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thicket_stance={Weak Anti},
thicket_stance_extract={A firm’s patent portfolio can enable the firm to mitigate appropriation concerns that arise across multiple deals. This occurs when patents are not specific to an individual deal, but rather apply across multiple technology commercializa- tion projects. Such an intellectual property portfolio can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s technology.11 The degree of protection afforded by such a portfolio will, of course, necessarily be dependent on the degree to which patents are relevant across multiple commercialization projects.},
thicket_def={#F, References Shapiro, Single Firm, Strategic Patenting (Good), Barrier To Entry}, thicket_def_extract={#F, Such an intellectual property portfolio can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s technology.}, tags={#Firm Strategy, Collaboration},
filename={Aggarwal Hsu (2009) - Modes Of Cooperative R And D Commercialization By Start Ups.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Overlapping Patents, Hold-up, Strategic Patenting (Good), Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
thicket_def_extract={#A-S, #B, #C1, Portfolio value can manifest itself in licensing negotiations, especially cross-licensing, or merely in the greater in terrorem effects it creates for competitors... Carl Shapiro has called "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology."},
tags={#IPR Reform, Patent Quality, Sequential Innovation},
filename={Allison Tiller (2003) - The Business Method Patent Myth.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, References Shapiro, Diversely-Held, Complementary Inputs, Always Hinders Innovation},
thicket_def_extract={Economist Carl Shapiro elaborates on the problems created by a ‘patent thicket’. Using traditional economic analysis, he has shown how, when several monopolists exist that each control a different raw material needed for development of a product, the price of the resulting product is higher than if a single firm controlled trade in all of the raw materials or made the product itself. However, the combined profits of the producers are lower in the presence of complementary monopolies. So, if there are several patent holders whose permission is needed to create a gene therapy (and any one of them could block the production of the gene therapy), inefficiencies in the market are created, potentially harming both the patent holder and the patent users.},
tags={#IPR Reform, #Private Mechanisms, Pools, Compulsory Licensing, #Effects on Academic Research},
filename={Andrews (2002) - Genes And Patent Policy Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights.pdf}
}
thicket_stance_extract={n the other hand, a situation such as a patent thicket is likely to impose additional costs and inefficiency on down- stream product development and cumulative innovation... Some similar issues are discussed by Shapiro (2001), who considers the strategies that firms may use to reduce the effects of a patent thicket on their ability to innovate. Shapiro considers the strategies of cross licensing, patent pools, and cooperative standard setting. Our paper is complementary to Shapiro’s in that our analysis is at the level of the market for technology, rather than an individual firm.},
thicket_def={#A, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={In the context of patents, a proliferation of IP rights may result in a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001) that can increase costs for downstream activities such as cumulative innovation and the development of new products that combine multiple existing innovations.}, tags={Private Mechanisms, Pools, Collectives, Clearinghouses... The more the existing IP rights that cover a given downstream activity, the higher will be the transaction costs associated with licensing. In addition, if the upstream IP rights are complementary, potential coordination failures among IP owners can lead to excessively high licensing fees.}, tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Collectives, Clearinghouses},
filename={Aoki Schiff (2008) - Promoting Access To Intellectual Property.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #A-T, #B, References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Always Hinders Innovation, Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
thicket_def_extract={However, there is no clear distinction between the use of patents to prevent copying and the use of patents to block competitors. The function of blocking is to create a wide space around an innovation where other firms cannot develop a competitive alternative.... One of the worst-case outcomes of the patenting strategies of private firms is the creation of an ‘anti-commons’ in which the necessary knowledge to conduct further research is covered by a large number of patents held by a large number of firms. This has been called a patent thicket, or a "dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology" (Shapiro, in press).Heller and Eisenberg (1998) raise the concern that licensing in some areas, such as biotechnology, could become so complex or expensive that it acts as a drag on the rate and direction of research, thereby slowing down the development of socially beneficial products and processes... Patent thickets that develop through both defensive and offensive patent strategies could increase the transaction costs for arranging licenses. The cost of complex licensing arrangements could raise business costs without any benefits to the firms involved, with costs passed on to consumers.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, Value from Position/Portfolio, #IPR Reform, License to Innovate/Research Exemptions. #Effects on Academic Research}
filename={Arundel Patel (2003) - Strategic Patenting.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, #D, Dubious Patents, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={Obviously, the more patents, the more inventors must spend on patent management, licensing and litigation. At some point the mounting costs must dissuade inventors with shallow pockets... so that [R\&D] accretes in major pharmaceutical companies, ahead of small biotechnology firms... Correa is correct that the quality of patent examination is scandalous. Even in Europe or North America, many dubious patents are issued. The resulting lack of legal certainty harms everyone: competitors who must spend heavily to overturn wronly granted patents; consumers who pay a premium while those patents remain in force; and even companies and their shareholders, as happened when an invalid Prozac patent was finally overtruned, wiping US $35 billion off Feli Lilly's market capitalization.},
tags={#Industry DiscussionCommentary, Sequential Innovation},
filename={Attaran (2004) - Patents Do Not Strangle Innovation But Their Quality Must Be Improved.pdf}
}
thicket_def={Broad Patents, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={#B, For example, a claim in a later patent may cover a new and nonobvious improvement on a basic invention claimed in an earlier patent. In this case, both patents would properly cover the improved product. A large number of patents containing overlapping claims which cover the same product are often referred to as a "patent thicket."},
tags={#Industry Commentary, Sequential Innovation},
filename={Baluch Radomsky Maebius (2005) - In Re Kumar The First Nanotech Patent Case In The Federal Circuit.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={The creator of this term defines the patent thicket as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology." (Shapiro, 2001)... The patent thicket describes a situation in which holders of different patents that are all necessary for complying with a standard mutually block each other in the implementation of the standard. Another advantage of pools highlighted by the economic literature is to reduce the transaction costs by cutting down the number of licenses needed by firms without patents who wish to produce products that comply with the standard. The last advantage of patent pools is to reduce the multiple marginalization problem6. This problem arises if different firms have market power over complementary inputs, such as different patents necessary for complying with the same standard, and fix prices independently of each other.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio},
filename={Baron Delcamp (2010) - Strategic Inputs Into Patent Pools.pdf}
}
thicket_stance={Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={Policy makers and industry participants have come to take a positive stance on patent pools, as pools play an important role in leveling the playing field for competition on the downstream production market, reducing transaction costs and encouraging the spread of innovative technology throughout the industry. In view of these benefits, patent pools are seen as indispensable instruments in cutting through the patent thickets in ICT. Indeed, by clearing blocking positions and facilitating access to the technology, patent pools help attenuating the negative downstream effects of patent thickets. On the other hand, as our analysis has pointed out, there is a risk that these positive downstream effects are offset by the fact that patent pools create incentives to exacerbate some of the worrying upstream effects of patent thickets. Indeed, one of the harmful effects of patent thickets is to induce socially wasteful excess investment in patent races and opportunistic patent files, deviating resources away from innovation to rent seeking strategies... },
thicket_def={#A-T,#C1, References Shapiro, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Transaction Costs, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held}, thicket_def_extract={#A-T,#C1, Patent pools are seen as a potential solution to inefficiencies resulting from dense "thickets" of overlapping patents (Shapiro, 2001). From an optimistic point of view, the positive effect of patent pools on the number of patent declarations would indicate that patent pools are efficient in mitigating the adverse effects of patent thickets on innovation and induce supplementary innovation efforts... Indeed, by clearing blocking positions and facilitating access to the technology, patent pools help attenuating the negative downstream effects of patent thickets....}, tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Standards, Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio},
filename={Baron Pohlmann (2011) - Patent Pools And Patent Inflation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={Broad Patents, Overlapping Patents, Diversely-Held, Single Firm, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={#B1, When holders of such broad patents refuse to license their patents or license these on exclusive basis or at prohibitive prices or with restrictive conditions, it leads to the growth of patent thickets impeding downstream research in nanotechnology. The existence of a high number of such patents with broad and sometimes, overlapping claims adds to the problem of thickets and leads to the fragmentation of the patent landscape. Such a scenario has been reported by Harris in the case of nanotubes where a large number of building blocks, broad patents are held by several different entities.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Compulsory Licensing, Standards, #IPR Reform, Research Exemptions},
filename={Barpujari (2010) - The Patent Regime And Nanotechnology Issues And Challenges.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Barrier To Entry, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Strategic Patenting (Good)},
