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| | ==The Master File== | | ==The Master File== |
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| − | @article{aggarwal2009modes,
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| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
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| − | title = {Modes of Cooperative R&D Commercialization by Start-Ups},
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| − | author = {Aggarwal, Vikas A. and Hsu, David H.},
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| − | journal = {Strategic Management Journal},
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| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
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| − | volume = {30},
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| − | number = {8},
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| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Aug., 2009},
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| − | pages = {pp. 835-864},
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| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/20536081},
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| − | ISSN = {01432095},
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| − | abstract = {This study empirically examines the determinants of heterogeneous firm-level cooperative R&D commercialization strategies. While the volume of interfirm collaboration has increased dramatically in recent decades, the determinants of firm-level choices among alternate modes of such cooperative activity remain relatively understudied. We develop a conceptual model of factors determining collaborative mode choice at the organizational portfolio level. These factors include the firm-level appropriation environment, in which deal-level choices have portfolio-level spillover implications, as well as governance capabilities developed by the firm over time. Using a random sample of innovating biotechnology start-ups, we assemble a firm-year panel dataset that aggregates transaction-level collaboration data to the firm-year level, allowing us to characterize firms' portfolios of collaborative deals. We find broad empirical support for our model, suggesting that a firm's appropriation environment and governance capabilities strongly influence portfolio-level collaboration mode choices. In addition, we explore the implications of governance capability development, finding that experience with particular modes, as well as deviations from existing capabilities, impact firm valuation.},
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| − | language = {English},
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| − | year = {2009},
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| − | publisher = {Wiley},
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| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Wiley},
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| − | filename={Aggarwal Hsu (2009) - Modes Of Cooperative R And D Commercialization By Start Ups.pdf}
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| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Econ: Empirical Biotech
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| − |
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| − | Biotech: all firms in Standard Industrial Classification
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| − | (SIC) codes 2833–2836 located in the United
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| − | States that have conducted an initial public offering
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| − | (IPO)17 in the past 25 years. From this list of
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| − | 468 firms, we randomly select 117 for our sample.
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| − |
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| − | A firm’s patent portfolio can enable the
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| − | firm to mitigate appropriation concerns that arise
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| − | across multiple deals. This occurs when patents
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| − | are not specific to an individual deal, but rather
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| − | apply across multiple technology commercialization
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| − | projects. Such an intellectual property portfolio
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| − | can thus act as a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro,
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| − | 2000), making it more difficult for collaborative
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| − | partners to expropriate the innovating firm’s technology.
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| − | 11 The degree of protection afforded by
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| − | such a portfolio will, of course, necessarily be
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| − | dependent on the degree to which patents are relevant
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| − | across multiple commercialization projects.
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| − |
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| − | While the prior literature has discussed patent thickets in
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| − | the context of fragmented markets for intellectual property, we
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| − | conceptualize an analogous situation with the innovator holding
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| − | a stock of interrelated patents that deters potential expropriation
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| − | of a range of related products, a situation especially relevant
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| − | for start-up innovators, as most such firms confine their product
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| − | development to a single or small number of related products for
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| − | resource reasons.
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| − |
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| − |
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| − | @article{allison2003business,
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| − | title={The Business Method Patent Myth},
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| − | author={Allison, J.R. and Tiller, E.H.},
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| − | journal={Berkeley Tech. LJ},
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| − | volume={18},
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| − | pages={987},
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| − | year={2003},
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| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
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| − | filename={Allison Tiller (2003) - The Business Method Patent Myth.pdf}
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| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Law: Empirical: Business Method Patents
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| − |
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| − | In other words, many closely related patents may cover a single product, making
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| − | it much more difficult for competitors to invent noninfringing substitutes. Patent
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| − | thickets increase the probability of “hold-up” licensing, that is, exercising the ability to
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| − | charge a premium for patent licenses in the case of technologies in which competitors
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| − | have already invested heavily. Id. A patent thicket is just one instance of portfolio value,
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| − | because a group of patents on related technologies can have a value greater than the sum
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| − | of its parts even if the patents do not create overlapping rights in the same product.
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| − |
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| − | Our initial search for all patents issued from the beginning of 1990 to
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| − | the end of 1999 that included the terms “Internet or World Wide Web”
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| − | yielded over 9,000, most of which used these terms in an incidental
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| − | fashion (such as a cite to a piece of prior art on the Internet).149 Although a
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| − | survey of these patents found a few initially promising candidates in older
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| − | computer industry classifications such as 345, 365, 370, and 375, we
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| − | found by far the heaviest concentration in the newer 700-series “data
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| − | processing” or “electrical computer” classifications.150 In particular, most
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| − | contenders for inclusion appeared in Class 705, 707, and 709.151
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| − |
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| − |
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| − | @article{aoki2008promoting,
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| − | title={Promoting access to intellectual property: patent pools, copyright collectives, and clearinghouses},
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| − | author={Aoki, R. and Schiff, A.},
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| − | journal={R\&d Management},
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| − | volume={38},
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| − | number={2},
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| − | pages={189--204},
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| − | year={2008},
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| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
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| − | filename={Aoki Schiff (2008) - Promoting Access To Intellectual Property.pdf}
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| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Econ: Theory: Pools, Collectives, Clearinghouses. ICT and Biotech.
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| − |
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| − | In the context of patents, a proliferation of IP
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| − | rights may result in a ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro,
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| − | 2001) that can increase costs for downstream
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| − | activities such as cumulative innovation and the
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| − | development of new products that combine multiple
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| − | existing innovations.
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| − |
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| − | For example, development of a new
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| − | genetic diagnostic test typically requires licenses
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| − | to a number of patents on gene sequences and
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| − | related technologies (Scherer, 2002). The greater
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| − | the number of licenses required, the greater the
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| − | cost of developing the new test. This paper is
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| − | concerned with ways in which these costs can be
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| − | reduced so that markets for technology can function
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| − | more efficiently.
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| − |
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| − | @inproceedings{arundel2003strategic,
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| − | title={Strategic patenting},
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| − | author={Arundel, A. and Patel, P.},
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| − | booktitle={Background report for the Trend Chart Policy Benchmarking Workshop" New Trends in IPR Policy},
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| − | year={2003},
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| − | filename={Arundel Patel (2003) - Strategic Patenting.pdf}
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| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Policy
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| − |
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| − | One of the worst-case outcomes of the patenting strategies of private firms is the
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| − | creation of an ‘anti-commons’ in which the necessary knowledge to conduct further
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| − | research is covered by a large number of patents held by a large number of firms. This
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| − | has been called a patent thicket, or a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property
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| − | rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize
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| − | new technology” (Shapiro, in press).
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| − |
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| − |
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| − |
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| − | @article{balasubramanian2011what,
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| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
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| − | Title = {What Happens When Firms Patent? New Evidence From U.S. Economic Census Data},
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| − | author = {Balasubramanian, Natarajan and Sivadasan, Jagadeesh},
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| − | journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
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| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
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| − | volume = {93},
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| − | number = {1},
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| − | jstor_formatteddate = {February 2011},
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| − | pages = {pp. 126-146},
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| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23015924},
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| − | ISSN = {00346535},
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| − | abstract = {We build a new concordance between the NBER Patent Data and U.S. Census microdata and use it to examine what happens when firms patent. We find strong evidence that increases in patent stock are associated with increases in firm size, scope, and skill and capital intensity. We find somewhat weaker evidence that changes in patenting are positively correlated with changes in total factor productivity. We also analyze firsttime patentees and find similar effects following initial patent application. Together, these results suggest that patenting is indeed associated with real changes within firms, in particular with growth through increases in scope.},
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| − | language = {English},
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| − | year = {2011},
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| − | publisher = {The MIT Press},
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| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2011 The MIT Press},
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| − | filename={Balasubramanian Sivadasan (2011) - What Happens When Firms Patent.pdf}
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| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Econ: Empirical: Cross industry, large scale, TFP
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| − |
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| − | We find strong evidence that increases in patent stock are associated
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| − | with increases in firm size, scope, and skill and capital intensity. We
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| − | find somewhat weaker evidence that changes in patenting are positively
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| − | correlated with changes in total factor productivity. We also analyze firsttime
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| − | patentees and find similar effects following initial patent application.
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| − | Together, these results suggest that patenting is indeed associated with real
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| − | changes within firms, in particular with growth through increases in scope.
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| − |
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| − | @article{baluch2005re,
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| − | title={In re Kumar: the first nanotech patent case in the federal circuit},
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| − | author={Baluch, A.S. and Radomsky, L. and Maebius, S.B.},
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| − | journal={Nanotech. L. \& Bus.},
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| − | volume={2},
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| − | pages={344},
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| − | year={2005},
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| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
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| − | filename={Baluch Radomsky Maebius (2005) - In Re Kumar The First Nanotech Patent Case In The Federal Circuit.pdf}
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| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Law: Nanotech
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| − |
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| − | For example, a claim in a later patent may cover a new and nonobvious improvement on a basic invention
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| − | claimed in an earlier patent. In this case, both patents would properly cover the improved product. A large number
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| − | of patents containing overlapping claims which cover the same product are often referred to as a "patent thicket."
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| − |
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| − |
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| − | @article{bargill2003thevalue,
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| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
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| − | title = {The Value of Giving Away Secrets},
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| − | author = {Bar-Gill, Oren and Gideon Parchomovsky},
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| − | journal = {Virginia Law Review},
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| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
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| − | volume = {89},
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| − | number = {8},
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| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 2003},
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| − | pages = {pp. 1857-1895},
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| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3202368},
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| − | ISSN = {00426601},
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| − | abstract = {},
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| − | language = {English},
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| − | year = {2003},
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| − | publisher = {Virginia Law Review},
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| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Virginia Law Review},
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| − | filename={BarGill Parchomovsky (2003) - The Value Of Giving Away Secrets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
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| − | Law: Cummulative Innovation -> give away rights can be best
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| − |
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| − | In growingn umbersf, irmse lect to foregop atentp rotection,
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| − | a nd choose instead to publishp otentiallyp atentabler esearchf
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| − | inding
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| − |
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| − | Indeed, from an ex post perspective, the original inventor would prefer a broader patent. The ex post perspective is deceptive, how- ever, since it presumes the existence of the cumulative invention- an existence which cannot be taken for granted. Generally, the cumulative inventor would need to sink substantial development costs before she can approach the original inventor and bargain for a license. Therefore, if a broad patent protects the original inven- tion and, consequently, the cumulative inventor expects to be held- up in the bargaining stage, she might decide to forego the cumula- tive invention altogether. Critically, the breadth of the original pat- ent determines the division of surplus between the original and
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| − | cumulative inventors.5 If the share that the cumulative inventor ex- pects to receive does not cover her ex ante development costs, then the cumulative invention will not be developed in the first place. This result is clearly detrimental not only to the cumulative inven- tor, but also to the original inventor
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| − |
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| − |
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| − | @article{baron2010patent,
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| − | title={Patent quality and value in discrete and cumulative innovation},
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| − | author={Baron, J. and Delcamp, H.},
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| − | journal={CERNA Working Paper},
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| − | number={2010-07},
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| − | year={2010},
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| − | filename={Baron Delcamp (2010) - Patent Quality And Value In Discrete And Cumulative Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Econ: Empirical: Patent quality and value in discrete vs. cummulative innovation
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| − |
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| − | Patent thickets are webs of overlapping and mutually blocking patents held by different
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| − | owners. Mutually blocking patent rights result from cumulative innovation, where no
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| − | technological component can be marketed individually without the technological
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| − | complements potentially protected by patent rights of different companies.
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| − |
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| − | @article{baron2010strategic,
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| − | title={Strategic inputs into patent pools},
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| − | author={Baron, J. and Delcamp, H.},
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| − | journal={Cerna working paper},
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| − | year={2010},
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| − | filename={Baron Delcamp (2010) - Strategic Inputs Into Patent Pools.pdf}
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| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Econ: Emprical Pools
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| − |
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| − | The patent thicket describes a situation in which
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| − | holders of different patents that are all necessary for complying with a standard mutually block
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| − | each other in the implementation of the standard.
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| − |
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| − | We have produced a unique database of 7 patent pools with 8046 patent observations: DVD6C,
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| − | MPEG2, MPEG4 Systems, MPEG4 Visuals, AVC H/264, IEEE 1394 and DVB-T.
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| − |
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| − | @inproceedings{baron2011patent,
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| − | title={Patent Pools and Patent Inflation},
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| − | author={Baron, J. and Pohlmann, T.},
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| − | booktitle={Conference Proceedings: 4th ZEW Conference on the Economics of Innovation and Patenting},
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| − | year={2011},
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| − | filename={Baron Pohlmann (2011) - Patent Pools And Patent Inflation.pdf}
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| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Econ: Empirical Pools
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| − |
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| − | Building upon theoretical propositions drawn from
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| − | Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007) and a database of 64.619 declarations of essential patents
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| − | to major international Standard Developing Organizations (SDO), we investigate how
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| − | patent pools influence the number of patents on a standard over time
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| − |
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| − | Shapiro, 2001 def.
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| − |
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| − | @article{barpujari2010patent,
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| − | title={The patent regime and nanotechnology: issues and challenges},
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| − | author={Barpujari, I.},
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| − | journal={Journal of Intellectual Property Rights},
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| − | volume={15},
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| − | number={3},
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| − | pages={206--213},
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| − | year={2010},
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| − | filename={Barpujari (2010) - The Patent Regime And Nanotechnology Issues And Challenges.pdf}
| |
| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Law: Nanotech
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| − |
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| − | Building upon theoretical propositions drawn from
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| − | Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007) and a database of 64.619 declarations of essential patents
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| − | to major international Standard Developing Organizations (SDO), we investigate how
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| − | patent pools influence the number of patents on a standard over time
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| − |
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| − |
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| − |
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| − | @article{bawa2007nanotechnology,
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| − | title={Nanotechnology patent proliferation and the crisis at the US Patent Office},
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| − | author={Bawa, R.},
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| − | journal={Alb. LJ Sci. \& Tech.},
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| − | volume={17},
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| − | pages={699},
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| − | year={2007},
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| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
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| − | filename={Bawa (2007) - Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation And The Crisis At The Us Patent Office.pdf}
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| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Law: Nanotech Discussion
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| − |
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| − | Not Copyable
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| − |
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| − |
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| − |
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| − |
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| − |
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| − | @article{bessen2003patent,
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| − | title={Patent thickets: Strategic patenting of complex technologies},
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| − | author={Bessen, J.},
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| − | journal={Available at SSRN 327760},
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| − | year={2003},
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| − | filename={Bessen (2003) - Patent Thickets Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies.pdf}
| |
| − | }
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| − |
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| − | Econ (weak): Theory of thickets
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| − |
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| − | These occur when each
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| − | product may involve many patents, in contrast with the one-to-one correspondence between
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| − | products and patents that is assumed in the patent race literature. Recent commentators suggest
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| − | that lower patenting standards encourage patent thickets, creating difficulties for innovators (see
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| − | Gallini, 2002, for a review). When innovators must negotiate with large numbers of
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| − | patentholders, they may face excessive transaction costs (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998), “holdup,”
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| − | and problems of vertical monopoly (Shapiro, 2001).
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| − |
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| − | @article{bessen2008value,
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| − | title={The value of US patents by owner and patent characteristics},
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| − | author={Bessen, J.},
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| − | journal={Research Policy},
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| − | volume={37},
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| − | number={5},
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| − | pages={932--945},
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| − | year={2008},
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| − | publisher={Elsevier},
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| − | filename={Bessen (2008) - The Value Of Us Patents By Owner And Patent Characteristics.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
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| − | Econ: Empirical: Thicketing may add to patent value
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| − |
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| − | A
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| − | larger number of patents may simply reflect that an owner is protecting more inventions with patents,
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| − | or that owner may be “fencing” off the technology by patenting possible substitute technologies or
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| − | building a patent “thicket.”
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| − |
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| − | @article{bergman2007global,
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| − | title={The global stem cell patent landscape: implications for efficient technology transfer and commercial development},
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| − | author={Bergman, K. and Graff, G.D.},
| |
| − | journal={Nature biotechnology},
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| − | volume={25},
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| − | number={4},
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| − | pages={419--424},
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| − | year={2007},
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| − | publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
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| − | filename={Bergman Graff (2007) - The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
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| − | Biology: Stem Cells (could give rise to thickets)
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| − |
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| − | Given the particular characteristics of stem
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| − | cells as a broadly enabling technology, many
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| − | expect the field to be particularly susceptible
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| − | to the emergence of a patent thicket8–13, also
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| − | known in property rights theory as an ‘anticommons’
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| − | 14. In a patent thicket, the existence
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| − | of many overlapping patent claims can cause
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| − | uncertainty about freedom to operate, impose
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| − | multiple layers of transaction costs and stack
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| − | royalty payments beyond levels that can be
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| − | supported by the value of single innovations.
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| − | By blocking pathways to market and dampening
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| − | investor interest in commercialization,
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| − | a patent thicket has the potential to slow and
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| − | skew the overall development of new technical
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| − | applications.
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| − |
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| − |
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| − | @article{blind2009influence,
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| − | title={The influence of strategic patenting on companies’ patent portfolios},
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| − | author={Blind, K. and Cremers, K. and Mueller, E.},
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| − | journal={Research Policy},
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| − | volume={38},
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| − | number={2},
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| − | pages={428--436},
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| − | year={2009},
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| − | publisher={Elsevier},
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| − | filename={Blind Cremers Mueller (2009) - The Influence Of Strategic Patenting On Companies Patent Portfolios.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
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| − | Econ: Effects of strategic patenting
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| − |
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| − | Furthermore, an observed offensive
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| − | blocking strategy results in frequent oppositions and rather limited citations of a
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| − | company’s patent portfolio. Such a strategy could also lead to “patent thickets”,
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{braun2007barriers,
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| − | title={Barriers to user innovation: moving towards a paradigm of'licence to innovate'?},
| |
| − | author={Braun, V. and Herstatt, C.},
| |
| − | journal={International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management},
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| − | volume={7},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={292--303},
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| − | year={2007},
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| − | publisher={Inderscience},
| |
| − | filename={Braun Herstatt (2007) - Barriers To User Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
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| − | Econ: Discussion based on seed-breeding
| |
| − |
| |
| − | An investigation of the barriers that users face when attempting to innovate is nevertheless lacking completely. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by discussing various factors that can prevent users from innovating. The evolution of the seed-breeding industry will be used for illustration purposes. We will argue that the barriers to user innovation seem to be progressing, potentially indicating that a paradigm change may be imminent.
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| − |
| |
| − | This refers to an overlapping set of IPRs, which requires those seeking to commercialise new technologies to obtain licences (Shapiro, 2001). It exists in many industries, such as in semiconductors and biotechnology (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{brenner2009optimal,
| |
| − | title={Optimal formation rules for patent pools},
| |
| − | author={Brenner, S.},
| |
| − | journal={Economic Theory},
| |
| − | volume={40},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={373--388},
| |
| − | year={2009},
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| − | publisher={Springer},
| |
| − | filename={Brenner (2009) - Optimal Formation Rules For Patent Pools.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Model of pool formation
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| − |
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| − | No real mention of thickets but builds off complementary patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{burk2003policy,
| |
| − | title={Policy levers in patent law},
| |
| − | author={Burk, D.L. and Lemley, M.A.},
| |
| − | journal={Va. L. Rev.},
| |
| − | volume={89},
| |
| − | pages={1575},
| |
| − | year={2003},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Burk Lemley (2003) - Policy Levers In Patent Law.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Theory - Direct discussion of thicket problem
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Closely related to the problem of complementarity is the prob- lem of horizontal overlaps between patents.122 Patents are fre- quently broader than the products the inventors actually make. Multiple patents often cover the same ground, sometimes as an in- tentional result of the patent system"' and sometimes because pat- ents regularly issue that are too broad or tread on the prior art.'24 Various parties may be able to lay claim to the same technologies or to aspects of the same technology. Carl Shapiro has termed this overlap of patent claims the "patent thicket." 125
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{calderini2006standardisation,
| |
| − | title={Standardisation in the ICT sector: The (complex) interface between antitrust and intellectual property},
| |
| − | author={Calderini, M. and Giannaccari, A.},
| |
| − | journal={Econ. Innov. New Techn.},
| |
| − | volume={15},
| |
| − | number={6},
| |
| − | pages={543--567},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={Taylor \& Francis},
| |
| − | filename={Calderini Giannaccari (2006) - Standardisation In The Ict Sector.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ/Policy: Discussion: Stardardization in ICT
| |
| − |
| |
| − | It is obvious that the characteristics of the aforementioned technological paradigm determine
| |
| − | a complex network of intertwined property rights to which a company intending to
| |
| − | develop a new product must access. This network is defined a patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001).
| |
| − | A patent thicket consists of a number of adjacent and overlapping property rights, which
| |
| − | impose on whoever wishes to use certain intermediate goods to ask for licenses from several
| |
| − | patent holders. Obviously, this frequently results in high monetary and transaction costs. The
| |
| − | entity of such costs is often so great as to discourage innovative activity in the downstream
| |
| − | phases of the innovation process. This finding represents a real turning over of one of the
| |
| − | funding concepts of the economics of intellectual property rights, according to which a tighter
| |
| − | enforcement of intellectual property rights favours innovative activity. Contrarily, in the presence
| |
| − | of cumulative and systemic innovative activities, there are reasons to believe that too
| |
| − | strict intellectual property rights would lead to perverse effects on innovative activity within
| |
| − | the industry.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{calderini2004intellectual,
| |
| − | title={Intellectual property rights as strategic assets: the case of European patent opposition in the telecommunications industry},
| |
| − | author={Calderini, M. and Scellato, G.},
| |
| − | journal={CESPRI, Cen tre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita'Bocconi, Working Paper},
| |
| − | volume={158},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | filename={Calderini Scellato (2004) - Intellectual Property Rights As Strategic Assets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Discussion: Close to Mexican Standoff
| |
| − |
| |
| − | We suggest that in an industry characterised
| |
| − | by strong technological complementarities the distribution of patent rights may induce
| |
| − | situations of mutual hold-up among innovators. The risk of retaliation through countersuits
| |
| − | represents a credible threat that can eventually favour the instauration of collusive
| |
| − | behaviours. Our results confirm this hypothesis, since the occurrence of patent
| |
| − | oppositions among large incumbents is significantly lower than industry average.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | No explicit definition.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{carnabuci2009knowledge,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Knowledge Specialization, Knowledge Brokerage and the Uneven Growth of Technology Domains},
| |
| − | author = {Carnabuci, Gianluca and Bruggeman, Jeroen},
| |
| − | journal = {Social Forces},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {88},
| |
| − | number = {2},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {December 2009},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 607-641},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645818},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00377732},
| |
| − | abstract = {Why do certain domains of knowledge grow fast while others grow slowly or stagnate? Two distinct theoretical arguments hold that knowledge growth is enhanced by knowledge specialization and knowledge brokerage. Based on the notion of recombinant knowledge growth, we show that specialization and brokerage are opposing modes of knowledge generation, the difference between them lying in the extent to which homogeneous vs. heterogeneous input ideas get creatively recombined. Accordingly, we investigate how both modes of knowledge generation can enhance the growth of technology domains. To address this question, we develop an argument that reconciles both specialization and brokerage into a dynamic explanation. Our contention is that specializing in an increasingly homogeneous set of input ideas is both more efficient and less risky than brokering knowledge. Nevertheless, specializing implies progressively exhausting available recombinant possibilities, while brokerage creates new ones. Hence, technology domains tend to grow faster when they specialize, but the more specialized they become, the more they need knowledge brokerage to grow. We cast out our argument into five hypotheses that predict how growth rates vary across technology domains.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2009},
| |
| − | publisher = {Oxford University Press},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press},
| |
| − | filename={Carnabuci Bruggeman (2009) - Knowledge Specialization Knowledge Brokerage.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ/Soci: Theory and empirics
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Might provide an interesting counter to the measures...
| |
| − |
| |
| − | the present study extends our understanding of how public technological knowledge accumulate
| |
| − | Our analysis showed that the process of recombinant growth driving the accumulation of public technological knowledge is far from combinatorially unconstrained. Rather, at any point in time, the rate of future accumulation of public technological knowledge is affected in important and predictable ways by the extent to which the body of accumulated prior knowledge in a technology domain is specialize
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{carrier2002antitrust,
| |
| − | title={Why Antitrust Should Defer to the Intellectual Property Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: A Commentary on Teece \& (and) Sherry},
| |
| − | author={Carrier, M.A.},
| |
| − | journal={Minn. L. Rev.},
| |
| − | volume={87},
| |
| − | pages={2019},
| |
| − | year={2002},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Carrier (2002) - Why Antitrust Should Defer To The Intellectual Property Rules Of SSOs.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ/Law (Commentary on Teece/Sherry).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | No definition of thickets.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{carrier2012roadmap,
| |
| − | title={A Roadmap to the Smartphone Patent Wars and FRAND Licensing},
| |
| − | author={Carrier, M.},
| |
| − | journal={CPI Antitrust Chronicle},
| |
| − | volume={2},
| |
| − | year={2012},
| |
| − | filename={Carrier (2012) - A Roadmap To The Smartphone Patent Wars And Frand Licensing.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Smartphone wars (short)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | No def
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{choi2005live,
| |
| − | title={Live and let live: A tale of weak patents},
| |
| − | author={Choi, J.P.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of the European Economic Association},
| |
| − | volume={3},
| |
| − | number={2-3},
| |
| − | pages={724--733},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
| |
| − | filename={Choi (2005) - Live And Let Live A Tale Of Weak Patents.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Substitute patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The lack of rigorous scrutiny in the examination process - in conjunction
| |
| − | with the recent explosion of patents granted - has led to a serious concern that
| |
| − | the current patent system may impede, rather than promote, innovation by creating
| |
| − | a "patent thicket" (Shapiro 2001; Gallini 2002; Bessen 2003).
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{clark2008fragmented,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Fragmented Property Rights and Incentives for R&D},
| |
| − | author = {Clark, Derek J. and Konrad, Kai A.},
| |
| − | journal = {Management Science},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {54},
| |
| − | number = {5},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {May, 2008},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 969-981},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/20122444},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00251909},
| |
| − | abstract = {Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2008},
| |
| − | publisher = {INFORMS},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2008 INFORMS},
| |
| − | filename={Clark Konrad (2008) - Fragmented Property Rights And Incentives For R And D.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Model of cummulative innovation where fragmentation is endogeneous?
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Complementarity of multiple patents has been identified
| |
| − | recently—by academics and industry practitioners—
| |
| − | as a potential problem, particularly in
| |
| − | biotechnology and other nascent industries based on
| |
| − | complex technologies. We have considered the incentives
| |
| − | for cumulative R&D effort if firms need several
| |
| − | complementary patent rights for producing multicomponent
| |
| − | products. Complementarity weakens the
| |
| − | incentives to invest in R&D effort. Intuitively, when
| |
| − | many complementary patents are needed to produce
| |
| − | a particular multicomponent good, a firm will very
| |
| − | likely fail to obtain all patents even if it invests heavily
| |
| − | in each of the single patent contests. At the same
| |
| − | time, holding a single patent secures the firm veto
| |
| − | power, and its payoff is therefore the same whether
| |
| − | it holds one, two, or even all but one of the patents.
| |
| − | This makes it less worthwhile to spend much effort
| |
| − | trying to win all the simultaneous contests. This effect
| |
| − | is strengthened if there is technological uncertainty
| |
| − | regarding whether each single patented innovation is
| |
| − | technically feasible and is weakened if patents have a
| |
| − | commercial value apart from the complementary use
| |
| − | in the multicomponent application.
| |
| − | When some firms already hold some patents in
| |
| − | their portfolios and others do not, this yields some
| |
| − | secure payoff to the leading firms. Although this is
| |
| − | good news for owners of firms that already hold large
| |
| − | stocks of patents, such stocks also yield a disincentive
| |
| − | for these leading firms to invest in ongoing patent
| |
| − | contests, unless only one patent remains unwon.
| |
| − | With a large number of further patents, the leading
| |
| − | firms are discouraged from participating in these
| |
| − | contests. The reason for this discouragement effect is
| |
| − | very different from Arrow’s well-known replacement
| |
| − | effect by which a new, superior patent invalidates
| |
| − | an incumbent firm’s existing one. Instead, the strategic
| |
| − | game becomes asymmetric because the firm that
| |
| − | has a nonempty portfolio still needs to win all further
| |
| − | patents to make the multicomponent product as
| |
| − | a monopolist, whereas the competing firm needs to
| |
| − | win only one of these further patents to secure some
| |
| − | of the monopoly profit.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{clarkson2004objective,
| |
| − | title={Objective Identification of Patent Thickets: A Network Analytic Approach},
| |
| − | author={Clarkson, G.},
| |
| − | journal={Harvard Business School Doctoral Thesis},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | filename={Clarkson (2004) - Objective Identification Of Patent Thickets A Network Analytic Approach.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Theory and cases: CORE THICKET PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Despite all that has been written about patent thickets,2 an objective methodology for
| |
| − | verifying the existence of a patent thicket has never been developed. Throughout the last 150
| |
| − | years, however, organizations have stumbled into a number of patent thickets and have
| |
| − | occasionally responded by constructing patent pools, which this paper defines as organizational
| |
| − | structures where multiple firms collectively aggregate patent rights into a package for licensing,
| |
| − | either among themselves or to any potential licensees irrespective of membership in the pool.
| |
| − | Such collaboration among technologically competing firms, however, has often encountered
| |
| − | difficulty from an antitrust standpoint, even if the formation of the pool is pro-competitive.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{clarkson2005patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent informatics for patent thicket detection: a network analytic approach for measuring the density of patent space},
| |
| − | author={Clarkson, G.},
| |
| − | journal={Academy of Management, Honolulu},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | filename={Clarkson (2005) - Patent Informatics For Patent Thicket Detection.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Empirical: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Discusses measures etc. Review in detail.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{clarkson2006problem,
| |
| − | title={The problem of patent thickets in convergent technologies},
| |
| − | author={Clarkson, G. and DeKorte, D.},
| |
| − | journal={Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
| |
| − | volume={1093},
| |
| − | number={1},
| |
| − | pages={180--200},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
| |
| − | filename={Clarkson DeKorte (2006) - The Problem Of Patent Thickets In Convergent Technologies.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Discussion with network measures: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patent thickets are unintentionally dense webs of overlapping
| |
| − | intellectual property rights owned by different companies that can
| |
| − | retard progress.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{cockburn2006entry,
| |
| − | title={Entry and Patenting in the Software Industry},
| |
| − | author={Cockburn, I.M. and MacGarvie, M.J.},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | journal={NBER Working Paper},
| |
| − | institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
| |
| − | filename={Cockburn MacGarvie (2006) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Many firms, nonetheless, acquire large portfolios
| |
| − | of patents, and even where the primary motivation
| |
| − | for doing this goes beyond the potential to
| |
| − | exclude competitors, the impact of an accumulated
| |
| − | patent “thicket” on entry costs may be substantial
| |
| − | (see Shapiro 2001 for a definition of patent thickets).
