Changes

thicket_stance_extract={A firm’s patent portfolio can enable the firm to mitigate appropriation concerns that arise across multiple deals. This occurs when patents are not specific to an individual deal, but rather apply across multiple technology commercializa- tion projects. Such an intellectual property port- folio portfolio can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s tech- nologytechnology.11 The degree of protection afforded by such a portfolio will, of course, necessarily be dependent on the degree to which patents are rel- evant relevant across multiple commercialization projects.}, thicket_def={Def1References Shapiro, Strategic Value},

tags={Firm strategy, Cooperative R&D, Decision-making},

research_type={empiricalEmpirical},

thicket_stance_extract={In other words, many closely related patents may cover a single product, mak- ing it much more difficult for competitors to invent noninfringing substitutes. Patent thickets increase the probability of “hold-up” licensing, that is, exercising the ability to charge a premium for patent licenses in the case of technologies in which competitors have already invested heavily. Id. A patent thicket is just one instance of portfolio value, because a group of patents on related technologies can have a value greater than the sum of its parts even if the patents do not create overlapping rights in the same product. Re- gardless Regardless of the particular manifestation of portfolio value, previous research has not captured cap- tured this aspect of patent value, and we have not ascertained a way to estimate the effect of a patent’s contribution to a portfolio apart from whatever stand-alone value it may or may not have.}, thicket_def={refs shapiroReferences Shapiro, quotes shapiroQuotes Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Carl Shapiro has called “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” Carl S. Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,}, tags={Industry Discussion, patent quality, internet business methods are patentable, inter-industry comparison of patents and prior art references},

thicket_stance={Assumed Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Economist Carl Shapiro elaborates on the problems created by a‘patent a ‘patent thicket’.Using traditional economic analysis, he has shown how, when several monopolists exist that each control a different raw material needed for development of a product, the price of the resulting product is higher than if a single firm controlled trade in all of the raw materi- als materials or made the product itself 18. However, the combined profits of the producers are lower in the presence of complementary monopolies. So, if there are several patent holders whose permission is needed to create a gene therapy (and any one of them could block the production of the gene therapy), ineffi- ciencies inefficiencies in the market are created, potentially harming both the patent holder and the patent users.}, thicket_def={def23References Shapiro, Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, Strategic Value},

tags={IPR Policy, Mechanisms, Patent Pools, Compulsory Licensing, Effects on Research},

thicket_stance_extract={n the other hand, a situation such as a patent thicket is likely to impose additional costs and inefficiency on down- stream product development and cumulative innovation... Some similar issues are discussed by Shapiro (2001), who considers the strategies that firms may use to reduce the effects of a patent thicket on their ability to innovate. Shapiro considers the strategies of cross licensing, patent pools, and cooperative standard setting. Our paper is complementary to Shapiro’s in that our analysis is at the level of the market for technology, rather than an individual firm.}, thicket_def={Def1References Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={In the context of patents, a proliferation of IP rights may result in a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro, 2001) that can increase costs for downstream activities such as cumulative innovation and the development of new products that combine multiple existing innovations.}, tags={Mechanisms, Pools, Collectives, Clearinghouses},

booktitle={Background report Report for the Trend Chart Policy Benchmarking Workshop" New Trends in IPR Policy},

thicket_stance_extract={Although there has been extensive discussion in The main problem for policy, however, is how to put a brake on the worst effects of strategic patenting without damaging the incentive effects of the literature on patent thickets and licensing hold-upssystem, we know very little about how nor the competitiveness of European firms. The latter is a serious this problem . All firms might be better off with less patenting, but as long as their competitors are active in strategic patenting, they will be forced to continue to patent excessively in order not to be left defenseless. This could be a particularly thorny problem for European firms that are active in the United States. Nor is today or if it has slowed technological progressstrategic patenting without its possible benefits to innovation. Cohen et al (2002b) note that non-cooperative interactions such as patent blocking and portfolio races ‘raise the possibility of socially wasteful expenditures of effort on applying for marginal patents and associated litigation’.}, thicket_def={ProReferences Shapiro, quotes and refs shapiroQuotes Shapiro, heller eisenbergReferences Heller/Eisenberg},

tags={IPR Policy, offensive and defensive use of patents, discussion of balancing incentives and strategic patenting, IPR Reform},

title={Patents do not Do Not Strangle Innovation, but Their Quality Must be Be Improved},

research_type={discussionDiscussion}, industry={PharmaPharmaceutical},

thicket_def={def11Based on Infringement}, thicket_def_extract={"As Professor Correa writes, the resulting thicket of patents could 'deprive society of the benefits[of] ... widespread use and dissemination of basic scinetific ideas. Possibilities and facts are not the same thing, however, and there is surprisingly little empirical data to show correct that the quality of patent thicket examination is subtracting from the rate of innovation scandalous. Even in Europe or society's benefit from it. Maybe that is happening without anyone noticingNorth America, but the available evidence suggests otherwise.".many dubious patents are issued..the The resulting lack of legal certainty harms everyone..: competitors who must spend heavily to overturn wronly granted patents; consumers who pay a premium while those patents remain in force; and even companies and their shareholders, as happened when an invalid Prozac patent was finally overtruned, wiping US $35 billion off Feli Lilly's market capitalization.}, tags={Against Thickets!Industry Discussion},

abstract={Patent thickets may inefficiently retardcumulative innovation. This Article explores two alternative mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the number of patents in our society. The first mechanism we discuss is price-based regulation of patents through a system of increasing renewal fees. The second and more innovative mechanism is quantity-basedregulation through the establishmentofa system of Tradable Patent Rights. The formalization of tradable patent rights would essentially create a secondary market for patent permits in which patent protection will be bought and sold. The Article then discusses how price and quantity regulationcan regulation can be combined to effect superiorweeding.},

tags={Mechanism, Licensing, Tradeable Licenses, price and quantity based regulation, regulation, tradable patent rights}, filename={Ayres Parchomovsky (2007) - Tradable Patent Rights.pdf}

@article{barnett2009isintellectualbaluch2005re, title = {Is Intellectual Property Trivial?In re Kumar: The First Nanotech Patent Case in the Federal Circuit}, author = {BarnettBaluch, Jonathan MA.S. and Radomsky, L. and Maebius, S.B.}, journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law ReviewNanotech. L. \& Bus.}, volume = {157}, number = {62}, pages = {pp. 1691-1742344}, year = {20092005}, abstract={On August 15,2005, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided what is arguably its first nanotech patent case, In re Kumar. Although the court adjudicated the case on procedural grounds, practitioners in the field of nanotechnology will appreciate several substantive themes in this decision. First, the court appears to treat a nanotechnology patent appeal no differently than patent appeals in cases involving other technologies. In this regard, the court did not establish any special rules Jar nanotechnologypatents. Second, the L S. Patentand Trademark Qffice ("PTO') is apparently taking the quality of nanotechnology patents seriously, with the Solicitor himself as lead counsel on the brief for the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. Third, the court's dicta provides nanotech inventors with guidance for overcoming§ 103 obviousness rejections based on overlapping sizes of nanoparticles. Such an argument, as nanotech commentators had predicted, may be used to rebut a prima facie case Qf obviousness where, as in this case, the claimed nanotech product is made by a different process than that of the prior art,},

