PTLR Discard Processed BibTeX

This page is part of the Patent Thicket Litature Review

Notes

This page contains the Discards Processed BibTeX. BibTeX entries should be added to this list when they are determined to be not up, down or core group.

Discards

Discard From Up Group By Ed (Apr 2nd)

@article{cotter2008patent,
  title={Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses},
  author={Cotter, T.F.},
  journal={J. Corp. L.},
  volume={34},
  pages={1151},
  year={2008},
  publisher={HeinOnline},
  abstract={},
  discipline={Law},
  research_type={Theory},
  industry={General},
  thicket_stance={Neutral},
  thicket_stance_extract={n recent years, influential scholars, 1 practicing lawyers, 2 government officials, 3 government commissions, 4 enforcement agencies, 5 and courts 6 have all identified the phenomenon of "patent holdup" as a serious problem that may require various reforms to both patent and antitrust law. Within the last year or so, however, critics of this view have become increasingly vocal. In two recent papers, for example, Damien Geradin and his coauthors argue that, as an empirical matter, the frequency and magnitude of patent holdup costs are exaggerated. 7 A second line of attack, taken up in recent work by scholars including Einer Elhauge,8 John Golden,9 and J. Gregory Sidak,10 focuses more on perceived theoretical vulnerabilities of the patent holdup literature-arguing, for example, that holdup is not necessarily inefficient,11 and that neither patent law nor economic theory provides a baseline from which to evaluate whether patentees' royalty demands are so excessive as to constitute holdups. 12 Third, some of these same critics (and others) argue that the reforms sometimes proposed to remedy patent holdup-such as eliminating the presumption of injunctive relief in patent infringement cases, changing the method by which courts calculate reasonable royalties, and permitting standard setting organizations (SSOs)13 to engage in collective bargaining with member patent owners over proposed licensing terms-threaten worse harms than the harms they would deter.},
  thicket_def={Strategic Value},
  thicket_def_extract={In this regard, I present a definition of patent holdup as a type of opportunistic behavior on the part of patent owners that threatens to impose (1) static deadweight losses that are not justified by likely increases in dynamic efficiency, or (2) dynamic efficiency losses due to reduction in the incentive to participate in standard setting organizations or to engage in follow-up innovation.},  
  tags={IPR Reform, Reasonable Royalty, Balance with Anti-trust, Private Mechanisms, SSOs},
  filename={Cotter (2008) - Patent Holdup Patent Remedies And Antitrust Responses.pdf}
}

@article{holman2012debunking,
  title={Debunking the Myth that Whole-Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands of Gene Patents},
  author={Holman, C.M.},
  journal={Nature Biotechnology},
  volume={30},
  number={3},
  pages={240--244},
  year={2012},
  publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
  abstract={The fear that human gene patents pose a threat to whole-genome sequencing is based largely on widely held misconceptions.},
  discipline={Law},
  research_type={Commentary, Discussion},
  industry={Biology, Genetics},
  thicket_stance={Anti},
  thicket_stance_extract={There is also good reason to think that even the claims most likely to be infringed, reciting short fragments of genomic DNA, or broadly defined methods of testing for genetic variation, would not necessarily be infringed by all forms of WGS, particularly next-generation technologies that do not amplify genes. A company that provides WGS services, but that leaves the job of analyzing the sequence data for clinically important variations to others, would be particularly unlikely to be found liable for infringing any of these gene patents.},
  thicket_def={},
  thicket_def_extract={},  
  tags={Industry Commentary},
  filename={Holman (2012) - Debunking The Myth That Whole Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands Of Gene Patents.pdf}
}