thicket_def_extract={#A, Some of the most important new issues are raised by the "defensive" use of intellectual property rights among oligopolists.... In semiconductors, and probably many other industries, there is a small number of oligopolists, probably small enough to provide the basis for a significant oligopoly rent due to parallel pricing above the competitive level. (Unless there is some form of quasi-rent or return greater than marginal cost, there will be no incentive for invest- ment in research.4) Each of the oligopolists holds a substantial patent portfolio, significant components of which are infringed by each of its competitors. Although litigation is possible, it is rare, because of the fear that any suit will be met by a counter suit. This fear may lead to a tacit cross-license of the patent portfolios; in some cases the cross-license may be explicit. Although this situation raises other antitrust issues to be discussed in this article, the most serious one arises from the possibility that the oligopolists will exercise their intellectual property rights to prevent entry into the oligopoly},
tags={#IPR Reform, Balance with Antitrust, Firm Strategy, Oligopoly, Value from Position/Portfolio, #Private Mechanisms, Cross-Licensing},
filename={Barton (2002) - Antitrust Treatment Of Oligopolies With Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={Similar perils for the public interest arise in the last of the reasons for voluntary technology sharing - the problem of "patent thickets" and the widespread patent pools that have been formed to deal with the thicket problem. A complex piece of equipment, such as a computer, characteristically is made up of components each of which is covered by a surprisingly large number of patents, and the patents pertinent for such an item are often owned by a considerable number of different firms, many of them direct competitors in the final-product market. For example, Peter N. Detkin, vice president and assistant general counsel at Intel Corporation, estimates that there were more than 90,000 patents generally related to microprocessors held by more than 10,000 parties in 2002 (Federal Trade Commission, 2002, p. 667). This puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manufacturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic consequences this threatens for each of them is the formation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities...},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Oligopoly, Private Mecnahsims, Pools, Regime Selection},
filename={Baumol (2004) - Entrepreneurial Enterprises Large Established Firms And Other Components.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Always Hinders Innovation, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Broad Patents, Dubious Patents, Overlapping Patents, Single Firm, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={#B, Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as "a ‘dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.’" Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Patent Cross-Licensing in the Computer and Software Industry, 233 N.Y. L. J., Jan. 11, 2005, at 3, 6 (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Settings, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam Jaffe et al. eds., 2001)). Such patent thickets, a result of multiple blocking patents, naturally discourage and stifle innovation and "[c]laims in such patent thickets have been characterized as ‘often broad, overlapping and conflicting . . . ’"). },
tags={#IPR Reform, Creation of New Classification, Balance Beteween Anti-Trust, Firm Strategy, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, Sequential Innovation},
filename={Bawa Bawa Maebius (2005) - The Nanotechnology Patent Gold Rush.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, Quotes Shapiro, Always Hinders Innovation, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Broad Patents, Overlapping Patents, Single Firm, Diversely-Held, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology". Such patent thickets, as a result of multiple blocking patents, are considered to discourage and stifle innovation. Claims in such patent thickets have been characterized as often broad, overlapping and conflicting - a scenario ripe for massive patent litigation battles in the future...},
tags={#Industry Commentary, #Private Mechanisms, Pools, Cross-licensing},
filename={Bawa (2005) - Will The Nanomedicine Patent Land Grab Thwart Commercialization.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, #C1, References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Always Hinders Innovation, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Broad Patents, Dubious Patents, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in academic discourse as "a 'dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.'"... Such patent thickets, a result of multiple blocking patents, naturally discourage and stifle innovation...},
tags={#IPR Reform, Stricter Patenting Requirements, #Private Mechanisms, Cross-Licensing, Industry Commentary},
filename={Bawa (2007) - Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation And The Crisis At The Us Patent Office.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-S, #B-S, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Hold-up, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={Where a highly complex product or process is covered by numerous interrelated patents, any holder of a patent that applies to that product or process potentially may block production and/or impede further technological developments, thereby jeopardizing the returns on other parties' prior investments. In such situations (i.e., where a given product is potentially affected by numerous patents owned by a number of different parties), the resulting uncertainty regarding unforeseen patent claims can dampen firms' incentives to invest in R&D activities. This potential for numerous interrelated patents to deter R&D investment has been called the patent thicket (or minefield) problem.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Cross-licensing, #IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust, Sequential Innovation},
filename={Beard Kaserman (2002) - Patent Thickets Cross Licensing And Antitrust.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B-T, References Heller/Eisenberg, Transaction Costs, Broad Patents, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={Given the particular characteristics of stem cells as a broadly enabling technology, many expect the field to be particularly susceptible to the emergence of a patent thicket8–13, also known in property rights theory as an ‘anti- commons’14. In a patent thicket, the existence of many overlapping patent claims can cause uncertainty about freedom to operate, impose multiple layers of transaction costs and stack royalty payments beyond levels that can be supported by the value of single innovations.},
tags={#Industry Commentary, #Private Mechanisms, Clearinghouse},
filename={Bergman Graff (2007) - The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Barrier To Entry},
thicket_def_extract={These developments certainly do not encourage user-innovation, as users wanting to amend existing products or to create new ones must navigate the IPR thicket. This refers to an overlapping set of IPRs, which requires those seeking to commercialise new technologies to obtain licences (Shapiro, 2001). It exists in many industries, such as in semiconductors and biotechnology (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Firm Strategy, Licensing, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, Value from Position/Portfolio},
filename={Braun Herstatt (2007) - Barriers To User Innovation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B2, #C1, References Shapiro, Broad Patents, Overlapping Patents, Dubious Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Closely related to the problem of complementarity is the problem of horizontal overlaps between patents.122 Patents are frequently broader than the products the inventors actually make. Multiple patents often cover the same ground, sometimes as an intentional result of the patent system"' and sometimes because patents regularly issue that are too broad or tread on the prior art.'24 Various parties may be able to lay claim to the same technologies or to aspects of the same technology. Carl Shapiro has termed this overlap of patent claims the "patent thicket"},
tags={#IPR Reform, Creation of New Classification, Industry Commentary, Cumulative Innovation},
filename={Burk Lemley (2003) - Policy Levers In Patent Law.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Hold-up, Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
thicket_def_extract={#A-T, This network is defined a patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001). A patent thicket consists of a number of adjacent and overlapping property rights, which impose on whoever wishes to use certain intermediate goods to ask for licenses from several patent holders... Obviously, this frequently results in high monetary and transaction costs... The nature of transaction costs previously mentioned can be traced back to two fundamental determinants: the problem of complementary input and the problem of hold-up.... There is a second aspect which deserves attention, regarding the already cited hold-up problem. This problem is strictly linked to the level of difficulty with which during the downstream stages from the innovative chain, it is possible to put into action inventing around strategies...},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Standards, SSOs, FRAND, Licensing, Compulsory Licensing, IP Reform, Balance with Anti-trust},
filename={Calderini Giannaccari (2006) - Standardisation In The Ict Sector.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-S, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={As discussed in the preceding section, the process of designing a chip is a complex and creative endeavor, and can incorporate hundreds or thousands of "potentially patentable" technologies for which adverse patents may be held.6" A chip designer cannot know that his work is blocked by an existing patent, any more than a musician can know that a tune popping into his head has already been copyrighted. Worse, there is the possibility that after a chip is designed and produced, an adverse patent will issue from an application that has lingered in the Patent Office, creating a wellspring of liability},
tags={#IPR Reform, #Firm Strategy, Willful Infringement, Balance with Anti-trust},
filename={Callaway (2008) - Patent Incentives In The Semiconductor Industry.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-S, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Hold-up, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro has defined a patent thicket as "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."20 3 Patent thickets have been associated most frequently with the semiconductor industry, but they also have been observed in the biotechnology, computer software, and Internet industries... The existence of a patent thicket increases the power of each patentholder with a patented part in the product, because each can block the use of the product by all others. The power is magnified by the patent system, with its use of injunctions and costly and lengthy infringement litigation. 20 5 The dangers of the patent thicket are exacerbated when patents are issued for products that already are on the market.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, #IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust, Cumulative Innovation},
filename={Carrier (2003) - Resolving The Patent Antitrust Paradox Through Tripartite Innovation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, #C, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Intragenerational bottlenecks occur most frequently in the semiconductor industry and have also appeared in the biotechnology, computer software, and Internet industries.188 In such industries,there frequently arises a "patent thicket,"189 in which overlapping patent rights enable each patent holder with a patented input in the product to block the use of the product by all others},
tags={#IPR Reform, Changes to Nature of IPR, #Private Mechanisms, Compulsory Licensing, Cumulative Innovation},
filename={Carrier (2004) - Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property Paradigm.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Hold-up},