research_type={theory, empiricalDiscussion}, industry={generalNanotechnology}, thicket_stance={neutralAnti}, thicket_stance_extract={But normative analysis Much has been made about the nanotech patent "land grab," where inventors rush to patent huge swaths of intelclaim space, while the PTO - lectual property coverage must be dynamic (allegedly with little knowledge of nanotechnology and no dedicated examining group - grants very broad and complex) if it is overlapping claims. 16 Moreover, the interdisciplinary nature of nanotechnology may allow two patents that use different language to be realistic: that isclaim the same nanotech product. For example, one patent might cover silicon nanocrystals with an average diameter between 1nm and 30nm, it must anticipate while another could cover any nanocrystal that any downward adjustment emits light in intellectual property coverage will trigger a variety of possible market responses that may neutralize or even reverse spectral range no greater than 60 nm. Such patents could overlap and create mutually blocking rights.17 While there is nothing in the adjustment, result- ing in patent law to prohibit new and nonobvious claims from overlapping (i) no net change .e., claims in access costs, (iidifferent patents which cover the same product and which are new and not obvious over the prior art) a net reduction in access costs, or (iii) 18 the commentators expressed concern that the allowed claims in some patents may be obvious over the most perverse caseprior art. In Kumar,however, even a net increase the PTO found the prior art and rejected those claims that it considered to be obvious in access costs coupled with a reduction in innovation gainslight of those references.}, thicket_def={def12Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents}, thicket_def_extract={This is For example, a claim in a later patent may cover a common theme of the expanding literature new and nonobvious improvement on "anticommons" effects, whereby proliferating intellectual property rights creates a "thicket" that impedes subsequent innovationbasic invention claimed in an earlier patent. SeeIn this case, e.gboth patents would properly cover the improved product., Michael Alarge number of patents containing overlapping claims which cover the same product are often referred to as a "patent thicket. Heller... Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg..."}, tags={Overview of Patent-based IPIndustry Commentary, Sequential Innovation}, filename={Barnett Baluch Radomsky Maebius (20092005) - Is Intellectual Property TrivialIn Re Kumar The First Nanotech Patent Case In The Federal Circuit.pdf}

@article{barnett2009propertybarpujari2010patent, title = {Property as ProcessThe Patent Regime and Nanotechnology: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation RegimesIssues and Challenges}, author = {BarnettBarpujari, Jonathan MI.}, journal = {The Yale Law Journalof Intellectual Property Rights}, volume = {11915}, number = {3}, year = {2009}, pages = {pp. 384206--456213}, publisher year= {The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2009 The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.2010}, abstract = {It is commonly asserted that innovation markets suffer from excessive intellectual property protections, which in turn stifle output. But empirical inquiries can neither confirm nor deny this assertion. Under the agnostic assumption that we cannot assess directly whether intellectual property coverage is excessive, an alternative query is proposed: can the market assess if any "propertization outcome" is excessive and then undertake actions to correct it? This process-based approach takes the view that innovator populations make rent-seeking investments that continuously select among innovation regimes that trade off securing innovation gains (which tends to demand more property) against reducing transaction costs and associated innovation losses (which tends to demand less). If we can identify the conditions under which privately interested investments in lobbying, enforcement, and transactional arrangements are likely to yield socially interested propertization outcomes, then the underlying datum at issue—whether there is "too much" intellectual property—can be determined indirectly at some reasonable degree of approximation. This approach identifies a "property trap" effect where, under high coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is prone to fail: litigation risk and associated transaction cost burdens drive innovators to overconsume state-provided property rights. Conversely, under low coordination costs, the regime selection mechanism is prone to succeed: adversely affected entities that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs have incentives to undertake actions that weaken property-rights coverage, including constrained enforcement, forming cooperative arrangements, or even forfeiting intellectual property to the public domain. Counterintuitively, these relationships imply that large firms that rely substantially on outside sources for innovation inputs tend to have the strongest incentives and capacities to take actions that correct overpropertization outcomes. Preliminary evidence is drawn from the semiconductor, financial services, and information technology industries.},

research_type={theory}, industry={general, semiconductorNanotechnology}, thicket_stance={Weakly AntiWeak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Popular and scholarly commentary widely assumes that certain innovation markets -especially multicomponent markets A fall out of such as biotechnology, softwarebroad claims has been patenting of inventions bordering closely on discoveries (unpatentable subject matter), and information technology- suffer from thickets patents on basic inventions or building block patents. When holders of overlapping property rights that restrain and encumber research and development activities, thereby slowing, rather than promoting, innovative output. But this often-repeated statement loses considerable force given that empirical inquiries such broad patents refuse to identify patent thickets license their patents or related "anticommons" effects in license these markets have so far failed to confirm on exclusive basis or at prohibitive prices or reject any inhibitory effect on innovation activity}with restrictive conditions, thicket_def={def12, def0}, thicket_def_extract={...it leads to the widely expressed view that innovation markets suffer from an intellectual property thicket (or "anticommons") where a misguided proliferation growth of property rights stifles innovative output beneath access restrictions, dispute-resolution actions, and other administrative burden}, tags={IP Regime Selection, Against Thicket}, filename={Barnett (2009) - Property As Process How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes.pdf} }  @article{baron2010patent, title={Patent Quality and Value patent thickets impeding downstream research in Discrete and Cumulative Innovation}, author={Baron, Jnanotechnology. The existence of a high number of such patents with broad and Delcampsometimes, H.}, journal={CERNA Working Paper}, number={2010-07}, year={2010}, abstract={This article compares overlapping claims adds to the relationship between patent quality and patent value in discrete and cumulative innovation. Using factor analysis and a set problem of various commonly used patent quality indicators including claims, citations thickets and family size, we build a quality factor jointly driving all indicators for 9255 patents. We then test leads to the significance fragmentation of this quality factor for predicting the patent renewal after 4, 8 and 12 years in an ordered logistic regressionlandscape... Whereas we establish For a robust and significant link between patent quality and value country like India just beginning to engage in samples nanotechnology, the existence of discrete such thickets and complex technology patents, there is no significant link for patents that are essential high licensing costs which may have to be paid to technological standards. Consistently, neither the quality factor nor any single indicator allows predicting litigation on an essential multiple patent. We conclude that while there is holders could act as a robust link between patent quality and value severe roadblock in discrete innovation, this link is much weaker developing indigenous capacity in cumulative innovation. Nevertheless, this affects only narrow, yet highly relevant, technological fields. There is no evidence that cumulativeness affects the relationship between quality and value in whole technological classes classified as “complex” by the literaturetechnology.}, disciplinethicket_def={Econ}Broad Patents, research_type={Empirical}Questionable Patents, industry={ICT}Based on Infringement, thicket_stance={ProRefusal to license}, thicket_stance_extractthicket_def_extract={The core prediction A fall out of such broad claims has been patenting of the patent thicket theory is thus that the link between patent quality inventions bordering closely on discoveries (unpatentable subject matter), and patent value erodespatents on basic inventions or building block patents. If the link between the value When holders of a patent and the significance of the underlying innovation is weakened, so is the capacity of the patent system such broad patents refuse to reward innovators for socially desirable innovation activity ... The primary determinant of patent value is the capacity of blocking other license their patents... Furthermore, among or license these essential patents on exclusive basis or at prohibitive prices or with blocking power over a standardrestrictive conditions, patent quality is no longer a determinant it leads to the growth of patent valuethickets impeding downstream research in nanotechnology.}, thicket_deftags={Def2}Industry Commentary, IPR Reform, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are webs Creation of overlapping and mutually blocking patents held by different owners. Mutually blocking patent rights result from cumulative innovationNew Classification, where no technological component can be marketed individually without the technological complements potentially protected by patent rights Review of different companies. Patent thickets have a clear impact on patent strategiesValidity, Stricter Patenting Requirements, as they provide incentives License to file blocking patents.}Innovate/Research Exemptions, Compulsory Licensing, Private Mechnanisms, tags={StandardsPatent Pools, Essential PatentsOpen Source}, filename={Baron Delcamp Barpujari (2010) - The Patent Quality Regime And Value In Discrete Nanotechnology Issues And Cumulative InnovationChallenges.pdf}

