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Baron Ferejohn (1989) - Bargaining In Legislatures (view source)
Revision as of 21:33, 18 May 2010
, 21:33, 18 May 2010no edit summary
#A recognised member will choose to share with the members with the lowest continuation values, and the member with the highest probability will have the lowest ex-ante value for the game.
#The SPNE doesn't say who should be choosen to share with, and can randomize. Randomization provides a stationary symmetric solution.
===Closed Rule - Infinite Sessions===
From proposition 2 in the paper, if:
<math>1 > \delta > \frac{(n+2)}{2(n-1)} \mbox{ and } n \ge 5\,</math>
then:
Any distribution of benefits (<math>x\,</math>) may be supported.
To support an arbitrary distribution <math>x \in X\,</math> then:
#A member proposes <math>x when recognized, everyone is to vote for <math>x\,</math>
#If a majority rejects <math>x\,</math>, then the next member proposes <math>x\,</math>
#If a member is recognized and proposes <math>y \ne x\,</math> then
##A majority <math>M(y)\,</math> is to reject <math>y\,</math>
##The next member proposes <math>z(y)\,</math> such that for the deviator <math>z_j(y) = 0\,</math> and everyone in <math>M(y)\,</math> is to vote for <math>z(y)\,</math> over <math>y\,</math>
##If the next member doesn't propose <math>z(y)\,</math> repeat the above stage to punish that member.