thicket_def_extract={Mark Lemley has shown that SSOs have concentrated “in precisely those industries where the unconstrained enforcement of patents could be most damaging to innovation,” namely, computer software, Internet, telecommunications, and semiconductors.89 In these industries, the presence of multiple patented inputs in products increases the risk of holdup. Just as ominous, the industries are marked by “cumulative innovation,” with one generation’s patented invention based on those of previous generations.90... In these industries, the presence of multiple patented inputs in products increases the risk of holdup. Just as ominous, the industries are marked by “cumulative innovation,” with one generation’s patented invention based on those of previous generations.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Standards, SSOs, #IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust, Cumulative Innovation},
filename={Carrier (2002) - Why Antitrust Should Defer To The Intellectual Property Rules Of SSOs.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1, References Shapiro, Dubious Patents},
thicket_def_extract={The lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process- in conjunction with the recent explosion of patents granted- has led to a serious concern that the current patent system may impede, rather than promote, innovation by creating a "patent thicket"(Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003). With the ex parte relationships between patent applicants and examiners and with no adversary to aid examiners either in identifying the relevant prior art or in evaluating the applicants' claims, the task of weeding out patents of questionable quality or even trivial significance is (in the current U.S. system) left to litigation in the courts.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Stricter Patenting Requirements, Private Mechanisms, Litigation, Probablistic Patents, Invalidation, Review of Patent Validity},
filename={Choi (2005) - Live And Let Live A Tale Of Weak Patents.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, References Heller/Eisenberg, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={...innovation is cumulative, the assertion of patents on key upstream discoveries may significantly restrict follow-on research.14 The patenting of numerous, individually less significant discoveries may also impede academic research. Although their focus is largely on commercial projects, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and Shapiro (2000) suggest that the patenting of a broad range of research tools that researchers need to do their work has spawned "patent thickets" that may make the acquisition of licenses and other rights too burdensome to permit the pursuit of what should otherwise be scientifically and socially worthwhile research,(engendering a tragedy of the "anticommons" [Heller and Eisenberg 1998]).},
tags={#Industry Commentary, #Private Mechanisms, Regime Selection, #IPR Reform, Research Exemptions, #Effects on Academic Research},
filename={Cohen Walsh (2008) - Real Impediments To Academic Biomedical Research.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, #C1, #D, Broad Patents, Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Dubious Patents, Barrier To Entry, Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
thicket_def_extract={In particular, originator companies confirm that they aim to develop strategies to extend the breadth and duration of their patent protection. One commonly applied strategy is filing numerous patents for the same medicine (forming so called "patent clusters" or "patent thickets"). Documents gathered in the course of the inquiry confirm that an important objective of this strategy is to delay or block the market entry of generic medicines.},
tags={#Industry Commentary, Firm Strategy, Defensive/Offensive Patents, Blocking Patents},
filename={Competition (2008) - Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1, #D-S, Overlapping Patents, Single Firm, Hold-up, Barrier To Entry, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={Here, the recent boom in patenting observed by many researchers is largely explained not by a firms’ drive to innovate more than before, but by a need to accumulate large enough “patent thickets”. These patent thickets work as a sort of insurance against possible legal actions from other companies. They are in effect therefore, a kind of defensive manoeuvre.For instance, take the situation where company A fears that its products will infringe one or more patents owned by company B. So, by developing and holding a large enough patent thicket company A makes sure that company B will inevitably infringe one of these thicketed patents. As a result, negotiations will follow in order to avoid court action between them, and likely end up with mutual cross-licensing between companies A and B... Defensive and strategic patenting has for instance, in some sectors resulted in patent thickets, the consequences of which are generally undesirable in terms of creating too many, possibly overlapping patents, which can crowd a technological field and make it difficult and costly to navigate through.... making it difficult for new and small inventors to enter the market.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Stricter Patenting Requirements, Low Patent Quality, Balance with Anti-trust, #Private Mechanisms, Pools, Clearinghouses, Firm Strategy, Defensive/Offensive Patenting},
filename={Cowin (2007) - Policy Options For The Improvement Of The European Patent System.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B2-T, Broad Patents, Overlapping Patents, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={When multiple organisations each own individual patents that are collectively necessary for a particular technology, their competing intellectual property rights form a "patent thicket"... However, if this does not happen, nanotechnology research is bound to get stifled in an atmosphere of fragmented intellectual property and broad overlapping claims, [FN30] although licencing also carries with it the problem of protracted negotiations, delays, high royalties and other transaction costs. In most cases this will deter many smaller startups and research centres from attempting to traverse the patent thicket. Also broad, overlapping and conflicting thickets are likely to lead to lengthy and costly patent battles... company that finds itself enmeshed in a patent thicket has a number of options. It can either sue anyone it finds that may be potentially infringing its patent or attempt to commercialise its patent and risk being sued in return.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Open Source, NPEs, #IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust},
filename={DSilva (2009) - Pools Thickets And Open Source Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-S, #B-S, Overlapping Patents, Hold-up},
thicket_def_extract={...Property rights advocates further note that such fears such as irrational hold-out?most often voiced in the con text of patent thickets and experimental use?are not supported by empirical evidence.3... More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation. One's exclusion of another from his land is isolated; a single patentee's ability to enjoin production of a semiconductor chip that implicates thousands of patents creates powerful negative externalities. Given such distinctions, many view the worlds of patent law and traditional property as sufficiently distinct to be unworthy of direct analogy... Most paradigmatically, inadvertent trespass onto another's land?coupled with sunk investment and nebulous boundaries?may lead to the imposition of a liability rule and the loss of a right to injunctive relief for the property owner. Sound reasoning underlies this element of the law, and it would seem no less applicable to the world of IP. Where an infringer has conducted a meaningful search, where the omitted patent, which is neither licensed nor marketed, is lost amongst thousands in an impenetrable thicket, and where the patent's indeter minate claims?even had they been discovered?would have lead a potential infringer to conclude as a matter of probability that its planned activity is non infringing, analogy to the law of real property would similarly suggest the im plementation of a liability rule. Allowing a non-practicing patentee to enjoin the activity of an innocent infringer following massive investment by the latter creates perverse incentives, inefficiencies, and wealth transfers of questionable desirability.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Probabilistic Patents, Prevent Hold-up/Royalty Stacking, #Private Mechanisms, Pools, Changes to Nature of IPR, Low Patent Quality},
filename={Devlin (2009) - Indeterminism And The Property Patent Equation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1, Broad Patents, Overlapping Patents, Single Firm, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={A number of observers of patenting, particularly in the biological sciences, have suggested that patenting rules and overlapping claims have generated a "patent thicket" that has impeded innovation and made the R&D process more costly (Rai, 2001; Rai, 1999). Rai (2001) for example, argues that broad patents especially on upstream platform technologies represent a threat to competition and the cumulative process of innovation in the biopharmaceutical industry.},
tags={Firm Strategy, Cumulative Innovation, Industry Commentary, #Private Mechanisms, Regime Selection},
filename={Dhar Foltz (2007) - The Impact Of Intellectual Property Rights In The Plant And Seed Industry.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={A second type of IP-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on many different patented technologies, each of which has no obvious substitute. Firms may find themselves in a patent "thicket," in which several parties are able to derail a shared platform by threatening to withhold necessary contributions.12 Each firm can issue an ultimatum, demanding a large share of the platform's added value},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Shared Platforms, Licensing, Joint Ventures, Complements},
filename={Eisenmann (2008) - Managing Proprietary And Shared Platforms.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1a, Dubious Patents, Overlapping Patents, Single Firm},
thicket_def_extract={Two other recently issued patents in the United States and United Kingdom (Table 1), each awarded to a different inventor with a potentially strong claim to priority, now stand alongside Yamanaka’s patent, which was exclusively issued in Japan. With this newly tangled IP landscape, questions are arising about the possible emergence of a patent thicket.},
tags={#Industry Commentary, #Firm Strategy, Collaboration},
filename={Eisenstein (2010) - Up For Grabs.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, #C1, References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Dubious Patents, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
thicket_def_extract={This tends to create a patent thicket that is, a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology"... Questionable patents contribute to the patent thicket. Much of this thicket of overlapping patent rights results from the nature of the technology;... Moreover, as more and more patents issue on incremental inventions, firms seek more and more patents to have enough bargaining chips to obtain access to others’ overlapping patents.21... In the context of a patent thicket, questionable patents can introduce new kinds of licensing difficulties, such as royalties stacked one on top of another, and can increase uncertainty about the patent landscape, thus complicating business planning. Questionable patents in patent thickets can frustrate competition by current manufacturers as well as potential entrants. Because a manufacturer needs a license to all of the patents that cover its product, firms can use questionable patents to extract high royalties or to threaten litigation...},
tags={#IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust, Duration Limits, Review of Patent Validity, #Firm Strategy, Willful infringement, Blocking patents, Defensive/Offensive Patenting},