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{cockburn2009patents,
| |
| − | title={Patents, Thickets and the Financing of Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry},
| |
| − | author={Cockburn, I.M. and MacGarvie, M.J.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of Economics \& Management Strategy},
| |
| − | volume={18},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={729--773},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
| |
| − | filename={Cockburn MacGarvie (2009) - Patents Thickets And The Financing Of Early Stage Firms.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In this paper we attempt to characterize the extent to which entrants into a software
| |
| − | market at any given point in time face a patent “thicket”—i.e. a “a dense web of overlapping
| |
| − | intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually
| |
| − | commercialize new technology”3—and evaluate the impact of patent thickets on the interaction
| |
| − | between new software ventures and capital markets.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{cockburn2011entry,
| |
| − | title={Entry and Patenting in the Software Industry},
| |
| − | author={Cockburn, I.M. and Macgarvie, M.J.},
| |
| − | journal={Management science},
| |
| − | volume={57},
| |
| − | number={5},
| |
| − | pages={915--933},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | publisher={Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences},
| |
| − | filename={Cockburn Macgarvie (2011) - Entry And Patenting In The Software Industry.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Revised version of above (only keep above if different)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{cockburn2010patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent thickets, licensing and innovative performance},
| |
| − | author={Cockburn, I.M. and MacGarvie, M.J. and M{\"u}ller, E.},
| |
| − | journal={Industrial and Corporate Change},
| |
| − | volume={19},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={899--925},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | publisher={Oxford Univ Press},
| |
| − | filename={Cockburn MacGarvie Muller (2010) - Patent Thickets Licensing And Innovative Performance.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Defined by Shapiro (2001) as “a dense web...
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @misc{cockburn2007patents,
| |
| − | title={Patents and the Survival of Internet-related IPOs},
| |
| − | author={Cockburn, I.M. and Wagner, S.},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA},
| |
| − | filename={Cockburn Wagner (2007) - Patents And The Survival Of Internet Related Ipos.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | DOES NOT MENTION THICKETS!!! But the results do not support thickets in internet-software firms.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @techreport{cohen2000protecting,
| |
| − | title={Protecting their intellectual assets: Appropriability conditions and why US manufacturing firms patent (or not)},
| |
| − | author={Cohen, W.M. and Nelson, R.R. and Walsh, J.P.},
| |
| − | year={2000},
| |
| − | institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
| |
| − | filename={Cohen Nelson Walsh (2000) - Protecting Their Intellectual Assets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Why firms patent
| |
| − |
| |
| − | For example, the building of patent fences can be carried to the extreme
| |
| − | noted by Scherer [1980] and others to the point of creating "patent thickets" that foster
| |
| − | broader monopolies than anticipated by patent policy which in turn impede entry and the
| |
| − | innovation that may accompany it.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Our data do not show the degree to which patent portfolio races distort the nature
| |
| − | of R&D incentives or lead to socially wasteful outcomes, or whether such portfolio races
| |
| − | or patent thickets actually block entry. Nor do they indicate whether fee stacking or the
| |
| − | breakdown of negotiations in complex technology industries have ever undermined the
| |
| − | commercialization of innovation. The data do suggest, however, that the potential for
| |
| − | such outcomes may be more pervasive than previously thought.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @incollection{cohen2008real,
| |
| − | title={Real impediments to academic biomedical research},
| |
| − | author={Cohen, W.M. and Walsh, J.P.},
| |
| − | booktitle={Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 8},
| |
| − | pages={1--30},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={University of Chicago Press},
| |
| − | filename={Cohen Walsh (2008) - Real Impediments To Academic Biomedical Research.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Academic research anticommons problems
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Although their focus is largely on com
| |
| − | mercial projects, Heller and Eisenberg (1998) and Shapiro (2000) suggest
| |
| − | that the patenting of a broad range of research tools that researchers
| |
| − | need to do their work has spawned "patent thickets" that may make the
| |
| − | acquisition of licenses and other rights too burdensome to permit the
| |
| − | pursuit of what should otherwise be scientifically and socially worth
| |
| − | while research, (engendering a tragedy of the "anticommons" [Heller
| |
| − | and Eisenberg 1998]).15
| |
| − |
| |
| − | We do find restrictions
| |
| − | imposed
| |
| − | on the flow of information and materials across biomedical researchers.
| |
| − | While patents play
| |
| − | some role, they
| |
| − | are not determinative. What appears to mat
| |
| − | ter are both academic and commercial incentives and effective excludability. Ex
| |
| − | clusion is rarely associated with the existence of a patent in academic settings, but
| |
| − | is more
| |
| − | readily achieved through secrecy or not sharing research materials.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @misc{competition2008pharmaceutical,
| |
| − | title={Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry-Preliminary Report},
| |
| − | author={Competition, DG},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | filename={Competition (2008) - Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: Pharmaceuticals
| |
| − |
| |
| − | One commonly applied strategy is filing numerous patents for the same medicine
| |
| − | (forming so called "patent clusters" or "patent thickets"). Documents gathered in the
| |
| − | course of the inquiry confirm that an important objective of this strategy is to delay or
| |
| − | block the market entry of generic medicines. In this respect the inquiry finds that
| |
| − | individual blockbuster medicines are protected by up to 1,300 patents and/or pending
| |
| − | patent applications EU-wide and that, as mentioned above, certain patent filings occur
| |
| − | very late in the life cycle of a medicine.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{cotter2008patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses},
| |
| − | author={Cotter, T.F.},
| |
| − | journal={J. Corp. L.},
| |
| − | volume={34},
| |
| − | pages={1151},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Cotter (2008) - Patent Holdup Patent Remedies And Antitrust Responses.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Definition of patent holdup (and ambush)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Doesn't mention thickets except in a footnote.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{cowin2007policy,
| |
| − | title={Policy options for the improvement of the European patent system},
| |
| − | author={Cowin, R. and Van der Eijck, W. and Lissoni, F. and Lotz, P. and Van Overwalle, G. and Schovsbo, J.},
| |
| − | journal={Scientific Technology Options Assessment (STOA) of the European Parliament},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | filename={Cowin (2007) - Policy Options For The Improvement Of The European Patent System.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: How to reform patent system. Focus on thickets
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The sectors which are most affected by this phenomenon, at least in the US, are those whose
| |
| − | process and product innovations rely upon complex technologies where an individual piece of
| |
| − | equipment is the result of a very large number of components, all susceptible to patent
| |
| − | protection. Here, the recent boom in patenting observed by many researchers is largely
| |
| − | explained not by a firms’ drive to innovate more than before, but by a need to accumulate
| |
| − | large enough “patent thickets”. These patent thickets work as a sort of insurance against
| |
| − | possible legal actions from other companies. They are in effect therefore, a kind of defensive
| |
| − | manoeuvre.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{csardi2007modeling,
| |
| − | title={Modeling innovation by a kinetic description of the patent citation system},
| |
| − | author={Cs{\'a}rdi, G. and Strandburg, K.J. and Zal{\'a}nyi, L. and Tobochnik, J. and {\'E}rdi, P.},
| |
| − | journal={Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications},
| |
| − | volume={374},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | pages={783--793},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Csardi (2007) - Modeling Innovation By A Kinetic Description Of The Patent Citation System.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Physics: Patent Citation Networks
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Since 1991, preferential attachment
| |
| − | in the patent system has become increasingly
| |
| − | strong, indicating that patents are more and more stratified,
| |
| − | with fewer and fewer of the patents receiving more
| |
| − | and more of the citations. A few very important, perhaps
| |
| − | “pioneer”, patents seem to dominate the citations.
| |
| − | This trend may be consistent with fears of an increasing
| |
| − | patent “thicket”, in which more and more patents
| |
| − | are issued on minor technical advances in any given area.
| |
| − | These technically dense patents must be cited by patents
| |
| − | that build upon or distinguish them directly, thus requiring
| |
| − | that more citations be made, but few of them will be
| |
| − | of sufficient significance to merit citation by any but the
| |
| − | most closely related patents. Further work will be needed
| |
| − | to understand this change in citation network kinetics.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{denicolo2007do,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?},
| |
| − | author = {Denicolò, Vincenzo},
| |
| − | journal = {Economic Policy},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {22},
| |
| − | number = {52},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Oct., 2007},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 679+681-729},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4502213},
| |
| − | ISSN = {02664658},
| |
| − | abstract = {Is the current level of patent protection too high or too low? To address this issue, this paper reformulates the theoretical analysis of the optimal level of patent protection to take into account the empirical findings of the innovation production function literature. This literature finds a strong relationship between R&D spending and inventions and estimates an elasticity of the supply of inventions of 0.5 or more. Thepaper then assesses the current level of patent protection, exploiting estimates of the private and social returns to R&D taken from the empirical literature and other available sources. Although more research is needed for a more precise assessment, the evidence available suggests that patents do not overcompensate innovators.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2007},
| |
| − | publisher = {Wiley on behalf of the Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies, and the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2007 Centre for Economic Policy Research, Center for Economic Studies and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme},
| |
| − | filename={Denicolo (2007) - Do Patents Over Compensate Innovators.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: 'Correct' allocation of returns to patent-holders
| |
| − |
| |
| − | T. his literaturfien ds a strongr elationshibpe tweenR &D
| |
| − | spendinagn di nventionasn de stimateasn elasticitoyf thes upplyo f inventionosf
| |
| − | 0.5 orm oreT. hepapetrh ena ssessetsh ec urrenlet veol f patentprotectieoxnp, loiting
| |
| − | estimateos f thep rivatea nds ocialr eturntso R&D takenfr om the empirical
| |
| − | literaturaen d othera vailables ourcesA. lthoughm orer esearcihs needefdo r a
| |
| − | morpe recisea ssessmentth, ee videncaev ailablseu ggesttsh atp atentsd o noto vercompensaitnen
| |
| − | ovators.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In certain industries, such as telecommunications and biotechnology, production of
| |
| − | new products often requires many complementary innovative components that are
| |
| − | owned by different firms.17 The proliferation and fragmentation of intellectual property
| |
| − | rights creates a 'patent thicket' that is often viewed as an obstacle to innovation.
| |
| − | Two main problems may emerge. First, a proliferation of patents held by different
| |
| − | owners increases transaction costs and might even prevent manufacturers from
| |
| − | obtaining the right to develop the new products, creating the tragedy of the anticommons
| |
| − | (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Second, with complementary patents there
| |
| − | may be a problem of Cournot complements (Shapiro, 2001) that increases the
| |
| − | deadweight loss to profit ratio D/17. How serious those problems are is a matter of
| |
| − | controversy,8
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{devlin2009indeterminism,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation},
| |
| − | author = {Devlin, Alan},
| |
| − | journal = {Yale Law & Policy Review},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {28},
| |
| − | number = {1},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {fall 2009},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 61-106},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27871287},
| |
| − | ISSN = {07408048},
| |
| − | abstract = {},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2009},
| |
| − | publisher = {Yale Law & Policy Review, Inc.},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2009 Yale Law & Policy Review, Inc.},
| |
| − | filename={Devlin (2009) - Indeterminism And The Property Patent Equation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Theory: Comparison of real and intellectual property rights
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Property rights advocates further note that such fears such as irrational hold-out?most often voiced in the con text of patent thickets and experimental use?are not supported by empirical evidence.34 Instead, strong, overlapping property rights give rise to their own solution through patent pools, portfolio cross-licenses, standard-setting organi zations (SSOs), and invent-around.35
| |
| − | See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inven tions, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 697, 719-27 (2001) (arguing that patents do not create a hold-out problem but in fact promote innovation and commercialization).
| |
| − | See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J. Competition L. & Econ. 915, 963 (2008). Patent pools are entities that accumu late and license blocking patents. They serve a valuable role in bypassing the un desirable economic phenomenon of royalty stacking, which can hinder or even prevent the commercialization of technologies that require the use of intellectual property-protected information. Sometimes a small number of companies that possess large patent portfolios can achieve the same result by cross-licensing one another.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | More fundamentally still, the innumerable overlapping patents in certain high tech fields create an impenetrable "thicket" that frustrates quixotic conceptions of Coasian bargaining and acts only as an anticommons that paradoxically fore closes innovation.200 One's exclusion of another from his land is isolated; a sin gle patentee's ability to enjoin production of a semiconductor chip that impli cates thousands of patents creates powerful negative externalities.201 Given such distinctions, many view the worlds of patent law and traditional property as sufficiently distinct to be unworthy of direct analogy.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{dhar20071,
| |
| − | title={The Impact of Intellectual Property Rights in the Plant and Seed Industry},
| |
| − | author={Dhar, T. and Foltz, J.},
| |
| − | journal={Agricultural Biotechnolgy and Intellectual Property Protection: Seeds of Change},
| |
| − | pages={161},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={CABI},
| |
| − | filename={Dhar Foltz (2007) - The Impact Of Intellectual Property Rights In The Plant And Seed Industry.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory with some empirics: Plant/Seed Industry
| |
| − |
| |
| − | UBC Marketing Prof...
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A number of observers of patenting, particularly in the biological sciences, have
| |
| − | suggested that patenting rules and overlapping claims have generated a "patent thicket"
| |
| − | 8
| |
| − | that has impeded innovation and made the R&D process more costly (Rai, 2001; Rai,
| |
| − | 1999). Rai (2001) for example, argues that broad patents especially on upstream platform
| |
| − | technologies represent a threat to competition and the cumulative process of innovation in
| |
| − | the biopharmaceutical industry
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Our work makes a start both theoretically and empirically in recognizing the
| |
| − | important strategic role of revelation loss in firm strategies of choice of intellectual
| |
| − | property rights or trade secrets.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{d2009pools,
| |
| − | title={Pools, thickets and open source nanotechnology},
| |
| − | author={D'Silva, J.},
| |
| − | journal={European intellectual property review},
| |
| − | volume={31},
| |
| − | number={6},
| |
| − | pages={300--306},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | filename={DSilva (2009) - Pools Thickets And Open Source Nanotechnology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Discussion: Nanotech
| |
| − |
| |
| − | When multiple organisations each own
| |
| − | individual patents that are collectively necessary for a particular technology,
| |
| − | their competing intellectual property rights form a "patent thicket".
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{eisenmann2008managing,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Managing Proprietary and Shared Platforms},
| |
| − | author = {Eisenmann, Thomas R.},
| |
| − | journal = {California Management Review},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {50},
| |
| − | number = {4},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Summer 2008},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 31-53},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/41166455},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00081256},
| |
| − | abstract = {In a platform-mediated network, users rely on a common platform (provided by one or more intermediaries) that encompasses infrastructure and rules required by users to transact with each other. A fundamental design decision for firms that aspire to develop platform-mediated networks is whether to preserve proprietary control or share their platform with rivals. A proprietary platform has a single provider that solely controls its technology (for example, Federal Express, Apple Macintosh, or Google). With a shared platform such as Visa, DVD, or Linux, multiple firms collaborate in developing the platform's technology and then compete in offering users different but compatible versions of the platform. This article examines factors that favor proprietary versus shared models when designing platforms and then explains how management challenges differ for proprietary and shared platform providers when mobilizing new networks.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2008},
| |
| − | publisher = {University of California Press},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2008 University of California Press},
| |
| − | filename={Eisenmann (2008) - Managing Proprietary And Shared Platforms.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Mgmt: Discussion: Platforms (TV adds)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A second type of IP-based claim can occur when shared platforms rely on many different patented technologies, each of which has no obvious substitute. Firms may find themselves in a patent "thicket," in which several parties are able to derail a shared platform by threatening to withhold necessary contribu- tions.12 Each firm can issue an ultimatum, demanding a large share of the plat- form's added value
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{eisenstein2010up,
| |
| − | title={Up for grabs},
| |
| − | author={Eisenstein, M.},
| |
| − | journal={Nature Biotechnology},
| |
| − | volume={28},
| |
| − | number={6},
| |
| − | pages={544--546},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
| |
| − | filename={Eisenstein (2010) - Up For Grabs.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Biology: Discussion: Stem Cells
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As recently as three months ago, it still all seemed
| |
| − | so simple. Shinya Yamanaka, whose team at
| |
| − | the University of Kyoto in Japan is generally
| |
| − | acknowledged by the research community as the
| |
| − | first to successfully reprogram differentiated cells
| |
| − | into iPS cells1, was also the sole patent holder for
| |
| − | the technology. But as with any other patent land
| |
| − | grab, iPS cell intellectual property (IP) is beginning
| |
| − | to look less and less like a one-horse race.
| |
| − | Two other recently issued patents in the
| |
| − | United States and United Kingdom (Table 1),
| |
| − | each awarded to a different inventor with a
| |
| − | potentially strong claim to priority, now stand
| |
| − | alongside Yamanaka’s patent, which was exclusively
| |
| − | issued in Japan. With this newly tangled IP
| |
| − | landscape, questions are arising about the possible
| |
| − | emergence of a patent thicket.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @misc{entezarkheir2010patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent Thickets and Market Value: An Empirical Analysis},
| |
| − | author={Entezarkheir, M.},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | filename={Entezarkheir (2010) - Patent Thickets And Market Value An Empirical Analysis.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In this paper, I study how the fragmentation of the ownership of complementary patents
| |
| − | impacts the market value of the firm. This fragmentation builds a patent thicket, which
| |
| − | contains a set of overlapping patents.3 The patent thicket requires obtaining permission
| |
| − | from several right holders to commercialize a product. Firms that face a fragmented
| |
| − | technology market have to pay higher transaction costs and royalty payments to license
| |
| − | external patents, because they are confronted with larger number of entities in the thicket.
| |
| − | They are more prone to opportunistic behaviour by external entities, since the likelihood
| |
| − | of infringing other firms’ patents is high. They are also more exposed to the risk of being
| |
| − | litigated against by other patent holders. Finally, they incur higher costs in finding out
| |
| − | whether the technologies they use have been patented by other firms.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{evans2004software,
| |
| − | title={Software patents and open source: the battle over intellectual property rights},
| |
| − | author={Evans, D.S. and Layne-Farrar, A.},
| |
| − | journal={Va. JL \& Tech.},
| |
| − | volume={9},
| |
| − | pages={10--13},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={Virginia Journal of Law and Technology Virginia Journal of Law and Technology},
| |
| − | filename={Evans LayneFarrar (2004) - Software Patents And Open Source.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Discussion: Sofware CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The theoretical economics literature argues that when innovations are sequential and cumulative, patents may impose more than the typical exclusion-period costs.113 For instance, a patent for an invention early in the innovative process could impose a toll on each sequential innovation that relies on it. Subsequent inventors, therefore, face higher transaction costs––they must pay licensing fees before they can further refine a technology. As the tolls build during the technology’s development path, later research could be discouraged altogether. Alluding to the famous argument for property rights, over-patenting has been dubbed the “tragedy of the anticommons,” as too many people with exclusionary rights can cause underutilization of resources.114 Shapiro uses another metaphor: the patent thicket
| |
| − |
| |
| − | the truth resides in one strain of the theoretical literature arguing against patents. Similarly, while the law and economics literature has established that patent thickets are possible, what little empirical evidence is available on this point indicates that they are not inevitable. Means of working around the exclusionary effects of patents––such as patent pools and cross-licensing––are available to the software industry.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{farrell2009intellectual,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment},
| |
| − | author = {Farrell, Joseph},
| |
| − | journal = {Innovation Policy and the Economy},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {9},
| |
| − | number = {1},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {2009},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 39-53},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/592420},
| |
| − | ISSN = {15313468},
| |
| − | abstract = {Executive Summary Intellectual property policy relies on bargaining in the shadow of exclusivity. But bargaining is generically less than fully efficient, and the bargaining that would be needed to reach efficient arrangements in the shadow of exclusivity may be especially difficult in certain ways. I explore these issues and illustrate with brief discussions of patent pools and standards organizations, among others.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2009},
| |
| − | publisher = {The University of Chicago Press},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2009 The National Bureau of Economic Research},
| |
| − | filename={Farrell (2009) - Intellectual Property As A Bargaining Environment.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Discussion: Bargaining in IP CORE and DOWN paper
| |
| − |
| |
| − | One common and intuitively difficult information problem arises
| |
| − | when a producer does not know with whom it must negotiate concerning
| |
| − | patents. One might call this a “potential-patent thicket,” as distinct
| |
| − | from the “actual-patent thicket” that can create multiple-marginalization
| |
| − | problems when many patents are known to be infringed by a product.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{federal2003promote,
| |
| − | title={To promote innovation: The proper balance of competition and patent law and policy},
| |
| − | author={Federal Trade Commission},
| |
| − | journal={Washington, DC},
| |
| − | year={2003},
| |
| − | filename={FTC (2003) - To Promote Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: Key FTC report
| |
| − |
| |
| − | This tends to create
| |
| − | a “patent thicket” – that is, a “dense web of
| |
| − | overlapping intellectual property rights that
| |
| − | a company must hack its way through in
| |
| − | order to actually commercialize new
| |
| − | technology.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Questionable patents contribute to
| |
| − | the patent thicket. In the context of a patent
| |
| − | thicket, questionable patents can introduce
| |
| − | new kinds of licensing difficulties, such as
| |
| − | royalties stacked one on top of another, and
| |
| − | can increase uncertainty about the patent
| |
| − | landscape, thus complicating business
| |
| − | planning. Questionable patents in patent
| |
| − | thickets can frustrate competition by current
| |
| − | manufacturers as well as potential entrants.
| |
| − | Because a manufacturer needs a license to
| |
| − | all of the patents that cover its product, firms
| |
| − | can use questionable patents to extract high
| |
| − | royalties or to threaten litigation
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{federal2011evolving,
| |
| − | title={The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning patent notice and remedies with competition.”},
| |
| − | author={Federal Trade Commission},
| |
| − | journal={March, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | filename={FTC (2011) - The Evolving IP Marketplace.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: Key FTC report
| |
| − |
| |
| − | See above. We should compare the two reports!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{feldman2004open,
| |
| − | title={The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?},
| |
| − | author={Feldman, R.},
| |
| − | journal={Minnesota Journal of Law, Science \& Technology},
| |
| − | volume={6},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | filename={Feldman (2004) - The Open Source Biotechnology Movement Is It Patent Misuse.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Theory/Discussion: Biotech, open source
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Scholars have used the term “patent thicket” to describe the problem of multiple
| |
| − | overlapping rights that can hamper innovation by creating transaction barriers.20 Most
| |
| − | scholars and those reporting from the field agree that large numbers of rights hamper
| |
| − | research and innovation, particularly in the biotech field.21 One scholar, however, has
| |
| − | challenged the notion.22 John Walsh argues that firms simply work around the problem
| |
| − | of multiple rights for example, by moving offshore beyond the reach of the patent rights,
| |
| − | inventing around the rights, and using public research tools.23 In particular, Walsh argues
| |
| − | that academic researchers routinely ignore rights structures and that patent holders
| |
| − | passively acquiesce.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{feldman2008open,
| |
| − | title={Open Source, Open Access, Open Transfer: Market Approaches to Research Bottlenecks},
| |
| − | author={Feldman, R. and Nelson, K.},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | filename={Feldman Nelson (2008) - Open Source Open Access Open Transfer.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Theory: Academic research tools
| |
| − |
| |
| − | On the patent front, a key debate concerns the existence, or non-existence, of
| |
| − | bottlenecks such as patent thickets and the extent to which any patent thickets may be
| |
| − | interfering with research. For decades, scholars warned that problems related to the over
| |
| − | proliferation of patent rights would interfere with innovation.1 In theory, multiple
| |
| − | overlapping patent rights can hamper innovation by creating high transactions costs as
| |
| − | researchers try to navigate the tangle of existing rights. These costs can discourage
| |
| − | investment in research or distort the paths that researchers take due to the difficulty of
| |
| − | identifying and negotiating all of the underlying rights necessary to begin researching.
| |
| − | This leads to inefficiencies and underutilization of intellectual resources. Across the
| |
| − | years, patent mavens traded stories of research deterred or research deferred due to patent
| |
| − | thickets.2 Innovation costs also may rise as rational enterprises factor in the risk that their
| |
| − | inventions will be plagued by suits from patent holders who emerge from the shadows of
| |
| − | the patent thicket to claim a share as soon as the invention is successful.3
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{fischer2011patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology-An Empirical Analysis of Trolls' Patent Acquisitions},
| |
| − | author={Fischer, T. and Henkel, J.},
| |
| − | journal={Available at SSRN 1523102},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | filename={Fischer Henkel (2011) - Patent Trolls On Markets For Technology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Trolls - which patents they buy
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The second patent characteristic patent trolls should favor is a high cost of substituting
| |
| − | the underlying invention in products. This substitution cost increases with the difficulty of
| |
| − | inventing around the patent, which in turn is high if the patent density and complexity of the
| |
| − | relevant technology field is high. This means that many patents exist that have a high degree
| |
| − | of overlap between them and with the patent under consideration, so that finding a gap for a
| |
| − | non-patented substitutive technology is difficult. In other words, the focal patent is part of a
| |
| − | patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{galasso2007broad,
| |
| − | title={Broad cross-license agreements and persuasive patent litigation: theory and evidence from the semiconductor industry},
| |
| − | author={Galasso, A.},
| |
| − | journal={LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EI45},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | filename={Galasso (2007) - Broad Cross License Agreements And Persuasive Patent Litigation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory and empirics: Determining cross-license agreements
| |
| − |
| |
| − | To uncover the incentives behind these contracts, I have developed a model of
| |
| − | bargaining with learning in which firms litigate over their patent disputes if they do
| |
| − | not agree upon a cross-license. The model predicts that the incentive to litigate decreases
| |
| − | with firm investment in specific technology. More precisely, I have shown that
| |
| − | whereas firms with low asset specificity prefer not to sign a cross-license agreement,
| |
| − | firms with high sunk costs are better off cross-licensing their intellectual property. In
| |
| − | addition, the model predicts that firms with intermediate levels of sunk costs will engage
| |
| − | in inefficient “persuasive” litigation aimed at obtaining a better deal in a broad
| |
| − | cross-license contract.
| |
| − | I have tested the predictions of the model using a novel dataset merging data
| |
| − | on cross-license agreements, patent litigation and financial variables for firms in the
| |
| − | semiconductor industry.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | renders it difficult to commercialize a new technology. In some industries the number
| |
| − | of intellectual property rights a firm requires to produce a new product is so large,
| |
| − | and their ownership is so dispersed, that it is quite easy to unintentionally infringe
| |
| − | on a patent. In this environment there is, therefore, a hold-up problem: when the
| |
| − | manufacturer starts selling its product a patentee might show up threatening to shut
| |
| − | production down unless it is paid high royalties.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{galasso2008patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent Thickets and the Market for Innovation: Evidence from Settlement of Patent Disputes},
| |
| − | author={Galasso, A. and Schankerman, M.},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6946},
| |
| − | filename={Galasso Schankerman (2008) - Patent Thickets And The Market For Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Fragmentation leads to quicker settlement (CORE PAPER)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | are the fragmentation of patent rights (often
| |
| − | referred to as ‘patent thickets’)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In this paper we investigate how the fragmentation of patent rights and the introduction
| |
| − | 2
| |
| − | in 1982 of the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affected the length of (costly)
| |
| − | patent infringement disputes. We develop a model that focuses on how the uncertainty of
| |
| − | the enforcement regime and ‘upstream’ fragmentation affect ‘downstream’ bargaining behavior
| |
| − | during patent litigation. Our model extends the settlement negotiation game of Bebchuk (1984)
| |
| − | and Spier (1992) by considering features of patent ownership fragmentation similar to those
| |
| − | described in Lerner and Tirole (2004). The model shows that settlement agreements will be
| |
| − | reached more quickly when the patent rights needed by the infringer are more fragmented
| |
| − | (ownership is more dispersed) and in the more ‘certain’ enforcement regime associated with
| |
| − | CAFC.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{galasso2010patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent thickets, courts, and the market for innovation},
| |
| − | author={Galasso, A. and Schankerman, M.},
| |
| − | journal={The RAND journal of economics},
| |
| − | volume={41},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={472--503},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
| |
| − | filename={Galasso Schankerman (2010) - Patent Thickets Courts And The Market For Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory and Empirical: Fragmentation leads to quicker settlement (CORE PAPER)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Seems like an improved version of above with a model? READ IT PROPERLY!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{gallini2011private,
| |
| − | title={Private agreements for coordinating patent rights: the case of patent pools},
| |
| − | author={Gallini, N.},
| |
| − | journal={Economia e Politica Industriale},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | publisher={FrancoAngeli Editore},
| |
| − | filename={Gallini (2011) - Private Agreements For Coordinating Patent Rights.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Patent Pools
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In synthesizing the ideas advanced in the economic literature, this paper
| |
| − | explores whether these antitrust concerns apply to pools with complementary patents and, if they do, the
| |
| − | implications for competition policy to constrain them. Special attention is given to the application of the U.S.
| |
| − | Department of Justice-Federal Trade Commission Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995) and its
| |
| − | companion Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007)
| |
| − | to recent patent pool cases.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A patent thicket arises when there are overlapping patent rights that must be identified and licensed in order for an
| |
| − | innovator to bring a new product or technology to market
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{gallini2002economics,
| |
| − | title={The economics of patents: Lessons from recent US patent reform},
| |
| − | author={Gallini, N.T.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of Economic Perspectives},
| |
| − | pages={131--154},
| |
| − | year={2002},
| |
| − | publisher={JSTOR},
| |
| − | filename={Gallini (2002) - The Economics Of Patents Lessons From Recent Us Patent Reform.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ/Policy: Patent Policy basics and reform
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Doesn't mention thickets explicitly.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Good material for the underpinnings...
