firm’s patents share important genealogical relationships, which we refer to as internal sequential innovations.We propose internal sequential innovations are more valuable and therefore more likely to be renewed than stand-alone innovations. We examine our hypotheses from a dataset of US pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents. The results confirm our hypotheses at both the patent and the firm levels.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Empirical}, industry={Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={With the power of the intellectual regime, internal sequential innovations offer a larger thicket of protection that can define the underlying technologies in a set of overlapping patents}, thicket_def={def6}, thicket_def_extract={With the power of the intellectual regime, internal sequential innovations offer a larger thicket of protection that can define the underlying technologies in a set of overlapping patents. That is, a sequence of patents revolving around the same technological trajectory can define the intellectual property more precisely and protect it with an enlarged degree of coverage. The holder of such patented innovations can thereafter exclude competitors from the collective scope of the claims laid out in all of the sequential patents (Wagner and Parchomovsky, 2005). In contrast, stand-alone innovations are more likely to be invented around and the underlying intellectual property has a higher hazard of being appropriated (Shapiro, 2000).}, tags={Internal sequential innovations, renewals}, filename={Liu (2008) - Internal Sequential Innovations.pdf} }
@article{meniere2008patent, title={Patent Law and Complementary Innovations}, author={M{\'e}ni{\`e}re, Y.}, journal={European Economic Review}, volume={52}, number={7}, pages={1125--1139}, year={2008}, abstract={The patent system was initially designed to provide incentives to develop stand-alone innovations in fi elds such as mechanics, chemicals or pharmaceuticals. Its application is therefore problematical in more recent elds such as biotechnology and ICT industries, where innovation patterns are different. A well-known problem concerns cumulative innovations. Patent law must then trade off the rights granted to upstream patent owners with the incentives to develop subsequent innovations (Scotchmer, 1991; Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). Another issue concerns complementary innovations, which are the focus of the paper. When final products embody several complementary innovations, the scattering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001). In biotechnology, this is the case of therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic tests that require the use of multiple patented gene fragments (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and software, where firms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001). Shapiro (2001) reports, for example, that in the semi-conductor industry rms receive thousands of patents each year and manufacturers can potentially infringe on hundreds of patents with a single product". The situation is similar in the U.S. software industry, where there are potentially dozens or hundreds of patents covering individual components of a product(FTC, 2003). I study the problem of the production of complementary innovations in a model of dynamic R&D competition between two firms, and argue that in some cases complementary innovations should not be patentable as such, but bundled with other innovations prior to patenting. To do so I consider two complementary innovations and examine whether they should be patented separately or as a bundle. This approach echoes several papers on cumulative innovations where patentability requirements are de ned as the need to develop two or more successive innovations before obtaining a patent (Scotchmer and Green, 1990; Hunt, 1995; ODonoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). As regards complementary innovations, the optimal patenting rule depends on a trade-off between the pro fit loss due to scattered complementary patents, and the possible bene fit of patent disclosure. The scattering of complementary patents between different owners creates a double marginalization issue. Since each patentee behaves as a monopolist, the Cournot (1838) theorem predicts that prices do not maximize the rmspro ts (Shapiro, 2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2005)1 . The requirement that complementary innovations be bundled prior to patenting can be a way to prevent this pro t loss. However, small innovations are not disclosed when innovations have to be bundled prior to patenting (Scotchmer and Green, 1990). As a result, firms lose the possibility to quit the race after a first innovation has been patented, which leads to R&D cost duplications. I show that patent disclosure has a positive social effect, although it does not permit a fully effi cient coordination between firms. In this context, bundling innovations prior to patenting can be more effi cient if innovations can be devel- oped quickly. As I argue in the Conclusion, this condition is consistent with the legal de nition of the "inventive step" patentability requirement. The paper is structured in six sections. First, the model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 then considers the case in which innovations can be patented separately, while Section 4 focuses on the case in which they must be bundled prior to patenting. Section 5 compares the social outcomes of the two require- ments. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the model.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={ICT, Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The present paper upholds policy arguments that emphasize the importance of a severe application of this patentability requirement as a means to limit the size of "patent thickets" and to promote innovation in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent (Jaffe, 2000; Barton, 2003; FTC, 2003)... When final products embody several complementary innovations, the scattering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001)}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and software, where rms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001).}, tags={Patent disclosure, bundling and separate patents, }, filename={Meniere (2008) - Patent Law And Complementary Innovations.pdf} }