filename={FTC (2003) - To Promote Innovation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, #C1, References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Transaction Costs, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={One commentator explains that this strategy usually involves acquiring a large quantity of often low quality patents, meaning those that are vague, likely invalid, or that provide narrow coverage of a feature having little commercial value.2 Indeed, IT products are often surrounded by “patent thickets” densely overlapping patent rights held by multiple patent owners... Large numbers of patents can create “patent thickets”35 and increase transaction costs for manufacturers that seek to clear the rights needed to produce a product.36},
tags={#IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust, Duration Limits, Industry Specific Policy, Prevent Hold-up/Royalty Stacking},
filename={FTC (2011) - The Evolving IP Marketplace.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B-T, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={Finally, any anticompetitive effects of the open source behavior would be outweighed by the procompetitive effects of reducing patent thickets and promoting the creation and dissemination of ideas without a short-term restriction of supply.... Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” to describe the problem of multiple overlapping rights that can hamper innovation by creating transaction barriers. Most scholars and those reporting from the field agree that large numbers of rights hamper research and innovation, particularly in the biotech field.21 One scholar, however, has challenged the notion.22 John Walsh argues that firms simply work around the problem of multiple rights for example, by moving offshore beyond the reach of the patent rights, inventing around the rights, and using public research tools.23 In particular, Walsh argues that academic researchers routinely ignore rights structures and that patent holders passively acquiesce... In areas not plagued by patent thickets, basic research tools may be controlled by one entity or a small group of entities},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Licensing, Open Source, #Effects on Academic Research},
filename={Feldman (2004) - The Open Source Biotechnology Movement Is It Patent Misuse.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Royalty Stacking, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={To avoid legal suits, developers of these products entangled in a “patent thicket” 2 have had to negotiate with multiple patent owners, stacking up royalty obligations in the process, or abandon R&D on the innovation altogether... A patent thicket arises when there are overlapping patent rights that must be identified and licensed in order for an innovator to bring a new product or technology to market (Shapiro, 2001)},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Complements,},
filename={Gallini (2011) - Private Agreements For Coordinating Patent Rights.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs, Barrier To Entry},
thicket_def_extract={In addition, the significant increase in the multiplicity of patents, referred to as “patent thickets” and “patent floods”, are considered by many to impede the ability of firms to conduct R&D activity effectively (Eisenberg 1989; Shapiro 2001)... A second issue relevant for sequential innovations is so-called “patent thickets”. In some industries, particularly biotechnology and information technologies, it is common that a new entrant, in order to engage in research or production, must obtain a large number of licenses from existing and previous innovators and producers. This problem raises the cost of product commercialization and may create substantial entry barriers for new firms.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust, International Harmonization, Cross-licensing, #Private Mechanisms, Pools, Litigation},
filename={Ganslandt (2009) - Intellectual Property Rights And Competition Policy.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, #B-T, Single Firm, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Medimmune has recently acquired exclusive licenses from the portfolios of Wisconsin, St. Jude, and Mount Sinai School of Medicine (“Technology for Faster, Safer Development of Pandemic Flu Vaccine Licensed by Mount School of Medicine” 2005; “MedImmune Expands Patent Estate for Reverse Genetics with New Rights from Mount Sinai School of Medicine” 2005). The IP rights situation described above was arguably a classical case of a patent thicket with fragmented IP rights and uncertainty about technology ownership... The option of a patent pool for this technology was raised (Fedson 04), but instead the situation was resolved by one patent owner acquiring exclusive licenses from the other ones},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Patent Pools, Cross-Licensing, Standards, },
filename={Gaule (2006) - Towards Patent Pools In Biotechnology.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-ST, References Shapiro, Diversely-Held, Complementary Inputs, Transaction Costs, Overlapping Patents},
thicket_def_extract={A “patent thicket,” in which many independent patent holders have rights that cover a technology, is one example of the anticommons...A “patent thicket,” in which many independent patent holders have rights that cover a technology, is one example of the anticommons.5 A patent thicket exists when rights to many patents from different patentees are necessary to lawfully make or sell a product (overlapping rights)},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, #IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust, #Firm Strategy, Collboration, FRAND, Compulsory Licensing},
filename={Gilbert (2010) - Ties That Bind Policies To Promote Good Patent Pools.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={While many researchers, especially in academia, find ways around patent restrictions, and many companies have no trouble executing license agreements, there are cases where “patent thickets” have discouraged other researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines of inquiry... CIRM and other stem cell funders can become catalysts for cutting through this patent thicket. They can require that all grant recipients agree to donate the exclusive license to any insights, materials, and technologies that they patent to a common patent pool supervised by a new, nonprofi t organization... },
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Industry Commentary, Licensing, Patent Pool, Open Source},
filename={Goozner (2006) - Innovation In Biomedicine.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-S, References Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={During the U.S. Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice hearings on the patent system and antitrust policy in 2002, a number of industry representatives expressed concerns about the difficulty of negotiating the patent thicket in their area and the risk of being “held-up” ex post by a patent on a technology that was only a small component of their product. “My observation is that patents have not been a positive force in stimulating innovation at Cisco. …….. Everything we have done to create new products would have been done even if we could not obtain patents on the innovations and inventions contained in these products. …..The only practical response to this problem of unintentional and sometimes unavoidable patent infringement is to file hundreds of patents each year ourselves, so that we can have something to bring to the table in cross-licensing negotiations. ….},
tags={#IPR Reform, Stricter Patenting Requirements, #Firm Strategy, Defensive/Offensive Patenting},
filename={Hall (2007) - Patents And Patent Policy.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#D, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Barrier To Entry, Single Firm},
thicket_def_extract={To forestall imitative activity and strengthen patent rights, firms often attempt to create a ‘patent thicket,’ i.e. obtaining patents not just on one central product or process, but on a host of related products or processes... The creation of a patent thicket of sleeping patents by an incumbent firm with monopoly power is a strategy referred to as ‘preemptive patenting.’ And, as noted by Shapiro [25], given cumulative innovation and multiple blocking patents, stronger patent rights can have the perverse effect of stifling, not encouraging, innovation. According to Gilbert and Newbery [26], such a firm has an incentive to maintain its monopoly power by patenting new technologies before potential competitors. The monopoly firm will preempt if the cost is less than the profits gained by preventing entry},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, Pre-emptive Patenting},
filename={Hemphill (2003) - Preemptive Patenting Human Genomics And The Us Biotechnology Sector.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1, #D, References Heller/Eisenberg, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={Various commentators have proposed that a proliferation of patents poses a serious threat to biotechnology research by creating a patent thicket, sometimes referred to as a “patent anticommons.”106 The theory is especially associated with articles published by Heller and Eisenberg in 1998, and Eisenberg and Rai in 2002.107... These commentators predict that the patenting of upstream technology will result in a difficult-to-penetrate thicket of patent rights that will severely impede biomedical research and development.110 The idea has found resonance with many, and its influence is evident in a variety of critiques of the current patent system.111 If in fact a patent thicket is significantly impeding biotechnology research and development, one might expect that organizations representing the interests of biotechnology, such as BIO, WARF, and Genentech, would be advocating for reforms},
tags={#IPR Reform, Renewal, Stricter Patenting Requirements},
filename={Holman (2005) - Biotechnologys Prescription For Patent Reform.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1-S, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={Upstream patents have been criticized on a number of counts. For example, it has been proposed that the proliferation of patents covering research tools has resulted in a “patent thicket,” rendering it virtually impossible to conduct biomedical research without inadvertently infringing upon a host of conflicting patent claims (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Rai and Eisenberg, 2002)... Although in theory a researcher should be able to license the necessary technology inputs, in practice it is generally not feasible owing to the large number of different patent holders, each with their own licensing agenda.},
tags={#Industry Commentary, #IPR Reform, Research Exemptions, #Effects on Academic Research, Stricter Patenting Requirements},
filename={Holman (2006) - Clearing A Path Through The Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1, References Heller/Eisenberg, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Some have postulated that a "thicket" of patents will impede basic biomedical research and will stifle development and utilization of technologies that involve the use of multiple genetic sequences; DNA microarrays are a prime example (5, 6)},
tags={#Industry Commentary},
filename={Holman (2008) - Trends In Human Gene Patent Litigation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={Therefore, if the ‘thicket’2 of essential IP rights underlying their use cannot be accessed under reasonable terms and conditions (eg cost) applied evenly to all similarly situated competitors, the best of standards often go unused.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Platforms, Licensing, Standards, Patent Intermediaries},
filename={Horn (2003) - Alternative Approaches To IP Management.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#D, References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