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @incollection{gallini2002intellectual,
| |
| − | title={Intellectual property: when is it the best incentive system?},
| |
| − | author={Gallini, N. and Scotchmer, S.},
| |
| − | booktitle={Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2},
| |
| − | pages={51--78},
| |
| − | year={2002},
| |
| − | publisher={MIT Press},
| |
| − | filename={Gallini Scotchmer (2002) - Intellectual Property When Is It The Best Incentive System.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ/Policy: Best IP incentive system
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Doesn't mention thickets explicitly.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Good material for the underpinnings...
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A recurring theme, especially evident in these
| |
| − | contexts, is that despite the efficiencies that contracting can ensure, contracting may
| |
| − | also facilitate anti-competitive behavior. See Hall and Ham (1999), Shapiro (2000),
| |
| − | Denicolò (2000). To understand whether the property system is too strong, too
| |
| − | weak, or necessary at all requires us to understand the incentives for contracting,
| |
| − | and its potential anticompetitive consequences.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{ganslandt2009intellectual,
| |
| − | title={Intellectual property rights and competition policy},
| |
| − | author={Ganslandt, M.},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | publisher={Emerald Group Publishing Limited},
| |
| − | filename={Ganslandt (2009) - Intellectual Property Rights And Competition Policy.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: Patent and Antitrust
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Intellectual property rights and competition policy are intimately related. In this paper I
| |
| − | survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law
| |
| − | and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in
| |
| − | practice.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In some industries, particularly biotechnology and information technologies, it is
| |
| − | common that a new entrant, in order to engage in research or production, must obtain a
| |
| − | large number of licenses from existing and previous innovators and producers. This
| |
| − | problem raises the cost of product commercialization and may create substantial entry
| |
| − | barriers for new firms. For example, Bessen and Meurer (2006) point to the fact that the
| |
| − | large number of patents facing a typical innovator makes careful assessment of avenues
| |
| − | open for competition burdensome and costly.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{gaule2006towards,
| |
| − | title={Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?},
| |
| − | author={Gaul{\'e}, P.},
| |
| − | journal={Innovation Strategy Today},
| |
| − | volume={2},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | pages={123--143},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | filename={Gaule (2006) - Towards Patent Pools In Biotechnology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Mgmt/Law: Discussion (v. small): Biotech
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The IP rights situation described above was arguably a classical case of a patent thicket with fragmented IP rights
| |
| − | and uncertainty about technology ownership. The option of a patent pool for this technology was raised (Fedson 04), but instead
| |
| − | the situation was resolved by one patent owner acquiring exclusive licenses from the other ones.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{george2006hiding,
| |
| − | title={What Is Hiding in the Bushes-Ebay's Effect on Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets},
| |
| − | author={George, G.D.},
| |
| − | journal={Mich. Telecomm. \& Tech. L. Rev.},
| |
| − | volume={13},
| |
| − | pages={557},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={George (2006) - What Is Hiding In The Bushes Ebays Effect On Holdout Behavior In Patent Thickets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Discussion: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A patent thicket exists where there are
| |
| − | numerous different firms holding patents that are legally and technologically
| |
| − | distinct, but overlap to cover a much smaller number of actual or
| |
| − | potential commercial products.2 For example, over five thousand patents
| |
| − | have now been granted in the area of nanotechnology despite the fact that
| |
| − | no nanotech products have yet been commercialized.3
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{geradin2007royalty,
| |
| − | title={Royalty stacking in high tech industries: separating myth from reality},
| |
| − | author={Geradin, D. and Layne-Farrar, A. and Padilla Blanco, A.},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6091},
| |
| − | filename={Geradin (2007) - Royalty Stacking In High Tech Industries Separating Myth From Reality.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Review: CORE Paper
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Shaprio def. But has lit review and history.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{geradin2008complements,
| |
| − | title={The complements problem within standard setting: assessing the evidence on royalty stacking},
| |
| − | author={Geradin, D. and Layne-Farrar, A. and Padilla Blanco, A.},
| |
| − | journal={Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2008},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | filename={Geradin LayneFarrar PadillaBlanco (2008) - The Complements Problem Within Standard Setting.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Review: CORE PAPER (Might be same as above)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{geroski2005intellectual,
| |
| − | title={Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy and Innovation: Is There a Problem?},
| |
| − | author={Geroski, P.A.},
| |
| − | journal={SCRIPT ed},
| |
| − | volume={2},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | filename={Geroski (2005) - Intellectual Property Rights Competition Policy And Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: Competition vs. patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The second problem arises with complex innovations. When a new innovation draws
| |
| − | on several different areas of technology, then the innovator will need to undertake a
| |
| − | series of bilateral negotiations with existing intellectual property rights holders if
| |
| − | his/her innovation is to see the light of day. This, in turn, means that any individual
| |
| − | antecedent patent holder has the ability to hold up the new innovation, possibly using
| |
| − | this bargaining power to extract most of the returns that it promises to produce for its
| |
| − | creator. These “patent thickets”, as they are sometimes called, basically inflate the
| |
| − | (2005) 2:4 SCRIPT-ed
| |
| − | 425
| |
| − | transactions costs of developing a new innovation, and are, therefore, likely to inhibit
| |
| − | the rate of development of new ideas or the good and services that come from them.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | I started this paper with a question - is the system of intellectual property rights, with
| |
| − | which we are all familiar, the best way to stimulate innovation? The gist of what I
| |
| − | have had to say is that the answer is “maybe”. In a sense, this is not a surprising
| |
| − | conclusion: it is just too hard to be sure what the best policy is in almost every setting
| |
| − | in which this question comes up. At a more sensible level, however, “maybe” is an
| |
| − | answer pregnant with possibilities. Most of these arise from two different types of
| |
| − | observations: first, that intellectual property rights systems can inhibit innovation, or
| |
| − | at least distort it in particular directions; and second, that competition and innovation
| |
| − | are not inimical.
| |
| − | For me, as a competition policy practitioner, the argument that competition stimulates
| |
| − | innovation is an important one, for it suggests that competition policy is not
| |
| − | necessarily in conflict with the use of intellectual property rights to stimulate
| |
| − | innovation. At a practical level, this argument seems to me to have two implications.
| |
| − | First, it seems clear that one ought to regard restrictive licensing practices as just what
| |
| − | they are: namely, restrictive practices. In this, as in many other areas of anti-trust, the
| |
| − | rule of reason ought to apply. That is, such practices should be evaluated in the
| |
| − | context of the benefits which they might – or might not – bring to consumers, in both
| |
| − | the short and also the long run. Second, anything that substantially lessens, or
| |
| − | adversely affects, competition in a particular market is, or should at least potentially
| |
| − | be regarded as, a threat to innovation. And, finally, the need to stimulate innovation is
| |
| − | the one thing that both competition policy and intellectual property rights have in
| |
| − | common.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{gilbert2004antitrust,
| |
| − | title={Antitrust for patent pools: A century of policy evolution},
| |
| − | author={Gilbert, R.J.},
| |
| − | journal={Stanford Technology Law Review},
| |
| − | volume={2004},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | filename={Gilbert (2004) - Antitrust For Patent Pools A Century Of Policy Evolution.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: History of Anti-trust and patent pools
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The court ruled that the agreement to license
| |
| − | present and future patents and to share know-how contributed to a patent thicket that created a
| |
| − | barrier to new entry and allowed DuPont and National Lead to control the domestic industry for
| |
| − | titanium dioxide products.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{gilbert2010ties,
| |
| − | title={Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools},
| |
| − | author={Gilbert, R.J.},
| |
| − | journal={Antitrust Law Journal},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | filename={Gilbert (2010) - Ties That Bind Policies To Promote Good Patent Pools.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Discussion: Patent Pools as a solution to thickets - anti-trust's take on this...
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A “patent thicket,” in which many independent patent holders have
| |
| − | rights that cover a technology, is one example of the anticommons.5 A
| |
| − | patent thicket exists when rights to many patents from different patentees
| |
| − | are necessary to lawfully make or sell a product (overlapping
| |
| − | rights).6 Patent thickets are common to many high-technology industries
| |
| − | in which the manufacture, use, or sale of a device or process may
| |
| − | require rights to hundreds of patents.7 Overlapping patent rights raise
| |
| − | numerous potential economic problems. Transaction costs of licensing
| |
| − | can be high because licensees must identify, search out, and negotiate
| |
| − | with numerous separate licensors. Litigation risks can be high because
| |
| − | an incomplete portfolio of patent licenses can expose a firm to potentially
| |
| − | large infringement damages. Royalties can be high if each of many
| |
| − | independent licensors of complementary patents attempts to obtain a
| |
| − | large share of the economic value of products that may infringe its patent.
| |
| − | For these reasons a patent thicket can raise prices and discourage
| |
| − | innovation relative to a situation with fewer patents or with coordinated
| |
| − | licensing of the overlapping patent rights.8
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{gilbert1982preemptive,
| |
| − | title={Preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly},
| |
| − | author={Gilbert, R.J. and Newbery, D.M.G.},
| |
| − | journal={The American Economic Review},
| |
| − | pages={514--526},
| |
| − | year={1982},
| |
| − | publisher={JSTOR},
| |
| − | filename={Gilbert Newbery (1982) - Preemptive Patenting And The Persistence Of Monopoly.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Entry deterence (monopoly)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | This paper takes a different tack
| |
| − | and inquires whether institutions such as the
| |
| − | patent system create opportunities for firms
| |
| − | with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly
| |
| − | power. The results apply to other
| |
| − | situations such as brand identification, spatial
| |
| − | location, and capacity expansion, which
| |
| − | share the characteristic that early, or preemptive,
| |
| − | actions may lower the returns to
| |
| − | potential competitors.
| |
| − | Preemptive invention is not without topical
| |
| − | interest. In a recent antitrust case-the
| |
| − | longest jury trial on record in the federal
| |
| − | courts-the SCM Corporation sought more
| |
| − | than $500 million in damages on its claim
| |
| − | that the Xerox Corporation, among other
| |
| − | alleged anticompetitiveb ehavior,h ad maintained
| |
| − | a "patent thicket" where some inventions
| |
| − | were used while others were neither
| |
| − | used nor licensed to others
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{goozner2006innovation,
| |
| − | title={Innovation in biomedicine: can stem cell research lead the way to affordability?},
| |
| − | author={Goozner, M.},
| |
| − | journal={PLoS medicine},
| |
| − | volume={3},
| |
| − | number={5},
| |
| − | pages={e126},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={Public Library of Science},
| |
| − | filename={Goozner (2006) - Innovation In Biomedicine.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Biology: Policy: Stem Cell
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The current innovation
| |
| − | system encourages researchers to
| |
| − | patent and commercialize discoveries
| |
| − | that in an earlier era were considered
| |
| − | basic science insights. This has led to
| |
| − | an active market in the building blocks
| |
| − | of further research, which can be
| |
| − | anything from a genetic sequence or a
| |
| − | cell receptor to the reagents needed to
| |
| − | culture cells. This proliferation of basic
| |
| − | science patents has raised the bar—
| |
| − | what economists call transaction costs—
| |
| − | for other researchers who want access
| |
| − | to those research tools. While many
| |
| − | researchers, especially in academia,
| |
| − | fi nd ways around patent restrictions,
| |
| − | and many companies have no trouble
| |
| − | executing license agreements, there
| |
| − | are cases where “patent thickets” have
| |
| − | discouraged other researchers from
| |
| − | pursuing similar or subsequent lines of
| |
| − | inquiry [5].
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{grindley1997licensing,
| |
| − | title={Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics},
| |
| − | author={Grindley, P.C. and Teece, D.J.},
| |
| − | journal={California Management Review},
| |
| − | volume={39},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | year={1997},
| |
| − | filename={Grindley Teece (1997) - Licensing And Cross Licensing In Semiconductors And Electronics.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Mgmt: Cross-licensing, semiconductors
| |
| − |
| |
| − | No mention of thickets. But old (seminal) paper.
| |
| | | | |
| | @article{gugler2007market, | | @article{gugler2007market, |
| Line 1,635: |
Line 12: |
| | author = {Gugler, Klaus and Siebert, Ralph}, | | author = {Gugler, Klaus and Siebert, Ralph}, |
| | journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, | | journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| | volume = {89}, | | volume = {89}, |
| | number = {4}, | | number = {4}, |
| Line 1,656: |
Line 32: |
| | Incre- mental process innovations occur more frequently in the memory segment, creating a higher density of the patent thicket. This fact is in line with the patent thicket literature | | Incre- mental process innovations occur more frequently in the memory segment, creating a higher density of the patent thicket. This fact is in line with the patent thicket literature |
| | see, for example, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Shapiro (2001).1 | | see, for example, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Shapiro (2001).1 |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{hall2005note,
| |
| − | title={A note on the bias in Herfindahl-type measures based on count data},
| |
| − | author={Hall, B.H.},
| |
| − | journal={Revue D' Economie Industrielle, Paris Editions, Techniques Et Economiques},
| |
| − | volume={110},
| |
| − | pages={149},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={Citeseer},
| |
| − | filename={Hall (2005) - A Note On The Bias In Herfindahl Type Measures Based On Count Data.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Econometrics: CORE PAPER!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{hall2005exploring,
| |
| − | title={Exploring the patent explosion},
| |
| − | author={Hall, B.},
| |
| − | journal={Essays in Honor of Edwin Mansfield},
| |
| − | pages={195--208},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={Springer},
| |
| − | filename={Hall (2005) - Exploring The Patent Explosion.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | No mention of thickets in 2005 paper!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | I am able to confirm that after the mid-1980s, patents held by
| |
| − | entrants to the publicly traded sector are indeed more highly valued than those
| |
| − | held by incumbents. An industry decomposition of this effect shows that it is
| |
| − | concentrated in what Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2001) label complex product
| |
| − | industries, which are industries where a single products can contain intellectual
| |
| − | property covered by thousands of patents held by hundreds of patentholders. In
| |
| − | such industries, patent portfolios often serve the defensive function of
| |
| − | facilitating cross-licensing negotiations, rather than the traditional role of
| |
| − | excluding competitors and securing the ownership of particular inventions.
| |
| − | Although patent yield per se is not valued for incumbents in any of the
| |
| − | industries, I show that in complex product industries there has been a strong
| |
| − | positive shift in valuation for entrants as we enter the pro-patent era.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{hall2007patents,
| |
| − | title={Patents and patent policy},
| |
| − | author={Hall, B.H.},
| |
| − | journal={Oxford Review of Economic Policy},
| |
| − | volume={23},
| |
| − | number={4},
| |
| − | pages={568--587},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={Oxford Univ Press},
| |
| − | filename={Hall (2007) - Patents And Patent Policy.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Barely mentions thickets, but sets the stage well.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | During the U.S. Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice hearings on the patent system
| |
| − | and antitrust policy in 2002, a number of industry representatives expressed concerns about the
| |
| − | difficulty of negotiating the patent thicket in their area and the risk of being “held-up” ex post by
| |
| − | a patent on a technology that was only a small component of their product. This complaint was
| |
| − | heard largely from those in the complex product industries (the ICT sector), such as Robert Barr,
| |
| − | then Vice-President for Intellectual Property and Worldwide Patent Counsel at Cisco
| |
| − | Corporation. He described two types of problems faced by firms in the sector: the first being the
| |
| − | large stockpiling of patents necessary as a defensive measure against others in the industry and
| |
| − | the second being the threat posed by small entities that have nothing at risk themselves and may
| |
| − | not even be producers.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The first of the problems Barr describes is clearly a case of mutually assured destruction that
| |
| − | leaves the firms in question no better (and no worse) off than if they were not accumulating
| |
| − | massive numbers of patents for defensive purposes, and yet at the same time is a very costly
| |
| − | strategy.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{hall2012study,
| |
| − | title={A Study of Patent Thickets},
| |
| − | author={Hall, B.H. and Helmers, C. and von Graevenitz, G. and Rosazza-Bondibene, C.},
| |
| − | journal={Draft Report to the UK IPO},
| |
| − | pages={1--66},
| |
| − | year={2012},
| |
| − | filename={Hall (2012) - A Study Of Patent Thickets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Patent Thickets!: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A patent thicket is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, 2000). Patent thickets consist of patents that protect components of a modular and complex technology. Here modular means that different sets of components can be assembled to yield a variety of technological products. Complex means that products consist of tens or hundreds of such modular components. Each component may end up being used in several products. Often there are partial or complete overlaps in the functionality of components and then the patents protecting the components may also overlap. If overlapping patents belong to different firms, then a patent thicket exists.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{hall2001patent,
| |
| − | title={The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the US semiconductor industry, 1979-1995},
| |
| − | author={Hall, B.H. and Ziedonis, R.H.},
| |
| − | journal={RAND Journal of Economics},
| |
| − | pages={101--128},
| |
| − | year={2001},
| |
| − | publisher={JSTOR},
| |
| − | filename={Hall Ziedonis (2001) - The Patent Paradox Revisited.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Semiconductors: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{hargreaves2011digital,
| |
| − | title={Digital opportunity: a review of intellectual property and growth: an independent report},
| |
| − | author={Hargreaves, I.},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | publisher={Intellectual Property Office},
| |
| − | filename={Hargreaves (2011) - Digital Opportunity.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | This patenting boom is
| |
| − | leading to problems of patent office backlogs and the emergence of so called “patent thickets”, which
| |
| − | obstruct entry to some markets and so impede innovation.
| |
| − | 6. Patent thickets and other obstructions to innovation. In order to limit the effects of these
| |
| − | barriers to innovation, the Government should:
| |
| − | • take a leading role in promoting international efforts to cut backlogs and manage the boom in
| |
| − | patent applications by further extending “work sharing” with patent offices in other countries;
| |
| − | • work to ensure patents are not extended into sectors, such as non-technical computer
| |
| − | programs and business methods, which they do not currently cover, without clear evidence of
| |
| − | benefit;
| |
| − | • investigate ways of limiting adverse consequences of patent thickets, including by working
| |
| − | with international partners to establish a patent fee structure set by reference to innovation
| |
| − | and growth goals rather than solely by reference to patent office running costs. The structure
| |
| − | of patent renewal fees might be adjusted to encourage patentees to assess more carefully the
| |
| − | value of maintaining lower value patents, so reducing the density of patent thickets.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | This finding may be due to the existence of patent thickets – meaning “an overlapping set of patent rights” which require innovators to reach licensing deals for multiple patents from multiple sources.12 These thickets appear to enable patent holders to exclude new and innovative firms from entering the market, thereby inhibiting growth. In these high technology and information intensive sectors we need to ensure that the IP system acts as a net incentive to innovation and growth.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{harhoff2008incidence,
| |
| − | title={Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets-The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity},
| |
| − | author={Harhoff, D. and Von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S.},
| |
| − | journal={CEPR Discussion Papers},
| |
| − | volume={6900},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={CEPR Discussion Papers},
| |
| − | filename={Harhoff (2008) - Incidence And Growth Of Patent Thickets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Patent thickets: 88-02, 30 industries, EPO data CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | fragmentation index has predominantly been studied in complex industries (Ziedonis, 2004,
| |
| − | Schankerman and Noel, 2006) where increasing fragmentation raises firms’ patent applications.
| |
| − | This is attributed to firms’ efforts to reduce potential hold-up by opportunistic patentees
| |
| − | owning critical or blocking patent rights – a situation which is associated with the existence of
| |
| − | patent thickets. This index does not measure hold-up potential as precisely as the complexity
| |
| − | measure we discuss above.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{harhoff2012conflict,
| |
| − | title={Conflict Resolution, Public Goods and Patent Thickets},
| |
| − | author={Harhoff, D. and Von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S.},
| |
| − | journal={Public Goods and Patent Thickets (April 15, 2012)},
| |
| − | year={2012},
| |
| − | filename={Harhoff VonGraevenitz Wagner (2012) - Conflict Resolution Public Goods And Patent Thickets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: EPO data CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Moreover, the presence of patent thickets, i.e., fields with a high number of patents that have
| |
| − | similar or overlapping claims
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{hegde2009pioneering,
| |
| − | title={Pioneering Inventors or Thicket Builders: Which US Firms Use Continuations in Patenting?},
| |
| − | author={Hegde, D. and Mowery, D.C. and Graham, S.J.H.},
| |
| − | journal={Management Science},
| |
| − | volume={55},
| |
| − | number={7},
| |
| − | pages={1214--1226},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | publisher={INFORMS},
| |
| − | filename={Hegde Mowery Graham (2009) - Pioneering Inventors Or Thicket Builders.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Patent Continuations: CORE PAPER (just)
| |
| − | These lower-quality patents can be valuable to patentholders
| |
| − | seeking to accumulate a thicket of patents
| |
| − | for “defensive” purposes and/or to improve their bargaining
| |
| − | position in patent cross-licensing negotiations
| |
| − | (Shapiro 2001). Additionally, according to Lemley and
| |
| − | Moore (2004), inventors may use the continuations
| |
| − | procedure to increase uncertainty for rivals’ research
| |
| − | and development (R&D) investment decisions, or to
| |
| − | acquire so-called “submarine patents.”1�2
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A high proportion of backward self-cites is another potential correlate
| |
| − | of patenting strategies that accumulate “thickets” of patents
| |
| − | that overlap and cite one another. We found that patents owned by
| |
| − | Compustat firms issuing from post-1995 CAPs contained a significantly
| |
| − | higher proportion of backward self-citations than any other
| |
| − | group of patents, whereas CAPs prior to 1995 cited their own
| |
| − | patents less frequently than patents issuing from any other type of
| |
| − | continuation. This provides additional evidence on the increased
| |
| − | use of CAPs in post-1995 strategies that involve building thickets
| |
| − | of patents.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{heller1998thetragedy,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets},
| |
| − | author = {Heller, Michael A.},
| |
| − | journal = {Harvard Law Review},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {111},
| |
| − | number = {3},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Jan., 1998},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 621-688},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1342203},
| |
| − | ISSN = {0017811X},
| |
| − | abstract = {Why are many storefronts in Moscow empty, while street kiosks in front are full of goods? In this Article, Professor Heller develops a theory of anticommons property to help explain the puzzle of empty storefronts and full kiosks. Anticommons property can be understood as the mirror image of commons property. By definition, in a commons, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners hold such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse - a tragedy of the commons. Depleted fisheries and overgrazed fields are canonical examples of this familiar tragedy. In an anticommons, according to this Article, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When too many owners hold such rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a tragedy of the anticommons. Empty Moscow storefronts are a canonical example of the tragedy of underuse. Anticommons property may appear whenever governments define new property rights in both post-socialist and developed market economies. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into usable private property bundles can be brutal and slow. The difficulties of overcoming a tragedy of the anticommons suggest that policymakers should pay more attention to the content of property bundles, rather than focusing just on the clairty of rights.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {1998},
| |
| − | publisher = {The Harvard Law Review Association},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 1998 The Harvard Law Review Association},
| |
| − | filename={Heller (1998) - The Tragedy Of The Anticommons.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: SEMINAL DOWN (FOUNDATION) ARTICLE.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In an anticommons,
| |
| − | according to this Article, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude
| |
| − | others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When too many
| |
| − | owners hold such rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse - a tragedy of the
| |
| − | anticommons.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In the United States, vivid examples appear at the frontiers of
| |
| − | Native American law and intellectual property protection.20
| |
| − |
| |
| − | See infra section IV.D (discussing an anticommons in Native American allotted lands). In a
| |
| − | forthcoming article, Rebecca Eisenberg and the author of this Article show how the recent proliferation
| |
| − | of patent rights in basic biomedical research may lead paradoxically to fewer useful pharmaceutical
| |
| − | products and procedures in the United States. A tragedy of the anticommons may be
| |
| − | the unintended consequence of privatizing basic biomedical research.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{heller1998can,
| |
| − | title={Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in biomedical research},
| |
| − | author={Heller, M.A. and Eisenberg, R.S.},
| |
| − | journal={Science},
| |
| − | volume={280},
| |
| − | number={5364},
| |
| − | pages={698--701},
| |
| − | year={1998},
| |
| − | publisher={American Association for the Advancement of Science},
| |
| − | filename={Heller Eisenberg (1998) - Can Patents Deter Innovation The Anticommons In Biomedical Research.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: CORE PAPER!!!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Never uses the term thicket. Foundational application of anti-commons to biotech patents.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In theory, in a world of costless
| |
| − | transactions, people could always avoid
| |
| − | commons or anticommons tragedies by
| |
| − | trading their rights (10). In practice, however,
| |
| − | avoiding tragedy requires overcoming
| |
| − | transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and
| |
| − | cognitive biases of participants (11), with
| |
| − | success more likely within close-knit communities
| |
| − | than among hostile strangers (12–
| |
| − | 14). Once an anticommons emerges, collecting
| |
| − | rights into usable private property is
| |
| − | often brutal and slow (15).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{hemphill2003preemptive,
| |
| − | title={Preemptive patenting, human genomics, and the US biotechnology sector: balancing intellectual property rights with societal welfare},
| |
| − | author={Hemphill, T.A.},
| |
| − | journal={Technology in Society},
| |
| − | volume={25},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={337--349},
| |
| − | year={2003},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Hemphill (2003) - Preemptive Patenting Human Genomics And The Us Biotechnology Sector.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy (academic): Biotech: human genomics
| |
| − |
| |
| − | To forestall
| |
| − | imitative activity and strengthen patent rights, firms often attempt to create a ‘patent
| |
| − | thicket,’ i.e. obtaining patents not just on one central product or process, but on a
| |
| − | host of related products or processes [11]. Firms that try to compete with the
| |
| − | inventing firm will find their attempts to duplicate the central product or process
| |
| − | blocked by the inventing firm’s grip on alternative technologies. Many of the firm’s
| |
| − | patents on related products or processes may never be used or licensed; such ‘sleeping
| |
| − | patents’ are held only to raise the costs of entry or imitation by potential rivals.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{holman2005biotechnology,
| |
| − | title={Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Reform},
| |
| − | author={Holman, C.M.},
| |
| − | journal={J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L.},
| |
| − | volume={5},
| |
| − | pages={i},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Holman (2005) - Biotechnologys Prescription For Patent Reform.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: 2005 patent reform act.
| |
| − | Before discussing some of the implications of specific reforms on biotechnology, I digress briefly with a few general observations regarding biotechnology’s patent reform agenda. First, to a large extent, it is apparent that biotechnology values patents primarily for their ability to attract investment, and thus, the perceptions of investors with respect to patent reform play a dominant role in shaping the biotechnology position. Second, despite the widely-expressed fear that a proliferation of patents would have a deleterious effect on biomedical research, one sees very little evidence of that concern coming from the industry itself. To the contrary, biotechnology is one of the staunchest defenders of a strong patent system, and generally evinces little enthusiasm for reforms that might address the problem of a “patent thicket.
| |
| − | serious threat to biotechnology research by creating a patent thicket, sometimes referred to as a “patent anticommons.”106 The theory is especially associated with articles published by Heller and Eisenberg in 1998, and Eisenberg and Rai in 2002.107 Proponents of the patent thicket hypothesis note that while patents traditionally were reserved for products, there has been an increasing tendency for biomedical researchers to patent upstream inventions, i.e., research tools and inputs
| |
| − | If in fact a patent thicket is significantly impeding biotechnology research and development, one might expect that organizations representing the interests of biotechnology, such as BIO, WARF, and Genentech, would be advocating for reforms that would address the problem. Indeed, the biotechnology industry has never been shy about advocating for legislative action to address its concerns.112 But instead, these groups tend to be among the most adamant defenders of the status quo and strong patent rights. One might infer from this that a patent thicket is not in fact substantially impeding biotechnology.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{holman2006clearing,
| |
| − | title={Clearing a path through the patent thicket},
| |
| − | author={Holman, C.},
| |
| − | journal={Cell},
| |
| − | volume={125},
| |
| − | number={4},
| |
| − | pages={629--633},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Holman (2006) - Clearing A Path Through The Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Commentary: Biotech (plant seed?)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Upstream patents have been criticized
| |
| − | on a number of counts. For example,
| |
| − | it has been proposed that the proliferation
| |
| − | of patents covering research
| |
| − | tools has resulted in a “patent thicket,”
| |
| − | rendering it virtually impossible to
| |
| − | conduct biomedical research without
| |
| − | inadvertently infringing upon a host of
| |
| − | conflicting patent claims (Heller and
| |
| − | Eisenberg, 1998; Rai and Eisenberg,
| |
| − | 2002). Although in theory a researcher
| |
| − | should be able to license the necessary
| |
| − | technology inputs, in practice it
| |
| − | is generally not feasible owing to the
| |
| − | large number of different patent holders,
| |
| − | each with their own licensing
| |
| − | agenda. Some patent holders will not
| |
| − | even consider licensing their technol
| |
| − | technology
| |
| − | to competitors, and in the U.S., a
| |
| − | patentee can virtually never be compelled
| |
| − | to grant a license.