@article{paredes2006written, title={Written Description Requirement in Nanotechnology: Clearing a Patent Thicket}, author={Paredes, J.P.}, journal={J. Pat. \& Trademark Off. Soc'y}, volume={88}, pages={489}, year={2006}, abstract={Nanotechnology is an emerging technology, and as an emerging technology, there are certain intellectual property issues surrounding the appropriate protection for nanotechnology. Broadly speaking, nanotechnology is the manufacture of structures and manipulation of matter within dimensions below 100 nanometers, where unique phenomena enable novel applications. At the nanoscale, the physical, chemical, and biological properties of materials differ in fundamental and valuable ways from the properties of individual atoms and molecules or bulk matter.' Researchers and companies are attempting at applying these novel properties to a wide-range of applications and industries.' One important intellectual property issue in addressing nanotechnology is the patenting of innovative techniques and compositions of matter which are necessary for downstream innovation. The notion of a patent thicket is where an overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees. If you get monopoly rights down at the bottom, "you may stifle competition that uses those patents later on and so the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition, but also have adverse effects in the long run on innovation." The patent thicket problem in nanotechnology has been suggested by a recent report by LuxResearch (hereinafter "LuxReport"), indicating that many patents have been filed relating to nanomaterials with their claims overlapping.While many companies will want to use these nanomaterials, the LuxReport states these companies will be forced to license patents from many different sources. Potentially, there will be significant transactional costs for further nanotechnology developments due to these overlapping claims. Moreover, the quality of these nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly called into question," so the navigation of a patent thicket will have to be around these questionable patents. The legal principles in the written description requirement could clear some of this patent thicket by narrowing overlapping claims in nanotechnology during examination, litigation, and especially in postgrant procedures. This paper generally discusses 1) the background of the nanomaterials in the LuxReport and the patent thicket; 2) the legal principles within the written description requirement; 3) why the written description requirement should be used; 4) the application of the legal principles within the written description requirement to nanomaterials discussed in the LuxReport; and 5) proposals for the written description requirement for the USPTO, the Federal Circuit, and postgrant procedures.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Nanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={While many companies will want to use these nanomaterials, the LuxReport states these companies will be forced to license patents from many different sources. Potentially, there will be significant transactional costs for further nanotechnology developments due to these overlapping claims. Moreover, the quality of these nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly called into question," so the navigation of a patent thicket will have to be around these questionable patents.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={The notion of a patent thicket is where an overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees}, tags={Written Description Requirement for Patent Grant Procedures}, filename={Paredes (2006) - Written Description Requirement In Nanotechnology.pdf} }
@article{reitzig2007sharks, title={On Sharks, Trolls, and Their Patent Prey—Unrealistic Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed”}, author={Reitzig, M. and Henkel, J. and Heath, C.}, journal={Research Policy}, volume={36}, number={1}, pages={134--154}, year={2007}, abstract={Patent trolls (or sharks) are patent holding individuals or (often small) firms who trap R&D intensive manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms and large manufacturers within a theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={We further argued that the increasing technology monitoring efforts for victims of trolls, namely large manufacturing R&D intensive firms, due to ballooning numbers of patent applications, probably led to the increase of sharks’ relevance for innovators. It facilitates 'trapping’ manufacturers by ‘hiding’ patented technologies in confusing patent thickets—a second necessary condition for sharks to operate. oreover, the strengthening of patent holder’s rights in certain jurisdictions (e.g. the US) most likely enabled sharks to operate more profitably, too.}, thicket_def={def7}, thicket_def_extract={As both articles show, the “strategic use” of patents (the two most important types being blocking and cross-licensing with patent ‘thickets’ playing a major role for the latter), has classically been discussed from the perspective of those patent holders who either engage in the production of their own technological goods or consider themselves professional intellectual property suppliers who repeatedly interact with manufacturers.}, tags={Patent Trolls and Sharks and their operations}, filename={Reitzig Henkel Heath (2007) - On Sharks Trolls And Their Patent Prey.pdf} }