thicket_def_extract={A further development is that patents gained in value by their ability to be linked with other patents, which encourages patenting of marginal inventions. The resulting complex network of single patents that bears many legal pitfalls for patent applicants was given the name ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001). These developments put into question an increased number of patents motivated by an increased need for IP protection and hint at the strategic value of patents to have driven the patent surge.},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Secrecy},
filename={Hussinger (2006) - Is Silence Golden Patents Versus Secrecy At The Firm Level.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={#B, Under this metaphor, a patent thicket arises when each block is granted separate yet concurrent exclusivity rights. The so-called thicket is the resulting nexus of concurrent and overlapping IP rights that one must navigate in order to practice any evolutionary form of science.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, IPR Reform, Pools, Balance with Anti-trust},
filename={Iyama (2005) - The Usptos Proposal Of A Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesnt Hold Water.pdf}
}
thicket_def={Single Firm, Evergreening},
thicket_def_extract={#C1, #D, Every patentee of a major invention is likely to come up with improvements and alleged improvements to his invention. By the time his main patent has expired there will be a thicket of patents intended to extend his monopoly.},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Evergreening, Industry Commentary},
filename={Jacob (2009) - Patents And Pharmaceuticals.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Broad Patents, Dubious Patents, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={The patent owner may do this by creating a thicket of pantents, so other parties are swamped with so much complex technical documentation that they cannot separate the chaff from the wheat. Developing patent thickets is relatively easy to do in this regime since the patent examination process is cursory.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Stricter Patenting Requirements, Review of Patent Validity},
filename={Jensen Webster (2004) - Achieving The Optimal Power Of Patent Rights.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={#A, #C1, In the field of economics, patent pools are analyzed by Shapiro (2000). He considers the role of patent pools in “patent thicket,” which means that there are so many patents issued that a single new patent will likely infringe on some other patents. This situation discourages and retards research, development and commercialization.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Substitutes, Licensing},
filename={Kato (2004) - Patent Pool Enhances Market Competition.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={Basic investigations conducted at universities and academic medical centers, usually publicly funded, often pro- duce key insights about the mecha- nisms underlying physiological function and disease states. Private corpora- tions can then commercialize these insights by designing and marketing new therapeutics or other medical tech- nologies based on them. In this chain of development, allowing patenting of each incremental innovation could risk generating a dense thicket of overlap- ping intellectual rights and thus hinder research efforts.},
tags={#Industry Commentary, #Effects on Academic Research, #IPR Reform, #Private Mechanisms, Pools,},
filename={Kesselheim Avorn (2005) - University Based Science And Biotechnology Products.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Overlapping Patents, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={The proliferation of fragmented and overlapping patent rights is increasingly being recognized as a serious problem; referred to as a "patent thicket" (or "anticommons" by Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Besides the additional transaction costs incurred in navigating a patent thicket, Shapiro (2001) has called attention to another source of inefficiency: the complements problem. When distinct firms are selling inputs - all of which are required for production of the final product - they fail to internalize the effect that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputs. This results in each patent holder setting too high a royalty rate.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Raising rivals' costs, #Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio, Defensive/Offensive Patenting},
filename={Kim (2004) - Vertical Structure And Patent Pools.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, #C1, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Hold-up},
thicket_def_extract={All three developments have led to what is perceived as a marked increase in junk patents, as well as what Carl Shapiro has termed a "patent thicket" - overlapping sets of patent rights leading to a maze of cross-licensing agreements, as well as the rise of hold-up litigation.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Post-grant Review, #Firm Strategy, Willful Infringement},
filename={King (2007) - Clearing The Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Hold-up, Complementary Inputs},
thicket_def_extract={#A, A growing number of studies have emphasized the negative effect of the hold-up problem when firms compete for a portfolio of complementary patents, called a patent thicket (e.g., Bessen 2004, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Shapiro 2001).},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Licensing, #Firm Strategy, Secrecy, Complements, Offensive/Defensive Patenting, Value from Position/Portfolio},
filename={Kwon (2012) - Patent Thicket Secrecy And Licensing.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Almost one hundred years later, patent pools have re-emerged as a remedy for industries that are plagued by litigation and patent blocking, which occurs when owners of competing patents prevent the commercialization of new technologies... Specifically, the prospect of a patent pool increases firms’ incentives to invest in R&D because lower risks of litigation and improved licensing schemes increase expected profits for participating firms...},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools},
filename={Lampe Moser (2009) - Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1, #D, References Shapiro, Dubious Patents},
thicket_def_extract={We also investigate whether part of the observed decline may be driven by a reduction in lower-quality or “strategic” patents. For example, the creation of a pool may reduce the need for member firms to create patent thickets by reducing the threat of litigation (e.g., Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004)},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, #Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio},
filename={Lampe Moser (2012) - Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Barrier To Entry, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={#A, Our findings that patent portfolio size and technology concentration significantly affect litigation risk have important implications for R&D incentives. The threat of costly enforcement can affect R&D investment and patenting strategies.45 This is especially so for small, high-technology firms that are more likely to face capital market constraints.46 Carl Shapiro emphasizes that firms rely heavily on cross-licensing arrangements and patent pools as a way of mitigating these problems of the anticommons (fragmented property rights).47 But small firms are effectively blocked from using these arrangements unless cash payments are accepted for participation, and typically they are not.},
tags={Value from Position/Portfolio, #Firm Strategy, Litigation Insurance},
filename={Lanjouw Schankerman (2004) - Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Are Small Firms Handicapped.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Until recently, the economic literature on patents pools - voluntary organizations created for the purpose of pooling a group of patents into a single licensing package - has been quite sparse. Following on the heels of the intense interest in the theories of "patent thickets" and "royalty stacking" (e.g., Shapiro, 2001, 2006), and the increased proliferation of organizations that promulgate technical standards for products and services, patent pools are emerging as an important topic for economic analysis. The newfound interest is understandable, given that patent pools are one of the more readily available tools proposed for overcoming the potentially harmful effects of overlapping or blocking patent rights (Merges, 1999; Shapiro, 2001).},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, #Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio, Standards},
filename={LayneFarrar Lerner (2011) - To Join Or Not To Join.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1, #D, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Dubious Patents},
thicket_def_extract={In short, a poorly implemented numeric proportionality rule would not only fail to satisfy FRAND principles,23 it would also encourage a proliferation of patenting of minor innovations...It would thus exacerbate any worries over patent proliferation and patent thickets, already a hotly debated in the academic literature and popular press. For influential papers on patent thickets, see Shapiro (2001) and Heller and Eisenberg (1998)},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Standards, SSOs, FRAND, Licensing},
filename={LayneFarrar (2007) - Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, #C1, Quotes Shapiro, Single Firm, Overlapping Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Dubious Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Single company acquisition of a dense web of overlapping patents-patent thickets 15-may create a seemingly impenetrable web which a company must hack its way through in order to commercialize new technology... As the number of issued patents skyrocket, companies more frequently enter into arrangements with competitors "not only to recover their investment from creating patented products but also to avoid the patent landmines that line the path of innovation."17 Companies strategically use patent litigation as a means to protect their competitive position. 18 Even though a company might believe that it is not infringing, it is often better to settle than fight... Proctor & Gamble, Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 406, 414 (D. Del. 1998). The term "patent thicket" first appeared in this case. Id at 414, n.6.... As stated above, patent thickets may encompass patents of dubious merit.143 Unfortunately, it is costly to innovate around assertions of infringement.1},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, Blocking patents, #Private Mechanisms, SSOs, Grant-backs, Package Licenses},
filename={Leaffer (2009) - Patent Misuse And Innovation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B, Overlapping Patents, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={...to intellectual property rights (IPR) bottlenecks with multiple stakeholders that have overlapping sets of IP (a.k.a patent thickets)},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools},
filename={Lee (2006) - Examining The Viability Of Patent Pools For The Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={#A, #B, This question has been of particular concern for the biological sciences, where production and exchange of biological ‘research tools’ are important for ongoing scientific progress. Recent studies addressing this issue in the United States1,2, Germany3, Australia4 and Japan5 find that “patent thickets”6 or an “anticommons”7 rarely affect the research of academic scientists... Our respondents do not encounter an anticommons or a patent thicket. Rather, they believe that institutionally mandated MTAs put sand in the wheels of a lively system of intradisciplinary exchanges of research tools. Seeing no countervailing effect on the supply of these tools, they conclude that patenting impedes the progress of research.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Research Exemption, Open Source, #Effects on Academic Research},