thicket_def={References shapiroShapiro, quotes shapiroQuotes Shapiro},

tags={patent poolsMechanisms, Patent Pools, inputs, theory on pool patent inputs},

thicket_stance_extract={Policy makers and industry participants have come to take a positive stance on patent pools, as pools play an important role in leveling the playing field for competition on the downstream production market, reducing transaction costs and encouraging the spread of innovative technology throughout the industry. In view of these benefits, patent pools are seen as indispensable instruments in cutting through the patent thickets in ICT. Indeed, by clearing blocking positions and facilitating access to the technology, patent pools help attenuating the negative downstream effects of patent thickets. On the other hand, as our analysis has pointed out, there is a risk that these positive downstream effects are offset by the fact that patent pools create incentives to exacerbate some of the worrying upstream effects of patent thickets. Indeed, one of the harmful effects of patent thickets is to induce socially wasteful excess investment in patent races and opportunistic patent files, deviating resources away from innovation to rent seeking strategies.}, thicket_def={Refs ShpiroShapiro},

tags={Mechanisms, Patent Pools, patents losing quality as more are being added to pools, uncertainty about pools ability to nurture R&D},

thicket_stance_extract={The patent thicket like situation in nanotechnology created as a result A fall out of many such broadclaims has been patenting of inventions bordering closely on discoveries (unpatentable subject matter), and patents on basic inventions or building block patents. When holders of such broad patents refuse to license their patents or license these on exclusive basis or at prohibitive prices or with restrictive conditions, could seriously impede developing country researchers from engaging in it leads to the growth of patent thickets impeding downstream research in nanotechnology. The existence of a high number of such patents with broad and sometimes, overlapping claims adds to the problem of thickets and leads to the fragementation of the patent landscape.}, thicket_def={def27Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents, Broad Patents},

tags={problems of patentabilityMechanisms, special categories for nanotechcompulsory licensing, problems with too many restrictions on patent quality.disclosure standard, research exemption},

research_type={theoryTheory}, industry={generalGeneral, ictICT},

thicket_def={def1References Shapiro},

tags={OligopoliesIPR Policy, Antitrust, Mutual Blocking},

industry={generalGeneral},

thicket_stance_extract={A complex piece of equipment, such as a computer, charactersitically is made up of components each of which is covered by a surprisingly large number of patents and the patents pertinent for such an item are often owned by a considerable number of different firms, many of them direct competitors in the final-product market...This puts many of these firms in a legal position that can enable each to bring the manu- facturing process of the others to a halt. The most effective way to prevent the catastrophic conse- quences this threatens for each of them is the for- mation of a patent pool in which each makes use of its patents available to the other members of the pool, and even to outsiders (as a step to avoid intervention by the anti-monopoly authorities}, thicket_def={def13Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, Mutliple Overlapping Blocking Patents, Strategic Value},

title={The nanotechnology patent ‘gold rush’Nanotechnology Patent ‘Gold Rush’},

thicket_def={def14Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents, Broad Patents, References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Predatory inventors Patent thickets are individuals or corporations broadly defined in academic discourse as “a ‘dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that patent every possible application around a novel early company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology. If this approach becomes commmon’” Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Patent Cross-Licensing in the Computer and Software Industry, 233 N.Y. L. J., Jan. 11, 2005, at 3, 6 (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Settings, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam Jaffe et al.eds., 2001)). it could inevitably create nanotech Such patent thickets, a result of multiple blocking patents, naturally discourage and stifle innovation and “[c]laims in such patent thickets have been characterized as ‘often broad, overlapping and conflicting . . . ’”).}, tags={IPR Policy, Patent Law Changes, USPTO, Licensing, Patenting strategy},

thicket_def={def1Quotes Shapiro, Complementary inputs with infringement, Includes innovation loss},

tags={Industry Discussion, IPR Reform, Commercialization},

thicket_def={refsReferences Shapiro, quotes shapiroQuotes Shapiro, Multiple Blocking Patents, Broad Patents}, thicket_def_extract={Patent thickets are broadly defined in acadmeic academic discourse as "a 'dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.'"... Such patent thickets, a result of multiple blocking patents, naturally discourage and stifle innovation...}, tags={IPR Policy, Patent Law Reform, USPTO, too many rightsholders, cross-licensing, enforceability of patents, issues with patents in nanotechnology},

title={Patent thicketsThickets, crossCross-licensing, and antitrustAntitrust},

industry={generalGeneral, Semiconductor},

thicket_def={def15Diversely-held Complementary Inputs},

tags={Mechanism, Cross-licensing, Anti-trust},

thicket_def={Def3References Heller/Eisenberg, Transaction Costs, Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents}, thicket_def_extract={Given the particular characteristics of stem cells as a broadly enabling technology, many expect the field to be particularly susceptible to the emergence of a patent thicket8–13, also known in property rights theory as an ‘anti- commons’14. In a patent thicket, the existence of many overlapping patent claims can cause uncertainty about freedom to operate, impose multiple layers of transaction costs and stack royalty payments beyond levels that can be supported by the value of single innovations.}, tags={Industry Discussion, Mechanisms, Clearinghouse},

thicket_def={def29Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents, References Heller/Eisenberg, References Shpairo}, thicket_def_extract={The problem Baker describes is often called a “patent thicket.” These occur when each product may involve many patents, in contrast with the one-to-one correspondence between products and patents that is assumed in the patent race literature. Recent commentators suggest that lower patenting standards encourage patent thickets, creating difficulties for innovators (see Gallini, 2002, for a review).When innovators must negotiate with large numbers of patentholders, they may face excessive transaction costs (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), “holdup,” and problems of vertical monopoly (Shapiro, 2001).}, tags={Mechanisms, Cross-licensing, patent pools, low innovation incentives, lack of lead time advantages, subsidize losers of innovation races},

thicket_stance_extract={The golden rice case finely illustrates While the effect of such thickets on innovative researchers. Swiss scientists had developed a Vitamin A-enhanced rice that promised huge health benefits to millions of poor children situation is somewhat different in developing countries. Before they could share their development, howeverwhere farmers have traditionally created thousands of different varieties, the scientists had lack of the technological know-how and instruments to work improve increasingly sophisticated seed varieties is also marginalising their way through 70 patents belonging role as seed innovators. The continued corporate and governmental pressure on such countries to over 30 companies in addition to six restrictive material transfer agreements strengthen their seed-marketing, IPR protection and enforcement systems (Damodaran and SrivatsSell, 20012003)will further adversely affect such farmers’ potentially innovative activities.}, thicket_def={Def1Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents, References Shapiro},

tags={Mechanisms, Barriers, Licensing},

thicket_def={Def1References Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Closely related to the problem of complementarity is the prob- lem problem of horizontal overlaps between patents.122 Patents are fre- quently frequently broader than the products the inventors actually make. Multiple patents often cover the same ground, sometimes as an in- tentional intentional result of the patent system"' and sometimes because pat- ents patents regularly issue that are too broad or tread on the prior art.'24 Various parties may be able to lay claim to the same technologies or to aspects of the same technology. Carl Shapiro has termed this overlap of patent claims the "patent thicket"}, tags={Various theories on Patent PoliciesIPR Policy, Industry Discussion, Effects of Thickets in Agriculture},

title={Standardisation in the ICT sectorSector: The (complexComplex) interface Interface between antitrust Antitrust and intellectual propertyIntellectual Property},