@inproceedings{rubinfeld2004strategic, title={The Strategic Use of Patents: Implications for Antitrust}, author={Rubinfeld, D.L. and Maness, R.}, booktitle={Antitrust, Patent and Copyright Conference}, year={2004}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Retail}, thicket_stance={Neutral}, thicket_stance_extract={The competitive offensive advantage associated with a patent thicket can be high. It follows, of course, that there is also a substantial defensive advantage as well. The result may be a “race” to grow one’s IP portfolio. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear whether that race will be “to the top” (i.e., in the social interest), or “to the bottom” (i.e., harmful from a social point of view).}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={Shapiro (2001) characterizes a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”, tags={Patent Thickets strategic use in negotiation and business strategy}, filename={Rubinfeld Maness (2004) - The Strategic Use Of Patents Implications For Antitrust.pdf} }
@article{rey2012abuse, title={Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property}, author={Rey, P. and Salant, D.}, journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization}, year={2012}, abstract={This paper examines the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the downstream firms that require access to that IP, as well as on consumers and social welfare. The paper considers a model in which there is product differentiation downstream. License fees and fixed entry costs determine the number of downstream competitors and thus variety. We first consider the case where there is a single upstream owner of essential IP. Increasing the number of licenses enhances product variety, which creates added value, but it also intensifies downstream competition, which dissipates profits. We derive conditions under which the upstream IP monopoly will then want to provide an excessive or insufficient number of licenses, relative to the number that maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare.When there are multiple owners of essential IP, royalty stacking can reduce the number of the downstream licensees, but also the downstream equilibrium prices the consumers face.The paper derives conditions determining whether this reduction in downstream price and variety is beneficial to consumers or society. Finally, the paper explores the impact of alternative licensing policies. With fixed license fees or royalties expressed as a percentage of the price, an upstream IP owner cannot control the intensity of downstream competition. In contrast, volumebased license fees (i.e., per-unit access fees), do permit an upstream owner to control downstream competition and to replicate the outcome of complete integration. The paper also shows that vertical integration can have little impact on downstream competition and licensing terms when IP owners charge fixed or volume-based access fees.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Patent thickets have long been a concern due to the potential for delaying deployment of products and adversely affecting consumers.}, thicket_def={def9}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets, layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to offer products that embody technologies owned by multiple firms, and licensing policies have drawn increasing scrutiny from policy makers. Patent thickets involve complementary products, which gives rise to double marginalization - the so-called royalty stacking problem - and has the potential to retard diffusion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare.}, tags={Optimal licensing policies regarding downstream competition, fixed access fees}, filename={Rey Salant (2012) - Abuse Of Dominance And Licensing Of Intellectual Property.pdf} }
@article{shapiro2003antitrust, title={Antitrust limits to patent settlements}, author={Shapiro, C.}, journal={RAND Journal of Economics}, pages={391--411}, year={2003}, abstract={Patents, patent litigation, and patent settlements increasingly influence competition. Settlements of patent disputes come in many forms,including licensing and cross-licensing agreements, patent pools, mergers, and joint ventures. While frequently procompetitive, such settlements can stifle competition and harm consumers. I propose a specific antitrust rule limiting such settlements: a settlement must leave consumers at least as well off as they would have been from ongoing patent litigation. After establishing that profitable settlements satisfying this constraint generally exist, I show how this antitrust rule can be used to evaluate three types of settlements: mergers, patent pools, and negotiated entry dates.}, discipline={econ}, research_type={theory}, industry={general}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={As described in Shapiro (2001), more and more companies are facing a patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to market.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={As described in Shapiro (2001), more and more companies are facing a patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to market.}, tags={Mergers, Patent Pools, Negotiated Entry Dates, Settlement effects}, filename={Shapiro (2003) - Antitrust Limits To Patent Settlements.pdf} }
@article{sabety2004nanotechnology, title={Nanotechnology innovation and the patent thicket: Which IP policies promote growth}, author={Sabety, T.}, journal={Alb. LJ Sci. \& Tech.}, volume={15}, pages={477}, year={2004}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Nanotechnology, Radio}, thicket_stance={Neutral}, thicket_stance_extract={On the one hand, the fear of the patent thicket has been raised: "[i]f you get monopoly rights down at the bottom, you may stifle competition that uses those patents later on and so . . . the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition, but also have adverse effects in the long run on innovation."9On the other hand, encouraging private investment in commercialization has also been raised: "[b]y enabling corporations to negotiate exclusive licenses of promising technologies [that were publicly funded],... [this] encourage[s] them to invest in the additional research, development, and manufacturing capabilities needed to bring new products to market." The information technology industry did not suffer severe patent deadlock in its early years while the radio industry did}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro defines "patent thicket" as "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."}, tags={licensing, government funding}, filename={Sabety (2004) - Nanotechnology Innovation And The Patent Thicket.pdf} }
