Difference between revisions of "Dessein (2002) - Authority And Communication In Organizations"

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(New page: ==Reference(s)== Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?s...)
 
 
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Return to [[BPP Field Exam Papers 2012]]
 
==Reference(s)==
 
==Reference(s)==
 
Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]
 
Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28200210%2969%3A4%3C811%3AAACIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E link] [http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Dessein%20(2002)%20-%20Authority%20and%20Communication%20in%20Organizations.pdf pdf]

Latest revision as of 19:14, 29 September 2020

Article
Has bibtex key
Has article title Authority And Communication In Organizations
Has author Dessein
Has year 2002
In journal
In volume
In number
Has pages
Has publisher
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Return to BPP Field Exam Papers 2012

Reference(s)

Dessein, Wouter (2002), "Authority and Communication in Organizations", The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 69, No. 4. (Oct.), pp. 811-838. link pdf

Abstract

We analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers. We insist on features that are relevantfor informational intermediation via the Internet: the presence of indirect network externalities, the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries, and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users' identity and on usage. Efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium, as well as some specific form of inefficient structures. Intermediaries have incentives to propose non-exclusive services, as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power We analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation service providers.