| |
| − | The problem is exemplified by
| |
| − | the experience of the developers of
| |
| − | “golden rice,” a genetically modified
| |
| − | crop engineered to produce elevated
| |
| − | levels of vitamin A (Ye et al., 2000).
| |
| − | The project reportedly required
| |
| − | access to technology inputs covered
| |
| − | by over 70 different patents,
| |
| − | and licensing the required intellectual
| |
| − | property was viewed as a major
| |
| − | obstacle to achieving success (RAFI
| |
| − | communiqué, 2000). In the end,
| |
| − | the patent owners agreed to freely
| |
| − | license the necessary technologies,
| |
| − | probably because golden rice was
| |
| − | being developed for humanitarian
| |
| − | purposes to prevent blindness in
| |
| − | children in the developing world and
| |
| − | was not considered commercially
| |
| − | viable.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{holman2008trends,
| |
| − | title={Trends in human gene patent litigation},
| |
| − | author={Holman, C.M.},
| |
| − | journal={Science},
| |
| − | volume={322},
| |
| − | number={5899},
| |
| − | pages={198--199},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={American Association for the Advancement of Science},
| |
| − | filename={Holman (2008) - Trends In Human Gene Patent Litigation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: Commentary: Gene patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | 3). Much of the focus
| |
| − | has been on the alleged detrimental impact of
| |
| − | gene patents on the development and availability
| |
| − | of diagnostic testing (1, 3, 4). Some have
| |
| − | postulated that a “thicket” of patents will impede
| |
| − | basic biomedical research and will stifle
| |
| − | development and utilization of technologies
| |
| − | that involve the use of multiple genetic
| |
| − | sequences; DNA microarrays are a prime
| |
| − | example (5, 6). Others claim that gene patents
| |
| − | are uniquely difficult to design around and,
| |
| − | thus, fundamentally more restrictive of followon
| |
| − | developments than “traditional” patents (6)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{holman2012debunking,
| |
| − | title={Debunking the myth that whole-genome sequencing infringes thousands of gene patents},
| |
| − | author={Holman, C.M.},
| |
| − | journal={Nature biotechnology},
| |
| − | volume={30},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={240--244},
| |
| − | year={2012},
| |
| − | publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
| |
| − | filename={Holman (2012) - Debunking The Myth That Whole Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands Of Gene Patents.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Nature: Whole Gene Sequencing
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Doesn't mention thickets - but explicitly debunks that there is one with respect to WGS (whole-genome
| |
| − | sequencing)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The assumption that 20% of human genes are
| |
| − | patented, and that as a consequence WGS will
| |
| − | inevitably result in the infringement of thousands
| |
| − | of gene patents, is based on a gross misinterpretation
| |
| − | of a single Science article. My
| |
| − | analysis of the claims from a substantial sampling
| |
| − | of the patents which form the basis for the
| |
| − | Jensen & Murray article indicates that the vast
| |
| − | majority of these patents would almost certainly
| |
| − | not be infringed by WGS, either because
| |
| − | they are not gene patents at all, or because they
| |
| − | only claim isolated DNA molecules unlikely to
| |
| − | be produced in WGS (e.g., long sequences and/
| |
| − | or cDNA sequences), or methods of genetic
| |
| − | testing that would not encompass WGS.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{horn2003alternative,
| |
| − | title={Alternative approaches to IP management: One-stop technology platform licensing},
| |
| − | author={Horn, L.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of commercial biotechnology},
| |
| − | volume={9},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | pages={119--127},
| |
| − | year={2003},
| |
| − | publisher={Palgrave Macmillan},
| |
| − | filename={Horn (2003) - Alternative Approaches To IP Management.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Technology Platform licensing: MPEG LA: Standards, pools
| |
| − |
| |
| − | By providing the marketplace with fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory
| |
| − | access to a portfolio of worldwide essential patents under a single licence, this
| |
| − | example of a one-stop technology platform licensing programme enables widespread
| |
| − | implementation, interoperability and use of fundamental broad-based technologies covered by
| |
| − | many patents owned by many patent owners. This paper will: (1) present observations from
| |
| − | MPEG LA’s unique experience and perspective including a description of the necessary
| |
| − | elements and principles on which such efforts are based, what works and why; and (2) describe
| |
| − | efforts to apply this innovative licensing model to the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
| |
| − | industries within the larger context of historical patent pooling as a solution to biotechnology
| |
| − | bottlenecks.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | But,
| |
| − | products and the standards on which they
| |
| − | are based increasingly rely upon many
| |
| − | patents owned by many patent owners.
| |
| − | Therefore, if the ‘thicket’2 of essential IP
| |
| − | rights underlying their use cannot be
| |
| − | accessed under reasonable terms and
| |
| − | conditions (eg cost) applied evenly to all
| |
| − | similarly situated competitors, the best of
| |
| − | standards often go unused.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{huang2009does,
| |
| − | title={Does patent strategy shape the long-run supply of public knowledge? Evidence from human genetics},
| |
| − | author={Huang, K.G. and Murray, F.E.},
| |
| − | journal={Academy of Management Journal},
| |
| − | volume={52},
| |
| − | number={6},
| |
| − | pages={1193--1221},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | publisher={Academy of Management},
| |
| − | filename={Huang Murray (2009) - Does Patent Strategy Shape The Long Run Supply Of Public Knowledge.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Thickets: Human Genome CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In testing
| |
| − | whether this effect shapes contributions to public
| |
| − | knowledge, we relied on two characteristics that
| |
| − | define the patent landscape: “thickets” and “fragmentation.”
| |
| − | A patent thicket is “an overlapping set
| |
| − | of patent rights requiring those seeking to commercialize
| |
| − | new technology to obtain licenses from multiple
| |
| − | patentees” (Shapiro 2001:1). We measured
| |
| − | thickets as the number of patents claiming the same
| |
| − | set of (gene) knowledge inputs.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Hypothesis 5. The denser the thicket of patents
| |
| − | over knowledge claimed in a publication, the
| |
| − | more the patent thicket negatively impacts the
| |
| − | rate of follow-on publications.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Although the 2 percent difference provides
| |
| − | weak support for Hypothesis 5, the underlying
| |
| − | relationship between gene patent grant and
| |
| − | long-run public knowledge production is clearly
| |
| − | not linear in the number of gene patents and does
| |
| − | not increase smoothly with thicket density.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Hypothesis 6. The greater the ownership fragmentation
| |
| − | of patents over knowledge claimed
| |
| − | in a publication, the more the fragmentation
| |
| − | negatively impacts the rate of follow-on
| |
| − | publications.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | We therefore turned to an analysis of the ownership
| |
| − | fragmentation of such patent thickets to examine
| |
| − | whether ownership complexity contoured the
| |
| − | impact of patents on long-run knowledge production.
| |
| − | When we analyzed the impact of increase in
| |
| − | fragmentation in model 5 of Table 7, we found
| |
| − | strong support for Hypothesis 6. Specifically, over
| |
| − | and above the baseline decline in expected citations
| |
| − | of 5 percent (also see model 3, Table 6), there
| |
| − | is an incremental 7 percent decline (p � .05) in
| |
| − | follow-on knowledge production for every unit
| |
| − | increase in fragmentation of the patent thicket (relative
| |
| − | to the mean and in absolute terms).19
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{hussinger2006silence,
| |
| − | title={Is silence golden? Patents versus secrecy at the firm level},
| |
| − | author={Hussinger, K.},
| |
| − | journal={Economics of Innovation and New Technology},
| |
| − | volume={15},
| |
| − | number={8},
| |
| − | pages={735--752},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={Taylor \& Francis},
| |
| − | filename={Hussinger (2006) - Is Silence Golden Patents Versus Secrecy At The Firm Level.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Trade Secrets!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The focus is on product innovating firms in German manufacturing in 2000.
| |
| − | The Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) and patent information from the
| |
| − | German Patent and Trademark Office constitute the data base. In 2000, the
| |
| − | MIP identifies firms that use patents and firms that use secrecy as a means
| |
| − | of protecting their IP. The importance of patents and secrecy is proxied by
| |
| − | the protected inventions’ success in the market, which is ultimately reflected
| |
| − | in figures of sales with new products. Using tobit and instrumental variables
| |
| − | regression a significant positive correlation between patenting and sales with
| |
| − | new products turns out, whereas there is no effect for secrecy.
| |
| − | This finding is in line with the hypothesis that for product innovating firms
| |
| − | patenting is the more important method to protecting inventions in their
| |
| − | market phase as opposed to secrecy, even though over the recent years a
| |
| − | more strategic use of patenting has gained in importance. This result is
| |
| − | confirmed by survey evidence in the same year suggesting that patents are
| |
| − | more important than secrecy to protect IP from the firms’ point of view.
| |
| − | The frequent use of secrecy may be explained by its protective value for
| |
| − | early-stage inventions.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A further development is that patents gained in value by their ability to
| |
| − | be linked with other patents, which encourages patenting of marginal inventions.
| |
| − | The resulting complex network of single patents that bears many legal
| |
| − | pitfalls for patent applicants was given the name ‘patent thicket’ (Shapiro,
| |
| − | 2001). These developments put into question an increased number of patents
| |
| − | motivated by an increased need for IP protection and hint at the strategic
| |
| − | value of patents to have driven the patent surge.
| |
| − | To summarize: on the one hand, recent changes in patenting schemes have
| |
| − | caused an elevated need for patents as an IP protection tool. On the other
| |
| − | hand, they gained in importance as strategic instruments.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{huys2009legal,
| |
| − | title={Legal uncertainty in the area of genetic diagnostic testing},
| |
| − | author={Huys, I. and Berthels, N. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, G.},
| |
| − | journal={Nature biotechnology},
| |
| − | volume={27},
| |
| − | number={10},
| |
| − | pages={903--909},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | publisher={Nature Publishing Group},
| |
| − | filename={Huys (2009) - Legal Uncertainty In The Area Of Genetic Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Biology/Law: Genetic Diagnostic Testing
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Different stakeholders have
| |
| − | expressed concerns about the effect of ‘blocking
| |
| − | patents’ or ‘patent thickets’ on genetic
| |
| − | technology, arguing that because such claims
| |
| − | are difficult or impossible to circumvent,
| |
| − | they would increase genetic testing prices
| |
| − | and hinder innovation2,3. The debate has
| |
| − | been directed towards the creation of possible
| |
| − | solutions for the potential “tragedy of
| |
| − | the anticommons” and several collaborative
| |
| − | licensing models have been proposed4
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As this study shows that not that many
| |
| − | blocking gene patents exist, proposals aiming
| |
| − | at banning patents on human genes do
| |
| − | not provide a plausible solution24, unless the
| |
| − | ban would be on patents for broad genetic
| |
| − | diagnostic methods as such. For instance,
| |
| − | the European Society of Human Genetics
| |
| − | (Vienna) has recently recommended avoiding
| |
| − | patenting of the pure link between a
| |
| − | mutation and disease2. More attention
| |
| − | should be paid to the licensing practices in a
| |
| − | ‘responsible’ way16,35,36. Otherwise, the risk
| |
| − | exists that the control by owners of patents
| |
| − | containing those broad claims with respect to
| |
| − | genetic diagnostic testing may in the future
| |
| − | dissociate actual genetic diagnostic testing
| |
| − | from genetic counseling and clinical investigation,
| |
| − | which is to the detriment of progress
| |
| − | of the genetic diagnostic service and public
| |
| − | healthcare system.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{iyama2005uspto,
| |
| − | title={The USPTO's proposal of a biological research tool patent pool doesn't hold water},
| |
| − | author={Iyama, S.},
| |
| − | journal={Stanford Law Review},
| |
| − | pages={1223--1241},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={JSTOR},
| |
| − | filename={Iyama (2005) - The Usptos Proposal Of A Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesnt Hold Water.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Patent Pools: USPTO Biological Research Tools
| |
| − |
| |
| − | 2 Specifically, IP rights to research tools can limit the viability of particular research scenarios because of the phenomenon known as patent thicketing.3 Patent thickets arise because of well-distributed and overlapping patent rights. Thus, a given research process will be adversely affected where a would-be investigator encounters difficulty in the assembly of utilization rights for each research tool required for the particular research scheme.4 To mitigate this problem of patent thicketing, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued a white paper arguing for the creation of a patent pool, composed of biological research tools, to mechanically facilitate a broad licensing scheme of the necessary use rights.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{jacob2009patents,
| |
| − | title={Patents and Pharmaceuticals},
| |
| − | author={Jacob, Robin},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | journal={A paper given on 29th November at the Presentation of the Directorate-General of Competition’s Preliminary Report of the Pharma-sector inquiry},
| |
| − | filename={Jacob (2009) - Patents And Pharmaceuticals.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Public Sector Inquiry: Pharma
| |
| − |
| |
| − | I wish to emphasise that the phenomenon of evergreening is not confined to the
| |
| − | pharma field. Nor is it new. Far from it. Every patentee of a major invention is likely to
| |
| − | come up with improvements and alleged improvements to his invention. By the time his
| |
| − | main patent has expired there will be a thicket of patents intended to extend his monopoly.
| |
| − | Some will be good, others bad. It is in the nature of the patent system itself that this should
| |
| − | happen and it has always happened. There is nothing new about “evergreening”, only the
| |
| − | name and the implication which flows from the word, that there is something sinister going on
| |
| − | and that it has only recently been discovered. My quotation from Blanco White shows this.
| |
| − | I would add that the particular figure of “up to 1,300” patents for a cluster needs more detail.
| |
| − | I do not believe it to be typical. In any event one one needs to divide the figure by 27 (for the
| |
| − | membership of the EU).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{jensen2004achieving,
| |
| − | title={Achieving the optimal power of patent rights},
| |
| − | author={Jensen, P.H. and Webster, E.},
| |
| − | journal={Australian Economic Review},
| |
| − | volume={37},
| |
| − | number={4},
| |
| − | pages={419--426},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
| |
| − | filename={Jensen Webster (2004) - Achieving The Optimal Power Of Patent Rights.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patent system: Designing one!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Not copyable. Some mention of thickets. Strange def.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{joshi2011strategic,
| |
| − | title={When do strategic alliances inhibit innovation by firms? Evidence from patent pools in the global optical disc industry},
| |
| − | author={Joshi, A.M. and Nerkar, A.},
| |
| − | journal={Strategic Management Journal},
| |
| − | volume={32},
| |
| − | number={11},
| |
| − | pages={1139--1160},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
| |
| − | filename={Joshi Nerkar (2011) - When Do Strategic Alliances Inhibit Innovation By Firms.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ/Mgmt: Patent Pools
| |
| − |
| |
| − | No mention of thickets
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Research and development (R&D) consortia are specialized strategic alliances that shape the
| |
| − | direction and scope of firm innovation activities. Little research exists on the performance consequences
| |
| − | of participating in R&D consortia. We study the effect of patent pools, a unique form of
| |
| − | R&D consortia, on firm performance in innovation. While prior research on alliances generally
| |
| − | implies that patent pools enhance firm innovation, our study finds the opposite. Analyzing data on
| |
| − | systemic innovation in the global optical disc industry, we find that patent pool formation substantially
| |
| − | and significantly decreases both the quantity and quality of patents subsequently generated
| |
| − | by licensors and licensees relative to the patenting activity of nonparticipants. Our empirical
| |
| − | findings suggest that patent pools actually inhibit, rather than enhance, systemic innovation by
| |
| − | participating firms.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{kato2004patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent pool enhances market competition},
| |
| − | author={Kato, A.},
| |
| − | journal={International Review of Law and Economics},
| |
| − | volume={24},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | pages={255--268},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Kato (2004) - Patent Pool Enhances Market Competition.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: patent pools: substitutes inc. welfare
| |
| − |
| |
| − | He considers the
| |
| − | role of patent pools in “patent thicket,” which means that there are so many patents issued
| |
| − | that a single newpatent will likely infringe on some other patents. This situation discourages
| |
| − | and retards research, development and commercialization. His paper concentrates on the
| |
| − | A. Kato / International Review of Law and Economics 24 (2004) 255–268 257
| |
| − | complements problem and claims that cross-licensing or patent pools may alleviate this
| |
| − | problem.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{kesselheim2005university,
| |
| − | title={University-based science and biotechnology products},
| |
| − | author={Kesselheim, A.S. and Avorn, J.},
| |
| − | journal={JAMA: the journal of the American Medical Association},
| |
| − | volume={293},
| |
| − | number={7},
| |
| − | pages={850--854},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={Am Med Assoc},
| |
| − | filename={Kesselheim Avorn (2005) - University Based Science And Biotechnology Products.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Biology: University Science, Biotech and pharma
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Private corporations
| |
| − | can then commercialize these
| |
| − | insights by designing and marketing
| |
| − | new therapeutics or other medical technologies
| |
| − | based on them. In this chain
| |
| − | of development, allowing patenting of
| |
| − | each incremental innovation could risk
| |
| − | generating a dense thicket of overlapping
| |
| − | intellectual rights and thus hinder
| |
| − | research efforts. However, restricting
| |
| − | patenting rights to the end product
| |
| − | alone ignores earlier scientific and financial
| |
| − | contributions. Where intellectual
| |
| − | property law draws the line has billiondollar
| |
| − | ramifications for universities and
| |
| − | academic medical centers attempting to
| |
| − | support their research budgets, for
| |
| − | patients who depend on the creation of
| |
| − | innovative medical products, and for
| |
| − | society, which ultimately benefits from
| |
| − | and pays for these discoveries.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{kieff2011removing,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition},
| |
| − | author = {Kieff, F. Scott},
| |
| − | journal = {Supreme Court Economic Review},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {19},
| |
| − | number = {1},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {January 2011},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 25-50},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/664561},
| |
| − | ISSN = {07369921},
| |
| − | abstract = {Commentators have poured forth a loud and sustained outcry over the past few years that sees property rule treatment of intellectual property (IP) as a cause of excessive transaction costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold-outs, and trolls, which unduly tax and retard innovation, competition, and economic growth. The popular response has been to seek a legislative shift towards some limited use of weaker, liability rule treatment, usually portrayed as “just enough” to facilitate transactions in those special cases where the bargaining problems are at their worst and where escape hatches are most needed. This essay is designed to make two contributions. First, it shows how a set of changes in case law over just the past few years have hugely re-shaped the patent system from having several major, and helpful, liability-rule pressure-release valves, into a system that is fast becoming almost devoid of significant property rule characteristics, at least for those small entities that would most need property rule protection. The essay then explores some harmful effects of this shift, focusing on the ways liability rule treatment can seriously impede the beneficial deal-making mechanisms that facilitate innovation and competition. The basic intuition behind this bad effect of liability rules is that they seriously frustrate the ability for a market-challenging patentee to attract and hold the constructive attention of a potential contracting party (especially one that is a larger more established party) while preserving the option to terminate the negotiations in favor of striking a deal with a different party. At the same time, liability rules can have an additional bad effect of helping existing competitors to coordinate with each other over ways to keep out new entrants. The essay is designed to contribute to the literature on IP in particular, as well as the broader literatures on property and coordination, by first showing how a seemingly disconnected set of changes to the legal rules impacting a particular legal regime like the patent system can have unintended and sweeping harmful consequences, and then by exploring why within the more middle range of the spectrum between the two poles of property rules and liability rules, a general shift towards the property side may be preferred by those seeking an increase in access and competition.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2011},
| |
| − | publisher = {The University of Chicago Press},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2011 The University of Chicago Press},
| |
| − | filename={Kieff (2011) - Removing Property From Intellectual Property And Intended.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Property rules and legal regime
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The essay is
| |
| − | designed to contribute to the literature on IP in particular,
| |
| − | as well as the broader literatures on property and coordination,
| |
| − | by fi rst showing how a seemingly disconnected set of
| |
| − | changes to the legal rules impacting a particular legal regime
| |
| − | like the patent system can have unintended and sweeping
| |
| − | harmful consequences, and then by exploring why within the
| |
| − | more middle range of the spectrum between the two poles of
| |
| − | property rules and liability rules, a general shift towards the
| |
| − | property side may be preferred by those seeking an increase in
| |
| − | access and competition.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In the vast majority of the intellectual property (IP) literature,
| |
| − | property rule treatment of IP is said to cause excessive transaction
| |
| − | costs, thickets, anticommons, hold-ups, hold- outs, and trolls,
| |
| − | unduly taxing and retarding innovation, competition, and economic
| |
| − | growth.5 The popular view of IP for the past several years has been
| |
| − | that property rule treatment is stopping deals from getting done, leaving
| |
| − | desired users of IP subject matter unable to engage in suffi cient
| |
| − | productive activities.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{kim2004vertical,
| |
| − | title={Vertical structure and patent pools},
| |
| − | author={Kim, S.H.},
| |
| − | journal={Review of Industrial Organization},
| |
| − | volume={25},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={231--250},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={Springer},
| |
| − | filename={Kim (2004) - Vertical Structure And Patent Pools.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: patent Pools: complements
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The proliferation of fragmented and overlapping patent rights is increasingly
| |
| − | being recognized as a serious problem; referred to as a ‘‘patent thicket’’ (or
| |
| − | ‘‘anticommons’’ by Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Besides the additional
| |
| − | transaction costs incurred in navigating a patent thicket, Shapiro (2001) has
| |
| − | called attention to another source of inefficiency – the complements problem.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{king2007clearing,
| |
| − | title={Clearing the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court and Congress Undertake Patent Reform},
| |
| − | author={King, S.M.},
| |
| − | journal={Intell. Prop. \& Tech. LJ},
| |
| − | volume={9},
| |
| − | pages={13--13},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | filename={King (2007) - Clearing The Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Patent Reform
| |
| − |
| |
| − | All
| |
| − | three developments have led to what is perceived as a
| |
| − | marked increase in junk patents, as well as what Carl
| |
| − | Shapiro has termed a “patent thicket”—overlapping
| |
| − | sets of patent rights leading to a maze of cross-licensing
| |
| − | agreements, as well as the rise of hold-up litigation.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{kwon2012patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent Thicket, Secrecy, and Licensing},
| |
| − | author={Kwon, I.},
| |
| − | journal={The Korean Economic Review},
| |
| − | volume={28},
| |
| − | number={1},
| |
| − | pages={27--49},
| |
| − | year={2012},
| |
| − | filename={Kwon (2012) - Patent Thicket Secrecy And Licensing.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Race for complementary patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | However, as new products
| |
| − | increasingly depend on more complex and complementary technologies, there exist
| |
| − | growing concerns that stronger patent protection may allow a single patent holder
| |
| − | to prevent other firms from commercializing all their new products that rely on that
| |
| − | patent, and discourage innovation as a consequence, called the hold-up problem (e.g.,
| |
| − | Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Parchomovsky and Wagner 2005, Shapiro 2001)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Note, however, that such hold-up problems can be solved or significantly
| |
| − | diminished through licensing contracts, because the owners of complementary
| |
| − | patents stand to lose their profits under the hold-up situation. Then, one can argue
| |
| − | that with licensing contracts, stronger patent protection should encourage
| |
| − | innovation even when firms compete for complementary patents, called a patent
| |
| − | thicket.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lanjouw2004protecting,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?},
| |
| − | author = {Jean O. Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman},
| |
| − | journal = {Journal of Law and Economics},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {47},
| |
| − | number = {1},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {April 2004},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 45-74},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/380476},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00222186},
| |
| − | abstract = {Abstract This paper studies the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978–99 by linking information from the U.S. patent office, the federal courts, and industry sources. We find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or other characteristics that facilitate “cooperative” resolution of disputes, are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits. However, postsuit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics. These findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits. Our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help in developing private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costs.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2004},
| |
| − | publisher = {The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2004 The University of Chicago},
| |
| − | filename={Lanjouw Schankerman (2004) - Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Are Small Firms Handicapped.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law/Econ: Empirical: Patent litigation incidence
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Thicket in footnote only
| |
| − |
| |
| − | We find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by
| |
| − | individuals and firms with small patent portfolios. Patentees with a large portfolio
| |
| − | of patents to trade, or other characteristics that facilitate “cooperative” resolution of
| |
| − | disputes, are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits. However, postsuit
| |
| − | outcomes do not depend on these characteristics. These findings show that small
| |
| − | patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because
| |
| − | their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @techreport{lampe2009patent,
| |
| − | title={Do patent pools encourage innovation? Evidence from the 19th-century sewing machine industry},
| |
| − | author={Lampe, R.L. and Moser, P.},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
| |
| − | filename={Lampe Moser (2009) - Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Pools (historic)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Thickets in many footnotes, not in main body
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @techreport{lampe2012patent,
| |
| − | title={Do patent pools encourage innovation? Evidence from 20 US Industries under the New Deal},
| |
| − | author={Lampe, R.L. and Moser, P.},
| |
| − | year={2012},
| |
| − | institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
| |
| − | filename={Lampe Moser (2012) - Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Pools (historic)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | We also investigate whether part of the observed decline may be driven by a
| |
| − | reduction in lower-quality or “strategic” patents. For example, the creation of a pool may
| |
| − | reduce the need for member firms to create patent thickets by reducing the threat of
| |
| − | litigation (e.g., Shapiro 2001; Gilbert 2004)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Good refs?