filename={Lei Juneja Wright (2009) - Patents Versus Patenting.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={The fact that a great many patents can read on a single product, and that this is common in certain critical industries, creates numerous practical problems for the operation of the patent system.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, SSOs, Standards, #IPR Reform, Prevent Hold-up/Royalty-stacking, Reasonable Royalty},
filename={Lemley Shapiro (2006) - Patent Holdup And Royalty Stacking.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={In a number of key industries, particularly semiconductors (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and computer software (Bessen and Hunt, 2004), companies file numerous patent applications on related components that are integrated into a single functional product.The result is a "patent thicket," in which hundreds of patents can apply to a single product (Shapiro, 2001; FTC, 2003).},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Cross-Licensing, #IPR Reform, Creation of New Classification, Stricter Patenting Requirements, Litigation},
filename={Lemley Shapiro (2005) - Probabilistic Patents.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={While universities have no direct incentive to restrict competition, their interests may or may not align with the optimal implementation of building-block nanotechnology inventions. The result is a nascent market in which a patent thicket is in theory a serious risk... In a surprising range of fields of invention over the past century in what we might think of as "enabling" technologies24 - computer hardware, software, the Internet, even biotechnology - the basic building blocks of the field were either unpatented, through mistake or because they were created by government or university scientists with no interest in patents, or the patents presented no obstacle because the government compelled licensing of the patents, or they were ultimately invalidated. In still other fields, including the laser, the integrated circuit, and polymer chemistry, basic building-block patents did issue, but they were delayed so long in interference proceedings that the industry developed in the absence of enforceable patents... These facts in combination mean that patents will cast a larger shadow over nanotech than they have over any other modern science at a comparable stage of development. Indeed, not since the birth of the airplane a hundred years ago have we seen similar efforts by a range of different inventors to patent basic concepts in advance of a developed market for end products.76 Some fear that ownership of nanotechnology patents is too fragmented, risking the development of a patent "thicket."77 Miller offers several examples of nanoscale technologies that have overlapping patents covering the same basic invention, including the carbon nanotube and semiconducting nanocrystals.},
tags={#Effects on Academic Research, #Private Mechanisms, Licensing, Compulsory Licensing, #IPR Reform, NPEs},
filename={Lemley (2005) - Patenting Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, Overlapping Patents, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Deliberate Royalty Stacking},
thicket_def_extract={Second, open source avoids the problem of a “patent thicket” when multiple firms have overlapping intellectual property rights, and at least one party attempts to extract a high fee for its particular contribution.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Open Source},
filename={Lerner Tirole (2005) - The Economics Of Technology Sharing Open Source And Beyond.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B, Diversely-Held, Overlapping Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Second, open source avoids the problem of a 30 “patent thicket” when multiple firms have overlapping intellectual property rights, and at least one party attempts to extract a high fee for its particular contribution... A more benign alternative is that firms enter into patent pools to solve the “patent thicket” problem: the presence of overlapping intellectual property holdings that make it difficult for third parties to license patent holdings and develop new technologies.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools},
filename={Lerner Strojwas Tirole (2003) - The Structure And Performance Of Patent Pools Empirical Evidence.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B, Diversely-Held, Overlapping Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result ?patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Licensing},
filename={Lerner Tirole (2002) - Efficient Patent Pools.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#Aa-T, Diversely-Held, Royalty Stacking, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={Many observers have suggested that patent-thicket problems - where key patents are widely held affect many emerging industries... Patent thickets may lead to three problems. First, royalty stacking may result: each individual patent holder may charge a royalty that seems reasonable when viewed in isolation, but together they represent an unreasonable burden. Second, even if other firms agree to license their patents at a modest rate, a hold-out problem may result if a single firm then sets a high license fee for its technology... Finally, the very process of arranging the needed licenses may prove to be time consuming. Patent pools thus offer a one-stop shop through which these problems can be avoided. B},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Licensing, Grant-back},
filename={Lerner Tirole (2008) - Public Policy Toward Patent Pools.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B, References Shapiro, Diversely-Held, Overlapping Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Therefore, the patent thicket problem – an overlapping set of patent rights requiring those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees (Shapiro, 2001) – could still exist},
tags={#IPR Reform},
filename={Lerner Zhu (2007) - What Is The Impact Of Software Patent Shifts.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Numerous commentators have suggested that the proliferation of awards has had socially detrimental consequences: overlapping intellectual property rights may make it difficult for inventors to commercialize new innovations (Gallini, 2002 reviews this literature). Patent pools have been proposed by Merges (1999), Priest (1977), Shapiro (2000), and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Clark, Piccolo, Stanton, and Tyson, 2001) as a way in which firms can address "patent thicket" problems.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Licensing, Grantbacks},
filename={Lerner Tirole Strojwas (2007) - The Design Of Patent Pools The Determinants Of Licensing Rules.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Hold-up},
thicket_def_extract={As the number of inputs needed in research increases, the innovator faces a patent thicket and is threatened by the possibility of hold-up, namely the risk that a useful innovation is not developed because of lack of agreement with the patent holders. This problem has been dubbed the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller 1998, Heller and Eisenberg 1998).},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Licensing, Sequential Innovation},
filename={Llanes Trento (2009) - Anticommons And Optimal Patent Policy In A Model Of Sequential Innovation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, commentators have observed a certain "patent thicket" effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of these new technologies.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Standards, SSOs, Pools, Sequential Innovation},
filename={Lin (2001) - Research Versus Development.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1, #D, References Heller/Eisenberg, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Diversely-Held, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={Related, and often overlapping, patents owned by many entities are often described as ‘‘patent thickets’’ and researchers have argued that patent thickets can be detrimental to innovation, especially in information industries such as software (see, among others, Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Lessig, 2001; Shapiro, 2001; Bessen and Maskin, 2009).},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Royalties, Licensing, Cumulative Innovation},
filename={Lin (2011) - Licensing Strategies In The Presence Of Patent Thickets.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={With the power of the intellectual regime, internal sequential innovations offer a larger thicket of protection that can define the underlying technologies in a set of overlapping patents. That is, a sequence of patents revolving around the same technological trajectory can define the intellectual property more precisely and protect it with an enlarged degree of coverage. The holder of such patented innovations can thereafter exclude competitors from the collective scope of the claims laid out in all of the sequential patents (Wagner and Parchomovsky, 2005). In contrast, stand-alone innovations are more likely to be invented around and the underlying intellectual property has a higher hazard of being appropriated (Shapiro, 2000).},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, #Private Mechanisms, Regime Selection, Sequential Innovation, #IPR Reform, Renewals},
filename={Liu (2008) - Internal Sequential Innovations.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, #B-T, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents},
thicket_def_extract={The costs of navigating through mazes of overlapping patent rights – through patent thickets – are likely to be considerable (Shapiro, 2001)...},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, #IPR Reform},
filename={Macdonald (2004) - When Means Become Ends.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1, Single Firm, Evergreening, Dubious Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Originators file numerous follow-on patent applications covering a drug in the hope that at least one of them will be granted and survive a litigation challenge. The consequence of this is often an extensive thicket or cloud of patents around a drug, the various parts of that cloud each typically... A good example of both an improperly granted follow-on patent and a patent thicket is found in relation to the product perindopril erbumine, discussed in Annex A... To prevent the creation of patent thickets and reduce the incidence of poor followon patents: (a) improve the quality of patents as outlined above and apply a rigorous assessment of patentability requirements; (b) prevent the fi ling of divisional patents that are essentially identical to the parent application; (c) require that patent claims with respect to the pharmacokinetic effect of administering a particular drug be directly linked to the formulation used to achieve that effect; (d) limit the scope of second and further medical use patents; and (e) grant patents only to genuine incremental innovation and not to simple changes in chemistry or formulation.},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Evergreening, #IPR Reform, Review of Patent Validity, Stricter Patenting Requirements},
filename={Mallo (2008) - Patent Related Barriers To Market Entry For Generic Medicines In The European Union.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and software, where firms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001)...The present paper upholds policy arguments that emphasize the importance of a severe application of this patentability requirement as a means to limit the size of "patent thickets" and to promote innovation in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent... When ?final products embody several complementary innovations, the scattering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues... The scattering of complementary patents between different owners creates a double marginalization issue.},