thicket_stance_extract={A patent thicket consists of a number of adjacent and overlapping property rights, which impose on whoever wishes to use certain intermediate goods to ask for licenses from several patent holders. Obviously, this frequently results in high monetary and transaction costs. The entity of such costs is often so great as to discourage innovative activity in the downstream phases of the innovation process... Contrarily, in the presence of cumulative and systemic innovative activities, there are reasons to believe that too strict intellectual property rights would lead to perverse effects on innovative activity within the industry.}, thicket_def={refs shapiroReferences Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents},

tags={SSOMechanisms, Standards, SSOs, IP Rights, Definition of SSOs},

research_type={theoryTheory},

thicket_stance_extract={The proliferation semiconductor market faces skewed incentives in the decision to patent integrated circuit technologies. First, patenting a circuit that is deeply embedded in a chip holds little promise for either a small or a large manufacturer. Small manufacturers face increased attention and aggressive licensing negotiations from larger players if they reveal parts of the 555 by their chips' inner workings through patent disclosure. When large companies patent deeply embedded circuits, they must put forth expensive and time- consuming efforts to find evidence that other companies illustrates are actually infringing their patents, because of the cutthroat needle-in-a-haystack nature of the semiconductor industry individual circuits in its infancycomplex chips. But todayFor both large and small companies, more than everthere is the threat that a patent disclosure will simply be co-opted by another manufacturer, large semiconductor companies encourage their rivals who will exploit the patentee's technology in a chip too obscure to enter cross-licensing agreementsever be detected.}, thicket_def={def1References Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Thickets only referenced in footnotes}, tags={IPR Policy, Changes to Patent Policy, 555 Timer, History, Industry example},

thicket_def={def16Diversely-held Complementary Inputs, Quotes Shapiro, References Shapiro},

tags={Mechanism, Pool, Bottlenecks},

thicket_stance_extract={In such industries, there frequently arises a "patent thicket," in which overlapping patent rights enable each patent holder with a patented input in the product to block the use of the product by all others. The power to hold other patent holders hostage is fostered and magnified by the injuctions and costly and lengthy infringement litigation that characterize the patent system. The danger inherent in these mechanisms is exacerbated when patents issue for products already on the market, because the owner of a newly issued patent holds a commanding position over manufacturers already in large-scale production, who cannot easily redesign their products and thus are forced to comply with the new patentee's demands}, thicket_def={def1References Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents},

tags={IP Policy, Changes to Patent Policy, Nature of IP, Reverse Doctorine of Equivalents},

thicket_def={Diversely-held Complementary Inputs}, thicket_def_extract={Mark Lemley has shown that SSOs have concentrated “in precisely those industries where the unconstrained enforcement of patents could be most damaging to innovation,” namely, computer software, Internet, telecommunications, and semiconductors.89 In these industries, the presence of multiple patented inputs in products increases the risk of holdup. Just as ominous, the industries are marked by “cumulative innovation,” with one generation’s patented invention based on those of previous generations.90}, tags={Mechanism, SSOs, Role of Antitrust, IPR Reform}, filename={Carrier (2002) - Why Antitrust Should Defer To The Intellectual Property Rules Of SSOs.pdf}

tags={Mechanisms, Industry Discussion, Standards, SSOs, FRAND, Smartphone, AntitrustSEP},

thicket_stance={Assumed Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={The Patent protection has gradually expanded over time, and many patents of suspect value are routinely granted owing to the lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process- . This has resulted in conjunction with the recent explosion of patents granted- has led to a serious concern that the current patent system may impede, rather than promote, innovation by creating and potentially creates a "patent thicket"(Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003)that hinders future innovation.}, thicket_def={refs shapiro, gallini, bessenReferences Shapiro},

tags={IPR Policy, IPR Reform, patents of suspect value, litigation issues, substitute patents, exclusive rights to first invalidator, IPR Reform},

@articleincollection{chu2009effectscohen2008real, title = {Effects of Blocking Patents on R&D: A Quantitative DGE AnalysisReal impediments to academic biomedical research}, author = {ChuCohen, Angus CW.M. and Walsh, J.P.}, journal booktitle= {Journal of Economic GrowthInnovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 8}, volume pages= {141--30}, number year= {12008}, pages publisher= {pp. 55-78University of Chicago Press}, abstract = {What are Numerous scholars have expressed concern over the growing "privatization of scientific commons" represented by the growth in academic patenting. Even before the Bayh-Dole Act and the effects pervasive patenting of blocking patents on R&D academic science, however, there was an earlier concern over the extent towhich the drive for recognition among scientists and competition for priority and consumption? associated rewards also limited contributions to the scientific commons. This paper develops suggests the utility of a qualitymore open-ladder growth model with overlapping intellectual property rights and capital accumulation to quantitatively evaluate ended consideration of the effects of blocking patentsdifferent factors-not just patenting-that might affect knowledge flows across scientists. The analysis focuses on two policy variables (In this paper, we use a) patent breadth simple economic perspective that determines emphasizes the amount benefits and costs of profits created by an invention excluding others from research results and (b) analyze the profit-sharing rule empirical evidence on exclusion in biomedical research. We suggest, first, that determines the distribution of profits one might distinguish between current legal and former inventors along the quality ladderpractical (i. The model is calibrated to aggregate data of the US economye. Under parameter values , lower cost) excludability?and that match key features practical excludabil ity, at least in theworld of academic research, may have little to do with patents. At the US economy same time, however, we suggest that excludability may indeed be a real concern for academic and show equilibrium R&D underinvestment, I particularly, biom?dical research, but to understand where and how it occurs, we need to look beyond patents to consider additional ways inwhich flows of knowledge and other inputs into research may be re stricted (including secrecy and control over materials). We do find that optimizing restrictions on the profit-sharing rule flow of blocking information and materials across biomedical researchers. While patents would lead play some role, they are not determinative. What appears to a significant increase in R&D, consumption matter are both academic and commercial incentives and welfareeffective excludability. Also, Exclusion is rarely associated with the paper derives and quantifies existence of a dynamic distortionary effect of patent policy on capital accumulationin academic settings, but is more readily achieved through secrecy or not sharing research materials.}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Springer}, copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Springer},

research_type={Theory, Empirical}, industry={GeneralAcademic Research}, thicket_stance={Assumed ProWeakly Anti}, thicket_stance_extract={This reasoning suggests that for We do find restrictions imposedon the purpose flow of stimulating R&Dinformation and materials across biomedical researchers. While patents play some role, reducing they are not determinative. What appears to matter are both academic and commercial incentives and effective excludability. Exclusion is rarely associated with the backloading effect existence of blocking patents would have been a less harmful policy instrument than increasing patent breadth. Even if the current level of R&D in academic settings, but is socially optimal, it would be beneficial for the society to reduce the level of patent breadth and the backloading effect of blocking patents simultaneously to keep R&D constantmore readily achieved through secrecy or not sharing research materials.}, thicket_def={def1References Heller/Eisenberg, References Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={TodayThough their focus is largely on commercial projects, most basic Heller and applied researchers are effectively standing on top of a huge pyramid... Of course, a pyramid can rise to far greater heights than could any one person... But what happens if, in order to scale the pyramid Eisenberg (1998) and place a new block on Shapiro (2000) suggest that the top, patenting of a researcher must gain the permission broad range of each person who previously placed a block in research tools that researchers need to do their work has spawned "patent thickets" that may make the pyramid, perhaps paying a royalty or tax to gain such permission? Would this system acquisition of intellectual property licenses and other rights slow down too burdensome to permit the construction pursuit of the pyramid or limit its heights? ... To complete the analogywhat should otherwise be scientifically and socially worthwhile research, blocking patents play the role (engendering a tragedy of the pyramid's building blocks"anticommons" [Heller and Eisenberg 1998]).Carl Shapiro (2001)}, tags={Blocking patentsIndustry Commentar, Private Mechanisms, Profit sharing rulesRegime Selection}, filename={Chu Cohen Walsh (20092008) - Effects Of Blocking Patents On R and D A Quantitative DGE AnalysisReal Impediments To Academic Biomedical Research.pdf}