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{layne2011join,
| |
| − | title={To join or not to join: examining patent pool participation and rent sharing rules},
| |
| − | author={Layne-Farrar, Anne and Lerner, Josh},
| |
| − | journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
| |
| − | volume={29},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | pages={294--303},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={LayneFarrar Lerner (2011) - To Join Or Not To Join.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Patent Pools: Vert Int and symmetry lead to joining, large founding groups and numeric prop. sharing rules don't
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In recognition that participation in modern patent pools is voluntary, we present empirical evidence on
| |
| − | participation rates and the factors that drive the decision to join a pool, including the profit sharing rules
| |
| − | adopted by the pool's founders. In most participation contexts, the at-risk group is extremely difficult, if not
| |
| − | impossible, to identify. For pools centered on technologies that result from a standard-setting process, in
| |
| − | contrast, we are able to identify a relatively unambiguous population of patents eligible for inclusion but that
| |
| − | have not been included in the pool. We find that vertically integrated firms, with patents and downstream
| |
| − | operations, are more likely to join a patent pool and among those firms that do join, those with relatively
| |
| − | symmetric patent contributions (in terms of value) to a standard appear more likely to accept numeric
| |
| − | patent share rules for dividing royalty earnings.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Following on the
| |
| − | heels of the intense interest in the theories of “patent thickets” and
| |
| − | “royalty stacking” (e.g., Shapiro, 2001, 2006), and the increased
| |
| − | proliferation of organizations that promulgate technical standards for
| |
| − | products and services, patent pools are emerging as an important topic
| |
| − | for economic analysis.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{layne2007pricing,
| |
| − | title={Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments},
| |
| − | author={Layne-Farrar, A. and Padilla, A.J. and Schmalensee, R.},
| |
| − | journal={Antitrust LJ},
| |
| − | volume={74},
| |
| − | pages={671},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={LayneFarrar (2007) - Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Pricing Licenses in SSOs
| |
| − |
| |
| − | It would thus exacerbate any worries over patent proliferation and patent thickets, already a hotly debated in the
| |
| − | academic literature and popular press.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{leaffer2009patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent Misuse and Innovation},
| |
| − | author={Leaffer, M.},
| |
| − | journal={J. High Tech. L.},
| |
| − | volume={10},
| |
| − | pages={142},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Leaffer (2009) - Patent Misuse And Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Patents vs. antitrust
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Single company
| |
| − | acquisition of a dense web of overlapping patents-patent
| |
| − | thickets 15-may create a seemingly impenetrable web which a
| |
| − | company must hack its way through in order to commercialize
| |
| − | new technology.16
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A firm with a
| |
| − | large patent portfolio enveloping a competitor's key
| |
| − | technologies-one that could be termed a "patent thicket"-has
| |
| − | the potential to use it to suppress competition in the ultimate
| |
| − | goods market
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Whether patent misuse should exist independently from
| |
| − | the antitrust inquiry is a question of vigorous debate. As the
| |
| − | above discussion demonstrates, this issue has been
| |
| − | enthusiastically debated on both sides, where Congress and
| |
| − | particularly the Federal Circuit have called into question the
| |
| − | misuse doctrine's independent existence
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lee2006examining,
| |
| − | title={Examining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket},
| |
| − | author={Lee, A.},
| |
| − | journal={Nanotech. L. \& Bus.},
| |
| − | volume={3},
| |
| − | pages={317},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Lee (2006) - Examining The Viability Of Patent Pools For The Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Mgmt: Patent pools in Nanotech
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patent pool can be more formally defined as “the aggregation of intellectual property rights which are the subject of cross-licensing, whether they are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through some medium, such as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer the patent pool”.26 They are often viewed as the “simplest solution” to intellectual property rights (IPR) bottlenecks with multiple stakeholders that have overlapping sets of IP (a.k.a patent thickets) or are uncertain if there is possible infringement of patent issues (a.k.a. Patent Hold-Up).27
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lei2009patents,
| |
| − | title={Patents versus patenting: implications of intellectual property protection for biological research},
| |
| − | author={Lei, Z. and Juneja, R. and Wright, B.D.},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | filename={Lei Juneja Wright (2009) - Patents Versus Patenting.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Biology: (Nature): Academic biological research and patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Our respondents do not encounter an anticommons
| |
| − | or a patent thicket. Rather, they
| |
| − | believe that institutionally mandated MTAs put
| |
| − | sand in the wheels of a lively system of intradisciplinary
| |
| − | exchanges of research tools. Seeing
| |
| − | no countervailing effect on the supply of these
| |
| − | tools, they conclude that patenting impedes the
| |
| − | progress of research.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lemley2005patenting,
| |
| − | title={Patenting nanotechnology},
| |
| − | author={Lemley, M.A.},
| |
| − | journal={Stanford Law Review},
| |
| − | pages={601--630},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={JSTOR},
| |
| − | filename={Lemley (2005) - Patenting Nanotechnology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Discussion: Nanotech
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Some fear that ownership of nanotechnology patents is too fragmented, risking the development of a patent "thicket."77 Miller offers several examples of nanoscale technologies that have overlapping patents covering the same basic invention, including the carbon nanotube and semiconducting nanocrystals.78 Others point to similar overlaps involving drug delivery nanoparticles.7 Further, companies that want to use nanotechnology to produce products may need to use a range of different building-block inventions - for example, using patented atomic force microscopes to detect and align atoms into patented materials that are then manipulated into patented structures used in constructing a patented end product. If each step has one or perhaps several different patents, all owned by different people, the company will need a lot of licenses.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lemley2007ten,
| |
| − | title={Ten things to do about patent holdup of standards (and one not to)},
| |
| − | author={Lemley, M.A.},
| |
| − | journal={BCL Rev.},
| |
| − | volume={48},
| |
| − | pages={149},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Lemley (2007) - Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup Of Standards And One Not To.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Discussion/Policy: SSOs and patent hold-up
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Thicket in footnote only
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lemley2005probabilistic,
| |
| − | title={Probabilistic Patents},
| |
| − | author={Lemley, M.A. and Shapiro, C.},
| |
| − | journal={The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
| |
| − | volume={19},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | pages={75--98},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={JSTOR},
| |
| − | filename={Lemley Shapiro (2005) - Probabilistic Patents.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Probabilistic Patents!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patent owners also improve their chance of winning the patent lottery by filing
| |
| − | multiple patents on closely related technologies, thereby increasing the chance that
| |
| − | their patents will cover technology that becomes widely adopted by market participants.
| |
| − | In a number of key industries, particularly semiconductors (Hall and
| |
| − | Ziedonis, 2001) and computer software (Bessen and Hunt, 2004), companies file
| |
| − | numerous patent applications on related components that are integrated into a
| |
| − | single functional product. The result is a "patent thicket," in which hundreds of
| |
| − | This content downloaded on Mon, 28 Jan 2013 19:30:04 PM
| |
| − | All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
| |
| − | 82 Journal of Economic Perspectives
| |
| − | patents can apply to a single product (Shapiro, 2001; FTC, 2003). If the holder of
| |
| − | a large patent portfolio asserts its patents against another company and claims that
| |
| − | the other company is infringing dozens or even hundreds of its patents, the target
| |
| − | company faces a very complex and costly undertaking if it chooses to fight all of
| |
| − | those patent infringement claims in court, knowing that it has to win all or nearly
| |
| − | all of the individual patent cases to avoid paying significant royalties or even being
| |
| − | enjoined from selling its product (Parchomovsky and Wagner, 2004).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Similarly, patent thickets can have deleterious effects on both competition and
| |
| − | innovation. One way to cut through the patent thicket is for incumbents with
| |
| − | extensive patent portfolios to enter into broad cross-licenses (that is, exchanges of
| |
| − | roughly symmetric patent positions) to "clear" the thicket. However, new entrants
| |
| − | who lack large patent portfolios may be at a major disadvantage in this situation
| |
| − | because they have no patents to trade. Without such cross-licenses, the result is
| |
| − | inefficient "royalty stacking," in which a manufacturer without its own patent
| |
| − | portfolio must pay royalties to a number of separate companies.6 Defensive patenting
| |
| − | is a natural, even inevitable, strategy in industries with patent thickets, but
| |
| − | defensive patenting itself can increase the density of the thicket.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lemley2006patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent holdup and royalty stacking},
| |
| − | author={Lemley, M. and Shapiro, C.},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | filename={Lemley Shapiro (2006) - Patent Holdup And Royalty Stacking.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Royalty stacking and hold-up
| |
| − |
| |
| − | We have occasionally seen problems like this before, see Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology Innovation and
| |
| − | the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote Growth?, 15 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 477, 495-503 (2005)
| |
| − | (discussing example of radio patents in the 1920s), but they are much more common now than in the past.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Royalty stacking, patent thickets, and the related “anti-commons” problem have been a source of
| |
| − | concern in the semiconductor and biotechnology industries for some time.38 While the precise
| |
| − | extent of these problems remains unclear, empirical evidence of has mounted that royalty
| |
| − | stacking is far more than a theoretical possibility.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lerner2003structure,
| |
| − | title={The structure and performance of patent pools: empirical evidence},
| |
| − | author={Lerner, J. and Strojwas, M. and Tirole, J.},
| |
| − | journal={Working paper},
| |
| − | year={2003},
| |
| − | filename={Lerner Strojwas Tirole (2003) - The Structure And Performance Of Patent Pools Empirical Evidence.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Pools
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Numerous commentators have suggested that
| |
| − | the proliferation of these awards has had socially detrimental consequences: overlapping
| |
| − | intellectual property rights may make it difficult for inventors to commercialize new
| |
| − | innovations. (Gallini [2002] reviews this literature.) Patent pools have been proposed by
| |
| − | Merges [1999], Shapiro [2000], and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Clark, et al.
| |
| − | [2001]) as a way in which firms can address these “patent thicket” problems.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lerner2007design,
| |
| − | title={The design of patent pools: The determinants of licensing rules},
| |
| − | author={Lerner, J. and Tirole, J. and Strojwas, M.},
| |
| − | journal={The RAND Journal of Economics},
| |
| − | volume={38},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={610--625},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
| |
| − | filename={Lerner Tirole Strojwas (2007) - The Design Of Patent Pools The Determinants Of Licensing Rules.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Patent pool licensing
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Identical quote to above, but different paper.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lerner2005theeconomics,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond},
| |
| − | author = {Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean},
| |
| − | journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {19},
| |
| − | number = {2},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Spring, 2005},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 99-120},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134939},
| |
| − | ISSN = {08953309},
| |
| − | abstract = {},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2005},
| |
| − | publisher = {American Economic Association},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2005 American Economic Association},
| |
| − | filename={Lerner Tirole (2005) - The Economics Of Technology Sharing Open Source And Beyond.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @techreport{lerner2002efficient,
| |
| − | title={Efficient patent pools},
| |
| − | author={Lerner, J. and Tirole, J.},
| |
| − | year={2002},
| |
| − | institution={National Bureau of Economic Research},
| |
| − | filename={Lerner Tirole (2002) - Efficient Patent Pools.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Patent pools
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Innovations in computer hardware, software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set
| |
| − | of owners and as a result ?patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude
| |
| − | the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.1
| |
| − |
| |
| − | There is now widespread agreement among policymakers and economists that patent pools
| |
| − | may beneÞt both intellectual property owners and consumers, provided that the pools include
| |
| − | patents that are complementary or blocking.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @incollection{lerner2008public,
| |
| − | title={Public policy toward patent pools},
| |
| − | author={Lerner, J. and Tirole, J.},
| |
| − | booktitle={Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 8},
| |
| − | pages={157--186},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={University of Chicago Press},
| |
| − | filename={Lerner Tirole (2008) - Public Policy Toward Patent Pools.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Policy: Pools (welfare)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | the fundamental tension in
| |
| − | regulators' views of antitrust activities. Many observers have suggested
| |
| − | that patent-thicket problems?where key patents are widely held?af
| |
| − | fect many emerging industries. Patent thickets may lead to three prob
| |
| − | lems. First, royalty stacking may result: each individual patent holder
| |
| − | may charge a royalty that seems reasonable when viewed in isolation,
| |
| − | but together they represent an unreasonable burden. Second, even if
| |
| − | other firms agree to license their patents at a modest rate, a hold-out
| |
| − | problem may result if a single firm then sets a high license fee for its tech
| |
| − | nology Finally, the very process of arranging the needed licenses may
| |
| − | prove to be time consuming. Patent pools thus offer a one-stop shop
| |
| − | through which these problems can be avoided.
| |
| − |
| |
| | | | |
| | @techreport{lerner2003cooperative, | | @techreport{lerner2003cooperative, |
| Line 2,879: |
Line 42: |
| | | | |
| | DISCARD: Appears to be almost identical to: Lerner Strojwas Tirole (2003) - The Structure And Performance Of Patent Pools Empirical Evidence | | DISCARD: Appears to be almost identical to: Lerner Strojwas Tirole (2003) - The Structure And Performance Of Patent Pools Empirical Evidence |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lerner2007impact,
| |
| − | title={What is the impact of software patent shifts? Evidence from Lotus v. Borland},
| |
| − | author={Lerner, J. and Zhu, F.},
| |
| − | journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
| |
| − | volume={25},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={511--529},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Lerner Zhu (2007) - What Is The Impact Of Software Patent Shifts.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Copyright and patents as substitutes in software
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The environment is a complex one: many other changes,
| |
| − | such as the widespread dissemination of the Internet, may have differentially affected firms
| |
| − | during this period. While our result contradicts the claim by Bessen and Hunt (2004) that software
| |
| − | patents substitute for R&D at the firm level, increased reliance on patenting could at the same time
| |
| − | contribute to patent thickets that slow down overall innovation in the industry. Therefore, the
| |
| − | patent thicket problem – an overlapping set of patent rights requiring those seeking to
| |
| − | commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees (Shapiro, 2001) – could
| |
| − | still exist
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lin2001research,
| |
| − | title={Research Versus Development: Patent Pooling, Innovation and Standardization in the Software Industry},
| |
| − | author={Lin, D.},
| |
| − | journal={J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L.},
| |
| − | volume={1},
| |
| − | pages={i},
| |
| − | year={2001},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Lin (2001) - Research Versus Development.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Patent pools in software
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Despite the impressive pace of modern invention, commentators have observed a certain “patent thicket” effect that may be impeding what has become an increasingly difficult road to the commercialization of new technologies.1 Specifically, as new technologies build upon old technologies, they necessarily become increasingly complex, and as a result, are often subject to the protection of multiple patents, covering both the new cumulative technologies as well as old foundational technologies.2 The difficulties of acquiring licenses (e.g., hold-out problems) for all such patents has the potential to stifle the development and commercialization of these new technologies. As such, patent pooling, once condemned as facilitating antitrust violations in past
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{lin2011licensing,
| |
| − | title={Licensing Strategies in the Presence of Patent Thickets},
| |
| − | author={Lin, L.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of Product Innovation Management},
| |
| − | volume={28},
| |
| − | number={5},
| |
| − | pages={698--725},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
| |
| − | filename={Lin (2011) - Licensing Strategies In The Presence Of Patent Thickets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Licensing strategies
| |
| − |
| |
| − | On the other hand, patents already granted can
| |
| − | make the development of cumulative technologies
| |
| − | prohibitively expensive, especially when the innovator
| |
| − | needs to license patents held by many firms or
| |
| − | faces potential litigation from patent holders. Related,
| |
| − | and often overlapping, patents owned by many entities
| |
| − | are often described as ‘‘patent thickets’’ and researchers
| |
| − | have argued that patent thickets can be
| |
| − | detrimental to innovation, especially in information
| |
| − | industries such as software (see, among others, Heller
| |
| − | and Eisenberg, 1998; Lessig, 2001; Shapiro, 2001; Bessen
| |
| − | and Maskin, 2009). One notable, and perhaps
| |
| − | unexpected, example of high licensing costs for downstream
| |
| − | firms is Microsoft. As one of the largest software
| |
| − | companies, Microsoft needs to license many
| |
| − | patented software components from independent
| |
| − | software vendors (ISV). In 2005, Microsoft paid
| |
| − | about $1 billion to license intellectual property from
| |
| − | other companies while collecting only $100 million in
| |
| − | royalties on its own patents (Ricadela, 2006).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{liu2008internal,
| |
| − | title={Internal sequential innovations: How does interrelatedness affect patent renewal?},
| |
| − | author={Liu, K. and Arthurs, J. and Cullen, J. and Alexander, R.},
| |
| − | journal={Research Policy},
| |
| − | volume={37},
| |
| − | number={5},
| |
| − | pages={946--953},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Liu (2008) - Internal Sequential Innovations.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | However, research often assumes that a firm’s patented
| |
| − | innovations are independent from each other.We draw upon evolutionary economics and
| |
| − | suggest that some of a firm’s patents share important genealogical relationships, which we
| |
| − | refer to as internal sequential innovations.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | With the
| |
| − | power of the intellectual regime, internal sequential innovations
| |
| − | offer a larger thicket of protection that can define
| |
| − | the underlying technologies in a set of overlapping patents.
| |
| − | That is, a sequence of patents revolving around the same
| |
| − | technological trajectory can define the intellectual property
| |
| − | more precisely and protect it with an enlarged degree
| |
| − | of coverage. The holder of such patented innovations can
| |
| − | thereafter exclude competitors from the collective scope of
| |
| − | the claims laid out in all of the sequential patents (Wagner
| |
| − | and Parchomovsky, 2005).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @techreport{llanes2009anticommons,
| |
| − | title={Anticommons and optimal patent policy in a model of sequential innovation},
| |
| − | author={Llanes, G. and Trento, S.},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | institution={Harvard Business School},
| |
| − | filename={Llanes Trento (2009) - Anticommons And Optimal Patent Policy In A Model Of Sequential Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Sequential innovation model with a thicket
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As the number of inputs needed in research increases, the innovator
| |
| − | faces a patent thicket and is threatened by the possibility of
| |
| − | hold-up, namely the risk that a useful innovation is not developed because
| |
| − | of lack of agreement with the patent holders. This problem has
| |
| − | been dubbed the tragedy of the anticommons (Heller 1998, Heller and
| |
| − | Eisenberg 1998).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{macdonald2004means,
| |
| − | title={When means become ends: considering the impact of patent strategy on innovation},
| |
| − | author={Macdonald, S.},
| |
| − | journal={Information Economics and Policy},
| |
| − | volume={16},
| |
| − | number={1},
| |
| − | pages={135--158},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Macdonald (2004) - When Means Become Ends.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Mgmt: Strategy: Discussion: Strategic use of patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Among the patent strategies
| |
| − | recommended by consultants are:
| |
| − | • patent in a thicket around key patents held by competitors
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The costs of navigating through mazes of
| |
| − | overlapping patent rights – through patent thickets – are likely to be considerable
| |
| − | (Shapiro, 2001), and are likely to be an obstacle to innovation. In industries
| |
| − | where the pace of change is rapid, where innovation is complex and dependent on
| |
| − | information from a multitude of sources, patent problems once found pragmatic
| |
| − | solutions.
| |
| − | Mostly, your patents are used in horse trading. You come together and
| |
| − | say, �Here�s our portfolio.� In [the communications equipment] industry,
| |
| − | things all build on each other. We all overlap on each others� patents.
| |
| − | Eventually we come to some agreement. �You can use ours and we can
| |
| − | use yours�. (quoted in Cohen et al., 2000, p. 19)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{mallo2008patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent-related barriers to market entry for generic medicines in the European Union: A review of weaknesses in the current European patent system and their impact on market access of generic medicines},
| |
| − | author={Mallo, L. and Roox, K. and Pike, J. and Brown, A. and Becker, S. and Thaler, G.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for the Generic Medicines Sector},
| |
| − | volume={5},
| |
| − | number={4},
| |
| − | pages={255--280},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={SAGE Publications},
| |
| − | filename={Mallo (2008) - Patent Related Barriers To Market Entry For Generic Medicines In The European Union.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: Pharma and Generic meds
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Certain structural defi ciencies and weaknesses
| |
| − | in the current examination procedure,
| |
| − | however, result in the grant of patents of
| |
| − | variable quality, giving a patent owner /
| |
| − | originator company facing expiry of a basic
| |
| − | product patent the opportunity to create what
| |
| − | is known as a ‘ patent thicket ’ (see below). The
| |
| − | most obvious structural issues are discussed
| |
| − | below.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | One of the strategies
| |
| − | employed is the use of follow-on patents on
| |
| − | nonessential features, a practice known as
| |
| − | evergreening. Originators fi le numerous
| |
| − | follow-on patent applications covering a drug
| |
| − | in the hope that at least one of them will be
| |
| − | granted and survive a litigation challenge. The
| |
| − | consequence of this is often an extensive
| |
| − | thicket or cloud of patents around a drug,
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{mann2004myth,
| |
| − | title={The myth of the software patent thicket},
| |
| − | author={Mann, R.J.},
| |
| − | journal={bepress Legal Series},
| |
| − | pages={183},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={bepress},
| |
| − | filename={Mann (2004) - The Myth Of The Software Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law/Mgmt: Software Patent Thicket CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | It then presents
| |
| − | evidence about existing practices in the industry suggests that technology in fact is readily
| |
| − | available, rebutting the prominent claims of a patent “thicket” that is supposedly stifling
| |
| − | innovation in the industry. On the contrary, I argue, to the extent patents have an important effect
| |
| − | in the industry, it is an effect that inures primarily to the benefit of the smaller firms trying to find
| |
| − | a foothold from which they can compete.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The broadest form of the criticism – associated with Carl Shapiro and Larry Lessig –
| |
| − | argues that the rapid proliferation of software patents has created a “patent thicket” that
| |
| − | deters innovation, particularly by small firms that are not well placed to compete against
| |
| − | the portfolios of their larger and better-heeled competitors
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Larry
| |
| − | Lessig presents it forcefully as a matter of truth that the proliferation of software patents
| |
| − | has created a patent “thicket” (Shapiro’s term)256 or an “anticommons” (a term Lessig
| |
| − | draws from Michael Heller’s work with Becky Eisenberg257). This concern also pervades
| |
| − | James Bessen’s work (by himself and with other co-authors).258 Specifically, the idea is
| |
| − | that there are so many overlapping patents in the industry that potential innovators cannot
| |
| − | readily obtain the approvals necessary to conduct their research.259
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The idea of a “thicket” or “anticommons” in the software industry is difficult to
| |
| − | credit.261 When raised in my interviews, that thesis universally was rejected.262 The
| |
| − | basic premise of the model is that assets will go unused because of the costs of obtaining
| |
| − | the permissions necessary to use them.263 As discussed above, there is nothing
| |
| − | theoretically impossible about that outcome. The important question, however, is
| |
| − | whether this is in fact what has happened in the software industry.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{marco2008therole,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {The Role of Patent Rights in Mergers: Consolidation in Plant Biotechnology},
| |
| − | author = {Marco, Alan C. and Gordon C. Rausser},
| |
| − | journal = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {90},
| |
| − | number = {1},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Feb., 2008},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 133-151},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/30139496},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00029092},
| |
| − | abstract = {Few empirical studies have addressed the impact of the patent system on industry structure. Using firm-level patent data for firms in plant biotechnology, we develop a measure of patent enforceability. Duration models show that patent statistics are useful predictors of the timing of consolidation and that patent enforceability is an important factor influencing the likelihood of consolidation. Acquisitions in plant biotechnology may be motivated by the enforcement of patent rights when firms have overlapping technologies; some merger activity may be explained by attempts to avoid mutually blocking technology, as exemplified by the case of Roundup Ready corn.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2008},
| |
| − | publisher = {Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2008 Agricultural & Applied Economics Association},
| |
| − | filename={Marco Rausser (2008) - The Role Of Patent Rights In Mergers.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Patent rights in mergers in biotech
| |
| − |
| |
| − | No real mention of thickets but uses past patent litigation etc.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{maskus2006reforming,
| |
| − | title={Reforming US patent policy: getting the incentives right},
| |
| − | author={Maskus, K.E.},
| |
| − | journal={Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization},
| |
| − | volume={1},
| |
| − | number={4},
| |
| − | pages={127--153},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={MIT Press},
| |
| − | filename={Maskus (2006) - Reforming Us Patent Policy Getting The Incentives Right.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: Reforming patent policy
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In addition to the costs of individual patents, researchers have to contend with
| |
| − | “patent thickets.” That is, complex technologies, such as biomedical research tools,
| |
| − | embody a number of technological inputs, many of which are patented. A different
| |
| − | company, in turn, could own each patent. Negotiating these thickets raises the cost of
| |
| − | securing rights. Weaker patent standards encourage patent proliferation and an
| |
| − | enlargement of the thickets for research in areas such as biotechnology, agricultural
| |
| − | chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{masur2010costly,
| |
| − | title={Costly Screens and Patent Examination},
| |
| − | author={Masur, J.S.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of Legal Analysis},
| |
| − | volume={2},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | pages={687--734},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | publisher={Oxford University Press},
| |
| − | filename={Masur (2010) - Costly Screens And Patent Examination.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law/Policy: Reforming the patent office - screening against low quality (crap paper?)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Third, there are patents of low private
| |
| − | value and low (or negative) social value; this class of patents includes
| |
| − | both discarded, unenforced patents that increase the search costs and
| |
| − | risk imposed on commercial firms—the ‘‘patent thicket,’’ in popular parlance
| |
| − | (Shapiro 2001)—and worthless, largely unenforceable patents usable
| |
| − | only for extracting nuisance settlements (see Section 2.2.).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As an initial matter, search and information costs for the
| |
| − | entering firm will be high regardless of whether these patents are ever
| |
| − | enforced, as the market entrant is forced to comb through a dense ‘‘patent
| |
| − | thicket’’ in order to ascertain the boundaries of existing property rights
| |
| − | (Ayres & Parchomovsky 2007, 6–17; Merges & Duffy 2007, 615–616). It
| |
| − | may also be difficult and costly for new firms to credibly signal necessary
| |
| − | third parties such as banks, investors, and customers that a set of threatening
| |
| − | patents are invalid, particularly when those third parties are not experts
| |
| − | in the relevant technologies.
| |
| − | Most significantly, nascent market participants might face higher up-front 28
| |
| − | costs if litigation uncertainties and information asymmetries force the firmto
| |
| − | pay small licensing fees or settlements to a series of patent-holders who
| |
| − | choose to file nuisance lawsuits
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{mcafee2004barrier,
| |
| − | title={What is a Barrier to Entry?},
| |
| − | author={McAfee, R.P. and Mialon, H.M. and Williams, M.A.},
| |
| − | journal={American Economic Review},
| |
| − | pages={461--465},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={JSTOR},
| |
| − | filename={McAfee Mialon Williams (2004) - What Is A Barrier To Entry.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Definition of barriers to entry!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{menezes2004amodel,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {A Model of Seller Holdout},
| |
| − | author = {Menezes, Flavio and Pitchford, Rohan},
| |
| − | journal = {Economic Theory},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {24},
| |
| − | number = {2},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Aug., 2004},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 231-253},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25055812},
| |
| − | ISSN = {09382259},
| |
| − | abstract = {We model a buyer who wishes to combine objects owned by two separate sellers in order to realize higher value. Sellers are able to avoid entering into negotiations with the buyer, so that the order in which they negotiate is endogenous. Holdout occurs if at least one of the sellers is not present in the first round of negotiations. We demonstrate that complementarity of the buyer's technology is a necessary condition for equilibrium holdout. Moreover, a rise in complementarity leads to an increased likelihood of holdout, and an increased efficiency loss. Applications include patents, the land assembly problem, and mergers.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2004},
| |
| − | publisher = {Springer},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2004 Springer},
| |
| − | filename={Menezes Pitchford (2004) - A Model Of Seller Holdout.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Model of seller holdout
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{meniere2008patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent law and complementary innovations},
| |
| − | author={M{\'e}ni{\`e}re, Y.},
| |
| − | journal={European Economic Review},
| |
| − | volume={52},
| |
| − | number={7},
| |
| − | pages={1125--1139},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Meniere (2008) - Patent Law And Complementary Innovations.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Model of complementary patent innovation
| |
| − |
| |
| − | It is also
| |
| − | very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and soft-
| |
| − | ware, where ?rms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As regards complementary innovations, the optimal patenting rule depends
| |
| − | on a trade-o¤ between the pro?t loss due to scattered complementary patents,
| |
| − | and the possible bene?t of patent disclosure. The scattering of complementary
| |
| − | patents between di¤erent owners creates a double marginalization issue. Since
| |
| − | each patentee behaves as a monopolist, the Cournot (1838) theorem predicts
| |
| − | that prices do not maximize the ?rms?pro?ts (Shapiro, 2001; Lerner & Tirole,
| |
| − | 2005)1 . The requirement that complementary innovations be bundled prior to
| |
| − | patenting can be a way to prevent this pro?t loss. However, small innovations are
| |
| − | not disclosed when innovations have to be bundled prior to patenting (Scotchmer
| |
| − | and Green, 1990). As a result, ?rms lose the possibility to quit the race after a
| |
| − | ?rst innovation has been patented, which leads to R&D cost duplications.
| |
| − | I show that patent disclosure has a positive social e¤ect, although it does not
| |
| − | permit a fully e¢ cient coordination between ?rms. In this context, bundling
| |
| − | innovations prior to patenting can be more e¢ cient if innovations can be devel-
| |
| − | oped quickly. As I argue in the Conclusion, this condition is consistent with the
| |
| − | legal de?nition of the "inventive step" patentability requirement.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{merges1996contracting,
| |
| − | title={Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property rights and collective rights organizations},
| |
| − | author={Merges, R.P.},
| |
| − | journal={Cal L. Rev.},
| |
| − | volume={84},
| |
| − | pages={1293},
| |
| − | year={1996},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Merges (1996) - Contracting Into Liability Rules.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Foundational 1996 article that claims thickets are already solved!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As intellectual property rights have gained in prominence, businesspeople
| |
| − | and scholars alike have complained of the increasing burden
| |
| − | of obtaining intellectual property licenses and, failing this,
| |
| − | litigating intellectual property disputes. Intellectual property experts,
| |
| − | especially scholars, have responded to this burgeoning thicket of rights
| |
| − | with a series of initiatives to expedite deal making by means of statutory
| |
| − | compulsory licensing. These licenses are classic examples of "liability
| |
| − | rulesh" in the foundational legal entitlements framework of Guido Calabresi
| |
| − | and A. Douglas Melamed. They appear to be a compromise:
| |
| − | they address the mushrooming transactional hurdle created by new and
| |
| − | stronger intellectual property rights, while preserving most of the economic
| |
| − | advantages that accompany strengthened rights. In this Article,
| |
| − | Professor Merges argues that proposals to create more compulsory licenses
| |
| − | are rooted in a faulty theoretical framework. Based on a survey
| |
| − | of the diverse institutions various industries have cultivated to handle
| |
| − | intellectual property transactions, Merges contends that "repeat players"
| |
| − | (individuals and firms that frequently need to exchange rights) can
| |
| − | and often do take steps to overcome transactional bottlenecks.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | This Article is aimed at providing conceptual guidance for those
| |
| − | who need to traverse the new thicket of intellectual property rights
| |
| − | (IPRs).' Each vine, each plant, standing in one's path represents a distinct
| |
| − | IPR owned by an individual. To pass through, one needs a license
| |
| − | from each owner. Where a single right blocks the path, this is easy: a
| |
| − | single licensing contract does the trick. Today, however, business people
| |
| − | more often than not encounter a tangled, twisted mass of IPRs, which
| |
| − | criss-cross the established walkways of commerce. Progress along this
| |
| − | path does not come cheaply; rather, it requires numerous contracts with
| |
| − | multiple, independent right holders.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{merges2006introductory,
| |
| − | title={Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange},
| |
| − | author={Merges, R.P.},
| |
| − | journal={Berkeley Tech. LJ},
| |
| − | volume={21},
| |
| − | pages={997},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Merges (2006) - Introductory Note To Brief Of Amicus Curiae In Ebay V MercExchange.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Troll, injuction
| |
| − |
| |
| − | This is commonly described as a "patent thicket": "a
| |
| − | dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must
| |
| − | hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology."
| |
| − | Carl Shapiro,
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The patent thicket and other well-recognized inefficiencies in the current
| |
| − | patent system provide the raw material for patent trolls' machinations.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{mertes2010managing,
| |
| − | title={Managing the patent thicket and maximizing patent lifetime in vaccine technology},
| |
| − | author={Mertes, M.M.M. and St{\"o}tter, G.},
| |
| − | journal={Human Vaccines},
| |
| − | volume={6},
| |
| − | number={10},
| |
| − | pages={860--863},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | publisher={Landes Bioscience},
| |
| − | filename={Mertes Stotter (2010) - Managing The Patent Thicket And Maximizing Patent Lifetime In Vaccine Technology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law/Policy: Thickets in vaccines (short)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Managing the patent thicket in the
| |
| − | fields of vaccine technology is challenging
| |
| − | as one product may be covered by a
| |
| − | plurality of exclusive IP rights that have
| |
| − | to be considered when developing a
| |
| − | product and building up a patent portfolio.
| |
| − | Consequently, licensing is a key point
| |
| − | in the vaccine industry. If a basic patent is
| |
| − | held by a powerful patent holder refusing
| |
| − | to grant a license under reasonable commercial
| |
| − | terms or abuses a market-dominating
| |
| − | position, it should be examined,
| |
| − | whether the requirements to request a
| |
| − | compulsory license are fulfilled.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{meurer2002business,
| |
| − | title={Business method patents and patent floods},
| |
| − | author={Meurer, M.J.},
| |
| − | journal={Wash. UJL \& Pol'y},
| |
| − | volume={8},
| |
| − | pages={309},
| |
| − | year={2002},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Meurer (2002) - Business Method Patents And Patent Floods.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Business method patents
| |
| − | Furthermore, a thicket of patents may stultify development of
| |
| − | technology because of the cost of securing patent licenses from the
| |
| − | large numbers of patent owners.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | I fear that customer service methods are especially likely
| |
| − | to create a patent thicket that slows cumulative innovation and
| |
| − | diffusion, and institutions like patent pools may not emerge to solve
| |
| − | these problems because of the uncertain valuation of these inventions
| |
| − | and the heterogeneity of the inventions and patent owners. Trade
| |
| − | secret law rather than patent law will often protect administrative
| |
| − | methods, so making them patentable subject matter might not have
| |
| − | significant effects.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @book{mossoff2009stitch,
| |
| − | title={A stitch in time: The rise and fall of the sewing machine patent thicket},
| |
| − | author={Mossoff, A.},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | publisher={George Mason University School of Law},
| |
| − | filename={Mossoff (2009) - A Stitch In Time The Rise And Fall Of The Sewing Machine Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: History: 'First' Patent Thicket
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Scholarly interest in how anticommons theory applies to patents has skyrocketed since
| |
| − | Professor Michael Heller first proposed a decade ago that excessively fragmented interests in
| |
| − | land can frustrate its commercial development. There is now a vigorous debate on whether
| |
| − | anticommons exist in patent law, and, if so, whether these “patent thickets” impede innovation in
| |
| − | patented products. This article contributes to this debate by analyzing the rise and fall of the first
| |
| − | patent thicket in American history: the “Sewing Machine War” of the 1850s. The invention of the
| |
| − | sewing machine in the antebellum era represents many firsts in the American legal system—the
| |
| − | first patent thicket, the first “patent troll,” and the first patent pool. Significantly, this case study
| |
| − | verifies that patent thickets exist and that they can frustrate commercial development of new
| |
| − | products. But it also challenges widely held assumptions in the patent thicket literature. Many
| |
| − | scholars believe that this is largely a modern problem arising from a host of allegedly new issues
| |
| − | in the patent system, such as incremental high-tech innovation, excessive litigation, and the rise
| |
| − | of “patent trolls.” Yet the sewing machine patent thicket exhibited all of these phenomena,
| |
| − | revealing that patent thickets have long existed within the historically successful American
| |
| − | patent system. The denouement of the sewing machine patent thicket in the Sewing Machine
| |
| − | Combination of 1856, the first privately formed patent pool, further challenges the widely held
| |
| − | belief that patent thickets are best solved through new statutes, regulations or court decisions
| |
| − | that limit property rights in patents. To the contrary, the Sewing Machine Combination was
| |
| − | formed against the backdrop of the strong protection of patent rights in the antebellum
| |
| − | era. Thus, the story of the invention of the sewing machine is a striking account of early
| |
| − | American technological, commercial and legal ingenuity, which heralds important empirical
| |
| − | lessons for how patent thicket theory is understood and applied today.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{mossoff2011rise,
| |
| − | title={Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, The},
| |
| − | author={Mossoff, A.},
| |
| − | journal={Ariz. L. Rev.},
| |
| − | volume={53},
| |
| − | pages={165},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Mossoff (2011) - Rise And Fall Of The First American Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | See above. Possibly a later version?
| |
| − |
| |
| − | When Michael Heller proposed that excessively fragmented property rights in land can frustrate its commercial development, patent scholars began debating whether Heller’s anticommons theory applies to property rights in inventions. Do ?patent thickets? exist? The rise and fall of the first American patent thicket—the Sewing Machine War of the 1850s—confirms that patent thickets do exist and that they can frustrate commercial development of new products. But this historical patent thicket also challenges the widely held assumption that this is a modern problem arising from allegedly new issues in the patent system, such as incremental high-tech innovation and the impact of ?patent trolls.? The Sewing Machine War exhibited all of these phenomena, proving that these are hoary issues in patent law. The denouement of this patent thicket in the Sewing Machine Combination of 1856, the first privately formed patent pool, further challenges the conventional wisdom that patent thickets are best solved through public-ordering regimes that limit property rights in patents. The invention and incredible commercial success of the sewing machine is a striking account of early American technological, commercial, and legal ingenuity, which heralds important empirical lessons for how patent thicket theory is understood and applied today.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @book{muris2001competition,
| |
| − | title={Competition and intellectual property policy: The way ahead},
| |
| − | author={Muris, T.J.},
| |
| − | year={2001},
| |
| − | publisher={US FTC},
| |
| − | filename={Muris (2001) - Competition And Intellectual Property Policy The Way Ahead.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: FTC speech!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | On the one hand, some observers believe that this patent explosion could injure competition by
| |
| − | making it more difficult for rival inventors to sell competing products. According to Professor Carl Shapiro, a
| |
| − | "patent thicket" has formed, which he describes as "a dense web of overlapping...
