Difference between revisions of "Becker Stigler (1974) - Law Enforcement Malfeasance And The Compensation Of Enforcers"

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Revision as of 13:05, 29 September 2020

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© edegan.com, 2016

Reference(s)

Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3, 1-19. pdf

Abstract

No abstract available at this time

Topic and Basic ideas

A government is designing a wage scheme to deter corruption in a two period game. The government can choose a period 1 and period 2 wage. The benefit of bribing is [math]b[/math] and the probability of being caught is [math]p[/math].

Authors solve for optimal wages to deter bribing. Note that this can be costly, but recouped by using entrance fees.