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The symmetric models section proceeds as follows:
#Simple '''first price or all pay auction ''' set-ups are discussed#'''Dasguspta and Stiglitz (1980) ''' gives a first price auction like game, but with a continously discounted prize and bids translate into times to invention.#'''Kamien and Schwatz (1976) ''' describe the partial equilibrium of a patent race with stochastic invention#'''[[Loury (1979) - Market Structure And Innovation |Loury (1979)]] ''' give the full equilibrium result #'''[[Lee,Wilde (1980) - Market Structure And Innovation A Reformulation |Lee and Wilde (1980)]] ''' extend Loury by considering the payment of cost to occur continously until an invention occurs, rather than solely at the outset#'''Reinganum (1982) ''' gives an even more general model, which allows for variable rates of investment over time (and so full strategic responses to rival's investment), and also considers imperfect patent protection.
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