@misc{competition2008pharmaceutical,

tags={Industry Discussion, Pharmaceutical Generics and Originators, Patent Filings, Industry Analysis, European},

thicket_stance={Weak ProNeutral}, thicket_stance_extract={In the next two Partsn recent years, influential scholars, 1 practicing lawyers, 2 government officials, however3 government commissions, I will argue that4 enforcement agencies, ifpatent 5 and courts 6 have all identified the phenomenon of "patent holdup is " as a serious problem in reality, certain that may require various reforms to both patent and antitrust law may be desirable. Within the last year or so, however, critics of this view have become increasingly vocal. In two recent papers, for example, Damien Geradin and his coauthors argue that, as an empirical matter, although the precise nature frequency and magnitude of those reforms will depend patent holdup costs are exaggerated. 7 A second line of attack, taken up in large part recent work by scholars including Einer Elhauge,8 John Golden,9 and J. Gregory Sidak,10 focuses more on perceived theoretical vulnerabilities of the comparative error costs patent holdup literature-arguing, for example, that holdup is not necessarily inefficient,11 and that neither patent law nor economic theory provides a baseline from which to evaluate whether patentees' royalty demands are so excessive as to constitute holdups. 12 Third, some of different approaches these same critics (and others) argue that the reforms sometimes proposed to calculating remedy patent holdup-such as eliminating the presumption of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases, changing the method by which courts calculate reasonable royalties, and permitting standard setting organizations (SSOs)13 to engage in collective bargaining with member patent owners over proposed licensing terms-threaten worse harms than the harms they would deter.}, thicket_def={def18Strategic Value},

tags={IPR Policy, IPR Reform, Patent Hold-up, Reasonable Royalty, Antitrust},

thicket_stance={Weakly Pro},

thicket_def={def31Diversely-held Compelmentary Inputs, Strategic Value}, thicket_def_extract={The Defensive and strategic patenting has for instance, in some sectors which are most affected by this phenomenon, at least resulted in the USpatent thickets, are those whose process and product innovations rely upon complex technologies where an individual piece of equipment is the result consequences of a very large number which are generally undesirable in terms of componentscreating too many, all susceptible to patent protection. Herepossibly overlapping patents, the recent boom in patenting observed by many researchers is largely explained not by which can crowd a firms’ drive to innovate more than before, but by a need technological field and make it difficult and costly to accumulate large enough “patent thickets”. These patent thickets work as a sort of insurance against possible legal actions from other companies. They are in effect therefore, a kind of defensive manoeuvrenavigate through.}, tags={IPR Policy, Changes to Patent Policy, reforming patent thickets in europe, defensive use of thickets, IPR Reform},

thicket_def={def30Diversely-held Complementary Inputs}, thicket_def_extract={When multiple organisations each own individual patents that are collectively necessary for a particular technology, their competing intellectual property rights form a "patent thicket". (cites: Gavin Clarkson and David DeKorte, "The Problem of Patent Thickets in Convergent Technologies" [2006] Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1093, 181.)}, tags={patent poolsMechanism, Patent Pools, open sourcingOpen Sourcing},

thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},

thicket_def={def20Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents},

tags={IPR Policy, IPR Reform, Probabilistic Patents, Comparison of real and intellectual property rights},

thicket_stance_extract={A 2002 court ruling number of observers of patenting, particularly in Madey v. Duke University greatly contracts the research exemption biological sciences, have suggested that patenting rules on US patents especially for universities making this and overlapping claims have generated a "patent thicket potentially " that has impeded innovation and made the R&D process more costly (Rai, 2001; Rai, 1999). Rai (2001) for example, argues that broad patents especially on upstream platform technologies represent a threat to competition and the cumulative process of a probleminnovation in the biopharmaceutical industry.}, thicket_def={Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents, Based on Infringement, Broad Patents},

tags={firm strategyFirm Strategy, Decision making, utility patents, revelation loss, IPR, trade secrets},

thicket_stance_extract={A second type of IP-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on many different patented technologies, each of which has no obvious substitute. Firms may find themselves in a patent "thicket," in which several parties are able to derail a shared platform by threatening to withhold necessary contributions.12 Each firm can issue an ultimatum, demanding a large share of the platform's added value.}, thicket_def={Refs References Shapiro},

thicket_stance={Weak Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={As recently as three months ago, it still all seemed so simple. Shinya Yamanaka, whose team at the University of Kyoto in Japan is generally acknowledged by the research community as the first to successfully reprogram differentiated cells into iPS cells1, was also the sole patent holder for the technology. But as with any other patent land grab, iPS cell intellectual property (IP) is beginning to look less and less like a one-horse race. Two other recently issued patents in the United States and United Kingdom on induced pluripotent stem (Table 1iPS)cells stack up, each awarded to a different inventor with a potentially strong claim to priority, now stand alongside Yamanaka’s patent, which was exclusively issued in Japan. With this newly tangled IP landscape, questions are arising about the possible emergence specter of a patent thicketlooms.},

thicket_def_extract={}, tags={Industry Discussion, Possible Signs of a Patent Thicket, iPS industry, intercountry patents, international applications},

thicket_stance_extract={Questionable patents contribute to the patent thicket. In the context of a patent thicket, questionable patents can introduce new kinds of licensing difficulties, such as royalties stacked one on top of another, and can increase uncertainty about the patent landscape, thus complicating business planning... For example, a questionable patent that claims a single routine in a software program may be asserted to hold up production of the entire software program. This process can deter follow-on innovation and unjustifiably raise costs to businesses and, ultimately, to consumers.}, thicket_def={def1References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro, def21Based on Infringement},

tags={IPR Policy, IPR Reform, FTC Report},

thicket_stance_extract={FurthermoreOvercompensation of certain patented technologies over-incentivizes invention in that area, if to the alleged infringer would face large switching costs due to sunk investments based on detriment of more productive innovative activity. It also over-incentivizes the patented technologypursuit of patents for their own sake, it may be forced unnecessarily increasing the number of patents in a given field beyond what is necessary to pay higher royalties than it would have negotiated prior to launchencourage productive innovation.30 These risks Large numbers of patents can create “patent thickets”35 and increase expected transaction costs, reducing firms’ incentives for manufacturers that seek to pursue innovative projects,31 while clear the associated expenses cause firms rights needed to reduce spending on R&Dproduce a product.}, thicket_def={def1References Shapiro, Quotes Shapiro},

tags={IPR Policy, IPR Reform, FTC Report},

thicket_stance={Assumed ProNeutral},

thicket_def={refs shapiro, lemleyReferences Shapiro},

tags={open source biotechnologyMechanism, academic research toolsLicensing, Open Source Biotechnology, Academic Research Tools},

thicket_def={refs shapiroReferences Shapiro},

tags={Mechanism, Cross-licensing},

abstract={Inventors and users of technology often enter into cooperative agreements for sharing their intellectual property in order to implement a standard or to avoid costly litigation. Over the past two decades, U.S. antitrust authorities have viewed pooling arrangements that integrate complementary, valid and essential patents as having procompetitive benefits in reducing prices, transactions costs, and the incidence of legal suits. Since patent pools are cooperative agreements, they also have the potential of suppressing competition if, for example, they harbor weak or invalid patents, dampen incentives to conduct research on innovations that compete with the pooled patents, foreclose competition from downstream product or upstream input markets, or raise prices on goods that compete with the pooled patents. In synthesizing the ideas advanced in the economic literature, this paper explores whether these antitrust concerns apply to pools with complementary patents and, if they do, the implications for competition policy to constrain them. Special attention is given to the application of the U.S. Department of Justice-Federal Justice‐Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its companion Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007) to recent patent pool cases.},

thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={These developments over the past few decades To avoid legal suits, developers of these products entangled in a “patent thicket” 2 have led some economists and legal experts to conclude – contrary had to conventional belief – that the strengthening of negotiate with multiple patent rights has frustratedowners, rather than supportedstacking up royalty obligations in the process, incentives to innovateor abandon R&D on the innovation altogether.}, thicket_def={def1References Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={A patent thicket arises when there are overlapping patent rights that must be identified and licensed in order for an innovator to bring a new product or technology to market...(Shapiro, 2001)},

title={Intellectual property rights Property Rights and competition policyCompetition Policy},

thicket_def={Def1References Shapiro, Def22References Heller/Eisenberg},

tags={IPR Policy, IPR Reform, Antitrust},

thicket_stance_extract={The strength of the anti-commons anti‐commons thesis rests on two assumptions that are very difficult to test: (1) that developing commercial biomedical products requires access to many different IP rights and (2) that negotiating access with different patent owners is prohibitively difficult and costly. On the first point, the number of biotechnology patents has certainly increased dramatically over the last decade, although by itself that does not necessarily imply greater fragmentation. Walsh et al. (2003) report from interviews with biotechnology industry IP practitioners that preliminary freedom to operate searches can sometimes find hundreds of patents relevant to a candidate product but that on closer inspection “there may be, in a complicated case, about 6-12 6‐12 that they have to seriously address, but that more typically the number was zero.” Enough anecdotal evidence exists, however, to suggest that the fragmentation of rights in biotechnology is sometimes a serious concern.}, thicket_def={Def32Diversely-held Complementary Inputs}, thicket_def_extract={Medimmune has recently acquired exclusive licenses from the portfolios of Wisconsin, St. Jude, and Mount Sinai School of Medicine (“Technology for Faster, Safer Development of Pandemic Flu Vaccine Licensed by Mount School of Medicine” 2005; “MedImmune Expands Patent Estate for Reverse Genetics with New Rights from Mount Sinai School of Medicine” 2005). The IP rights situation described above was arguably a classical case of a patent thicket with fragmented IP rights and uncertainty about technology ownership}, tags={patent poolsMechanism, Patent Pools, cross-licensing},

tags={Mechanisms, Antitrust, patent pools, competition, IPR Reform},

thicket_def={Refs References Shapiro},

tags={Mechanism, Patent Pools},

thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={This proliferation of basic science patents has raised the bar— what economists call transaction costs— for other researchers who want access to those research tools...While many researchers, especially in academia, find ways around patent restrictions, and many companies have no trouble executing license agreements, there are cases where “patent thickets” have discouraged other researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines of inquiry.}, thicket_def={refs heller eisenberg, refs eisenbergReferences Eisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={While many researchers, especially in academia, find ways around patent restrictions, and many companies have no trouble executing license agreements, there are cases where “patent thickets” have discouraged other researchers from pursuing similar or subsequent lines of inquiry.}, tags={Mechanism, Industry Discussion, Incentives, Patent Proliferation, License Agreements, Patent Pool, Open Source},

thicket_def={Def4References Shapiro, Strategic Value, Diversely-held Complementary Inputs},

tags={IPR Policy, IPR Reform, General Patent Discussion},

thicket_def={def33Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents}, thicket_def_extract={To forestall imitative activity and strengthen patent rights, firms often attempt to create a ‘patent thicket,’ i.e. obtaining patents not just on one central product or process, but on a host of related products or processes [11].}, tags={Firm strategy, decision making, preemptive patenting, consumer welfare, international affairs, strategic value},

thicket_def={refs References Heller /Eisenberg},

tags={IPR Policy, Critique on Reform Proposals, Continuation, First innovator, Injunction, IPR Reform },

thicket_def={Refs hellerHeller/eisenberg, rai/eisenbergEisenberg},

tags={Industry Discussion, Academia, patents of dubious quality, research use, public domain},

thicket_stance_extract={However, for the most part, fears expressed concerning human gene patents have not been manifested overtly in patent litigation. Human gene patent litigation invariably has involved an alleged infringer engaged in substantial commercial activities focused specifically on the single gene that is the subject of the asserted patent, the antithesis of a patent thicket scenario (14). Some have speculated that DNA microarray technology is particularly at risk of becoming entangled in a thicket (6). However, I found no instance in which a human gene patent was asserted against the manufacturer or user of microarray technology, although microarray companies have experienced substantial patent litigation involving nongene patents since the mid-1990s.}, thicket_def={refs heller eiseneberg, bartonRefs Heller/Eiseneberg},

tags={Industry Discussion, Gene patent litigation, frequency of litigation},

journal={Nature biotechnologyBiotechnology},

abstract={The fear that human gene patents pose a threat to whole-genome sequencing is based largely on widely held misconceptions.},

tags={Industry Discussion, Whole Genome Sequencing, Infringement},

title={Alternative approaches Approaches to IP management: One-stop technology platform licensingTechnology Platform Licensing},

thicket_def={refs shapiroReferences Shapiro},

tags={Mechanism, Patent Pools, technology platform licensing, standards poolsStandards},

thicket_stance={neutralNeutral},

thicket_def={refs shapiroReferences Shapiro},

tags={Firm Strategy, Decision Making, patenting secrecy, firm strategy},

thicket_def={refs shapiroReferences Shapiro, Multiple Overlapping Blocking Patents},

tags={Mechanism, IPR Policy, Patent pool, antitrust},

thicket_stance_extract={The patent owner may do this by creating In general, a thicket of pantents, so other parties are swamped with so much complex technical documentation that they cannot separate the chaff from the wheat. Developing patent thickets less rigorous examination is relatively easy cheap to do in this regime since administer but induces uncertainty regarding the patent examination process is cursory.'s validity and thus diminishes the power of patents to prevent imitation.This may have been alleged to give rise to unnecessary license fees, forgone research opportunities, and projects abandoned by competitors who unjustly fear infringement litigation.the average cost of dispute resolution will be high}, thicket_def={def35Strategic Value, Multiple Blocking Patents}, thicket_def_extract={The patent owner may do this by creating a thicket of pantents, so other parties are swamped with so much complex technical documentation that they cannot separate the chaff from the wheat. Developing patent thickets is relatively easy to do in this regime since the patent examination process is cursory...the average cost of dispute resolution will be high}, tags={Designing IPR Policy, Changes to current policy, designing patent system},

thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},

thicket_def={Refs References Shapiro},

tags={Mechanism, patent pools, substitute patents, welfare},

thicket_stance_extract={Basic investigations conducted at universities and academic medical cen- terscenters, usually publicly funded, often pro- duce key insights about the mecha- nisms underlying physiological function and disease states. Private corpora- tions can then commercialize these insights by designing and marketing new therapeutics or other medical tech- nologies based on them. In this chain of development, allowing patenting of each incremental innovation could risk generating a dense thicket of overlap- ping intellectual rights and thus hinder research efforts.}, thicket_def={quotes shapiroQuotes Shapiro, References Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={Basic investigations conducted at universities and academic medical cen- terscenters, usually publicly funded, often pro- duce key insights about the mecha- nisms underlying physiological function and disease states. Private corpora- tions can then commercialize these insights by designing and marketing new therapeutics or other medical tech- nologies based on them. In this chain of development, allowing patenting of each incremental innovation could risk generating a dense thicket of overlap- ping intellectual rights and thus hinder research efforts.}, tags={Industry Discussion, Effects of a Thicket, Academia, University research, upstream patents, defining lineage of products},