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{murray2006when,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {When Ideas Are Not Free: The Impact of Patents on Scientific Research},
| |
| − | author = {Murray, Fiona and Stern, Scott},
| |
| − | journal = {Innovation Policy and the Economy},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {7},
| |
| − | number = {},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {2006},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 33-69},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25056189},
| |
| − | ISSN = {15313468},
| |
| − | abstract = {This chapter describes the impact of formal intellectual property rights on the production and diffusion of "dual knowledge"-ideas that are simultaneously of value as a scientific discovery and as a useful, inventive construct. We argue that a great deal of knowledge generated in academia, particularly in the life sciences, falls into this category (sometimes referred to as Pasteur's Quadrant). The production and diffusion of dual purpose knowledge challenges the premise of most science policy analysis, which is implicitly based on a clear separation between basic scientific knowledge and applied knowledge useful in the development of new technology. Instead, dual knowledge simultaneously makes both a basic and an applied contribution. We review qualitative and quantitative evidence relating to the policy challenges raised by the production and dissemination of dual knowledge, highlighting three broad findings. First, rather than facing a fundamental tradeoff between applied research and more fundamental scientific knowledge, research agencies can and do invest in dual purpose knowledge. Indeed, the dual purpose knowledge framework suggests a distinct rationale for public sector involvement in the funding and conduct of research: the social impact of a given piece of knowledge may be enhanced when knowledge is produced and disclosed in accordance with the norms of the scientific research community (particularly compared to secrecy). Second, we suggest that, within Pasteur's Quadrant, the increased use of formal IPR seems to be significantly shaping the structure, conduct and performance of both university and industry researchers. On the one hand, from the perspective of individual researchers, patenting does not seem to come at the expense of scientific publication, and both respond to the process of scientific discovery. There is some evidence, however, that patent grant may reduce the extent of use of knowledge: the citation rate to a scientific article describing a dual-purpose discovery experiences a modest decline after patent rights are granted over that knowledge. Finally, the impact of patents may be indirect; rather than directly impacting behavior through patent enforcement, scientific conduct may be affected through related mechanisms such as material transfer agreements. Not simply a legal document within a seamless web of cooperation, nor a bludgeon to stop scientific progress in its tracks, patents seem to be changing the "rules of the game" for scientific exchange, cooperation, and credit.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2006},
| |
| − | publisher = {The University of Chicago Press},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2006 The National Bureau of Economic Research},
| |
| − | filename={Murray Stern (2006) - When Ideas Are Not Free The Impact Of Patents On Scientific Research.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Discussion with some empirics: Effect on academic research of patents
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In other
| |
| − | words, recent empirical evidence points to the presence of a "licensing
| |
| − | thicket": the proliferation of both patents and contractual mechanisms
| |
| − | such as MTAs limiting the exchange and diffusion of scientific research
| |
| − | materials and knowledge.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Overall, it is important to emphasize that each of these pieces of
| |
| − | empirical evidence should be treated with considerable caution: tracing
| |
| − | out the impact of policy and institutions on the creation and diffusion
| |
| − | of knowledge is a formidable task. This research is recent and a great
| |
| − | deal of further theoretical and empirical work remains to be done. With
| |
| − | these important caveats in mind, the empirical evidence to date does
| |
| − | seem to suggest that IPR and related institutions have real impacts on
| |
| − | the conduct and nature of research in Pasteur's Quadrant, and offers a
| |
| − | novel perspective on innovation policy, particularly in the life sciences.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{nagaoka2006empirical,
| |
| − | title={An Empirical Assessment of the Effects of Patent Thickets},
| |
| − | author={Nagaoka, S. and Nishimura, Y.},
| |
| − | journal={unpublished, Hitotsubashi University},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | filename={Nagaoka Nishimura (2006) - An Empirical Assessment Of The Effects Of Patent Thickets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: JUST ONE PAGE - APPEARS A CORE PAPER (though weak)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In this paper we assess empirically how a “patent thicket” affects the patenting
| |
| − | propensity and the use of the patents as well as whether it negatively affects the
| |
| − | appropriability of the R&D and patenting by a firm.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Our major findings are the following four: Firstly, a firm with higher sales per
| |
| − | capita tends to have a higher propensity to patent its inventions in an industry in
| |
| − | which there is extensive cross-licenses. Secondly, while a firm with extensive crosslicensing
| |
| − | has a lower rate of patent utilization, there is no evidence that a firm in an
| |
| − | industry with higher patent thicket has a lower rate of internally utilizing the granted
| |
| − | patents. Thirdly, a firm in an industry with higher patent thicket has a lower proportion
| |
| − | of blocking patents in the total granted patents. Fourthly, there is no strong evidence
| |
| − | that R&D spending or patent acquisition has a significantly lower effect on the firm’s
| |
| − | profitability for a firm in an industry with higher patent thicket.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{napoleon2009impact,
| |
| − | title={Impact of Global Patent and Regulatory Reform on Patent Strategies for Biotechnology},
| |
| − | author={Napoleon, V.J.},
| |
| − | journal={Pitt. J. Tech. L. \& Pol'y},
| |
| − | volume={9},
| |
| − | pages={1},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Napoleon (2009) - Impact Of Global Patent And Regulatory Reform On Patent Strategies For Biotechnology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law/Policy (badly written): patent reform in biotech
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As we discussed, at the broadest level biotechnology is an industry that includes innovation and commercialization that are supported by patents. The breadth of patent filings and the issuance of patents on more basic discoveries are on the rise.
| |
| − | This pattern, however, has created what some would characterize as a “Patent Thicket”59 in biotechnology. That is, emerging from the overabundance of patent filings and associated activity is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights”60 that requires those seeking to commercialize new technology to obtain licenses from multiple patentees.61 Pharmaceutical companies typically grow a patent thicket seeking a wide range of chemical variants and analogs, methods of synthesizing the drug, chemical intermediates in this synthesis, different crystal forms, different finished dosage forms and various methods of use.62 Obtaining permission from various patent holders for use of patents can prove to be difficult particularly if the patent holder’s objective in creating the thicket is to block innovation by outsiders. Because useful innovation in biotechnology requires multiple inventive steps and technologies, we could conceivably witness cumulative innovation with infringement on many patents which ultimately serves as a drag on innovation and commercialization.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{nielsen2006compulsory,
| |
| − | title={Compulsory Patent Licensing: Is It a Viable Solution in the United States},
| |
| − | author={Nielsen, C.M. and Samardzija, M.R.},
| |
| − | journal={Mich. Telecomm. \& Tech. L. Rev.},
| |
| − | volume={13},
| |
| − | pages={509},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Nielsen Samardzija (2006) - Compulsory Patent Licensing.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Compulsory Licensing
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Many of the patents overlap and block the use of other
| |
| − | patents, thereby creating a “patent thicket”—a “dense web
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patent trolls notwithstanding, the ability to bring a product to market
| |
| − | in the presence of a patent thicket and the stacking royalties must separately
| |
| − | be addressed. Patent clearinghouses (“PCHs”) and patent pools
| |
| − | have been proposed and utilized. Sometimes, however, patent owners
| |
| − | simply refuse to license the patent rights needed to produce a product—
| |
| − | particularly where the demand for a hefty royalty cannot be met or a
| |
| − | threat by a patent troll is involved.
| |
| − | To tackle the issue of obtaining a license from a non–practicing patentee,
| |
| − | such as a patent troll, or in the event that a patent owner wishes to
| |
| − | opt out of the PCH or patent pool, compulsory patent licensing may be a
| |
| − | viable, or only, solution
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{noel2006strategic,
| |
| − | title={Strategic patenting and software innovation},
| |
| − | author={Noel, M.D. and Schankerman, M.},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={CEPR Discussion Paper},
| |
| − | filename={Noel Schankerman (2006) - Strategic Patenting And Software Innovation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Reduced form model with empirics. CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating, especially in industries
| |
| − | characterised by cumulative innovation. This paper studies the effects of strategic patenting
| |
| − | on R&D, patenting and market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key
| |
| − | aspects: patent portfolio size which affects bargaining power in patent disputes, and the
| |
| − | fragmentation of patent rights (.patent thickets.) which increases the transaction costs of
| |
| − | enforcement. We develop a model that incorporates both effects, together with R&D
| |
| − | spillovers. Using panel data for the period 1980-99, we find evidence that both strategic
| |
| − | patenting and R&D spillovers strongly affect innovation and market value of software firms.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In such industries, it is a widely held view that patenting
| |
| − | activity creates a ?thicket?of fragmented property rights that impedes R&D activity by constrain-
| |
| − | ing the ability of ?rms to operate without extensive licensing of complementary technologies.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | There are four key empirical ?ndings in the paper. First, there are large, positive technology
| |
| − | spillovers from R&D for software ?rms. Second, we ?nd that patenting by technology rivals reduces
| |
| − | the ?rm?s R&D investment, patenting and market value. Third, greater concentration (less frag-
| |
| − | mentation) of patent rights among rivals reduces both R&D and patenting by the ?rm ?re?ecting
| |
| − | less need to have an arsenal of patents to resolve disputes when there are fewer players ?but it
| |
| − | increases market value because transaction costs are lower. Finally, we ?nd that there is a large
| |
| − | patent premium in the stock market valuation of these software ?rms, which accounts for about
| |
| − | twenty percent of the overall private returns to R&D investments.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{packalen2010complements,
| |
| − | title={Complements and potential competition},
| |
| − | author={Packalen, Mikko},
| |
| − | journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
| |
| − | volume={28},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={244--253},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Packalen (2010) - Complements And Potential Competition.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Underlying theory on licensing complements
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In this paper we examine the effect of cooperation between complementary incumbent monopolists on
| |
| − | consumer welfare. While divided technical leadership makes it difficult for firms to integrate into
| |
| − | complementary markets, firms induce entry in complementary markets by reducing the cost of entry in
| |
| − | those markets. This is accomplished through, for example, the development and dissemination of royaltyfree
| |
| − | intellectual property. We present and analyze a model in which incumbents can influence the ease of
| |
| − | entry in complementary markets. Cooperation between complementary monopolists decreases consumer
| |
| − | welfare by reducing or even eliminating the entry inducement incentive but increases consumer welfare by
| |
| − | eliminating double marginalization. We show that cooperation may decrease consumer welfare, contrary to
| |
| − | Cournot's celebrated double monopoly result, and that the welfare comparison can be determined in terms
| |
| − | of straightforward economic concepts. We also present and analyze a model in which each incumbent can
| |
| − | induce entry in the complementary market through long-term price commitments which are common in
| |
| − | patent licensing.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{palangkaraya2011misclassification,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | Title = {Misclassification Between Patent Offices: Evidence From A Matched Sample Of Patent Applications},
| |
| − | author = {Palangkaraya, Alfons and Webster, Elizabeth and Jensen, Paul H.},
| |
| − | journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {93},
| |
| − | number = {3},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {August 2011},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 1063-1075},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23016095},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00346535},
| |
| − | abstract = {In this paper, we estimate the extent of misclassification in patent examination decisions between the European Patent Office (EPO) and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), that is, applications that are incorrectly refused a patent or incorrectly granted a patent. Using a proxy for inventive step as the predictor of the correct decision, we find that the probability that a "true grant" application is refused is 6.1%, while the probability that a "true refusal" application is granted is 9.8%. However, we find no evidence of an increasing trend of granting "bad" patents at the EPO and JPO.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2011},
| |
| − | publisher = {The MIT Press},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2011 The MIT Press},
| |
| − | filename={Palangkaraya Webster Jensen (2011) - Misclassification Between Patent Offices.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Abstract—In this paper, we estimate the extent of misclassification in
| |
| − | patent examination decisions between the European Patent Office (EPO)
| |
| − | and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), that is, applications that are incorrectly
| |
| − | refused a patent or incorrectly granted a patent. Using a proxy for
| |
| − | inventive step as the predictor of the correct decision, we find that the
| |
| − | probability that a ‘‘true grant’’ application is refused is 6.1%, while the
| |
| − | probability that a ‘‘true refusal’’ application is granted is 9.8%. However,
| |
| − | we find no evidence of an increasing trend of granting ‘‘bad’’ patents at
| |
| − | the EPO and JPO.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Second, our notion of a correct decision rests on the legal
| |
| − | meaning of validity (that is, novelty, nonobviousness, and
| |
| − | usefulness). From an economic perspective, however,
| |
| − | whether an invention should be patentable depends on the
| |
| − | relative net change to the incentive to invent and innovate
| |
| − | and the size of the deadweight monopoly losses. The latter
| |
| − | includes strategic ways to construct undesirable patent
| |
| − | thickets, build patent portfolios to extract additional bargaining
| |
| − | power in cross-licensing arrangements, or other
| |
| − | rent-seeking activities. Our estimated size of misclassification
| |
| − | effectively overlooks these issues. However, it is plausible
| |
| − | that the legal and economic interpretations of patent
| |
| − | validity are correlated.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{parchomovsky2005patent,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Patent Portfolios},
| |
| − | author = {Gideon Parchomovsky and Wagner, R. Polk},
| |
| − | journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {154},
| |
| − | number = {1},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Nov., 2005},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 1-77},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25047582},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00419907},
| |
| − | abstract = {},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2005},
| |
| − | publisher = {The University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2005 The University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
| |
| − | filename={Parchomovsky Wagner (2005) - Patent Portfolios.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Patent Portfolio theory...
| |
| − |
| |
| − | This article develops a comprehensive theory of patent value, responding to
| |
| − | growing empirical evidence that the traditional appropriability premise of pat
| |
| − | ents is fundamentally incomplete in the modern innovation environment. We
| |
| − | find that for patents, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts: the true
| |
| − | value of patents lies not in their individual worth, but in their aggregation into
| |
| − | a collection of related patents?a patent portfolio.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | "Patent thickets" refer to the fact that in many areas of technology, great num
| |
| − | bers of related patents exist at any particular time, and many might have applicability
| |
| − | to any commercial product. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The patent portfolio theory also predicts that certain components
| |
| − | of the cost of innovation will increase in the future. As we explained
| |
| − | above, to achieve an effective portfolio, firms must obtain a significant
| |
| − | number of related patents.212 The concentration of related patents in
| |
| − | the hands of certain firms will raise the information and transaction
| |
| − | costs associated with innovation. In a portfolio-driven environment,
| |
| − | innovators will be forced to spend more time acquiring information
| |
| − | about preexisting patents213 and negotiating licenses with their hold
| |
| − | ers. As several commentators have pointed out, in such a patent
| |
| − | intensive environment, one should also expect occasional holdup
| |
| − | problems and bargaining failures.214 As a result, innovation becomes
| |
| − | more costly, at least for firms that do not have strong patent portfolios
| |
| − | of their own.
| |
| − | The portfolio theory not only explains the existence of "patent
| |
| − | thickets," but also suggests that the problem is highly unlikely to go
| |
| − | away.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{paredes2006written,
| |
| − | title={Written Description Requirement in Nanotechnology: Clearing a Patent Thicket},
| |
| − | author={Paredes, J.P.},
| |
| − | journal={J. Pat. \& Trademark Off. Soc'y},
| |
| − | volume={88},
| |
| − | pages={489},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Paredes (2006) - Written Description Requirement In Nanotechnology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Nanotech: written description requirement
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The
| |
| − | notion of a patent thicket is where an
| |
| − | overlapping set of patent rights requires
| |
| − | that those seeking to commercialize new
| |
| − | technology obtain licenses from multiple
| |
| − | patentees.6 If you get monopoly rights
| |
| − | down at the bottom, "you may stifle competition
| |
| − | that uses those patents later on
| |
| − | and so the breadth and utilization of
| |
| − | patent rights can be used not only to stifle
| |
| − | competition, but also have adverse effects
| |
| − | in the long run on innovation."7
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Moreover, the quality of these
| |
| − | nanotechnology patents has been repeatedly
| |
| − | called into question," so the navigation
| |
| − | of a patent thicket will have to be
| |
| − | around these questionable patents.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | One of the policy purposes of the written
| |
| − | description requirement has been the quid
| |
| − | pro quo of the patent bargain, which
| |
| − | requires the patentee to describe the
| |
| − | invention in such terms that any person
| |
| − | skilled in the art to which it pertains may
| |
| − | construct and use it after expiration of the
| |
| − | patent .6
| |
| − |
| |
| − | became more clear that the
| |
| − | purpose of the written description
| |
| − | requirement is to "ensure that the scope of
| |
| − | the right to exclude, as set forth in the
| |
| − | claims, does not overreach the scope of
| |
| − | the inventor's contribution to the field of
| |
| − | art as described in the patent specification."
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{pray2005innovation,
| |
| − | title={Innovation and dynamic efficiency in plant biotechnology: An introduction to the researchable issues},
| |
| − | author={Pray, C. and Oehmke, J.F. and Naseem, A.},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={AgBioForum},
| |
| − | filename={Pray Oehmke Naseem (2005) - Innovation And Dynamic Efficiency In Plant Biotechnology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Innovation and dyn. eff. in biotech
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The agricultural biotechnology industry is characterized by
| |
| − | heavy investment in research and development, dynamic technical
| |
| − | change, and increasing concentration in both the output
| |
| − | market and the ownership of intellectual properties that support
| |
| − | ongoing innovation. This raises questions about the industry’s
| |
| − | ability to continue to deliver path-breaking innovations. This
| |
| − | paper lays out these questions, describes the relevant data
| |
| − | (including the newly available agricultural biotechnology intellectual
| |
| − | property database), and provides a conceptual framework
| |
| − | for addressing the questions. The empirical discussion and conceptual
| |
| − | framework in this paper constitute a structure upon
| |
| − | which the remaining articles in this issue build to address the
| |
| − | overall question of how best we can maintain socially desirable
| |
| − | rates of innovation and dynamic efficiency in plant biotechnology.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The 1990s witnessed legal challenges to many
| |
| − | key patents, complaints by scientists and industry that
| |
| − | they could not commercialize products that relied on
| |
| − | intellectual properties patented by private firms, record
| |
| − | numbers of mergers and acquisitions to integrate the
| |
| − | biotechnology and seed industries, and complex thickets
| |
| − | of interwoven patents that prevented even the most
| |
| − | skilled negotiators from obtaining rights to disseminate
| |
| − | innovative technologies. Industry responded by aggressively
| |
| − | consolidating, so that enabling intellectual properties
| |
| − | were owned by the same company, which could
| |
| − | then move forward with the commercialization of new
| |
| − | agricultural technologies.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As the technology has developed, patenting has
| |
| − | become increasingly widespread in every major area of
| |
| − | agricultural biotechnology. Every successive five-year
| |
| − | period has seen more patented innovation than the last
| |
| − | period—in every technology. It is unclear whether this
| |
| − | supports the anticommons/patent thicket concern.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{quillen2001continuing,
| |
| − | title={Continuing patent applications and performance of the US patent and trademark office},
| |
| − | author={Quillen, C.D. and Webster, O.H.},
| |
| − | journal={Fed. Cir. BJ},
| |
| − | volume={11},
| |
| − | pages={1},
| |
| − | year={2001},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Quillen Webster (2001) - Continuing Patent Applications And Performance Of The Us Patent And Trademark Office.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Empirical: Patent continuations
| |
| − | The United States is unique in permitting patent applicants to refile their
| |
| − | patent applications as continuation and continuation-in-part applications claiming
| |
| − | the benefit of the filing date of a prior application and restart the examination
| |
| − | process all over again. Data provided by the USPTO concerning continuing
| |
| − | application filings for its fiscal years 1993-1998 reveal that 28.4% of the utility,
| |
| − | plant, and reissue (UPR) applications filed in those years were not new or original
| |
| − | applications, but were continuing applications claiming the benefit of the filing
| |
| − | dates of previously filed applications.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Doesn't directly mention thickets
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{rai2003engaging,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform},
| |
| − | author = {Rai, Arti K.},
| |
| − | journal = {Columbia Law Review},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {103},
| |
| − | number = {5},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Jun., 2003},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 1035-1135},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123832},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00101958},
| |
| − | abstract = {The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, charged with adjudicating appeals in patent cases, has adopted an unusual approach that arrogates power over fact finding while it simultaneously invokes rule-formalism. Although the Federal Circuit's approach may be justified by the fact-finding and policy application deficiencies of the trial courts and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), it has had a negative impact on innovation policy and has resulted in a patent system that is sorely in need of reform. This Article argues that because of the interdependence of the various institutions within the patent system, reform of the system must be both multi-institutional and closely attentive to the institutional competence of the system's actors. Although Congress should clearly bolster the PTO's fact-finding abilities, giving plenary responsibility over factual questions to the PTO would not be cost effective. Accordingly, Congress should endow the system with improved fact-finding expertise through the institution of specialized trial courts. As for actual policy formulation, each of the available institutional options--the legislature, the PTO, and the courts--has substantial associated liabilities. On balance, however, the Federal Circuit is probably best positioned to formulate patent policy, so long as the fact-finding expertise of inferior institutions is bolstered and additional appellate mechanisms are instituted. By paying attention to institutional design and revising our institutions accordingly, we can achieve the patent system we should have had all along.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2003},
| |
| − | publisher = {Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.},
| |
| − | filename={Rai (2003) - Engaging Facts And Policy.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: patent reform
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Defensive patenting has become particularly prominent in certain industries like
| |
| − | the semiconductor industry, where innovation is cumulative, and a thicket of relevant
| |
| − | patents often exists.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | More?
| |
| − | over, the guidelines on utility incorporate, at least implicitly, economic
| |
| − | concerns that setting the utility standard too low could impede scientific
| |
| − | progress by creating a transaction-cost-heavy thicket of patents on basic
| |
| − | research.443
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @inproceedings{regibeau2011assessment,
| |
| − | title={Assessment of potential anticompetitive conduct in the field of intellectual property rights and assessment of the interplay between competition policy and IPR protection},
| |
| − | author={Regibeau, Pierre and Rockett, Katharine},
| |
| − | booktitle={Prepared for the European Commission, Publications Office of the European Union, ISBN 978-92-79-22210-8},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | filename={Regibeau Rockett (2011) - Assessment Of Potential Anticompetitive Conduct.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy: Anticompetitive behaviour and patents - CORE PAPER. Solid Lit Review.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Over the last 10 years or so, there has been a growing policy concern about so-called patent
| |
| − | thickets. The terms “thicket” has been used somewhat indiscriminately in competition law
| |
| − | circles to describe various types of concentration of IPRs3. In this report, we use the term in
| |
| − | a much more specific and precise sense. Following Shapiro’s definition, patent thickets are
| |
| − | “an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialise new
| |
| − | technology obtain licenses from multiple partners”.4 Two conditions must then be fulfilled for
| |
| − | a thicket to arise. Firstly, the production and sale of a given product involves the use of a
| |
| − | large number of patent rights. Secondly, the ownership of those rights is dispersed.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | 4.Shapiro (2001), p. 119.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{reichman2007harmonization,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Harmonization without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty},
| |
| − | author = {Reichman, Jerome H. and Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper},
| |
| − | journal = {Duke Law Journal},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {57},
| |
| − | number = {1},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Oct., 2007},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 85-130},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040588},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00127086},
| |
| − | abstract = {In this Article, we contend that the World Intellectual Property Organization's proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) is premature. Developing countries are struggling to adjust to the heightened standards of intellectual property protection required by the TRIPS Agreement of 1994. With TRIPS, at least, these countries obtained side payments (in the form of trade concessions) to offset the rising costs of knowledge products. A free-standing instrument, such as the SPLT, would shrink the remaining flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement with no side payments and no concessions to the catch-up strategies of developing countries at different stages of technological advancement. More controversially, we argue that a deep harmonization would boomerang against even its developed country promoters by creating more problems than it would solve. There is no vision of a properly functioning patent system for the developed world that commands even the appearance of a consensus. The evidence shows, instead, that the worldwide intellectual property system has entered a brave new scientific epoch, in which experts have only tentative, divergent ideas about how best to treat a daunting array of new technologies. The proposals for reconciling the needs of different sectors, such as information technology and biotechnology, pose hard, unresolved issues at a time when the costs of litigation are rising at the expense of profits from innovation. These difficulties are compounded by the tendency of universities to push patenting up stream, generating new rights to core methodologies and research tools. As new approaches to new technologies emerge in different jurisdictions, there is a need to gather empirical evidence to determine which, if any, of these still experimental solutions are preferable over time. Our argument need not foreclose other less intrusive options and measures surveyed in the Article that can reduce the costs of delaying harmonization. However, the international community should not rush to freeze legal obligations regarding the protection of intellectual property. It should wait until economists and policymakers better understand the dynamics of innovation and the role that patent rights play in promoting progress and until there are mechanisms in place to keep international obligations responsive to developments in science, technology, and the organization of the creative community.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2007},
| |
| − | publisher = {Duke University School of Law},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2007 Duke University School of Law},
| |
| − | filename={Reichman Dreyfuss (2007) - Harmonization Without Consensus.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: patent reform
| |
| − |
| |
| − | For example, the risk of debilitating suits motivates participants to acquire multiple patents, hoping that with enough potential counterclaims, they can fend off or negotiate their way out of difficulty. The result is a vicious cycle: thickets of rights that are expensive (or nearly impossible) to clear, requiring an ever-larger arsenal of defensive protection
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{reitzig2004private,
| |
| − | title={The private values of ‘thickets’ and ‘fences’: towards an updated picture of the use of patents across industries},
| |
| − | author={Reitzig, M.},
| |
| − | journal={Economics of Innovation and New Technology},
| |
| − | volume={13},
| |
| − | number={5},
| |
| − | pages={457--476},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={Taylor \& Francis},
| |
| − | filename={Reitzig (2004) - The Private Values Of Thickets And Fences.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Thickets different in discrete vs. complex tech. CORE PAPER.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | On the basis of a novel data set of 612 European patents and related inventions from five different industries, it is shown
| |
| − | that multiple patents per invention are filed in both discrete and complex technologies. Multivariate analysis of the data
| |
| − | suggests that in selected discrete technologies, patent ‘fences’ may serve to exclude competitors whereas in complex
| |
| − | technologies, ‘thickets’ represent exchange forums for complementary technology. The results expand on traditional
| |
| − | views of profitable patent exploitation across industries and elaborate on the most recent findings by Cohen et al.
