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Sequential Matching of Entrepreneurs to Accelerators and Venture Capitalists (view source)
Revision as of 13:09, 5 June 2017
, 13:09, 5 June 2017→Summary
See [[Fox (2008) - An Empirical Repeated Matching Game Applied to Market]] for a brief write up on Jeremy's theory paper
==Simple Outline of Model==
As of now, the goal is to simulate a repeated matching model with dynamically optimizing agents. More specifically, there are two sides for a matching market with transferable utility (for now, call these men and women) with a continuum of agents, but a finite number of types. They participate in matches for T periods and receive utility that is a sum of a structural component (determined solely by their type and the type they are matched with) and a individual taste component (with some known distribution).
What distinguishes this model from a static matching model is that the agents have some probability of transitioning between types that is conditional on the match they make in the previous period (e.g., a man of low type might be more likely to change into a man of high type after being matched to a woman of high type). When making these matches, the agents take these transition probabilities into account when evaluating expected future utility. This adds a dynamic element to the model.
==Work to do==
*Code up three algorithms to simulate match(primal,IPFP,dual)
*Compare with R code from NYU
===Work done so far===
*Coded up primal and IPFP (may have errors)