tags={IP Policy, IP Reform, Recent Trends in Case Law about Patents and Liability},

thicket_stance_extract={When distinct firms are selling inputs – all of which are required for pro- duction of the final product – they fail to internalize the effect that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputs. This results in each patent holder setting too high a royalty rate. A ‘‘patent pool’’ "patent pool" has begun to attract widespread attention as a solution to both the transaction cost and com- plements complements problems. }, thicket_def={Refs shapiro and hellerReferences Shapiro, References Heller/eisenbergEisenberg}, thicket_def_extract={The proliferation of fragmented and overlapping patent rights is increasingly being recognized as a serious problem; referred to as a ‘‘patent thicket’’ "patent thicket" (or ‘‘anticommons’’ "anticommons" by Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Besides the additional transaction costs incurred in navigating a patent thicket, Shapiro (2001) has called attention to another source of inefficiency – the complements problem. When distinct firms are selling inputs – all of which are required for pro- duction production of the final product – they fail to internalize the effect that their royalty rates have on the demand for other inputs. This results in each patent holder setting too high a royalty rate. }, tags={vertical integrationMechanism, patent poolsVertical Integration, Patent Pools, raising Raising rivals' costs, double marginalization},

thicket_def={Refs References Shapiro},

tags={IPR Policy, IPR Reform, supreme court, cases, patent reform},

thicket_def={def1References Shapiro},

title={To join Join or not Not to joinJoin: examining patent pool participation Examining Patent Pool Participation and rent sharing rulesRent Sharing Rules},

publisher={Elsevier}, abstract={In recognition that participation in modern patent pools is voluntary, we present empirical evidence on participation rates and the factors that drive the decision to join a pool, including the pro?t profit sharing rules adopted by the pool's founders. In most participation contexts, the at-risk group is extremely dif?cultdifficult, if not impossible, to identify. For pools centered on technologies that result from a standard-setting process, in contrast, we are able to identify a relatively unambiguous population of patents eligible for inclusion but that have not been included in the pool. We ?nd find that vertically integrated ?rmsfirms, with patents and downstream operations, are more likely to join a patent pool and among those ?rms firms that do join, those with relatively symmetric patent contributions (in terms of value) to a standard appear more likely to accept numeric patent share rules for dividing royalty earnings.}, discipline={MgmtEcon},

industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Until recently, the economic literature on patents pools–voluntary organizations created for the purpose of pooling a group of patents into a single licensing package–has been quite sparse. Following on the heels of the intense interest in the theories of “patent thickets” and “royalty stacking” (e.g., Shapiro, 2001, 2006), and the increased proliferation of organizations that promulgate technical standards for products and services, patent pools are emerging as an important topic for economic analysis. The newfound interest is understandable, given that patent pools are one of the more readily available tools proposed for overcoming the potentially harmful effects of overlapping or blocking patent rights (Merges, 1999; Shapiro, 2001).}, thicket_def={References Shapiro, Overlapping Blocking Patents}, thicket_def_extract={Until recently, the economic literature on patents pools–voluntary organizations created for the purpose of pooling a group of patents into a single licensing package–has been quite sparse. Following on the heels of the intense interest in the theories of “patent thickets” and “royalty stacking” (e.g., Shapiro, 2001, 2006), and the increased proliferation of organizations that promulgate technical standards for products and services, patent pools are emerging as an important topic for economic analysis. The newfound interest is understandable, given that patent pools are one of the more readily available tools proposed for overcoming the potentially harmful effects of overlapping or blocking patent rights (Merges, 1999; Shapiro, 2001).}, tags={Private Mechanisms, Pools},

  @article{layne2007pricing, title={Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments}, author={Layne-Farrar, A. and Padilla, A.J. and Schmalensee, R.}, journal={Antitrust LJ}, volume={74}, pages={671}, year={2007}, abstract={We explore potential methods for assessing whether licensing terms for intellectual property declared essential within a standard setting organization can be considered fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). We first consider extending Georgia-Pacific to a standard setting context. We then evaluate numeric proportionality, which is modelled after certain patent pool arrangements and which has been proposed in a pending FRAND antitrust suit. We then turn to two economic models with potential. The first—the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR)—is based on the economic concept of market competition. The second—-the Shapley value method—is based on cooperative game theory models and social concepts for a fair division of rents. Interestingly, these two distinct methods suggest a similar benchmark for evaluating FRAND licenses, but ones which might appeal differently to the courts and competition authorities in the US as compared to Europe. We find that under any approach, patents covering “essential” technologies with a greater contribution to the value of the standard and without close substitutes before the standard gets adopted should receive higher royalty payments after the adoption of the standard.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Assumed Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={In short, a poorly implemented numeric proportionality rule would not only fail to satisfy FRAND principles,23 it would also encourage a proliferation of patenting of minor innovations...It would thus exacerbate any worries over patent proliferation and patent thickets, already a hotly debated in the academic literature and popular press. For influential papers on patent thickets, see Shapiro (2001) and Heller and Eisenberg (1998)}, thicket_def={References Shapiro}, thicket_def_extract={In short, a poorly implemented numeric proportionality rule would not only fail to satisfy FRAND principles,23 it would also encourage a proliferation of patenting of minor innovations...It would thus exacerbate any worries over patent proliferation and patent thickets, already a hotly debated in the academic literature and popular press. For influential papers on patent thickets, see Shapiro (2001) and Heller and Eisenberg (1998)}, tags={Private Mechanisms, Standards, SSOs, FRAND, Licensing}, filename={LayneFarrar (2007) - Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations.pdf} }  @article{leaffer2009patent, title={Patent Misuse and Innovation},

@techreport{lerner2003cooperativelerner2002efficient, title={Cooperative marketing agreements between competitors: evidence from patent poolsEfficient Patent Pools}, author={Lerner, Josh J. and Tirole, Jean and Strojwas, MarcinJ.}, year={20032002}, institution={National Bureau of Economic Research} , abstract={On numerous occasionsThe paper builds a tractable model of a patent pool, rival firms seek an agreement among patent owners to license a set of their patents to one another or to market goods together, particularly in hightechnology industriesthird parties. This paper empirically examines one such institution: the It Þrst provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a patent poolto enhance welfare. The analysis highlights five findings consistent with the theoretical predictions: (a) pools involving substitute patents are unlikely to allow It shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents independentlymatters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing, consistent with our earlier theoretical work; (b) independent licensing is more frequently allowed when a property that allows the antitrust authorities to use this requirement to screen out unattractive pools. The paper then undertakes a number of members extensions: cases where patents differ in the pool growsimportance, where asymmetric blocking patterns exist, which may reflect the increasing challenges that reconciling users’ differing technological agendas pose in large pools; (c) larger pools and where licensors are more likely to have centralized control also licencees. We also undertake some initial explorations of litigation, which may reflect either the fact impact of pools on innovation. We conclude by showing that the incentives for individual enforcement in large analysis has broader applicability than pools are smaller or that large pools are more likely to include small players with limited enforcement capabilities; (d) third party licensing , as it is more common in larger pools, consistent with suggestions that such pools were established primarily also relevant to resolve the bargaining difficulties posed by overlapping patent holdings; and (e) during the most recent era, when an intense awareness a number of antitrust concerns precluded many competitionharming patent pools, more important patents were selected for pools and patents selected for pools were subsequently more intensively referenced by othersco-marketing arrangements. },

research_type={DiscussionTheory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result “patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.}, thicket_def={def40}, thicket_def_extract={Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result “patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.}, tags={Patent pools, welfare}, filename={Lerner Tirole Strojwas (20032002) - Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between CompetitorsEfficient Patent Pools.pdf}