tags={Complements, #IPR Reform, Stricter Patenting Requirements},
filename={Meniere (2008) - Patent Law And Complementary Innovations.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={In addition to the costs of individual patents, researchers have to contend with “patent thickets.” That is, complex technologies, such as biomedical research tools,embody a number of technological inputs, many of which are patented.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Issues of Patent Validity, Compulsory Licensing},
filename={Maskus (2006) - Reforming Us Patent Policy Getting The Incentives Right.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1, #D-S, References Shapiro, Dubious Patents},
thicket_def_extract={Third, there are patents of low private value and low (or negative) social value; this class of patents includes both discarded, unenforced patents that increase the search costs and risk imposed on commercial firms—the ‘‘patent thicket,’’ in popular parlance (Shapiro 2001)...},
tags={#IPR Reform, Review of Patnet Quality, Infrastructure Changes},
filename={Masur (2010) - Costly Screens And Patent Examination.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #C1, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Dubious Patents},
thicket_def_extract={As the Federal Trade Commission recently explained, innovation in the computer and Internet industry is often incremental and cumulative, and the pace of change is rapid.4 The net result is that each marketable product in this industry may incorporate--often in an incidental, tangential, and sometimes unintentional way-hundreds or even thousands of patented processes. This is commonly described as a "patent thicket": "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology." Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120-21 (Adam Jaffee et al. eds., 2001); see also To Promote Innovation 2:27-31, 3:2, 34-35, 52-53},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, NPEs},
filename={Merges (2006) - Introductory Note To Brief Of Amicus Curiae In Ebay V MercExchange.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={Managing the patent thicket in the fields of vaccine technology is challenging as one product may be covered by a plurality of exclusive IP rights that have to be considered when developing a product and building up a patent portfolio.. Consequently, licensing is a key point in the vaccine industry. If a basic patent is held by a powerful patent holder refusing to grant a license under reasonable commercial terms or abuses a market-dominating position, it should be examined, whether the requirements to request a compulsory license are fulfilled.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Licensing, #Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio},
filename={Mertes Stotter (2010) - Managing The Patent Thicket And Maximizing Patent Lifetime In Vaccine Technology.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={Of particular concern, reduced patent quality increases uncertainty about the scope and validity of patents and increases the frequency of patent litigation. The fragility of the many start-ups in new markets makes them vulnerable to strategic patent litigation. The threat of patent litigation may deter entry or induce exit from the market. Furthermore, a thicket of patents may stultify development of technology because of the cost of securing patent licenses from the large numbers of patent owners... The other anticompetitive threat is a pool or cross-licensing agreement justified as a way to cut through a patent thicket and economize on transaction costs might actually serve merely to orchestrate collusion on prices... },
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, #Firm Strategy, Patent Floods, Defensive/Offensive Patenting},
filename={Meurer (2002) - Business Method Patents And Patent Floods.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-S, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro},
thicket_def_extract={According to Professor Carl Shapiro, a "patent thicket" has formed, which he describes as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology." Firms in certain industries are said to fear that it is "all too easy" to infringe another patent accidentally and thereby risk liability. A On the other hand, some observers believe that innovation currently is not hindered.'"' Moreover, even if there were a "patent thicket" problem, others state that firms have found a range of means to overcome these obstacles, including cross-licenses and patent pooling.-},
tags={#IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust, Balance with Anti-trust, Duration Limits, #Private Mechanisms, SSOs},
filename={Muris (2001) - Competition And Intellectual Property Policy The Way Ahead.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B1, #D, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={This pattern, however, has created what some would characterize as a “Patent Thicket”59 in biotechnology. That is, emerging from the overabundance of patent filings and associated activity is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights”60 that requires those seeking to commercialize new technology to obtain licenses from multiple patentees.61 Pharmaceutical companies typically grow a patent thicket seeking a wide range of chemical variants and analogs, methods of synthesizing the drug, chemical intermediates in this synthesis, different crystal forms, different finished dosage forms and various methods of use.62 Obtaining permission from various patent holders for use of patents can prove to be difficult particularly if the patent holder’s objective in creating the thicket is to block innovation by outsiders. Because useful innovation in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies, we could conceivably witness cumulative innovation with infringement on many patents which ultimately serves as a drag on innovation and commercialization.},
tags={#IPR Reform, International Harmonization, Renewal },
filename={Napoleon (2009) - Impact Of Global Patent And Regulatory Reform On Patent Strategies For Biotechnology.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={In some industries, particularly the semiconductor industry, access to hundreds of patents may be necessary in order to produce a single commercial product. Many of the patents overlap and block the use of other patents, thereby creating a “patent thicket”—a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”3 It is hypothesized that patent thickets increase transactional costs and stifle innovation by making it more expensive and difficult to bring new developments to the market... the ability to bring a product to market in the presence of a patent thicket and the stacking royalties must separately be addressed... Closely related is the concept of patent thickets. A single product may include many different, individually patented components.... The patent thicket is best understood in the semiconductor industry where any given microchip may infringe a number of patents, including the process manufacturing patents used to produce the chip. Here, patents are complementary because different inventors independently have patented different components of the larger invention. This is unlike blocking patents (otherwise referred to as improvement patents) resulting from the incremental process of innovation.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, #IPR Reform, Compulsory Licensing, Pools, Clearinghouses, Licensing},
filename={Nielsen Samardzija (2006) - Compulsory Patent Licensing.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
thicket_def_extract={Second, our notion of a correct decision rests on the legal meaning of validity (that is, novelty, nonobviousness, and usefulness). From an economic perspective, however, whether an invention should be patentable depends on the relative net change to the incentive to invent and innovate and the size of the deadweight monopoly losses. The latter includes strategic ways to construct undesirable patent thickets, build patent portfolios to extract additional bargaining power in cross-licensing arrangements, or other rent-seeking activities.},
tags={#IPR Reform},
filename={Palangkaraya Webster Jensen (2011) - Misclassification Between Patent Offices.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B1, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Broad Patents, Dubious Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Diversely-Held, Cummulative Invention},
thicket_def_extract={The notion of a patent thicket is where an overlapping set of patent rights requires that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees... If you get monopoly rights down at the bottom, "you may stifle competition that uses those patents later on and so the breadth and utilization of patent rights can be used not only to stifle competition, but also have adverse effects in the long run on innovation."... indicating that many patents have been filed relating to nanomaterials with their claims overlapping... Moreover, the quality of these nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly called into question," so the navigation of a patent thicket will have to be around these questionable patents.},
tags={#IPR Reform},
filename={Paredes (2006) - Written Description Requirement In Nanotechnology.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #C1, References Heller/Eisenberg, Transaction Costs, Dubious Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Defensive patenting has become particularly prominent in certain industries like the semiconductor industry, where innovation is cumulative, and a thicket of relevant patents often exists.... Moreover, the guidelines on utility incorporate, at least implicitly, economic concerns that setting the utility standard too low could impede scientific progress by creating a transaction-cost-heavy thicket of patents on basic research},
tags={#IPR Reform, Review of Patent Validity},
filename={Rai (2003) - Engaging Facts And Policy.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1, #C2, References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, Dubious Patents, Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI), Strategic Patenting (Bad)},
thicket_def_extract={In this case, a firm with a large patent portfolio surrounding competitors’ key technologies (i.e., a “patent thicket”) has the opportunity to use its patent portfolio to lessen competition in the final goods market.17 Suppose, for example, that within a patent thicket are a number of patents of dubious merit (perhaps some were obtained through inequitable conduct) and it is costly to innovate around assertions of infringement.... Shapiro (2001) characterizes a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”... Previous research recognizes a few ways in which a patent thicket can be used to strategic advantage. First, a company can patent new technology before potential competitors, including features and technologies that it never intends to commercialize (socalled “submarine patents).21 The patent thicket creates considerable uncertainty for competitors about whether their technology infringes, especially with respect to a hidden or submarine patent. Even if a firm is not practicing submarine patents, a patent thicket makes it hard to design and sell products without running the risk of infringing on a competitor’s patent.... A patent thicket is an especially effective means of extracting concessions from rivals.},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, Package Licenses},
filename={Rubinfeld Maness (2004) - The Strategic Use Of Patents Implications For Antitrust.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Deliberate Royalty Stacking},
thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets, layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to offer products that embody technologies owned by multiple firms, and licensing policies have drawn increasing scrutiny from policy makers. Patent thickets involve complementary products, which gives rise to double marginalization - the so-called royalty stacking problem - and has the potential to retard diffusion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Licensing, Royalties},