@article{schmidt2008complementary, title={Complementary Patents and Market Structure}, author={Schmidt, K.}, year={2008}, publisher={CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7005}, abstract={Many high technology goods are based on standards that require access to several patents that are owned by different IP holders. We investigate the royalties chosen by IP holders under different market structures. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders (or a patent pool) solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and innovation.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={This “patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on the revenues of the other patent holders when setting his royalties, so the sum of all royalties will be inefficiently high.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={This “patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on the revenues of the other patent holders when setting his royalties, so the sum of all royalties will be inefficiently high.}, tags={patent pools}, filename={Schmidt (2008) - Complementary Patents And Market Structure.pdf} }
@article{schneider2008fences, title={Fences and competition in patent races}, author={Schneider, C.}, journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization}, volume={26}, number={6}, pages={1348--1364}, year={2008}, abstract={This paper studies the behaviour of firms facing the decision to create a patent fence, de fined as a portfolio of substitute patents. We set up a patent race model, where firms can decide either to patent their inventions, or to rely on secrecy. It is shown that fi rms build patent fences, when the duopoly profi ts net of R&D costs are positive. We also demonstrate that in this context, a fi rm will rely on secrecy when the speed of discovery of the subsequent invention is high compared to the competitors. Furthermore, we compare the model under the First-to-Invent and First-to-File legal rules. Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of patent fences.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={While the issue of "thickets" of complementary technologies in cumulative innovations has been extensively analyzed2, as well as the institutional solutions to overcome this problem (Lerner and Tirole, 2005 and Shapiro, 2001), little attention has been paid to fencing patents so far.}, thicket_def={def10}, thicket_def_extract={More precisely, firms will patent a coherent group of inventions, which form what is sometimes called a patent "bulk", aimed at protecting one product. The "bulk" can either be a "fence" of substitute patents or a "thicket" of complementary patents (see Reitzig, 2004 and Cohen et al., 2000).}, tags={patent fences, }, filename={Schneider (2008) - Fences And Competition In Patent Races.pdf} }
@article{santore2010patent, title = {Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence}, author = {Rudy Santore and Michael McKee, and David Bjornstad}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, volume = {53}, number = {1}, pages = {pp. 167-183}, year = {2010}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School}, abstract = {Abstract Production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among patent holders, who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty fees. Summed across patents, these fees become the total producer cost of the package of patents. Royalties, because they function as excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibria, which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm to not license the technology, resulting in inefficient outcomes. We report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing of patents in a patent pool. We find that pool-like pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents.}, discipline={Law, Econ}, research_type={Theory, Empirical}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={More recently, a National Academy of Sciences (2006) committee studied the issue, concluding that even though evidence of blocking or market failures has yet to emerge, the anticommons or patent thickets may well emerge as profit opportunities in biomedical markets grow.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={Shapiro (2001) broadens the concept as a “patent thicket” in which possible outcomes include excessively high fees for the use of the patent set, uncertainty regarding potential patent infringement, and, in the limit, holdup problems.}, tags={patent pools}, filename={Santore McKee Bjornstad (2010) - Patent Pools As A Solution To Efficient Licensing Of Complementary Patents.pdf} }