@article{kieff2011removing,
  title = {Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition},
  author = {Kieff, F. Scott},
  journal = {Supreme Court Economic Review},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {pp. 25-50},
  year = {2011},
  abstract = {Commentators have poured forth a loud and sustained outcry over the past few years that sees property rule treatment of intellectual property (IP) as a cause of excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, which unduly tax and retard innovation, competition, and economic growth. The popular response has been to seek a legislative shift towards some limited use of weaker, liability rule treatment, usually portrayed as “just enough” to facilitate transactions in those special cases where the bargaining problems are at their worst and where escape hatches are most needed. This essay is designed to make two contributions. First, it shows how a set of changes in case law over just the past few years have hugely re-shaped the patent system from having several major, and helpful, liability-rule pressure-release valves, into a system that is fast becoming almost devoid of significant property rule characteristics, at least for those small entities that would most need property rule protection. The essay then explores some harmful effects of this shift, focusing on the ways liability rule treatment can seriously impede the beneficial deal-making mechanisms that facilitate innovation and competition. The basic intuition behind this bad effect of liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the ability for a market-challenging patentee to attract and hold the constructive attention of a potential contracting party (especially one that is a larger more established party) while preserving the option to terminate the negotiations in favor of striking a deal with a different party. At the same time, liability rules can have an additional bad effect of helping existing competitors to coordinate with each other over ways to keep out new entrants. The essay is designed to contribute to the literature on IP in particular, as well as the broader literatures on property and coordination, by first showing how a seemingly disconnected set of changes to the legal rules impacting a particular legal regime like the patent system can have unintended and sweeping harmful consequences, and then by exploring why within the more middle range of the spectrum between the two poles of property rules and liability rules, a general shift towards the property side may be preferred by those seeking an increase in access and competition.},
  discipline={Econ},
  research_type={Discussion},
  industry={General},
  thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={In the vast majority of the intellectual property (IP) literature, property rule treatment of IP is said to cause excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold- outs, and trolls, unduly taxing and retarding innovation, competition, and economic growth.},
  thicket_def={},
  thicket_def_extract={},  
  tags={IPR Reform, Liability},
  filename={Kieff (2011) - Removing Property From Intellectual Property And Intended.pdf},
}

@article{serafino2007survey,
  title={Survey of patent pools demonstrates variety of purposes and management structures},
  author={Serafino, D.},
  journal={Knowledge Ecology International. http://keionline. org/content/view/69/1},
  year={2007},
  abstract={The collective management of intellectual property rights is a term used to describe methods of managing large portfolios of intellectual property assets, including patents, copyrights, trademarks, know-how and data. Patent pools are one such mechanism. A “patent pool” is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties.2 In its 2001 White Paper on Patent Pools, the USPTO said, “A patent pool allows interested parties to gather all the necessary tools to practice a certain technology in one place, e.g, ‘one-stop shopping,’ rather than obtaining licenses from each patent owner individually.”3 The following paper provides a summary of features of 35 patent pools organized or proposed from 1856 to the present. Each of the patent pools was organized in response to a particular set of policy objectives and circumstances. Their purposes were heterogeneous. Some were organized in order to promote the interests of monopolists or cartels. Others were organized to promote competition and benefit the users of patents. There are pools that manage the patents on standards for new information technologies, that enhance R&D for new biomedical or biotechnology agricultural products, or that seek to promote other objectives. Some pools are organized by patent owners, others by manufacturers, and yet others by non-profit institutions, including governments. There is no single reason for creating a patent pool and no single way to manage a patent pool.},
  discipline={Econ},
  research_type={Written Theory, Empirics},
  industry={General, Technology},
  thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
  thicket_stance_extract={The Supreme Court ruled in 1947 that the division of the market by territory violated American antitrust laws, and included the contract between National Lead and DuPont in this ruling, which read, in part...The court also determined that “the agreement to license present and future patents and to share know-how contributed to a patent thicket that created a barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to control the domestic industry for titanium dioxide products.”},
  thicket_def={},
  thicket_def_extract={The court also determined that “the agreement to license present and future patents and to share know-how contributed to a patent thicket that created a barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to control the domestic industry for titanium dioxide products.”28},  
  tags={Private Mechanisms, Patent Pools, Standards},
  filename={Serafino (2007) - Survey Of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety Of Purposes And Management Structures.pdf},
}

@article{schmidt2007negotiating,
  title={Negotiating the RNAi Patent Thicket},
  author={Schmidt, C.},
  journal={Nature biotechnology},
  volume={25},
  number={3},
  pages={273--280},
  year={2007},
  publisher={New York, NY: Nature Pub. Co., 1996-},
  abstract={Patent disputes haven’t materialized in the RNAi field yet, but once products near the market, it might be a different story. Charlie Schmidt investigates.},
  discipline={Biology},
  research_type={Discussion},
  industry={Biology},
  thicket_stance={},
  thicket_stance_extract={},
  thicket_def={},
  thicket_def_extract={},  
  tags={Industry Commentary, Private Mechanisms, Licensing},
  filename={Schmidt (2007) - Negotiating The Rnai Patent Thicket.pdf}
}