filename={Rey Salant (2012) - Abuse Of Dominance And Licensing Of Intellectual Property.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #C1, #C2, References Shapiro, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Making matters even more complex, many products can potentially infringe multiple patents. As described in Shapiro (2001), more and more companies are facing a patent thicket requiring them to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to market. The need to negotiate licenses or other settlements of intellectual property disputes is made even greater because of the danger of hidden or submarine patents, which make it all too easy for a company unintentionally to infringe on a patent that was not yet issued when the company's product was designed.2 Likewise, the need to resolve intellectual property disputes is arguably made yet greatert o the extent thatt he U.S. Patenta nd TrademarkO ffice has issued "bad"p atents, i.e., patentso n technology that does not in fact meet the novelty requirements.},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Mergers, #Private Mechanisms, Pools, Settlements, Negotiated Entry Dates},
filename={Shapiro (2003) - Antitrust Limits To Patent Settlements.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B1, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Yet, several commentators have raised concerns that the extraordinary pace of patenting of nanotechnology5 will result in a patent deadlock6 that will stifle innovation and impede economic growth.7... Carl Shapiro defines "patent thicket" as "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Licensing, #IPR Reform, Government Funding},
filename={Sabety (2004) - Nanotechnology Innovation And The Patent Thicket.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={Royalty fees are an inherently inefficient mechanism for pricing patents. In effect, such fees constitute an excise tax on downstream production, shifting the marginal cost of the good upward and resulting in higher prices and lower quantities for the consumers of the final product. The problem is compounded when a set of patents is required to produce the good.3 Each patent holder sets a use fee (a royalty), and since each of these acts as an excise tax on the downstream producer, the cumulative effect of several fees being charged (what Lemley and Shapiro [2007] refer to as “patent stacking”) is a higher cost of producing the good and a smaller quantity of output. The welfare losses consist of the sum of the patent holder’s lost returns, the lost profits of the downstream firm, and the consumers’ loss of surplus from the final product.... Buchanan and Yoon (2000) study the incentives inherent in pricing complementary patents and demonstrate conditions under which the price of a complementary patent bundle increases with each additional patent in the bundle. Shapiro (2001) broadens the concept as a “patent thicket” in which possible outcomes include excessively high fees for the use of the patent set, uncertainty regarding potential patent infringement, and, in the limit, holdup problems.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Complements, Licensing},
filename={Santore McKee Bjornstad (2010) - Patent Pools As A Solution To Efficient Licensing Of Complementary Patents.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, References Shapiro, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held},
thicket_def_extract={This “patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001) gives rise to a complements problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on the revenues of the other patent holders when setting his royalties, so the sum of all royalties will be inefficiently high.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Licensing, Standards},
filename={Schmidt (2008) - Complementary Patents And Market Structure.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B2, #D, Complementary Inputs, Single Firm},
thicket_def_extract={More precisely, firms will patent a coherent group of inventions, which form what is sometimes called a patent "bulk", aimed at protecting one product. The "bulk" can either be a "fence" of substitute patents or a "thicket" of complementary patents (see Reitzig, 2004 and Cohen et al., 2000).... In complex product industries, where innovation is highly cumulative, ?rms use patents to force rivals into negotiations and, as a consequence, they create "thickets" of complementary technologies.},
tags={#Firm Strategy, #Private Mechanisms, Regime Selection, Secrecy},
filename={Schneider (2008) - Fences And Competition In Patent Races.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#C1-ST, References Shapiro, Dubious Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism (Not DHCI)},
thicket_def_extract={Patent Office has been awarding patents too easily and that US courts have been too willing to uphold the validity of dubious patents.9 To the extent that patent policy inflates the number of patents that must be licensed in order to practice a standard, it contributes to what has beecalled a ‘patent thicket’ through which standard-setting must pass.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Standards, SSOs, #IPR Reform, Balance with Anti-trust, Prevent Hold-up/Royalty Stacking},
filename={Schmalensee (2009) - Standard Setting Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#B2, #D, Single Firm, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism, Strategic Patenting (Bad), Hold-up},
thicket_def_extract={When strong, watertight patents are available, as in pharma ceuticals, firms may be able to rely on them to isolate key commercial opportunities (Merges, 1998). On the other hand, in systems products industries, thickets of patents may be necessary to foil attempts to invent around the patent, and obtain a robust patent position. Moreover, defensive patenting, the building of large patent port folios may become necessary if rivals, aided by a strong enforcement regime, are able to effectively threaten to hold up a firm's commercial operations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).},
tags={#Firm Strategy, Value from Position/Portfolio, #Private Mechanisms, Settlements},
filename={Somaya (2003) - Strategic Determinants Of Decisions Not To Settle Patent Litigation.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-ST, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={Scholars such as Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Carl Shapiro, and others have drawn attention—arguably too much attention—to the transactional problems created for innovators by such dispersed ownership and the density (or so-called thickets) of patents... Indeed, the plethora of IP implicated, and the resulting complex licensing required, has led some academics to despair that some sections of the economy have—or are about to—experience a “tragedy of the anticommons” (i.e., no one will use the patented technology because licensing the required technologies is simply too challenging or too expensive).},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pre-emptive patenting, #Firm Strategy Value from Position/Portfolio, Defensive/Offensive Patenting, Licensing},
filename={Somaya Teece Wakeman (2011) - Innovation In Multi Invention Contexts.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B, References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Unfortunately, the rush to secure worldwide intellectual property rights in nanotechnology could lead to the development of a "patent thicket." This term, coined by intellectual property scholars, refers to an overlapping set of patent rights that requires researchers, inventors, and entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize new technologies to obtain licenses from multiple patentees.},
tags={#IPR Reform, Compulsory Licensing},
filename={Tullis (2005) - Application Of The Government License Defense To Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research.pdf}
}
thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Patents, Broad Patents, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={#B1, This pattern — the increasing number of patents, increasing patent breadth, and the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries — has created what some call a patent thicket in biotechnology: “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees},
tags={#IPR Reform, Research Exemption, Compulsory Licensing, Industry Commentary},
filename={Taylor Cayford (2003) - American Patent Policy Biotechnology And African Agriculture.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={Scientists, patent attorneys and academics have expressed concerns about the emergence of a “patent thicket” in the biomedical sciences. Many patents have been granted in this specific technical field, leading to concern among researchers and companies that they will encounter serious difficulties cuttting through the bulk of patents and paying the associated licensing fees.1 Heller and Eisenberg developed the idea that such an increase in property rights will ultimately lead to a “tragedy of the anticommons”.2,3 By this, they refer to the situation where there are so many property rights in the hands of various owners — with whom parties must reach agreements to enable them to aggregate the rights they need access to in order to legally perform their activities — that it will prove difficult to bargain licences to the patented inventions successfully.},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, Clearinghouses, Royalties},
filename={VanZimmeren (2006) - A Clearing House For Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, #B1, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Transaction Costs},
thicket_def_extract={A second phenomenon relates to the dense and fragmented genetic patent landscape. Problems arise when “patent thickets” (a web of overlapping patents through which a company must “hack” in order to commercialize a technology) emerge ( 12). Accumulation, or “stacking,” of royalties that have to be paid when confronted with a patent thicket may lead to a “tragedy of the anti-commons”},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools, #IPR Reforms, Compulsory Licensing},
filename={VanOverwalle (2010) - Turning Patent Swords Into Shares.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A-T, #B1-T, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro, References Heller/Eisenberg, Diversely-Held, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={Anticommons effect. An effect arising from the situation where multiple owners each have the right to exclude others from the use of a resource and no one has an effective privilege of use: this results in under use of the resource [7,8].... Patent thicket: The intellectual property portfolios of several companies that form a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights... Recent studies have reported on the licensing practices of the owners of patents for genetic inventions [3–6], and concerns have been raised that patent thickets, resulting in royalty stacking (see Glossary), block access to patented technology through the accumulated license fees that a downstream inventor has to pay to upstream patent holders. Although the existence of an anticommons effect (see Glossary) of patents [7,8] has not been validated by comprehensive empirical data, it is pertinent to reflect on ways to remedy this},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Pools},
filename={Verbeure (2006) - Patent Pools And Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
}
thicket_def={#A, References Shapiro, Unspecified Blocking Mechanism},
thicket_def_extract={"Patent thickets" refer to the fact that in many areas of technology, great numbers of related patents exist at any particular time, and many might have applicability to any commercial product. See, e.g, Carl Shapiro,},
tags={#Private Mechanisms, Patent Intermediaries},
filename={Wagner (2003) - Information Wants to be Free}
}
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