@article{tullis2005application, title={Application of the Government License Defense to Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research: The Case for a Limited Patent Compulsory Licensing Regime}, author={Tullis, T.K.}, journal={UCLA L. Rev.}, volume={53}, pages={279}, year={2005}, abstract={Nanotechnology's potential impact on worldwide industries has nations around the world investing billions of dollars for research in order to capture a part of the projected trillion dollar market for nanotechnology products in 2010. The current rush to patent nanotechnologies may lead to an overcrowded nanotechnology patent thicket that could deter critical innovation and continued product development in the United States. At this early stage of nanotechnology's life cycle, increasing numbers of broad and potentially overlapping patents are being issued--while few nonexclusive licenses are being offered. Furthermore, the lack of significant case law provides little guidance on proper nanotechnology patent scope and validity, while the decline of legal defenses such as experimental use leaves innovators exposed to potential infringement liability for even the most fundamental of scientific research studies. In this Comment, the author proposes that the U.S. government exercises the full extent of its rights under the twenty-five year old Bayh-Dole Act and develop the government license defense to create a limited patent compulsory licensing regime for the fruits of federally funded research. The author argues that recipients of the billions of dollars in federal nanotechnology research funds should provide broad, nonexclusive licenses to the privatized patent rights they obtain as a result of public funding. Ultimately, a well-formulated government license defense, which assesses the extent to which an "infringing" act against a federally funded patent falls along a spectrum of fair use, would provide a means for overcoming the innovation-impeding effects of absolute exclusion rights.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Nanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The development of such a patent thicket could deter further innovation, 6 and the active enforcement by nanotechnology patent holders of their exclusivity rights ultimately could result in the creation of a nanotechnology anticommons-a situation in which a scarce resource becomes prone to underuse because there are too many owners holding the right to exclude others from that resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={Unfortunately, the rush to secure worldwide intellectual property rights in nanotechnology could lead to the development of a "patent thicket." This term, coined by intellectual property scholars, refers to an overlapping set of patent rights that requires researchers, inventors, and entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize new technologies to obtain licenses from multiple patentees.}, tags={government license defense}, filename={Tullis (2005) - Application Of The Government License Defense To Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research.pdf} }
@article{taylor2003american, title={American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change}, author={Taylor, M.R. and Cayford, J.}, journal={Harv. JL \& Tech.}, volume={17}, pages={321}, year={2003}, abstract={}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory}, industry={Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The patent thicket is a problem because useful innovation in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies. The field of biotechnology is particularly dependent on the cumulative work of many researchers, and therefore is vulnerable to the “anticommons” problem mentioned earlier.}, thicket_def={def1}, thicket_def_extract={This pattern — the increasing number of patents, increasing patent breadth, and the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries — has created what some call a patent thicket in biotechnology: “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees}, tags={patent policies negative effects on African agriculture}, filename={Taylor Cayford (2003) - American Patent Policy Biotechnology And African Agriculture.pdf} }
@article{van2006clearing, title={A Clearing House for Diagnostic Testing: the Solution to Ensure Access to and Use of Patented Genetic Inventions?}, author={Van Zimmeren, E. and Verbeure, B. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, G.}, journal={Bulletin of the World Health Organization}, volume={84}, number={5}, pages={352--359}, year={2006}, publisher={SciELO Public Health}, abstract={In genetic diagnostics, the emergence of a so-called “patent thicket” is imminent. Such an overlapping set of patent rights may have restrictive effects on further research and development of diagnostic tests, and the provision of clinical diagnostic services. Currently, two models that may facilitate access to and use of patented genetic inventions are attracting much debate in various national and international fora: patent pools and clearing houses. In this article, we explore the concept of clearing houses. Several types of clearing houses are identified. First, we describe and discuss two types that would provide access to information on the patented inventions: the information clearing house and the technology exchange clearing house. Second, three types of clearing houses are analysed that not only offer access to information but also provide an instrument to facilitate the use of the patented inventions: the open access clearing house, the standardized licences clearing house and the royalty collection clearing house. A royalty collection clearing house for genetic diagnostic testing would be the most comprehensive as it would serve several functions: identifying patents and patent claims essential to diagnostic testing, matching licensees with licensors, developing and supplying standardized licences, collecting royalties, monitoring whether users respect licensing conditions, and providing dispute resolution services such as mediation and arbitration. In this way, it might function as an effective model for users to facilitate access to and use of the patented inventions. However, it remains to be seen whether patent holders with a strong patent portfolio will be convinced by the advantages of the royalty collection clearing house and be willing to participate.}, discipline={Policy Report}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Genetics}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Moreover, there are factors that may lead to the emergence of a patent blocking problem in genetics in the future: increased awareness among researchers; and growing rate of patent enforcement caused by the strategic enforcement of their rights by patent holders and the proliferating complexity of biomedical research requiring a broader range and greater number of inputs of which a growing number is patented.}, thicket_def={def26}, thicket_def_extract={This pattern — the increasing number of patents, increasing patent breadth, and the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries — has created what some call a patent thicket in biotechnology: “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees.}, tags={patent pools, clearing houses}, filename={VanZimmeren (2006) - A Clearing House For Diagnostic Testing.pdf} }
