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tags={information, drm, control},
filename={Wagner (2003) - Information Wants to be Free}
}
===Additional entries===
@article{layne2011join,
title={To join or not to join: examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules},
author={Layne-Farrar, Anne and Lerner, Josh},
journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
volume={29},
number={2},
pages={294--303},
year={2011},
abstract={In recognition that participation in modern patent pools is voluntary, we present empirical evidence on participation rates and the factors that drive the decision to join a pool, including the pro?t sharing rules adopted by the pool's founders. In most participation contexts, the at-risk group is extremely dif?cult, if not impossible, to identify. For pools centered on technologies that result from a standard-setting process, in contrast, we are able to identify a relatively unambiguous population of patents eligible for inclusion but that have not been included in the pool. We ?nd that vertically integrated ?rms, with patents and downstream operations, are more likely to join a patent pool and among those ?rms that do join, those with relatively symmetric patent contributions (in terms of value) to a standard appear more likely to accept numeric patent share rules for dividing royalty earnings},
discipline={Mgmt},
research_type={Empirical},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
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tags={},
filename={LayneFarrar Lerner (2011) - To Join Or Not To Join.pdf}
}
@techreport{lerner2003cooperative,
title={Cooperative marketing agreements between competitors: evidence from patent pools},
author={Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean and Strojwas, Marcin},
year={2003},
institution={National Bureau of Economic Research} abstract={On numerous occasions, rival firms seek to market goods together, particularly in hightechnology industries. This paper empirically examines one such institution: the patent pool. The analysis highlights five findings consistent with the theoretical predictions: (a) pools involving substitute patents are unlikely to allow pool members to license patents independently, consistent with our earlier theoretical work; (b) independent licensing is more frequently allowed when the number of members in the pool grows, which may reflect the increasing challenges that reconciling users’ differing technological agendas pose in large pools; (c) larger pools are more likely to have centralized control of litigation, which may reflect either the fact that the incentives for individual enforcement in large pools are smaller or that large pools are more likely to include small players with limited enforcement capabilities; (d) third party licensing is more common in larger pools, consistent with suggestions that such pools were established primarily to resolve the bargaining difficulties posed by overlapping patent holdings; and (e) during the most recent era, when an intense awareness of antitrust concerns precluded many competitionharming patent pools, more important patents were selected for pools and patents selected for pools were subsequently more intensively referenced by others. },
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Discussion},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
thicket_def_extract={},
tags={},
filename={Lerner Tirole Strojwas (2003) - Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between Competitors.pdf}
}
@article{lerner2007design,
title={The design of patent pools: The determinants of licensing rules},
author={Lerner, Josh and Strojwas, Marcin and Tirole, Jean},
journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
volume={38},
number={3},
pages={610--625},
year={2007},
abstract={Patent pools are an important but little-studied economic institution. In this article, we first make a set of predictions about the licensing terms associated with patent pools. The theoretical framework predicts that (i) pools consisting of complementary patents are more likely to allow members to engage in independent licensing and (ii) the requirement that firms license patents to the pool (grantbacks) should be associated with pools that consist of complements and allow independent licensing. We then examine the terms of 63 pools, and show that licensing rules are consistent with these hypotheses. },
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Theory},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
thicket_stance_extract={},
thicket_def={},
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tags={},
filename={Lerner Strojwas Tirole (2007) - The Design Of Patent Pools The Determinants Of Licensing Rules.pdf}
}
@article{siebert2006licensing,
title={How licensing resolves hold-up: Evidence from a dynamic panel data model with unobserved heterogeneity},
author={Siebert, Ralph and Von Graevenitz, Georg},
year={2006},
abstract={},
discipline={},
research_type={},
industry={},
thicket_stance={},
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thicket_def={},
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tags={}, ,
filename={Siebert VonGraevenitz (2006) - How Licensing Resolves Hold Up.pdf}
}
