Hall Ziedonis (2007) - An Empirical Analysis Of Patent Litigation In The Semiconductor Industry
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| Has article title | An Empirical Analysis Of Patent Litigation In The Semiconductor Industry |
| Has author | Hall Ziedonis |
| Has year | 2007 |
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Reference
- Hall, Bronwyn H and Ziedonis, Rosemarie (2007), "An empirical analysis of patent litigation in the semiconductor industry", University of California at Berkeley working paper
@article{hall2007empirical,
title={An empirical analysis of patent litigation in the semiconductor industry},
author={Hall, Bronwyn H and Ziedonis, Rosemarie},
journal={University of California at Berkeley working paper},
year={2007},
publisher={Citeseer},
abstract={Semiconductor firms sell products that embed hundreds if not thousands of patented inventions, elevating concerns about patent-related hold-up in this sector. This paper examines the incidence and nature of patent lawsuits involving 136 dedicated U.S. semiconductor firms between 1973 and 2001. By supplementing patent litigation data with information drawn from archival sources, we estimate the probability that firms will be involved in patent lawsuits, either as enforcers of exclusionary rights or as targets of litigation filed by other patent owners. We further distinguish between disputes that involve product-market rivals and those that do not. Overall, we find little evidence that semiconductor firms have adopted a more aggressive stance towards patent enforcement since the 1970s, despite the effective strengthening of U.S. patent rights in the 1980s and widespread entry by small firms. In fact, their litigation rate as enforcers of patents remains relatively stable over the past two decades once we control for factors such as the number of patents they own and changes in R&D spending. In striking contrast, we find an escalation in their baseline risk as targets of litigation brought by outside patent owners.},
discipline={Econ},
research_type={Empirical, Discussion},
industry={Semiconductor},
thicket_stance={Assumed Pro},
thicket_stance_extract={The conclusion is that semiconductor firms behave like other firms in thickets industries with respect to their own litigation, but compared to other thickets industries, as targets their size and their large sunk technology costs make them look more like firms in chemicals.},
thicket_def={#A, Complementary Inputs, Diversely-Held, Hold-up},
thicket_def_extract={If there is an innovation tax arising from patents, it is expected to be especially salient in sectors where products are complex and combine many patentable technologies that may be owned by a number of different parties. As suggested by a number of researchers (e.g., see Grindley and Teece 1997) and as shown by Arora et al. (2003), Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sectors, including semiconductors, are likely to fall in this class of sectors. Such firms typically require access to a thicket of external intellectual property to advance technology or to legally manufacture and sell products, elevating concerns about patent-related hold-up problems.},
tags={},
filename={Hall Ziedonis (2007) - An Empirical Analysis Of Patent Litigation In The Semiconductor Industry.pdf}
}
File(s)
Abstract
Semiconductor firms sell products that embed hundreds if not thousands of patented inventions, elevating concerns about patent-related hold-up in this sector. This paper examines the incidence and nature of patent lawsuits involving 136 dedicated U.S. semiconductor firms between 1973 and 2001. By supplementing patent litigation data with information drawn from archival sources, we estimate the probability that firms will be involved in patent lawsuits, either as enforcers of exclusionary rights or as targets of litigation filed by other patent owners. We further distinguish between disputes that involve product-market rivals and those that do not. Overall, we find little evidence that semiconductor firms have adopted a more aggressive stance towards patent enforcement since the 1970s, despite the effective strengthening of U.S. patent rights in the 1980s and widespread entry by small firms. In fact, their litigation rate as enforcers of patents remains relatively stable over the past two decades once we control for factors such as the number of patents they own and changes in R&D spending. In striking contrast, we find an escalation in their baseline risk as targets of litigation brought by outside patent owners.
