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==Course Website==
The course website was [http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~szeidl/ec207B/ec207Bindex.htm|here].
==Course Materials==
There was a useful [[Media:ECON207B-Syllabus.pdf |syllabus]].
Lecture slides:
*[[Media:ECON207B-Lecture3.pdf |Lecture 3]]
*[[Media:ECON207B-Lecture4.pdf |Lecture 4]]
*[[Media:ECON207B-Lectures5_6.pdf |Lecture Lectures 5&6]]
*[[Media:ECON207B-Lecture7.pdf |Lecture 7]]
*Lecture 8 did not have slides
===Games played on networks===
Presentation by Matt Leister ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-NetworkGames.pdf |slides]])
*Calvo-Armengol A., E. Patacchini and Y. Zenou (2009), Peer E¤ects and Social Networks in Education,Review of Economic Studies 76, 1239-1267.
*Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo and Yariv (2010): Network Games, The Review of Economic Studies , 77 (1) , pp. 218244.
===Strategic network formation===
Presentation by Michele Muller ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Strategic1.pdf |slides]])
*Jackson and Wolinsky (1996): A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, Journal of Economic Theory , 71 (1) , pp. 44-74.
*Christakis, N.A. and Fowler, J.H. and Imbens, G.W. and Kalyanaraman, K. (2010), "An empirical model for strategic network formation", National Bureau of Economic Research
===Strategic network formation===
Presentation by Marco Alexander Schwarz([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Strategic2.pdf |slides]])
*Bala and Goyal (2000): A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation, Econometrica, 68 (5) , pp. 11811229.
*Galeotti and Goyal (2010): The Law of the Few, American Economic Review.
===Statistical network formation===
Presentation by James([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Stochastic.pdf |slides]])
*Jackson and Rogers (2007): Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random are Socially Generated Networks?, American Economic Review 97, pp. 890-915.
*Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009): An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation, Econometrica , 77 (4) , pp. 10031045.
===Information aggregation in networks===
Presentation by Junjie Zhou([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-InfoAggregation.pdf |slides]])
*DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003): Persuasion Bias, Social Influence and Unidimensional Opinions, Quarterly Journal of Economics , 118, pp. 909-968.
*Golub and Jackson (2010): Naive Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and the Wisdom of Crowds, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
===Networks and labor markets===
Presentation by Attila Lindner ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-LaborMarkets.pdf |slides]])
*Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004): The E¤ects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality, American Economic Review , 94 (3) , pp. 426-454
*Topa (2001): Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies , 68 (2) , pp. 261-295
===Favoritism and political connections===
Presentation by Alisa Tazhitdinova([[Media:ECON207B-SlidesFavoritism.pdf |slides]])
*Bramoulle, Y. and S. Goyal (2010), Favoritism,Working paper, Laval University and Cambridge.
*Khwaja, A., and A. Mian (2005). Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market,Quarterly Journal of Economics 120.
===Financial networks===
Presentation by Tarso Mori Madeira([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Financial1.pdf |slides]])
*Allen, Franklin and Gale, DouglasM. [2000] Financial Contagion,Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 108, No. 1.
*Allen, Franklin, Ana Babus and Elena Carletti [2010] Financial Connections and Systemic Risk,Working paper, UPenn, Cambridge, EUI.
===Financial networks===
Presentation by Vladimir ([[Media:ECON207B-Slides-Financial2.pdf |slides]])
*Caballero, Ricardo, and Alp Simsek [2010] Complexity and Financial Panics,working paper, MIT and Harvard.
==Particularly Useful Papers==
I found the following papers from the class particularly useful:
*Manski (1993): Identifcation of Endogenous Social E¤ects: The Reflection Problem, Review of Economic Studies , 60 , pp. 531-542. ([[Media:Manski (1993) - Identification of Endogenous Social Effects.pdf |pdf]])
*Sacerdote (2001): Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates, Quarterly Journal of Economics , 116 (2) , pp. 681-704 ([[Media:Sacerdote (2001) - Peer Effects with Random Assignment.pdf |pdf]])
In addition, these paper from my own reading were highly relevant:
*Jackson, Matthew O. (2003), "A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency", in "Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions", edited by Gabrielle Demange and Myrna Wooders, Cambridge University Press ([[Media:Jackson (2003) - A Survey of Models of Network Formation Stability and Effciency.pdf |pdf]])
*Ozsoylev, Han, Johan Walden, Deniz Yavuz, Recep Bildik (2011), “Investor Networks in the Stock Market”, Working Paper ([[Media:Ozsoylev Walden Yavuz Bildik (2011) - Investor Networks in the Stock Market.pdf |pdf]])
I also strongly recommend interested students to read:
*Roth, A.E. (1988), "The Shapley value: essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley", Cambridge Univ. Press.
(This should be available in your library. It provides the cooperative game theory foundations for modern network economics. And Roth writes an excellent foreword and chapter that will get you up to speed fast.)
