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This paper is a chapter in the Handbook of Industrial Organization. It cover four basic topics:
#'''Symmetric Models ''' - Firms are homogeneous and compete to produce an innovation and secure the associated rents#'''Asymmetric Models ''' - There is an incumbent and one or more entrants, which compete to produce an innovatation and secure the associated rents#'''Licensing and Joint Ventures ''' - Do joint ventures increase or restrict innovation and the dissemination of innovations? Licensing might be used strategically to disincentivize a rival from pursuing further innovation.#'''Diffusion ''' - What theories can help explain the observed patterns of diffusion for innovations? When will firms adopt too early or too late?
==Symmetric Models==
There are some basic assumptions that underlie all of the symmetric models:
*Firms are '''homogeneous''', and so we look for symmetric solutions*'''Innovation is costly''', with costs (eventually at least) decreasing and convex (i.e. there are eventual diseconomies of scale)*'''The first to invent wins ''' the rights to a rent (i.e. gets a patent) and everyone else gets nothing (i.e. no spillovers)
Furthermore:
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