Difference between revisions of "Sequential Matching of Entrepreneurs to Accelerators and Venture Capitalists"

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See [[Fox (2008) - An Empirical Repeated Matching Game Applied to Market]] for a brief write up on Jeremy's theory paper
 
See [[Fox (2008) - An Empirical Repeated Matching Game Applied to Market]] for a brief write up on Jeremy's theory paper
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==Simple Outline of Model==
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As of now, the goal is to simulate a repeated matching model with dynamically optimizing agents. More specifically, there are two sides for a matching market with transferable utility (for now, call these men and women) with a continuum of agents, but a finite number of types. They participate in matches for T periods and receive utility that is a sum of a structural component (determined solely by their type and the type they are matched with) and a individual taste component (with some known distribution).
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What distinguishes this model from a static matching model is that the agents have some probability of transitioning between types that is conditional on the match they make in the previous period (e.g., a man of low type might be more likely to change into a man of high type after being matched to a woman of high type). When making these matches, the agents take these transition probabilities into account when evaluating expected future utility. This adds a dynamic element to the model.
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==Work to do==
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*Code up three algorithms to simulate match(primal,IPFP,dual)
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*Compare with R code from NYU
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===Work done so far===
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*Coded up primal and IPFP (may have errors)

Revision as of 13:09, 5 June 2017

Academic Paper
Title Matching Entrepreneurs to Accelerators and VCs (Academic Paper)
Author Ed Egan, Jeremy Fox
RAs Amir Kazempour
Status In development
© edegan.com, 2016


Summary

This paper describes a two-stage matching model and estimates this model using data on entrepreneurs that match to accelerators and (lead) venture capitalists. Once the model is estimated, we can enact various policy-relevant changes and estimate their effects. For example, we could eliminate non-profit accelerators, government-sponsored venture capitalists, or other participants.

See Fox (2008) - An Empirical Repeated Matching Game Applied to Market for a brief write up on Jeremy's theory paper

Simple Outline of Model

As of now, the goal is to simulate a repeated matching model with dynamically optimizing agents. More specifically, there are two sides for a matching market with transferable utility (for now, call these men and women) with a continuum of agents, but a finite number of types. They participate in matches for T periods and receive utility that is a sum of a structural component (determined solely by their type and the type they are matched with) and a individual taste component (with some known distribution).


What distinguishes this model from a static matching model is that the agents have some probability of transitioning between types that is conditional on the match they make in the previous period (e.g., a man of low type might be more likely to change into a man of high type after being matched to a woman of high type). When making these matches, the agents take these transition probabilities into account when evaluating expected future utility. This adds a dynamic element to the model.

Work to do

  • Code up three algorithms to simulate match(primal,IPFP,dual)
  • Compare with R code from NYU

Work done so far

  • Coded up primal and IPFP (may have errors)