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Messner, M. and M. Polborn (2004), Voting on Majority Rules (view source)
Revision as of 15:21, 16 May 2012
, 15:21, 16 May 2012→Intergenerational Conflict=
Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]
===Intergenerational Conflict===
*Voters born in continuous time and live for length 1
*Deaths equal birth, so continuous mass
*Some chance of reform opportunity
*Reforms cost, c, yeild value v element of [0, <math> \infty</math>] ====Results====*At any given time, median voter will be happy with simply majority*However, median voter is only median for a split second, so if constitutional moment arises, he will choose super-majority*While median voter prefer voting rule of <math>r(t_{m})=2c</math> for a current project, he prefers <math>r(t_{m})=4c</math> to decide on all future projects.*rule of <math>r(t_{m})=4c</math> corresponds to <math>t_{s}=frac{3}{4}>frac{1}{2}</math>