@article{verbeure2006patent, title={Patent Pools and Diagnostic Testing}, author={Verbeure, B. and van Zimmeren, E. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, G.}, journal={TRENDS in Biotechnology}, volume={24}, number={3}, pages={115--120}, year={2006}, abstract={There is increasing concern that overlapping patents in the field of genetics will create a costly and legally complex situation known as a patent thicket, which, along with the associated issues of accumulating royalty payments, can act as a disincentive for innovation. One potential means of preventing this is for the patent holders to enter into a so-called patent pool, such as those established in the electronics and telecommunications industries. Precedents for these also exist in the field of genetics, notably with the patents pertaining to the SARS genome. In this review, we initially address the patent pool concept in general and its application in genetics. Following this, we will explore patent pools in the diagnostic field in more detail, and examine some existing and novel examples of patent pools in genetics.}, discipline={Policy Report}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Biotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weakly Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={There is increasing concern that overlapping patents in the field of genetics will create a costly and legally complex situation known as a patent thicket, which, along with the associated issues of accumulating royalty payments, can act as a disincentive for innovation.}, thicket_def={def24}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thicket. The intellectual property portfolios of several companies that form a dense web of overlapping intellectual property right}, tags={patent pools}, filename={Verbeure (2006) - Patent Pools And Diagnostic Testing.pdf} }
@article{wang2010rise, title={Rise of the Patent Intermediaries}, author={Wang, A.W.}, journal={Berkeley Tech. LJ}, volume={25}, pages={159}, year={2010}, abstract={Patents are evolving from purely exclusionary instruments into intellectual property assets that play a part in business strategy and have value as transactional goods. Businesses operating in the intellectual property marketplace have experienced an unprecedented explosion of activity involving these intangible but valuable assets. The new market for intellectual property has inspired entrepreneurial legal professionals and business professionals alike to create new companies and expand existing ones to act as middlemen, encouraging the continued proliferation of patent transactions. These entities operate and thrive in the intermediary market between buyers and sellers of intellectual property as well as auxiliary markets related to the protection of intellectual property.}, discipline={Law}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={ICT}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In this age of patent thickets, an organization must tread carefully lest it infringe countless patents just by doing business (cites Heller Eisenberg's Anticommons)}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro defines a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001)}, tags={}, filename={Wang (2010) - Rise Of The Patent Intermediaries.pdf} }
@article{wagner2003information, title = {Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control}, author = {Wagner, R. Polk}, journal = {Columbia Law Review}, volume = {103}, number = {4}, pages = {pp. 995-1034}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.}, abstract = {This Essay challenges a central tenet of the recent criticism of intellectual property rights: the suggestion that the control conferred by such rights is detrimental to the continued flourishing of a public domain of ideas and information. In this Essay, Professor Wagner argues that such theories understate the significance of the intangible nature of information, and thus overlook the contribution that even perfectly controlled intellectual creations make to the public domain. In addition, this Essay shows that perfect control of propertized information--an animating assumption in much of the contemporary criticism--is both counterfactual and likely to remain so. These findings suggest that increasing the appropriability of information goods is likely to increase, rather than diminish, the quantity of "open" information. Further, the benefits of control in fostering coordination and enabling flexibility in arrangements are essential elements of promoting progress in a changing world.}, filename={Wagner (2003) - Information Wants To Be Free.pdf} discipline={Law}, research_type={Theory, Discussion}, industry={ICT}, thicket_stance={Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={Control-talk is of "the second enclosure movement," the lurking "tragedy of the anticommons," or the dangers of "patent thickets" -not to mention the phenomenon of litigation efforts (or perhaps social movements?) sporting their own slogans (and logos), such as "Free the Mouse," "Create Like It's 1790," or "When Copyright Attacks."}, thicket_def={def25}, thicket_def_extract={"Patent thickets" refer to the fact that in many areas of technology, great numbers of related patents exist at any particular time, and many might have applicability to any commercial product.}, tags={information, drm, control}, filename={Wagner (2003) - Information Wants to be Free} }