| |
| − | (Cohen, W.M., Nelson, R.R. and Walsh, J.P. (2000) Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions
| |
| − | and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or not). Cambridge, MA: NBER.) The analysis suggests that different
| |
| − | legislative issues arise from multiple patenting per innovation in complex and discrete technologies depending on
| |
| − | the degree of technological complementarity. The results have unexpected policy implications in that they illustrate
| |
| − | how patentees could eliminate competition in the form of substitute technologies through fencing. They have wide
| |
| − | managerial implications regarding the valuation of patent portfolios and the design of corporate IP strategies.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{reitzig2007sharks,
| |
| − | title={On sharks, trolls, and their patent prey—Unrealistic damage awards and firms’ strategies of “being infringed”},
| |
| − | author={Reitzig, M. and Henkel, J. and Heath, C.},
| |
| − | journal={Research Policy},
| |
| − | volume={36},
| |
| − | number={1},
| |
| − | pages={134--154},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Reitzig Henkel Heath (2007) - On Sharks Trolls And Their Patent Prey.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Trolls
| |
| − |
| |
| − | As both
| |
| − | articles show, the “strategic use” of patents (the two most important
| |
| − | types being blocking and cross-licensing with patent ‘thickets’ playing
| |
| − | a major role for the latter), has classically been discussed from the perspective
| |
| − | of those patent holders who either engage in the production
| |
| − | of their own technological goods or consider themselves professional
| |
| − | intellectual property suppliers who repeatedly interact with manufacturers.
| |
| − | The strategy of “being infringed” as pursued by trolls is a
| |
| − | different phenomenon. While not entirely new(see Section 4.1, quoting
| |
| − | Lemelson versus Mattel), the broad systematic use of troll strategies
| |
| − | appears to be very recent, however.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{rey2012abuse,
| |
| − | title={Abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property},
| |
| − | author={Rey, P. and Salant, D.},
| |
| − | journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
| |
| − | year={2012},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Rey Salant (2012) - Abuse Of Dominance And Licensing Of Intellectual Property.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Underlying theory of thickets
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patent thickets, layers of licenses a �rm needs to be able to o�er products that embody
| |
| − | technologies owned by multiple �rms, and licensing policies have drawn increasing
| |
| − | scrutiny from policy makers. Patent thickets involve complementary products, which
| |
| − | gives rise to double marginalization { the so-called royalty stacking problem { and has
| |
| − | the potential to retard di�usion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare.1
| |
| − |
| |
| − | One is the patent thicket problem,
| |
| − | which is an extension of Cournot's 1838 complementary product oligopoly model to
| |
| − | IP.5 When there are two or more owners of essential IP, each fails to take into account
| |
| − | the impact of its licensing policy on the owners of complementary IP; this results in
| |
| − | double-marginalization
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patent thickets have long been a concern due to the potential for delaying deployment
| |
| − | of products and adversely a�ecting consumers. To examine the implications of such
| |
| − | patent thickets, we consider a model in which the upstream IP owner or owners sell
| |
| − | into a market in which there are di�erentiated products and positive �xed entry costs.
| |
| − | It is well known that, in the absence of vertical licensing agreements, there can be
| |
| − | excessive entry, due to business stealing e�ects, or insu�cient entry, if �rms entering
| |
| − | the market appropriate only part of the surplus they generate. We revisit this issue,
| |
| − | taking into account the upstream owner(s)' licensing policy
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @inproceedings{rubinfeld2004strategic,
| |
| − | title={The strategic use of patents: Implications for antitrust},
| |
| − | author={Rubinfeld, D.L. and Maness, R.},
| |
| − | booktitle={Antitrust, Patent and Copyright Conference},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | filename={Rubinfeld Maness (2004) - The Strategic Use Of Patents Implications For Antitrust.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Creating a thicket to raise rivals cost
| |
| − |
| |
| − | To see more specifically how a firm could use a large patent portfolio to raise rivals’
| |
| − | costs, consider the case of a differentiated product oligopoly where innovation and product
| |
| − | design are important elements of competition among rivals. In this case, a firm with a large
| |
| − | patent portfolio surrounding competitors’ key technologies (i.e., a “patent thicket”) has the
| |
| − | opportunity to use its patent portfolio to lessen competition in the final goods market.17
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{sabety2004nanotechnology,
| |
| − | title={Nanotechnology innovation and the patent thicket: Which IP policies promote growth},
| |
| − | author={Sabety, T.},
| |
| − | journal={Alb. LJ Sci. \& Tech.},
| |
| − | volume={15},
| |
| − | pages={477},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Sabety (2004) - Nanotechnology Innovation And The Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Thickets in nanotech (comparison with radio industry)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Yet, several commentators have raised concerns
| |
| − | that the extraordinary pace of patenting of nanotechnology5
| |
| − | will result in a patent deadlock6 that will stifle innovation and
| |
| − | impede economic growth.7
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{santore2010patent,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence},
| |
| − | author = {Rudy Santore and Michael McKee, and David Bjornstad},
| |
| − | journal = {Journal of Law and Economics},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {53},
| |
| − | number = {1},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {February 2010},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 167-183},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/600078},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00222186},
| |
| − | abstract = {Abstract Production requiring licensing groups of complementary patents implements a coordination game among patent holders, who can price patents by choosing among combinations of fixed and royalty fees. Summed across patents, these fees become the total producer cost of the package of patents. Royalties, because they function as excise taxes, add to marginal costs, resulting in higher prices and reduced quantities of the downstream product and lower payoffs to the patent holders. Using fixed fees eliminates this inefficiency but yields a more complex coordination game in which there are multiple equilibria, which are very fragile in that small mistakes can lead the downstream firm to not license the technology, resulting in inefficient outcomes. We report on a laboratory market investigation of the efficiency effects of coordinated pricing of patents in a patent pool. We find that pool-like pricing agreements can yield fewer coordination failures in the pricing of complementary patents.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2010},
| |
| − | publisher = {The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business of the University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2010 The University of Chicago},
| |
| − | filename={Santore McKee Bjornstad (2010) - Patent Pools As A Solution To Efficient Licensing Of Complementary Patents.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law/Econ: Theory with Empircs: patent pools
| |
| − |
| |
| − | More recently, a National Academy of Sciences (2006) committee studied the issue,
| |
| − | concluding that even though evidence of blocking or market failures has yet to emerge, the anticommons
| |
| − | or patent thickets may well emerge as profit opportunities in biomedical markets grow
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Shapiro (2001) broadens the concept as a “patent thicket” in
| |
| − | which possible outcomes include excessively high fees for the use of the patent set, uncertainty
| |
| − | regarding potential patent infringement, and, in the limit, holdup problems.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{sanyal2005peanut,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Peanut Butter Patents versus the New Economy: Does the Increased Rate of Patenting Signal More Invention or Just Lower Standards?},
| |
| − | Author = {Sanyal, Paroma And Jaffe, Adam B. And Sanyal, Panoma},
| |
| − | journal = {Annals of Economics and Statistics / Annales d'Économie et de Statistique},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {Contributions in memory of Zvi Griliches},
| |
| − | volume = {},
| |
| − | number = {79/80},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {JULY/DECEMBER 2005},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 211-240},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/20777576},
| |
| − | ISSN = {0769489X},
| |
| − | abstract = {The explosion in the patenting rate in the U.S. during the last half of the 1990s is often attributed partly to an apparent decline in examination standards. We estimate a simultaneous equation model accounting for the fact that a decline in examination standards would itself induce an increase in dubious applications. We have a multi-dimensional panel, with data on the application and grant rates and country of origin and destination. We find that a 'loosening' of the grants standard by 1 percent increases applications by 8 percent in the full sample and by 3 percent in the Non-US sample. After accounting for the endogenous application response, the application elasticity of grants is around 0.124 for the full sample and 0.145 for the Non-US one. Countries whose patent applications are more likely to be successful in the US are more likely to be successful in other countries as well. These findings confirm that inventors respond to increased likelihood of success at the patent office by filing more applications, but also confirm earlier findings that the surge in patenting in the US in the last two decades appears to be driven to a significant extent by an increase in the underlying invention rate. L'explosion du taux de délivrance de brevets aux Etats-Unis durant la seconde moitié des années 90 est souvent attribuée en partie à un relâchement des niveaux d'exigence requis à l'examen des inventions. Nous estimons un modèle d'équations simultanées rendant compte du fait qu'un abaissement du niveau d'exigence devrait induire une augmentation des demandes douteuses. Nous utilisons un panel multi-dimensionnel, contenant des données sur la nature des demandes de brevet, les taux de délivrance, les pays d'origine et de destination. Nous trouvons qu'une diminution du niveau d'exigence pour la délivrance des brevets de 1% augmente le nombre de demandes de 8% dans l'échantillon total et de 3% dans l'échantillon non-US. En tenant compte de l'endogénéité.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2005},
| |
| − | publisher = {L'INSEE / GENES on behalf of ADRES},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2005 L'INSEE / GENES},
| |
| − | filename={Sanyal Jaffe Sanyal (2005) - Peanut Butter Patents Versus The New Economy.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: looser standards dramatically increase patenting
| |
| − |
| |
| − | ABSTRACT. - The explosion in the patenting rate in the U.S. during the last half of the 1990s is often attributed partly to an apparent decline in examination standards. We estimate a simultaneous equation model accounting for the fact that a decline in examination standards would itself induce an increase in dubious applications. We have a multi-dimensional panel, with data on the application and grant rates and country of origin and destination. We find that a loosening' of the grants standard by 1 percent increases applications by 8 percent in the full sample and by 3 percent in the Non-US sample. After accounting for the endogenous application response, the application elasticity of grants is around 0.124 for the full sample and 0.145 for the Non-US one. Countries whose patent applications are more likely to be successful in the US are more likely to be successful in other countries as well. These findings confirm that inventors respond to increased likelihood of success at the patent office by filing more applications, but also confirm earlier findings that the surge in patenting in the US in the last two decades appears to be driven to a significant extent by an increase in the underlying invention rate.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @book{schacht2006patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent reform: Issues in the biomedical and software industries},
| |
| − | author={Schacht, W.H.},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={Congressional Research Service (7 April 2006), available at:< http://sharp. sefora. org/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/rl33367. pdf},
| |
| − | filename={Schacht (2006) - Patent Reform Issues In The Biomedical And Software Industries.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | PolicyReport: Patent reform (rpt for congress)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Concerns have been expressed in the academic community that the propensity
| |
| − | to patent and the extensive use of cross licensing has resulted in a “patent thicket”
| |
| − | where ownership of patent title is used to block others from innovating. According
| |
| − | to Bessen and Hunt, “This may have increased the attractiveness of a strategy that
| |
| − | emphasizes patent rights over a strategy based on R&D.”61 However, other experts
| |
| − | maintain that this might not be a true assessment of the situation. In an article for the
| |
| − | Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, David Evans and Anne Layne-Farrar argue
| |
| − | it is not clear that a patent thicket exists. “Other industries with longstanding histories
| |
| − | of patenting could be categorized as having cumulative and sequential R&D, yet they
| |
| − | do not display signs of innovation gridlock.”62 There are additional ways to prevent
| |
| − | the use of patents to block innovation including the use of pro-competitive patent
| |
| − | pools and antitrust enforcement.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{scheffman2003twenty,
| |
| − | title={Twenty years of raising rivals' costs: History, assessment, and future},
| |
| − | author={Scheffman, D.T. and Higgins, R.S.},
| |
| − | journal={Geo. Mason L. Rev.},
| |
| − | volume={12},
| |
| − | pages={371},
| |
| − | year={2003},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Scheffman Higgins (2003) - Twenty Years Of Raising Rivals Costs History Assessment And Future.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Raising rival's cost
| |
| − |
| |
| − | More difficult to reach are what appear to be anti-consumer (but may
| |
| − | be more difficult to reach as anticompetitive) activities by “patent vultures,”
| |
| − | and the use of patent thickets (sometimes combined with high stakes
| |
| − | (for the defendant) actions at the International Trade Commission)
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{schmalensee2009standard,
| |
| − | title={Standard-Setting, Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy},
| |
| − | author={Schmalensee, R.},
| |
| − | journal={The Journal of Industrial Economics},
| |
| − | volume={57},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={526--552},
| |
| − | year={2009},
| |
| − | publisher={Wiley Online Library},
| |
| − | filename={Schmalensee (2009) - Standard Setting Innovation Specialists And Competition Policy.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Standard setting
| |
| − |
| |
| − | To the extent that patent policy inflates the number of patents that must be licensed in order to practice a standard, it contributes to what has beecalled a ‘patent thicket’ through which standard-setting must pass. This clearly complicates
| |
| − | 3
| |
| − | standard-setting and may make standards less socially valuable.10 As my concern here is with antitrust policy, however, I will treat patent policy as given.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | One might argue that the rate of innovation or at least of patenting is in fact too high in some sectors, particularly those in which the patent thicket problem is severe. A problem 26
| |
| − | with this argument is that the returns to major innovations would be reduced by collective negotiation, not just the returns to the minor advances that contribute more to patent thickets than to real progress. Alternatively, one could contend that in many industries the probability that any given innovation will be involved in standard-setting is low enough that the general use of collective negotiation in standard-setting would not have a major impact on the expected returns to innovation. This argument does not seem persuasive in the IT/communications sector, however, where standard-setting is of central importance.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{schmidt2007negotiating,
| |
| − | title={Negotiating the RNAi patent thicket},
| |
| − | author={Schmidt, C.},
| |
| − | journal={Nature biotechnology},
| |
| − | volume={25},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={273--280},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | publisher={New York, NY: Nature Pub. Co., 1996-},
| |
| − | filename={Schmidt (2007) - Negotiating The Rnai Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Biology: Thicket due to a single firm in RNA interference?
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Currently based in San Francisco, Sirna spent
| |
| − | its recent past accumulating one of the broadest
| |
| − | RNAi patent estates in existence. Merck now
| |
| − | owns that estate, and all the uncertainty that
| |
| − | comes with it. As a Nobel-prize winning technology,
| |
| − | RNAi could become biotech’s third act,
| |
| − | after gene cloning and monoclonal antibodies.
| |
| − | But no one can say whether it will ever bring
| |
| − | useful drugs to market.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{schmidt2008complementary,
| |
| − | title={Complementary Patents and Market Structure},
| |
| − | author={Schmidt, K.},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7005},
| |
| − | filename={Schmidt (2008) - Complementary Patents And Market Structure.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Model of complementary patent problems
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Thus, if a downstream firm wants to produce goods that are based
| |
| − | on the standard it requires access to each of the essential patents. All the patents are perfect
| |
| − | complements. Therefore each of the upstream IP holders has monopoly power over the
| |
| − | downstream market. This “patent thicket” (Shapiro, 2001) gives rise to a complements
| |
| − | problem: each patent holder does not internalize the negative external effect on the revenues
| |
| − | of the other patent holders when setting his royalties, so the sum of all royalties will be
| |
| − | inefficiently high. In addition, there is a vertical double marginalization problem if firms on
| |
| − | the downstream market have market power. These externalities affect not only the prices
| |
| − | charged downstream, they also affect the incentives to enter the downstream market with new
| |
| − | product varieties and to develop new technology that improves the quality of the standard.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{schneider2008fences,
| |
| − | title={Fences and competition in patent races},
| |
| − | author={Schneider, C.},
| |
| − | journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
| |
| − | volume={26},
| |
| − | number={6},
| |
| − | pages={1348--1364},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Schneider (2008) - Fences And Competition In Patent Races.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Fencing with substitutes
| |
| − |
| |
| − | This paper studies the behaviour of ?rms facing the decision to cre-
| |
| − | ate a patent fence, de?ned as a portfolio of substitute patents. We set
| |
| − | up a patent race model, where ?rms can decide either to patent their
| |
| − | inventions, or to rely on secrecy. It is shown that ?rms build patent
| |
| − | fences, when the duopoly pro?ts net of R&D costs are positive. We
| |
| − | also demonstrate that in this context, a ?rm will rely on secrecy when
| |
| − | the speed of discovery of the subsequent invention is high compared
| |
| − | to the competitor?s. Furthermore, we compare the model under the
| |
| − | First-to-Invent and First-to-File legal rules. Finally, we analyze the
| |
| − | welfare implications of patent fences.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | However, ?rms patent for di¤erent reasons in ?discrete? product
| |
| − | industries, in which an invention can be protected by a limited number of
| |
| − | patents and in ?complex?product industries, where a single patent is not
| |
| − | enough to protect an invention. More precisely, ?rms will patent a coherent
| |
| − | group of inventions, which form what is sometimes called a patent "bulk",
| |
| − | aimed at protecting one product. The "bulk" can either be a "fence" of
| |
| − | substitute patents or a "thicket" of complementary patents (see Reitzig, 2004
| |
| − | and Cohen et al., 2000).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | While the issue of "thickets" of complementary technologies in cumula-
| |
| − | tive innovations has been extensively analyzed2, as well as the institutional
| |
| − | solutions to overcome this problem (Lerner and Tirole, 2005 and Shapiro,
| |
| − | 2001), little attention has been paid to fencing patents so far.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{shand2007trends,
| |
| − | title={Trends in intellectual property and nanotechnology: implications for the global south},
| |
| − | author={Shand, H. and Wetter, K.J.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of Intellectual Property Rights},
| |
| − | volume={12},
| |
| − | pages={111--117},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | filename={Shand Wetter (2007) - Trends In Intellectual Property And Nanotechnology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: nanotech
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Not copyable. Not good either - no support for argument that there is a thicket and it is a problem.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{sharrott2006intellectual,
| |
| − | title={Intellectual Property Developments in Biochip Nanotechology},
| |
| − | author={Sharrott, D. and Sayeed, H.A.},
| |
| − | journal={Nanotech. L. \& Bus.},
| |
| − | volume={3},
| |
| − | pages={20},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Sharrott Sayeed (2006) - Intellectual Property Developments In Biochip Nanotechology.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: thicket in DNA microarrays (some nanotech genetic thingies)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | When the
| |
| − | National Institutes of Health applied for the first EST patents in 1991, the possibility arose that such
| |
| − | patents could overlap with and possibly invalidate later patents directed toward fully-sequenced,
| |
| − | expressed genes.8 Commentators describe this proliferation of overlapping patents as a potential “patent
| |
| − | thicket”—a tangle of intellectual property rights through which companies must cut to bring new
| |
| − | technologies to market.9 In the thicket, scientists and corporations might be forced to renegotiate
| |
| − | constantly for the right to exercise any individual gene patent, or to use commercial products obtained
| |
| − | from that gene.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Until recently, the most significant IP concern about biochips involved the patentability of expressed
| |
| − | sequence tags
| |
| − |
| |
| − | On September 7, 2005, the Federal Circuit signaled its agreement with the PTO guidelines by
| |
| − | holding that ESTs are unpatentable because of a lack of specific and substantial utility.13 In re Fisher
| |
| − | involved an appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for an invention relating to ESTs
| |
| − | purified from maize plants. The Federal Circuit held that, absent clear identification of the related maize
| |
| − | plant genes, the claimed ESTs were not “researched and understood to the point of providing an
| |
| − | immediate, well-defined, real world benefit to the public meriting the grant of a patent.”14 The Court
| |
| − | majority was unmoved by the argument that ESTs could offer substantial utility as laboratory research
| |
| − | tools.15
| |
| − | In re Fisher marks a paradigm shift in biotechnology innovation. The Federal Circuit appears intent
| |
| − | on preventing patent thickets from taking root in genetic applications. How In re Fisher will affect
| |
| − | business growth and research and development in the microfluidics industry will be of intense interest to
| |
| − | investors in the coming months and years.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{serafino2007survey,
| |
| − | title={Survey of patent pools demonstrates variety of purposes and management structures},
| |
| − | author={Serafino, D.},
| |
| − | journal={Knowledge Ecology International. http://keionline. org/content/view/69/1},
| |
| − | year={2007},
| |
| − | filename={Serafino (2007) - Survey Of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety Of Purposes And Management Structures.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory and Empirics: Licensing to resolve the thicket
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In some high technology industries the process of research and development is comparable to
| |
| − | the continuous extension of a pyramid through the addition of new building blocks at the top
| |
| − | [Shapiro (2001)]. Here, the pyramid serves as a metaphor for the cumulativeness of scientific
| |
| − | research in complex product industries.1
| |
| − | Firms increasingly protect their contributions to this pyramid with patents. As a result
| |
| − | several high technology industries are now affected by a “patent thicket” [Heller and Eisenberg
| |
| − | (1998); Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Shapiro (2001)]. In a patent thicket many rival firms hold
| |
| − | patents protecting components of a single technology. Whenever a firm uses such a technology
| |
| − | it is vulnerable to hold up by firms holding blocking patents [Grindley and Teece (1997),
| |
| − | Jaffe (2000), Shapiro (2001)]. The threat posed by blocking patents frequently induces firms
| |
| − | to build up a large portfolio of patents. This creates a strong bargaining position for the firm
| |
| − | owning the portfolio in any disputes with rivals. In a patent thicket all firms face the prospect
| |
| − | of hold up and have strong incentives to patent, which perpetuates the patent thicket. Hold
| |
| − | up in a patent thicket may be resolved through licensing of blocking patents. Therefore, an
| |
| − | understanding of how licensing works in industries affected by patent thickets is increasingly
| |
| − | important.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @incollection{shapiro2001navigating,
| |
| − | title={Navigating the patent thicket: Cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting},
| |
| − | author={Shapiro, C.},
| |
| − | booktitle={Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1},
| |
| − | pages={119--150},
| |
| − | year={2001},
| |
| − | publisher={MIT Press},
| |
| − | filename={Shapiro (2001) - Navigating The Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | CORE PAPER!!!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | REVIEW IT CAREFULLY (AGAIN)
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{shapiro2003antitrust,
| |
| − | title={Antitrust limits to patent settlements},
| |
| − | author={Shapiro, C.},
| |
| − | journal={RAND Journal of Economics},
| |
| − | pages={391--411},
| |
| − | year={2003},
| |
| − | publisher={JSTOR},
| |
| − | filename={Shapiro (2003) - Antitrust Limits To Patent Settlements.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patents, patent litigation, and patent settlements increasingly influence competition. Settlements
| |
| − | ofpatent disputesc ome in manyforms,i ncludingl icensing and cross-licensinga greementsp, atent
| |
| − | pools, mergers, and joint ventures. While frequently procompetitive, such settlements can stifle
| |
| − | competition and harm consumers. I propose a specific antitrust rule limiting such settlements: a
| |
| − | settlement must leave consumers at least as well off as they would have been from ongoing patent
| |
| − | litigation. After establishing that profitable settlements satisfying this constraint generally exist,
| |
| − | I show how this antitrust rule can be used to evaluate three types of settlements: mergers, patent
| |
| − | pools, and negotiated entry dates.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Making matters even more complex, many products can potentially infringe multiple patents. As
| |
| − | described in Shapiro (2001), more and more companies are facing a patent thicket requiring them
| |
| − | to obtain multiple licenses to bring their products safely to market.
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{siebert2006jostling,
| |
| − | title={Jostling for advantage: Licensing and entry into patent portfolio races},
| |
| − | author={Siebert, R. and Von Graevenitz, G.},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={CEPR Discussion Paper},
| |
| − | filename={Siebert VonGraevenitz (2006) - Jostling For Advantage Licensing And Entry Into Patent Portfolio Races.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Licensing and entry in a thicket CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Licensing in a patent thicket allows firms to either avoid or resolve hold-up. Firms’ R&D
| |
| − | incentives depend on whether they license ex ante or ex post. We develop a model of a
| |
| − | patent portfolio race, which allows for endogenous R&D efforts, to study firms’ choice
| |
| − | between ex ante and ex post licensing. The model shows that firms’ relationships in product
| |
| − | markets and technology space jointly determine the type of licensing contract chosen.
| |
| − | In particular, product market competitors are more likely to avoid patent portfolio races,
| |
| − | since the threat of hold-up increases. On the other hand, more valuable technologies are
| |
| − | more likely to give rise to patent portfolio races. We also discuss the welfare implications
| |
| − | of these results.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Rival firms, in complex product industries, are often owners of complementary assets.1 Therefore,
| |
| − | firms in these industries are more frequently forced to license technologies from each
| |
| − | other than rival firms in other industries. Increasingly, rival firms in complex product industries
| |
| − | protect these component technologies with patents [Hall (2004)]. It is, therefore, likely
| |
| − | that ownership of technologies underlying a complex product is highly dispersed and a “patent
| |
| − | thicket” emerges [Heller and Eisenberg (1998); Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Shapiro (2001)].
| |
| − | Firms caught in a patent thicket must cooperate by licensing technologies, otherwise mutual
| |
| − | blocking of technological improvements is likely and competition degenerates into litigation.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{siebert2008does,
| |
| − | title={Does Licensing Resolve Hold Up in the Patent Thicket?},
| |
| − | author={Siebert, R. and Graevenitz, G.},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | filename={Siebert Graevenitz (2008) - Does Licensing Resolve Hold Up In The Patent Thicket.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Empirical: Licensing and thickets CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In a patent thicket licensing provides a mechanism to either avoid or resolve hold up.
| |
| − | We study the choice between ex ante licensing to avoid hold up and ex post licensing
| |
| − | to resolve it. Firms’ choice of licensing contract is studied in the context of a patent
| |
| − | portfolio race. We show that high expected blocking leads to ex ante licensing while ex
| |
| − | post licensing arises if expected blocking is low but realized blocking is high. Also, ex
| |
| − | ante licensing reduces firms’ R&D incentives. A sample selection model of licensing is
| |
| − | derived from the theoretical model. In this framework theoretical predictions on effects
| |
| − | of blocking are tested with data from the semiconductor industry. We show that licensing
| |
| − | helps firms to resolve blocking. However, licensing is not a cure all: it decreases as
| |
| − | fragmentation of property rights increases and arises mainly between large firms with
| |
| − | similar market shares. Using a treatment effects model we also confirm the prediction
| |
| − | that ex ante licensing reduces the level of R&D investment.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Firms increasingly protect their contributions to this pyramid with patents. As a result
| |
| − | several high technology industries are now affected by a “patent thicket” [Heller and Eisenberg
| |
| − | (1998); Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Shapiro (2001)]. In a patent thicket many rival firms hold
| |
| − | patents protecting components of a single technology. Whenever a firm uses such a technology
| |
| − | it is vulnerable to hold up by firms holding blocking patents [Grindley and Teece (1997),
| |
| − | Jaffe (2000), Shapiro (2001)]. The threat posed by blocking patents frequently induces firms
| |
| − | to build up a large portfolio of patents. This creates a strong bargaining position for the firm
| |
| − | owning the portfolio in any disputes with rivals. In a patent thicket all firms face the prospect
| |
| − | of hold up and have strong incentives to patent, which perpetuates the patent thicket. Hold
| |
| − | up in a patent thicket may be resolved through licensing of blocking patents. Therefore, an
| |
| − | understanding of how licensing works in industries affected by patent thickets is increasingly
| |
| − | important.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Our results indicate that licensing in the semiconductor industry is undertaken primarily
| |
| − | by larger and more symmetric pairs of firms. We show that licensing choices made by such
| |
| − | firms is consistent with a model of patent portfolio races in which licensing guarantees freedom
| |
| − | to operate. This contrasts with existing models of licensing which focus on technology
| |
| − | 35
| |
| − | exchange and or attempts to affect the intensity of product market competition [Scotchmer
| |
| − | (2004), Shapiro (2003a)]. We also show that licensing ex ante, before R&D investments are
| |
| − | made allows firms to reduce the levels of patenting. This finding further supports the patent
| |
| − | portfolio race model of patenting in the semiconductor industry.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Finally, we find that the fragmentation
| |
| − | of patent rights reduces firms’ propensity to license ex ante and ex post. Thus a deepening of
| |
| − | 36
| |
| − | patent thickets resulting from more complex blocking relationships seems to undermine the
| |
| − | usefulness of licensing to resolve blocking.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Worryingly our results also indicate that licensing becomes less important as patent
| |
| − | ownership becomes more fragmented.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{siebert2010licensing,
| |
| − | title={Licensing in the Patent Thicket-Timing and Benefits},
| |
| − | author={Siebert, R.B. and Von Graevenitz, G.},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | filename={Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Licensing In The Patent Thicket Timing And Benefits.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory and empirics: licensing in thickets
| |
| − |
| |
| − | CORE PAPER. Seems a combination of two of the above.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Licensing can be a solution for hold-up in patent thickets. In this paper we study whether
| |
| − | licensing is an effective solution for hold-up. To do this we distinguish between ex ante
| |
| − | and ex post licensing. A theoretical model shows that firms’ expectations of blocking in
| |
| − | a patent thicket determine whether they license ex ante while ex post licensing arises if
| |
| − | expected blocking was low but realized blocking turns out to be high. It can also be shown
| |
| − | that ex ante licensing will allow firms to reduce their patenting efforts. A sample selection
| |
| − | model of licensing is derived from the theoretical model. Applying this to data from the
| |
| − | semiconductor industry we show that licensing does help firms to resolve blocking. However,
| |
| − | the probability of observing licensing decreases as fragmentation of property rights
| |
| − | increases and arises mainly between large firms with similar market shares. Licensing
| |
| − | experience is also an important determinant of licensing. As expected ex ante licensing
| |
| − | allows firms to reduce the level of patenting.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In a patent thicket many firms hold patents protecting components of a single technology.