@article{lerner2007design, title={The design of patent pools: The determinants of licensing rules}, author={Lerner, Josh and Strojwas, Marcin and Tirole, Jean}, journal={The RAND Journal of Economics}, volume={38}, number={3}, pages={610--625}, year={2007}, abstract={Patent pools are an important but little-studied economic institution. In this article, we first make a set of predictions about the licensing terms associated with patent pools. The theoretical framework predicts that (i) pools consisting of complementary patents are more likely to allow members to engage in independent licensing and (ii) the requirement that firms license patents to the pool (grantbacks) should be associated with pools that consist of complements and allow independent licensing. We then examine the terms of 63 pools, and show that licensing rules are consistent with these hypotheses. }, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={}, filename={Lerner Strojwas Tirole (2007) - The Design Of Patent Pools The Determinants Of Licensing Rules.pdf} }  @techreport{lerner2002efficient, title={Efficient Patent Pools}, author={Lerner, J. and Tirole, J.}, year={2002}, institution={National Bureau of Economic Research}, abstract={The paper builds a tractable model of a patent pool, an agreement among patent owners to license a set of their patents to one another or to third parties. It Þrst provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a patent pool to enhance welfare. It shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing, a property that allows the antitrust authorities to use this requirement to screen out unattractive pools. The paper then undertakes a number of extensions: cases where patents differ in importance, where asymmetric blocking patterns exist, and where licensors are also licencees. We also undertake some initial explorations of the impact of pools on innovation. We conclude by showing that the analysis has broader applicability than pools, as it is also relevant to a number of co-marketing arrangements.}, discipline={Econ}, research_type={Theory}, industry={General}, thicket_stance={Weak Pro}, thicket_stance_extract={Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result ?patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.}, thicket_def={def40}, thicket_def_extract={Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set of owners and as a result ?patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.}, tags={Patent pools, welfare}, filename={Lerner Tirole (2002) - Efficient Patent Pools.pdf} }  @incollection{lerner2008public,

abstract={The patent system was initially designed to provide incentives to develop stand-alone innovations in fi?elds fi…elds such as mechanics, chemicals or pharmaceuticals. Its application is therefore problematical in more recent ?elds …elds such as biotechnology and ICT industries, where innovation patterns are different. A well-known problem concerns cumulative innovations. Patent law must then trade off the rights granted to upstream patent owners with the incentives to develop subsequent innovations (Scotchmer, 1991; Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). Another issue concerns complementary innovations, which are the focus of the paper. When ?final …final products embody several complementary innovations, the scattering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001). In biotechnology, this is the case of therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic tests that require the use of multiple patented gene fragments (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and software, where ?firms …firms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001). Shapiro (2001) reports, for example, that in the semi-conductor industry ?rms …rms receive ?thousands “thousands of patents each year and manufacturers can potentially infringe on hundreds of patents with a single product". The situation is similar in the U.S. software industry, where there are ?potentially “potentially dozens or hundreds of patents covering individual components of a product?product”(FTC, 2003). I study the problem of the production of complementary innovations in a model of dynamic R&D competition between two ?firms…firms, and argue that in some cases complementary innovations should not be patentable as such, but bundled with other innovations prior to patenting. To do so I consider two complementary innovations and examine whether they should be patented separately or as a bundle. This approach echoes several papers on cumulative innovations where patentability requirements are de?ned de…ned as the need to develop two or more successive innovations before obtaining a patent (Scotchmer and Green, 1990; Hunt, 1995; O?DonoghueO’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). As regards complementary innovations, the optimal patenting rule depends on a trade-off between the pro?fit pro…fit loss due to scattered complementary patents, and the possible bene?fit bene…fit of patent disclosure. The scattering of complementary patents between different owners creates a double marginalization issue. Since each patentee behaves as a monopolist, the Cournot (1838) theorem predicts that prices do not maximize the ?rms?pro?ts …rms’pro…ts (Shapiro, 2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2005)1 . The requirement that complementary innovations be bundled prior to patenting can be a way to prevent this pro?t pro…t loss. However, small innovations are not disclosed when innovations have to be bundled prior to patenting (Scotchmer and Green, 1990). As a result, ?firms …firms lose the possibility to quit the race after a ?first …first innovation has been patented, which leads to R&D cost duplications. I show that patent disclosure has a positive social effect, although it does not permit a fully effi cient coordination between ?firms…firms. In this context, bundling innovations prior to patenting can be more effi cient if innovations can be devel- oped quickly. As I argue in the Conclusion, this condition is consistent with the legal de?nition de…nition of the "inventive step" patentability requirement. The paper is structured in six sections. First, the model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 then considers the case in which innovations can be patented separately, while Section 4 focuses on the case in which they must be bundled prior to patenting. Section 5 compares the social outcomes of the two require- ments. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the model.},

thicket_stance_extract={The present paper upholds policy arguments that emphasize the importance of a severe application of this patentability requirement as a means to limit the size of "patent thickets" and to promote innovation in sectors where complementary innovations are frequent (Jaffe, 2000; Barton, 2003; FTC, 2003)... When ?final …final products embody several complementary innovations, the scattering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges & Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001)},

thicket_def_extract={It is also very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and software, where ?rms …rms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001).},

@article{schmidt2007negotiating, title={Negotiating the RNAi Patent Thicket}, author={Schmidt, C.}, journal={Nature biotechnology}, volume={25}, number={3}, pages={273--280}, year={2007}, publisher={New York, NY: Nature Pub. Co., 1996-}, abstract={Patent disputes haven’t materialized in the RNAi field yet, but once products near the market, it might be a different story. Charlie Schmidt investigates.}, discipline={Biology}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Biology}, thicket_stance={}, thicket_stance_extract={}, thicket_def={}, thicket_def_extract={}, tags={RNA Interface, Licensing, Royalties}, filename={Schmidt (2007) - Negotiating The Rnai Patent Thicket.pdf} }  @article{schmidt2008complementary, title={Complementary Patents and Market Structure},

abstract={This paper studies the behaviour of ?firms …firms facing the decision to create a patent fence, de?fined de…fined as a portfolio of substitute patents. We set up a patent race model, where ?firms …firms can decide either to patent their inventions, or to rely on secrecy. It is shown that fi?rms fi…rms build patent fences, when the duopoly profi?ts profi…ts net of R&D costs are positive. We also demonstrate that in this context, a fi?rm fi…rm will rely on secrecy when the speed of discovery of the subsequent invention is high compared to the competitor?scompetitor’s. Furthermore, we compare the model under the First-to-Invent and First-to-File legal rules. Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of patent fences.},

thicket_def_extract={More precisely, ?firms …firms will patent a coherent group of inventions, which form what is sometimes called a patent "bulk", aimed at protecting one product. The "bulk" can either be a "fence" of substitute patents or a "thicket" of complementary patents (see Reitzig, 2004 and Cohen et al., 2000).},

@article{siebert2006licensingschmidt2007negotiating, title={How licensing resolves hold-up: Evidence from a dynamic panel data model with unobserved heterogeneityNegotiating the RNAi Patent Thicket}, author={SiebertSchmidt, Ralph and Von GraevenitzC.}, Georg journal={Nature biotechnology}, volume={25}, number={3}, pages={273--280}, year={20062007}, publisher={New York, NY: Nature Pub. Co., 1996-}, abstract={Patent disputes haven’t materialized in the RNAi field yet, but once products near the market, it might be a different story. Charlie Schmidt investigates.}, discipline={Biology}, research_type={Discussion}, industry={Biology},

tags={RNA Interface, Licensing, Royalties}, , filename={Siebert VonGraevenitz Schmidt (20062007) - How Licensing Resolves Hold UpNegotiating The Rnai Patent Thicket.pdf}