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Ting (2009) - Organizational Capacity (view source)
Revision as of 22:52, 4 April 2010
, 22:52, 4 April 2010New page: ==Reference(s)== Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edeg...
==Reference(s)==
Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek)
==Abstract==
Organizational capacity is critical to the e�ective implementation of policy. Consequently, strategic legislators and bureaucrats must take capacity into account in designing programs. This paper develops a theory of endogenous organizational capacity. Capacity is modeled as an investment that a�effects a policy's subsequent quality or implementation level. The agency has an advantage in providing capacity investments, and may therefore constrain the legislature's policy choices. A key variable is whether investments can be targeted" toward speciffc policies. If it cannot, then implementation levels decrease with the divergence in the players' ideal points, and policy-making authority may be delegated to encourage investment. If investment can be targeted, then implementation levels increase with the divergence of ideal points if the agency is suffciently professionalized, and no delegation occurs. In this case, the agency captures more benefits from its investment, and capacity is higher. The agency therefore prefers policy-specific technology.
Ting, Michael (2009), "Organizational Capacity", forthcoming JLEO, [http://www.columbia.edu/~mmt2033/organizational_capacity.pdf available on his website] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organizational%20Capacity.pdf pdf] (Class Slides: [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set1.pdf Set1] [http://www.edegan.com/repository/Ting%20(2009)%20-%20Organisational%20Capacity%20--%20Slides%20Set2.pdf Set2], © Adrienne Hosek)
==Abstract==
Organizational capacity is critical to the e�ective implementation of policy. Consequently, strategic legislators and bureaucrats must take capacity into account in designing programs. This paper develops a theory of endogenous organizational capacity. Capacity is modeled as an investment that a�effects a policy's subsequent quality or implementation level. The agency has an advantage in providing capacity investments, and may therefore constrain the legislature's policy choices. A key variable is whether investments can be targeted" toward speciffc policies. If it cannot, then implementation levels decrease with the divergence in the players' ideal points, and policy-making authority may be delegated to encourage investment. If investment can be targeted, then implementation levels increase with the divergence of ideal points if the agency is suffciently professionalized, and no delegation occurs. In this case, the agency captures more benefits from its investment, and capacity is higher. The agency therefore prefers policy-specific technology.