| |
| − | Whenever a firm uses such a technology it is vulnerable to hold-up by firms holding blocking
| |
| − | patents (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Shapiro, 2001). The threat posed by blocking patents
| |
| − | frequently induces firms to build large patent portfolios in costly patent portfolio races. These
| |
| − | bolster firms’ bargaining positions in disputes with rivals (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Lemley,
| |
| − | 2001). Patent thickets undermine the proper functioning of patent systems: they raise costs of
| |
| − | using complex technology and increase incentives to acquire marginal patents.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | These results imply that licensing has important benefits for large firms in the semiconductor
| |
| − | industry. Ex ante licensing reduces competitive pressure and the intensity of patent
| |
| − | portfolio races if firms expect blocking to be high. As the theoretical model indicates, these
| |
| − | are precisely the settings in which the pressure to patent is greatest. Ex post licensing allows
| |
| − | firms at least to exchange blocking patents in settings in which patent portfolio races are less
| |
| − | intense. Our results show clearly that ability to license is an acquired skill that helps firms
| |
| − | regulate the intensity of competition for patents. This is especially true for ex ante licensing.
| |
| − | Worryingly, our results also indicate that licensing becomes less important as patent ownership
| |
| − | becomes more fragmented.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{siebert2010jostling,
| |
| − | title={Jostling for advantage or not: Choosing between patent portfolio races and ex ante licensing},
| |
| − | author={Siebert, R. and Von Graevenitz, G.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of economic behavior \& organization},
| |
| − | volume={73},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | pages={225--245},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Siebert VonGraevenitz (2010) - Jostling For Advantage Or Not.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory and empirics: licensing in thickets
| |
| − |
| |
| − | CORE PAPER. Seems a combination of two of the above.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Complex high technology industries are increasingly affected by patent thickets in which
| |
| − | firms’ patents mutually block the use of important technologies. Firms facing patent thickets
| |
| − | patent intensively to acquire bargaining chips and use licensing to ensure freedom
| |
| − | to operate. Such licensing allows rivals to either avoid or resolve hold-up from blocking
| |
| − | patents. R&D incentives depend on whether licensing takes place ex ante or ex post. We
| |
| − | model the choice between ex ante licensing and entry into patent portfolio races leading to
| |
| − | ex post licensing. It is shown that higher degrees of blocking lead firms to license ex post,
| |
| − | while stronger product market competition leads firms to license ex ante. Empirical results
| |
| − | support these theoretical predictions.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A patent thicket consists of complementary patents related to one technology. The patents in a patent
| |
| − | thicket belong to many rival firms. In the absence of cross-licensing agreements, or patent pools, use of the technology is
| |
| − | blocked.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{somaya2003strategic,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Strategic Determinants of Decisions Not to Settle Patent Litigation},
| |
| − | author = {Somaya, Deepak},
| |
| − | journal = {Strategic Management Journal},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {24},
| |
| − | number = {1},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {Jan., 2003},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 17-38},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/20060509},
| |
| − | ISSN = {01432095},
| |
| − | abstract = {Settlement outcomes in patent litigation are modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by firms with their patented technologies. Hypotheses are derived for two types of influences: the use of patents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their 'defensive' role in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Parameter estimates from a sample selection probit model provide support for the strategic stakes hypotheses, while the evidence for mutual hold-up is inconclusive. Interindustry comparisons show that nonsettlement of patent suits in both research medicines and computers is increased by strategic stakes and, in addition, mutual hold-up appears to play an important role in computer patent suits.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2003},
| |
| − | publisher = {Wiley},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Wiley},
| |
| − | filename={Somaya (2003) - Strategic Determinants Of Decisions Not To Settle Patent Litigation.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ/Mgmt: ICT and Biotech: When to settle suits
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Settlement outcomes in patent litigation are modeled as resulting from strategies pursued by firms
| |
| − | with their patented technologies. Hypotheses are derived for two types of influences: the use of
| |
| − | patents as isolating mechanisms to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their 'defensive
| |
| − | 'role
| |
| − | in obtaining access to external technologies through mutual hold-up. Parameter estimates from
| |
| − | a sample selection probit model provide support for the strategic stakes hypotheses, while the
| |
| − | evidence for mutual hold-up is inconclusive. Interindustry comparisons show that nonsettlement
| |
| − | of patent suits in both research medicines and computers is increased by strategic stakes and, in
| |
| − | addition, mutual hold-up appears to play an important role in computer patent suits. Copyright
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Computer suits are much more likely to
| |
| − | include more than one patent, consistent with
| |
| − | the perception that individual computer patents
| |
| − | are much less effective at blocking rivals (Cohen
| |
| − | et al., 2000), and that thickets of patents may
| |
| − | be required instead. Patent challenges (suits filed
| |
| − | by the nonpatentee) are somewhat more common
| |
| − | in research medicines, but the difference is
| |
| − | not significant. Consistent with the settlement
| |
| − | inducing role of mutual hold-up in systems
| |
| − | product industries (Hypothesis 4b), computer
| |
| − | suits in the sample are more likely (8%) than
| |
| − | research medicine suits (1.5%) to be a part of
| |
| − | counter-suits between rivals in litigation.10
| |
| − |
| |
| − | When strong,
| |
| − | watertight patents are available, as in pharma
| |
| − | ceuticals, firms may be able to rely on them
| |
| − | to isolate key commercial opportunities (Merges,
| |
| − | 1998). On the other hand, in systems products
| |
| − | industries, thickets of patents may be necessary
| |
| − | to foil attempts to invent around the patent, and
| |
| − | obtain a robust patent position. Moreover, defen
| |
| − | sive patenting?the building of large patent port
| |
| − | folios?may become necessary if rivals, aided by a
| |
| − | strong enforcement regime, are able to effectively
| |
| − | threaten to hold up a firm's commercial operations
| |
| − | (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{somaya2011innovation,
| |
| − | title={Innovation in Multi-Invention Contexts: Mapping Solutions to Technological and Intellectual Property Complexity},
| |
| − | author={Somaya, D. and Teece, D. and Wakeman, S.},
| |
| − | journal={California Management Review},
| |
| − | volume={53},
| |
| − | number={4},
| |
| − | pages={47--79},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | publisher={JSTOR},
| |
| − | filename={Somaya Teece Wakeman (2011) - Innovation In Multi Invention Contexts.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Mgmt: Firm Strategy in response to thickets etc.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Scholars such as Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Carl
| |
| − | Shapiro, and others have drawn attention—arguably too much attention—to
| |
| − | the transactional problems created for innovators by such dispersed ownership
| |
| − | and the density (or so-called thickets) of patents.58 Less attention has been paid
| |
| − | by those authors to the equally important role of patents for supporting innovation
| |
| − | in multi-invention settings. Innovators and entrepreneurs are often among
| |
| − | the most enthusiastic supporters of the patent system because they perceive it as
| |
| − | providing safeguards from misappropriation of their inventions.59 Research has
| |
| − | also shown that innovators are often able to devise “working solutions” to navigate
| |
| − | patent access concerns, and that patents may in turn be crucial for enabling
| |
| − | transactions in technology.60
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{sternitzke2008visualizing,
| |
| − | title={Visualizing patent statistics by means of social network analysis tools},
| |
| − | author={Sternitzke, C. and Bartkowski, A. and Schramm, R.},
| |
| − | journal={World Patent Information},
| |
| − | volume={30},
| |
| − | number={2},
| |
| − | pages={115--131},
| |
| − | year={2008},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Sternitzke Bartkowski Schramm (2008) - Visualizing Patent Statistics By Means Of Social Network Analysis Tools.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Networks: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The present paper reviews the literature on social network analysis with applications to bibliometric data, and in particular, patent
| |
| − | information. Several approaches of network analysis are conducted in the field of optoelectronics to exemplify the power of network
| |
| − | analysis tools. Cooperation networks between inventors and applicants are illustrated, emphasizing bibliometric measures such as activity,
| |
| − | citation frequency, etc. as well as network theoretical measures, e.g. centrality or betweenness. In this context it is found that inventors
| |
| − | who serve as interfaces or links between different inventor groups apply for technologically broader patents, hence, benefiting from
| |
| − | their access to different knowledge through their position. Furthermore, citation networks of patent documents as well as patent applicants
| |
| − | were drawn. Here, patent thickets could be identified. The position of applicants within citation networks seems to be useful in
| |
| − | explaining behaviour of the applicants in the marketplace, such as cooperation or patent infringement trials.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | On the second level, key patents, characterized by a high
| |
| − | citation frequency within a network, and their relationship
| |
| − | to other patents can be identified more easily. It was
| |
| − | showed that such analyses can be deployed to identify patent
| |
| − | thickets [9]. When inventors or patent applicants are
| |
| − | considered as nodes within a network, it can be demonstrated
| |
| − | to what extent they build upon each others knowledge.
| |
| − | Closeness between two nodes in a network signifies
| |
| − | that they are technologically related. If, for instance, two
| |
| − | applicants are situated closely together, and they do not
| |
| − | cooperate, then they should be engaged in a high level of
| |
| − | technological competition. However, if they cooperate,
| |
| − | then it seems rather that they jointly develop new technology,
| |
| − | using complementary competencies. To calculate the
| |
| − | citation ties between applicants to better assess technological
| |
| − | competitiveness between these players, two approaches
| |
| − | are chosen:
| |
| − | (i) Simple counts, i.e. if applicant A cited six patent families
| |
| − | from applicant B, then six citations are counted.
| |
| − | (ii) Multiple citation counts, i.e. if applicant A cited six
| |
| − | patent families from applicant B, but if each patent
| |
| − | family was cited twice (e.g. from two different patent
| |
| − | families of applicant A) then twelve citations are
| |
| − | counted. This approach should deliver more exact
| |
| − | results than the former.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{strandburg2006law,
| |
| − | title={Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the ``Patent Explosion"},
| |
| − | author={Strandburg, K.J.},
| |
| − | journal={bepress Legal Series},
| |
| − | pages={1617},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={bepress},
| |
| − | filename={Strandburg (2006) - Law And The Science Of Networks.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law/Econ: Citations measures description (good). CORE PAPER, also useful for OTHER research
| |
| − |
| |
| − | At the same time, developments in the law, including the establishment of a
| |
| − | single appellate court -- the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals -- to hear the vast majority
| |
| − | of patent appeals in the United States, have led to debate as to whether the legal system is
| |
| − | becoming increasingly “patent-friendly;” whether patents are being issued for lower
| |
| − | quality innovations; and whether the legal rights awarded to patentees are becoming
| |
| − | stronger.52
| |
| − |
| |
| − | There are dire predictions of a patent “thicket,”65 in
| |
| − | which technological progress is made increasingly difficult by the need to negotiate
| |
| − | multiple levels of “blocking patent” rights on each of the many patented components
| |
| − | which may be needed to produce a new commercial product.66 One way to avoid a
| |
| − | potential thicket is for competing patent holders to negotiate cross-licenses or “patent
| |
| − | pools.” Such agreements between competitors raise concerns about collusion, however,
| |
| − | and the societal ramifications depend upon the extent to which cross-licensing lowers
| |
| − | barriers to the use of complementary technologies (as opposed to allowing competitors to
| |
| − | avoid competition from substitute technologies).67
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patents and their citations form a directed network (meaning that citations go
| |
| − | from later patents to earlier patents and not in the opposite direction) in which patents are
| |
| − | the network “nodes” and citations are directed “links.” Citations convey valuable
| |
| − | information about the relationships between the technologies covered by the citing and
| |
| − | cited patents. The patent citation network thus can be viewed as a kind of map of the
| |
| − | space of patented technology, indicating the relationships between various pieces of
| |
| − | “property” in that space.77 As discussed in Part III.B, the evolution of the network may
| |
| − | help to illuminate whether patents are being awarded for more trivial technological steps.
| |
| − | While the precise significance of a patent citation varies, a citation sometimes
| |
| − | indicates that the claims of the cited patent encompass the claims of the citing patent and
| |
| − | that a “blocking patent” situation exists so that permission from both patent owners is
| |
| − | needed in order to use the invention claimed in the citing patent.
| |
| − | As will be discussed in
| |
| − | Part V, we believe it is likely that the structure of the patent citation “map” can be mined
| |
| − | for signatures of patent “thickets,” in which there is a high density of overlapping patent
| |
| − | claims, so as to test, for example, whether such “thickets” are increasingly prevalent in
| |
| − | the patent system.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | A high density of patents in a particular technological “niche” need not always
| |
| − | indicate a patent thicket, however. Closely related patented technologies may be
| |
| − | potential substitutes for one another -- creating something more like patent supermarkets
| |
| − | offering many nearly interchangeable options than patent thickets. If these patents are
| |
| − | separately owned, competition between patent holders will reduce licensing fees and the
| |
| − | issue of hold-up will not arise.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Setting aside some technical issues about how to
| |
| − | compare citation densities from different sized network samples, citation density is a
| |
| − | useful way to assess the level of technological interrelatedness in a particular field.124
| |
| − | Density alone cannot distinguish between patent thickets and patent supermarkets, in
| |
| − | which closely related technologies compete for licensing “customers,” however. The
| |
| − | mere existence of a citation from one patent to another cannot tell us which scenario is
| |
| − | most likely. Determining the meaning of a particular citation is an extremely laborintensive
| |
| − | process requiring understanding of the legal and technical relationship between
| |
| − | the citing and cited patents. To investigate the existence of patent thickets and the
| |
| − | potential for related antitrust problems, some structural metric that is sensitive to the
| |
| − | character of a citation is highly desirable. It may be possible to design such a metric
| |
| − | based on transitivity concepts.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{taylor2003american,
| |
| − | title={American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change},
| |
| − | author={Taylor, M.R. and Cayford, J.},
| |
| − | journal={Harv. JL \& Tech.},
| |
| − | volume={17},
| |
| − | pages={321},
| |
| − | year={2003},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Taylor Cayford (2003) - American Patent Policy Biotechnology And African Agriculture.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Effect of thickets on biotech for developing nations
| |
| − |
| |
| − | According to one commentator writing about biotechnology
| |
| − | patents in the pharmaceutical field, “[w]ith cumulative
| |
| − | innovation and multiple blocking patents, stronger patent rights can
| |
| − | have the perverse effect of stifling, not encouraging, innovation.”71
| |
| − |
| |
| − | (“PTO”) have created what some call a “patent
| |
| − | thicket” around biotechnology and how the PTO’s pro-patent culture
| |
| − | affects the proliferation of patents. We then identify policies affecting
| |
| − | access to patented technology and U.S. foreign policy on patents,
| |
| − | which may have more long-term impact on access to biotechnology in
| |
| − | developing countries than the PTO’s domestic patenting practices
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{tullis2005application,
| |
| − | title={Application of the Government License Defense to Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research: The Case for a Limited Patent Compulsory Licensing Regime},
| |
| − | author={Tullis, T.K.},
| |
| − | journal={UCLA L. Rev.},
| |
| − | volume={53},
| |
| − | pages={279},
| |
| − | year={2005},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Tullis (2005) - Application Of The Government License Defense To Federally Funded Nanotechnology Research.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Policy Discussion: Solve thicket in nanotech using the Gov. License Defence.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | GOVERNMENT LICENSE DEFENSE
| |
| − | IN FEDERALLY FUNDED NANOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Unfortunately, the rush to secure worldwide intellectual property
| |
| − | rights in nanotechnology could lead to the development of a "patent
| |
| − | thicket." This term, coined by intellectual property scholars, refers to an
| |
| − | overlapping set of patent rights that requires researchers, inventors, and
| |
| − | entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize new technologies to obtain licenses
| |
| − | from multiple patentees. 5 The development of such a patent thicket could
| |
| − | deter further innovation, 6 and the active enforcement by nanotechnology
| |
| − | patent holders of their exclusivity rights ultimately could result in the creation
| |
| − | of a nanotechnology anticommons-a situation in which a scarce
| |
| − | resource becomes prone to underuse because there are too many owners
| |
| − | holding the right to exclude others from that resource, and no one has an
| |
| − | effective privilege of use.'
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{turner2011patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent Thickets, Trolls and Unproductive Entrepreneurship},
| |
| − | author={Turner, J.},
| |
| − | journal={Trolls and Unproductive Entrepreneurship (October 1, 2011)},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | filename={Turner (2011) - Patent Thickets Trolls And Unproductive Entrepreneurship.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: Theory: Model of endogeneous thickets with trolls
| |
| − |
| |
| − | I introduce and analyze an equilibrium model of invention, patenting and infringement under
| |
| − | monopolistic competition. Profitable use of inventions requires adaptation to complementary
| |
| − | technologies. With patents, a thicket of conflicting rights emerges and costly infringements
| |
| − | occur. This taxes invention and lowers welfare. When an inventor may be a “troll”—patent
| |
| − | without inventing—the rate of invention falls further. Intuitively, some trolls would invent if
| |
| − | it were impossible to be a troll. More technology is patented with trolls, so the thicket grows
| |
| − | and welfare falls. Being a troll is unprofitable unless a critical mass of inventions, made by
| |
| − | other firms, exists.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Patents grant their owners (“patentees”) the right to exclude others from using their
| |
| − | inventions. When multiple patents cover complementary components of a given technology,
| |
| − | a common contemporary phenomenon (Heller and Eisenberg 1998), multiple owners can
| |
| − | exclude each other from using the technology. Hence, producers often must navigate a
| |
| − | “thicket” of conflicting rights just to use their own inventions
| |
| − |
| |
| − | My monopolistic competition model lets firms’ decisions of whether to invest in new
| |
| − | input technology and whether to patent both determine and depend on the endogenous rate
| |
| − | of invention and patenting in the economy. This enables study of how the complementarity
| |
| − | of technology affects incentives to invent both directly and through influencing the rate of
| |
| − | patenting. I show that an increase in input complementarity lowers equilibrium invention,
| |
| − | and typically raises the rate of patenting, by both increasing dispute costs paid and by
| |
| − | increasing the payoff to would-be patentees. This predicts that troll behavior should be
| |
| − | most harmful in industries where input complementarities are greatest.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{ukipo2011patentthickets,
| |
| − | title={Patent Thickets: An overview},
| |
| − | author={Intellectual Property Office Patent Informatics Team},
| |
| − | journal={UK Intellectual Property Office},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | filename={UKIPO (2011) - Patent Thickets An Overview.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Policy Report: CORE PAPER - Includes lit, terms and industry analysis and more
| |
| − |
| |
| − | The phrase “patent thicket” is a descriptive term which highlights issues that new entrants to a market may face when attempting to innovate within, or enter into, a technology space having existing intellectual property rights. The most generally used definition of a thicket is that coined by Shapiro:
| |
| − | “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology”
| |
| − | Equal weighting is given to fragmented technological areas (areas where there are large numbers of small patent holdings), or areas where there are small numbers of large players with large patent holdings, each of which creates a thicket that any entrants into the area will have to negotiate in order to be able to operate.
| |
| − | There is no clear consensus on terms used to describe patent thickets and the entities involved with them. If these terms were applied consistently, further debate on any issues could be conducted on a level playing field. Any change in policy associated with patent thickets should be carefully considered for its potential impact across different technology landscapes.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{vanoverwalle2010turning,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Turning Patent Swords into Shares},
| |
| − | author = {Van Overwalle, Geertrui},
| |
| − | journal = {Science},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {330},
| |
| − | number = {6011},
| |
| − | series = {New Series},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {17 December 2010},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 1630-1631},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40964338},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00368075},
| |
| − | abstract = {},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2010},
| |
| − | publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2010 American Association for the Advancement of Science},
| |
| − | filename={VanOverwalle (2010) - Turning Patent Swords Into Shares.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | SciencePolicy: genes and thickets 2pgs.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Problems arise when “patent thickets” (a web
| |
| − | of overlapping patents through which a company
| |
| − | must “hack” in order to commercialize
| |
| − | a technology) emerge ( 12). Accumulation, or
| |
| − | “stacking,” of royalties that have to be paid
| |
| − | when confronted with a patent thicket may
| |
| − | lead to a “tragedy of the anti-commons” ( 13),
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{van2006clearing,
| |
| − | title={A clearing house for diagnostic testing: the solution to ensure access to and use of patented genetic inventions?},
| |
| − | author={Van Zimmeren, E. and Verbeure, B. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, G.},
| |
| − | journal={Bulletin of the World Health Organization},
| |
| − | volume={84},
| |
| − | number={5},
| |
| − | pages={352--359},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={SciELO Public Health},
| |
| − | filename={VanZimmeren (2006) - A Clearing House For Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | WHO Bulletin: 8 pages. Advocates clearing houses
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Abstract In genetic diagnostics, the emergence of a so-called “patent thicket” is imminent. Such an overlapping set of patent
| |
| − | rights may have restrictive effects on further research and development of diagnostic tests, and the provision of clinical diagnostic
| |
| − | services. Currently, two models that may facilitate access to and use of patented genetic inventions are attracting much debate in
| |
| − | various national and international fora: patent pools and clearing houses. In this article, we explore the concept of clearing houses.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{verbeure2006patent,
| |
| − | title={Patent pools and diagnostic testing},
| |
| − | author={Verbeure, B. and van Zimmeren, E. and Matthijs, G. and Van Overwalle, G.},
| |
| − | journal={TRENDS in Biotechnology},
| |
| − | volume={24},
| |
| − | number={3},
| |
| − | pages={115--120},
| |
| − | year={2006},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={Verbeure (2006) - Patent Pools And Diagnostic Testing.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Biology: 6pgs. Advocates Pools for diagnostic testing
| |
| − |
| |
| − | There is increasing concern that overlapping patents in
| |
| − | the field of genetics will create a costly and legally
| |
| − | complex situation known as a patent thicket, which,
| |
| − | along with the associated issues of accumulating
| |
| − | royalty payments, can act as a disincentive for
| |
| − | innovation.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{von2011measure,
| |
| − | title={How to measure patent thickets -- A novel approach},
| |
| − | author={Von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S. and Harhoff, D.},
| |
| − | journal={Economics Letters},
| |
| − | volume={111},
| |
| − | number={1},
| |
| − | pages={6--9},
| |
| − | year={2011},
| |
| − | publisher={Elsevier},
| |
| − | filename={VonGraevenitz Wagner Harhoff (2011) - How To Measure Patent Thickets A Novel Approach.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: CORE PAPER!
| |
| − |
| |
| − | 2007). These patent explosions have had particularly
| |
| − | strong impact on technologies characterized by modular design and
| |
| − | high complexity of products such as electronics and semiconductors.
| |
| − | The combination of complex technology and high volume patenting
| |
| − | creates patent thickets, which can be defined as dense webs of
| |
| − | overlapping patent rights (Shapiro, 2001).
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{von2012incidence,
| |
| − | title={Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets-The Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity},
| |
| − | author={von Graevenitz, G. and Wagner, S. and Harhoff, D.},
| |
| − | journal={Journal of Industrial Economics},
| |
| − | year={2012},
| |
| − | filename={vonGraevenitz (2012) - Incidence And Growth Of Patent Thickets.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: CORE PAPER
| |
| − |
| |
| − | fragmentation index has predominantly been studied in complex industries (Ziedonis, 2004,
| |
| − | Schankerman and Noel, 2006) where increasing fragmentation raises firms’ patent applications.
| |
| − | This is attributed to firms’ efforts to reduce potential hold-up by opportunistic patentees
| |
| − | owning critical or blocking patent rights – a situation which is associated with the existence of
| |
| − | patent thickets. This index does not measure hold-up potential as precisely as the complexity
| |
| − | measure we discuss above.
| |
| − | The complexity measure combines information on actual blocking relationships within
| |
| − | technological opportunities which the fragmentation index does not.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{wagner2003information,
| |
| − | jstor_articletype = {research-article},
| |
| − | title = {Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control},
| |
| − | author = {Wagner, R. Polk},
| |
| − | journal = {Columbia Law Review},
| |
| − | jstor_issuetitle = {},
| |
| − | volume = {103},
| |
| − | number = {4},
| |
| − | jstor_formatteddate = {May, 2003},
| |
| − | pages = {pp. 995-1034},
| |
| − | url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123783},
| |
| − | ISSN = {00101958},
| |
| − | abstract = {This Essay challenges a central tenet of the recent criticism of intellectual property rights: the suggestion that the control conferred by such rights is detrimental to the continued flourishing of a public domain of ideas and information. In this Essay, Professor Wagner argues that such theories understate the significance of the intangible nature of information, and thus overlook the contribution that even perfectly controlled intellectual creations make to the public domain. In addition, this Essay shows that perfect control of propertized information--an animating assumption in much of the contemporary criticism--is both counterfactual and likely to remain so. These findings suggest that increasing the appropriability of information goods is likely to increase, rather than diminish, the quantity of "open" information. Further, the benefits of control in fostering coordination and enabling flexibility in arrangements are essential elements of promoting progress in a changing world.},
| |
| − | language = {English},
| |
| − | year = {2003},
| |
| − | publisher = {Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.},
| |
| − | copyright = {Copyright © 2003 Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.},
| |
| − | filename={Wagner (2003) - Information Wants To Be Free.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Theory/Discussion: Don't worry about the 'control' aspect, information will be free anyway
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Contemporary criticism of intellectual property rights is notable for
| |
| − | its clear focus on the control inherent in the system of government-extended
| |
| − | grants of exclusivity-in particular the assertion that such control
| |
| − | is in tension with the development of a public domain of information.2
| |
| − | This development is (and has been) both intellectually and rhetorically
| |
| − | significant. Intellectually, by emphasizing the effects of control, these
| |
| − | critics can support intellectual property generally, yet condemn it specifically,
| |
| − | where the pernicious side effects of the mechanism are seen. In a
| |
| − | way, this approach seems to have largely transcended the more abstract
| |
| − | question of whether intellectual property is a socially useful tool, and focused
| |
| − | our attention on the specifics.3 Rhetorically, an entire vocabulary
| |
| − | has been built to support this line of argument. Control-talk is of "the
| |
| − | second enclosure movement,"4 the lurking "tragedy of the anticom-
| |
| − | mons,"5 or the dangers of "patent thickets"6 -not to mention the phenomenon
| |
| − | of litigation efforts (or perhaps social movements?) sporting
| |
| − | their own slogans (and logos), such as "Free the Mouse," "Create Like It's
| |
| − | 1790," or "When Copyright Attacks."7
| |
| − |
| |
| − | This Essay challenges a major tenet of this control-criticism: the
| |
| − | claim that control will reduce the availability of information in the public
| |
| − | domain.8 The core contention here is that the critics understate-perhaps
| |
| − | dramatically-the contribution that even "perfect" control of intellectual
| |
| − | creations makes to the public domain, just as they overstate the
| |
| − | current and potential effectiveness of this control. Combining this understanding
| |
| − | with the dynamic incentive-effects of intellectual property
| |
| − | rights suggests that such rights (even in strong forms) are likely to increase
| |
| − | the content of the public domain rather than decrease it. Thus,
| |
| − | while there are perhaps other reasons to limit the scope and enforceability
| |
| − | of intellectual property rights, concern about the withering of the public
| |
| − | domain seems not to be one of them.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Notwithstanding
| |
| − | efforts to the contrary, information cannot truly be controlled, at least
| |
| − | not in the way that the control-critics suggest. That is, the "fencing" of
| |
| − | information is a remarkably futile proposition; the control we offer owners
| |
| − | of intellectual property rights is simply not the control we offer landowners.
| |
| − | It should not be, but more importantly, it cannot be. It turns out
| |
| − | that information does "want to be free."' 4 Understanding that this is the
| |
| − | great strength of intellectual property, as well as the great challenge, offers
| |
| − | a new perspective on the function of control and the benefits of
| |
| − | strong intellectual property rights.'5
| |
| − |
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{wang2010rise,
| |
| − | title={Rise of the patent intermediaries},
| |
| − | author={Wang, A.W.},
| |
| − | journal={Berkeley Tech. LJ},
| |
| − | volume={25},
| |
| − | pages={159},
| |
| − | year={2010},
| |
| − | publisher={HeinOnline},
| |
| − | filename={Wang (2010) - Rise Of The Patent Intermediaries.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Law: Intermediaries as a solution to thickets
| |
| − |
| |
| − | In this age
| |
| − | of patent thickets,60 an organization must tread carefully lest it infringe
| |
| − | countless patents just by doing business,61 and an aggregate license to a large
| |
| − | cluster of patents in the appropriate field of technology can provide peace
| |
| − | of mind. Moreover, an aggregate license lowers the search costs for a
| |
| − | member company planning to embark on a plan of research and
| |
| − | development in a particular field. Defensive aggregation services strive for
| |
| − | complete adoption by all players in the market and the resulting obsolescence
| |
| − | of expenditures on patent searches and license negotiations. Though this
| |
| − | scenario may never actually come to pass, companies are likely to have great
| |
| − | interest in partnering with an entity able to bring them closer to this ideal.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | @article{ziedonis2004don,
| |
| − | title={Don't fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent acquisition strategies of firms},
| |
| − | author={Ziedonis, R.H.},
| |
| − | journal={Management Science},
| |
| − | volume={50},
| |
| − | number={6},
| |
| − | pages={804--820},
| |
| − | year={2004},
| |
| − | publisher={INFORMS},
| |
| − | filename={Ziedonis (2004) - Dont Fence Me In.pdf}
| |
| − | }
| |
| − |
| |
| − | Econ: CORE PAPER!!!
| |
