Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Gilligan Krehbiel (1987) - Collective Decision Making And Standing Committees (view source)
Revision as of 20:40, 30 September 2011
, 20:40, 30 September 2011→Closed rule, specialization
The case of the closed rule with specialization is much like the open rule with specialization except that for extreme values of <math>\omega\,</math> (specifically <math>\omega \le -3x_c - p_0\,</math> and <math>\omega \ge x_c - p_0)\,</math>, the floor can exactly infer the state of the world and is willing to implement the committee's ideal point, as it prefers this to the status quo. For non-extreme values, noisy signalling again occurs, but now the committee can constrain the floor to choosing between its bill and the status quo. The full details of an equilibrium are in the paper on page 318.
Equilibrium is separating if <math>0<\omega<-3x_{c}-p_{0}</math> or <math>1>\omega>x_{c}-p_{0}</math>. Otherwise pooling. Winner of vote is b iff <math>0<\omega<-x_{c}-p_{0}</math> or <math>x_{c}-p_{0}</math>. Otherwise <math>p_{0}</math> wins.
Again, we can derive a condition for when the committee would wish to specialize. Crucially, under a closed rule, a committee may choose to 'overspecialize', because this results in distributional gains. A committee will specialize iff:
*Extreme iff <math>x_c \in (x_c'',x_c')\,</math>
*Very Extreme iff <math>x_c \ge x_c' \,</math>
We can then derive a set of conditions under which the floor would choose an open or closed rule, and in essence which game to play:
